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Introduction
Rousseau touched the hearts of a great many people who felt the author spoke 
directly to them.1 Yet the reputation of his works is dogged by their perceived 
contradictions.  Rousseau vehemently rejected such charges, even as he admitted to 
the paradoxical nature of his thought.  If the temperamental author had his way, 
readers would surely follow the fictional Frenchman’s lead in his Dialogues and 
recognize his oeuvres as “things that were profoundly thought out, forming a coherent 
system which might not be true but which offered nothing contradictory.”2
Rousseau’s insistent claims notwithstanding, his writings strike inharmonious chords.  
Of these, perhaps none rings more awkwardly than his simultaneous embrace of 
religiosity and secularism.
Writing as if attuned to the means of salvation, Rousseau incorporated both 
Christian and Pagan traditions within a vision of strong democratic citizenship and 
corporeal improvement.  How did these competing influences unfold as a model of 
practicable reform?  Was their synthesis compelling?  Or even coherent?  What might 
we make of Rousseau’s religious conviction, and its relation to civic harmony and 
political virtue?  And for a thinker so obviously concerned with secular affairs, why 
was religion necessary to his thought?
1 See: Robert Darnton, “Readers Respond to Rousseau: The Fabrication of Romantic Sensitivity,” in 
The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History. (New York: Basic Books, 
1983).
2 In claiming both that his works “offered nothing contradictory” and that paradox was “necessary” to 
his thought, Rousseau forced a crucial distinction between paradox and inconsistency discussed in 
Chapter 2 above.  Dialogues.  CW I.209; OC I.930.
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Because Rousseau’s writings are rife with paradoxes and antinomies, answers 
do not come easily.  Indeed, his efforts have conspicuously divided audiences.  In 
Rousseau’s own age, Frederick the Great believed that the Genevan’s moral rigor was 
matched only by his saint-like self-castigation.3  Yet the Archduke Christophe de 
Beaumont derided him as a dangerous heretic, the living epitome of Saint Paul’s 
prophecy of “perilous days” destined to cloud mankind’s future.4  To most—his 
friends, foes, and intellectual peers alike—Rousseau was a rabble-rouser cut of 
Diogenes the Cynic’s abrasive cloth.  Yet to himself, he was one of the last few true 
Christians, believers who followed the gospel of Christ rather than the Church’s 
dictates.
Was Jean-Jacques pious or profane, a disciple of Jesus or a radical Pagan 
upstart?  Evidence suggests that each of these descriptions bears some measure of 
truth.  Deeply engaged with the corporeal world as critic and reformer, he drew a 
paradoxical faith in the capacity for human redemption from a heterodox assumption 
of man’s natural goodness.  Applying virulent social criticism to an optimistic vision 
of political reform, he rose to fame as a demonstrative recluse—a thinker ill-at-ease in 
the society to whose improvement he was so deeply committed.  Such engagement 
reflects wholly secular concerns, yet Rousseau’s work also betrayed strong 
religiosity.  His faith in human innocence rested upon a self-professed love of divine 
order and the natural world of God’s creation.  From his very first Discourse, to the 
Vicar’s Profession, to the final Reveries, Rousseau urged us to follow the principles 
3 For a detailed discussion of Frederick’s claim, see Chapter 4 below.
4 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.3.  Beaumont’s Biblical reference is to 2 Timothy 3:1-4, 8.
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of virtue “engraved in all hearts”  and revealed through the God-given conscience 
from which socialized man had alienated himself.
One of his epoch’s most virulent anti-Clericalists, Rousseau nonetheless 
embraced religion as a necessary foundation for individual and collective 
improvement.  Yet his vision of piety rested upon a Pelagian heresy, a claim of 
ontological innocence that was itself colored by a profound mistrust of human 
society.  A self-designated recluse, he expressed personal distaste for social 
obligation, duty and convention.  A champion of cohesive communities, he found 
peace only in solitude, alone amongst nature while lost in his passionate reveries.  
Perhaps the greatest social critic of his age, he staked his career—and following his 
motto,5 his very life—on a mission of public service: pursuing the truth and revealing 
it to his peers.  Yet this secular calling was itself the fruit borne of a spiritual 
conversion, an epiphany that changed his life on the road to Vincennes.
Such are the beds of Rousseau’s making, and the conspicuously strange 
bedfellows he conjured.  Taken together, his skepticism of men (as social creatures 
infected with amour-propre) and faith in man (en générale, as creations of God 
endowed with conscience) appear to be incompatible.  Rousseau’s sunny view of 
human nature seems ill-fitted with his belief in Divine order and an afterlife, two 
concepts traditionally used to literally instill the fear of God in the descendents of 
Adam.   His acute distrust of formal religion only complicates matters.  If man is 
good and religion is necessary, yet men have grown as wicked and corrupt as 
religious institutions, can we honestly hope for improvement?  What concrete lesson 
5 Namely, Vitam impendere vero (Dedicate life to truth).  For a more thorough examination of 
Rousseau’s motto see Chapter 2 below.
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might we draw from these inchoate conclusions?  Can such a dissonant theory 
materialize in practice?
Again, Rousseau’s readers harbored strong doubts.  Even those who 
appreciated his work have wished aloud that the Genevan abandon his dialectic 
approach for a more singular methodology and agenda.  If only Rousseau had chosen 
a more righteous path unencumbered by earthly affairs, perhaps he would have 
survived the Enlightenment as one of the world’s great martyrs, a figure deified 
without irony or scorn.  Infighting with the philosophes, repentant success, 
hypersensitivity over his reputation and legacy, and eventual exile only heightened 
his discomfort and fueled his critics; yet he never relinquished his burdensome 
commitment to corporeal reform.  
Rousseau was, after all, equally enamored with spiritual and secular 
improvement.  To abandon one would have been to destroy the provocative dialectic 
that makes his thought so compelling.  Had he convincingly renounced his ties to the 
world, the questions that now confront us would be irrelevant.  He would not have 
struggled to envision religious associations compatible with liberal democratic 
principles of tolerance, equality and strong citizenship.  He would not, in other words, 
have formulated his theory of Civil Religion.
Civil Religion is a nexus of Rousseau’s earthly and otherworldly concerns.  
One of his most widely-disparaged writings, this attempt to found a “purely civil 
faith” (a term which itself testifies to his confluence of spiritual and secular values) 
marked a culminating point in Rousseau’s life-consuming quest to foster religious 
and political reform.  In it, we find an author struggling to apply his faith to practice, 
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to reconcile his dour view of the world as it was with his dream of society as it should 
be.6  In the end, was he successful?  Were his apparently competing influences and 
aims irreconcilable?  Or does Rousseau offer a powerful lens through which to 
reconsider the relationship between religion and politics?
*   *   *   *   *
Readers may yet ask, why another book about Rousseau?  Although the topic 
of his religiosity has been long-studied, I believe it could be better studied.  After all, 
the most thorough and widely-acclaimed writings are both aged and unavailable in 
English: P.-M. Masson and William Cuendet wrote nearly one century ago, while 
comparable works from renowned scholars such as Robert Dérathe and Pierre 
Burgelin date from the middle of the twentieth-century.7
To be fair, contemporary authors have expanded upon these pioneering 
efforts.  James Miller and Helena Rosenblatt discussed Rousseau’s relationship to 
Protestantism in illuminating the significance of his Swiss heritage.8  In Not By 
Reason Alone, Joshua Mitchell explored the influence of Christian and Protestant 
6 This is, of course, a reference to The Social Contract’s opening lines: “I want to inquire whether there 
can be a legitimate and reliable rule of administration in the civil order, taking men as they are and 
laws as they can be.”  As we will see, this dialectic between realism and idealism is central to 
Rousseau’s religious and political thought alike.  The Social Contract.  CW IV.131; OC III.351. (My 
emphasis.)
7 See: Pierre-Maurice Masson, La Religion de J. J. Rousseau, Vols. I-III. (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 
1916); William Cuendet, La Philosophie religieuse de Jean-Jacques Rousseau et ses sources. (Geneva: 
A. Jullien, 1913); Robert Dérathe, Le rationalisme de Jean-Jacques Rousseau. (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1948); Pierre Burgelin, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la religion de Genève. 
(Geneva: Éditions Labor et Fides, 1962).
8 See: James Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); 
Helena Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva: From the First discourse to the Social Contract, 1749-
1762. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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authors upon his thought.9  Ann Hartle’s eloquent work, The Modern Self in 
Rousseau’s Confessions,10 analyzed the Augustinian elements within his model of 
self-discovery, a connection likewise detailed by Christopher Brooke11 and 
Christopher Kelly.12  Victor Gourevitch13 drew attention to Rousseau’s providential 
description of “nature,” while Ronald Grimsley14 expounded upon his Biblical 
concept of redemption.  And Patrick Riley’s well-documented The General Will 
Before Rousseau illustrated the Malebranchian influence upon his concept of 
voluntarism, while charting the general will’s movement from a divine to a civic 
emphasis.15
Despite the breadth and depth of such scholarship, however, rarely is 
Rousseau’s religion considered as a keystone to his political vision, and a crucial 
linkage which unites his entire oeuvres.16  Quite the contrary, far more effort has been 
9 Mitchell goes so far as to claim that “Rousseau and Luther embark on identical projects” of social 
criticism.  Joshua Mitchell, Not By Reason Alone: Religion, History and Identity in Early Modern 
Political Thought. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993).
10 See: Ann Hartle, The Modern Self in Rousseau’s Confessions: A Reply to Saint Augustine. (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).
11 Christopher Brooke, “Rousseau’s Political Philosophy: Stoic and Augustinian Origins,” in Patrick 
Riley, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
12 Christopher Kelly, Rousseau’s Exemplary Life: The “Confessions” as Political Philosophy. (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
13 Victor Gourevitch, “The Religious Thought,” in Riley.
14 Ronald Grimsley, Rousseau and the Religious Quest. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).
15 Patrick Riley, The General Will Before Rousseau: The Transformation of the Divine into the Civic. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
16 Instead, scholars often look for ways to subvert or disprove Jean-Jacques’ claim of consistency.  The 
most compelling example of this approach is Judith Shklar’s Men and Citizens.  Shklar argued 
forcefully that Rousseau was a deeply pessimistic thinker whose vision of secular redemption—of 
cultivating men and citizens—was, by his own admission and example, fatally flawed.  With due 
respect, I believe that Shklar subverts his significant and sincere optimism (a value tied to his 
religiosity) by exaggerating the extent and implications of his pessimism.  Yet Rousseau’s writings did 
not fall into the category of philosophical speculation he so loathed; he meant his vision to be 
implemented in practice.  We should, however, note that not all authors follow Shklar’s skeptical lead.  
As much as anyone, Jean Starobinski struggled to identify the underlying coherence of Rousseau’s 
work.  In La transparence et l’obstacle, he noted the simultaneous piety and profanity that 
characterized the Genevan’s morality, without taking this as evidence of his inconsistency.  This work 
is therefore in part an attempt to flesh out Starobinski’s claim, to determine where exactly Rousseau’s 
opposed values coalesced within his singular vision of democratic virtue.  See: Judith N. Shklar, Men 
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made to use his concept of religion against him: to argue that his spiritual optimism is 
fundamentally incoherent and incompatible with his political vision; that his Civil 
Religion reveals a despotic, totalitarian temperament; and that his conversions from 
Protestantism to Catholicism back to Protestantism attest to his capricious nature.17
A fresh perspective is needed, one which defends Rousseau from these claims 
by clarifying the significance of his religiosity, particularly as it informs a coherent 
model of democratic virtue.  Towards this end, we will explore the Pagan and 
Christian traditions evident in concepts central to his life and writings; examine his 
more contentious theological beliefs, particularly his sorely overlooked Pelagianism, 
his proclamations of Christian faith, and his self-defense against the charges of heresy 
brought against Emile; and explore how his simultaneous piety and profanity shapes a 
compelling vision of political reform.
Drawing upon previous efforts, considerable space will be devoted to textual, 
historical, and biographical analysis.  We will also take seriously the abundant 
misgivings put forth by Rousseau’s critics, and broach the question of his consistency 
and coherence from the outset.  In addition to addressing oft-overlooked figures (both 
Pagan and Christian alike) crucial to fleshing out the complexity of his faith, we will 
also explore Rousseau’s more neglected writings: the many letters, fragments, and 
and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Thought. (London and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969); Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction. Arthur 
Goldhammer, tr. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988).  Originally published as Jean-
Jacques Rousseau: La transparence et l’obstacle suivi de Sept essais sur Rousseau. (Paris: Éditions 
Gallimard, 1971). 
17 See: J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. (London: Martin Secker & Warburg, 
Ltd., 1952); Lester G. Crocker, Rousseau’s Social Contract. (Cleveland: Press of Case Western 
Reserve University, 1968); Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1969); J. H. Huizinga, Rousseau: The Self Made Saint. (New York: Viking Press, 1976); Arthur 
M. Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau’s Thought. (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1990).
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minor works that supplement his (in)famous chapters On Civil Religion and the 
Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar.  Finally, we will examine Civil Religion as 
the practical realization of Rousseau’s religious and secular convictions, before 
concluding on the very path where he claimed his career began: the road to 
Vincennes, where a life-changing revelation pressed him to serve both God and man.
Although we begin by introducing politico-theological relations as a tension 
still-relevant (perhaps more than ever) to democratic theory, this is not a work of 
public policy.  It makes no claim to provide programmatic solutions to the 
contentious relationship between religion and politics, nor even explicitly apply 
Rousseau’s writings to contemporary problems.  Nor, for that matter, is it an attempt 
to draw linear relations between the Genevan and his Christian and Pagan forebears.  
It rather suggests that Rousseau offers valuable insight into the relationship between 
religion and politics; that his secular thought cannot be understood without reference 
to his views on religion; and that his connection to such disparate figures as 
Augustine and Pelagius, Diogenes and Saint Antony, Hobbes and Saint Paul, clarifies 
the roots, innovations, and implications of Rousseau’s peculiar18 faith.  By examining 
these inchoate influences, we may determine why Rousseau lauded religion yet was 
so critical of religious dogmatism; why he was condemned as a heretic, despite 
insisting upon his piety; and how his radical faith in man and God alike informed a 
distinctly political vision of virtue with decidedly religious undertones.  In the end, by 
reconciling Rousseau’s uncompromising amalgam of spiritual and secular traditions, 
18 According to The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1971), the term peculiar has two senses equally applicable to Rousseau’s faith: particular to him, 
and highly unusual.
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we will be poised not only to explain the necessity of religion to his thought, but also 
glean a coherent political lesson from its role in the path to civic virtue.
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Chapter 1: Strained Relations
On February 11, 1906, Pope Pius X unleashed an eloquent fury on the French 
government.  The object of his wrath was La Loi concernant la séparation des 
Églises et de l'État (December 9, 1905), which instituted a formal separation between 
church and state in France.  In an elaborate Encyclical entitled Vehementer Nos, Pius 
condemned the legislation on moral, political, practical and legal grounds, levying the 
following censure on behalf of the Vatican:
We do, by virtue of the supreme authority which God has confided to 
Us … reprove and condemn the law voted in France for the separation 
of Church and State, as deeply unjust to God whom it denies, and as 
laying down the principle that the Republic recognizes no cult.  We 
reprove and condemn it as violating the natural law, the law of nations, 
and fidelity to treaties; as contrary to the Divine constitution of the 
Church, to her essential rights and to her liberty; as destroying justice 
and trampling underfoot the rights of property which the Church has 
acquired by many titles and, in addition, by virtue of the Concordat.  
We reprove and condemn it as gravely offensive to the dignity of the 
Apostolic See, to Our own person, to the Episcopacy, and to the clergy 
and all the Catholics of France.  Therefore, We protest solemnly and 
with all Our strength against the introduction, the voting and the 
promulgation of this law, declaring that it can never be alleged against 
the imprescriptible rights of the Church.” (§13)19
Amongst his many specific charges, he concluded that French legislators were “guilty 
of a great injustice to God” (§3).  Evoking Augustine’s City of God, he argued that 
the separation sabotaged the state’s “ultimate object which is man’s eternal happiness 
after this short life shall have run its course.” (§3)  Such disregard “inflicts great 
injury on society itself, for it cannot either prosper or last long when due place is not 
19 All section numbers refer to: Vehementer Nos, Encyclical of Pope Pius X, promulgated on February 
11, 1906.  All quotes are taken from the official Vatican translation.
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left for religion, which is the supreme rule and the sovereign mistress in all questions 
touching the rights and the duties of men.” (§3)  The ruling betrayed a nation’s 
ungratefulness, as France had been “during the course of centuries the object of… 
great and special predilection on the part of the [Roman Catholic Church].” (§4)  It 
constituted a breach of international treaty law by unceremoniously revoking the 
bilateral Concordat between the Roman Pontiff and the French Government. (§5)  La 
Loi also subverted a Papal hierarchy rooted in both divine and natural law, placing 
“the Church under the domination of the civil power” (§7), and assigning “the 
administration and the supervision of public worship… to an association formed of 
laymen,” provisions which “seriously violate the rights of the Church, and are in 
opposition with her Divine constitution.” (§8)
Labeling the legislation “an event of the gravest import, and one that must be 
deplored by all the right-minded, for it is as disastrous to society as it is to religion,” 
Pius admitted that “it is an event which surprised nobody who has paid any attention 
to the religious policy followed in France of late years.” (§1)  Indeed, though La Loi 
stands as the legal foundation of France’s separation between church and state, its 
inception marked the culmination of a hundred-year movement towards strict 
secularism.  A process which began in 1792 during the short-lived First Republic, the 
subsequent century saw a series of legislation which instituted a civil code (1804) and 
civil marriage mandates (1810), abolished an 1814 law prohibiting work on Sundays 
and holidays (1880), and barred public prayers before parliamentary sessions (1884).  
During this period, France also secularized its schools and hospitals, enlisted clerics 
in military service, banished Catholic practices and emblems from all public 
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establishments, and removed religious references from its judicial oath.  The 1905 
law formally upheld the spirit of these measures, reasserting on no uncertain terms 
what had been a central theme of post-Jacobin politics: “La République assure la 
liberté de conscience.”20  The official separation of church and state, codified at the 
start of the twentieth century, was deemed essential to protecting this liberty.  By 
prohibiting federal support of religious institutions, the ruling broadly denounced 
preferential treatment towards any one particular faith; égalité, as much as liberté, 
was the law’s guiding spirit.
It was not without concern, then, that a debate of some consequence began in 
France in the early days of 2003.  On January 17, according to Le Monde, Secretary 
of State Pierre Bédier and government spokesman Jean-François Copé announced 
unequivocally that la Loi de 1905 was sorely in need of reform.21  The catalysts to 
this claim were the September 11, 2001 destruction of the World Trade Center, 
subsequent bombings conducted by the Al Qaeda network, and a correlative fear of 
future fundamentalist violence.  As justification for his proposal, Bédier drew an 
explicit connection between the dangers posed by Islamic extremism today and 
Catholicism one hundred years prior: “In 1905, the government thought that Catholics 
were anti-republican, and constituted a menace as such.  Today, Islam poses a similar 
problem.  It would be unrealistic to ignore this concern.”22
At heart of this debate are anxieties associated with the foreign financing of 
Muslim mosques.  Although la Loi explicitly prohibits public sponsorship of houses 
20 La Loi concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat, Article 1.  Promulgated on July 3, 1905
with 314 votes for, 233 against.
21 “Faut-il réviser la loi de séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat?” Le Monde, January 17, 2003.
22 Ibid., Le Monde, January 17, 2003.
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of worship (a practice sometimes circumvented by partitions which establish ‘non-
prayer’ areas), there is growing concern that mosques are financed by persons or 
organizations with terrorist ties or sympathies; that they might either serve as covert 
terrorist communities, or distribute laundered funds to extremist cells within France; 
and that state subsidization could effectively limit the amount of suspicious capital 
entering from abroad.  Alluding to both an “Islamic league” and unspecified Saudi 
sources as possible perpetrators, Bédier cited the need for “extreme vigilance” in 
regulating money arriving from ill-intentioned “foreign powers.”23  An “Islam of 
France,” he argued, must supplant “Islam in France”—the religion must be sponsored 
and regulated by the government, and not merely allowed to infiltrate the nation’s 
borders.24
Leaving aside the logic of this argument and the vagueness of its targets, the 
proposal is radical: the state must oversee the affairs of one specific creed.25  To 
monitor mosques and prevent the laundering of “terrorist” funds, France must first 
reform a hard-fought hallmark of its democracy (the strict separation of church and 
state).  To protect republican virtues, Bédier and Copé argue, they must revise a 
paradigmatic republican law.  Whereas in 1905 similar fears of Catholicism inspired a 
strict separation of church and state, misgivings about Muslimism are now prompting 
the French government to reconsider its abstention.
23 “Bédier souhaite un ‘islam de France’ et non plus un ‘islam en France.’” Agence France-Presse, 
January 23, 2003.
24 If Bédier’s distinction is not terribly clear, we might consider it in relation to Rousseau, who was a 
man in Paris but never considered himself a man of Paris.  Ibid. (My emphasis.)
25 It is worth noting that this charge takes issue with the church (or, more precisely, the Mosque), and 
not the religious practice itself.
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The seeds for such revisionism had already been planted five years prior, 
when, on October 7, 1998, the National Assembly unanimously approved Décret n° 
98-890.  The decree instituted mission interministérielle de lutte contre les sects 
(MILS), an interdepartmental effort which “incites public services to take, in respect 
of public liberties, appropriate measures to anticipate and combat sects who 
undermine personal human dignity or who threaten the public order.”26  Under the 
auspices of civic welfare—to “inform the public of the dangers posed by the sectarian 
phenomenon”—the French government established an agency to officially monitor 
religious factions.27
These are striking examples of a democratic nation rethinking the interstices 
of religion and politics, but not isolated ones.  On December 12, 2002, George W. 
Bush passed a unilateral Executive Order entitled “Equal Protection of the Laws for 
Faith-based and Community Organizations.”  This so-called “Faith-based initiative” 
entitled religious groups to receive federal tax dollars for “social service programs”—
those which provide “services directed at reducing poverty, improving opportunities 
for low-income children, revitalizing low-income communities, empowering low-
income families and low-income individuals to become self-sufficient, or otherwise 
26 “Décret n° 98-890 du 7 octobre 1998 instituant une mission interministérielle de lutte contre les 
sectes.” Taken from: Journal Officiel N° 234, du 9 Octobre 1998, page 15286.
27 Earlier in the same year, the United States passed the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 
“To express United States foreign policy with respect to, and to strengthen United States advocacy on 
behalf of, individuals persecuted in foreign countries on account of religion.”  According to the 
subsequent “International Religious Freedom Report of 2002” released by the Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor, religious groups in France “continued to be concerned about the possible 
impact of [recent] legislation passed,”  although “no overall change in the status of respect for religious 
freedom” was noted.  See: “International Religious Freedom Act of 1998” (H.R. 2431), and the U.S. 
Department of State “International Religious Freedom Report 2002: France.”
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helping people in need.”28  Immediately condemned by The New York Times as being 
“unconstitutional, and fundamentally unfair,” and running “counter to decades of 
First Amendment law, which holds that government dollars cannot be used to 
promote religion,” the initiative has nonetheless garnered support from citizens of all 
faiths who cite the growing need for spiritual guidance amongst charitable 
organizations.29
If the separation of church and state offers an essential foundation of a strong, 
pluralist democracy, then the new millennium has begun on an ominous note.  In very 
different manners and for very different reasons, two of the world’s leading 
democratic powers are redrawing the boundaries between secular and spiritual 
institutions.  In part, such revisionism is a sign of the times.  Since September 11, 
2001, ours has been a climate in which the ambiguous and ubiquitous use of the word 
“terrorist” has supplanted “communist” as this era’s primary antonym for democracy, 
and where terrorism is often conflated with Muslim fundamentalism.  Yet amidst this 
atmosphere of mistrust, western nations have increasingly embraced another creed—
Christianity—for guidance in social, moral, political, and educational reform.30  If 
France has deemed Islam a potential threat to republican order and “public liberties,” 
the United States has approached faith-based groups as heretofore neglected sources 
28 George W. Bush, “Equal Protection of the Laws for Faith-based and Community Organizations.” 
Executive Order 13279 of December 12, 2002.
29 “Using Tax Dollars for Churches.” The New York Times, December 30, 2002.
30 Shortly after the World Trade Center attacks, British Prime Minister Tony Blair proposed increasing 
state-funding for religious schools as part of a New Labour Party plan to reform secondary education.  
Although roughly 7,000 of Britain’s 25,000 schools already have religious affiliations, the measure 
was in part seen as a means of luring middle class families—an increasing number of whom send 
children to privately financed schools—back to the public sector.  More recently (in 2002), Polish 
president Aleksander Kwasniewski successfully solicited Pope John Paul II to raise public support for 
inclusion into the European Union, arguing that such an alliance would help to “restore Christian 
values in Western Europe.”  See: “Tony and the little children” (The Economist, December 6, 2001); 
“Preaching for the European Union” (The Economist, March 14, 2002).
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of “helping people in need.”  Whether guided by skeptical mistrust or philanthropic
idealism, such divergent positions and policies reveal a common conviction: 
democracies cannot ignore the civic significance (for better or worse) of religious 
associations.  Furthermore, in both instances (and no matter the motives) the end 
result is similar: democratic states are increasingly involved in religious affairs.
Given these turns of events, we may well ask: was Nietzsche wrong?  When 
the prophetic German foretold the death of God, when he heralded that “belief in the 
Christian god has become unbelievable,” had he spoken too soon?31  Ours is certainly 
an age of scientific rationalism and global capitalism, of a liberalism whose most 
visible ambassadors travel through television and film, music and internet lines.  Pat 
Buchanan’s infamous “Culture War” speech and his Republican National Convention 
address of 1992 were both offensive and vitriolic, but were they entirely far-
fetched?32  America does seem awash in the godless libertinism of popular culture; 
the nuclear family is a dying unit; we are increasingly tolerant, and do parade our 
sexual, ethnic and political diversity with pride rather than shame.
But ours is equally an age of religious resurgence, of Jihad and missionaries, 
of the sudden integration of church and state.  According to The Economist, 
Millenarianism—the fundamentalist “belief in the thousand-year reign of King 
Jesus”—has appealed to broader audiences since September 11, a rise evidenced by 
both its popularity amongst conservative radio station audiences, and the soaring sales 
31 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Walter Kaufmann, tr. (New York: Random House, Inc., 
1974),  §343, p. 279.
32 According to Buchanan, “There is a religious war going on in our country for the soul of America. It 
is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as was the Cold War itself.” See: 
Patrick J. Buchanan, “1992 Republican National Convention Speech” (August 17, 1992).  Similarly, in 
his speech entitled “The Cultural War for the Soul of America” (September 14, 1992), Buchanan asks: 
“Are we any longer ‘one nation under God,’ or has one-half of that nation already begun to secede 
from the other?”
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of the bestselling evangelical novel series “Left Behind” which molds a message of 
Old Testament fire-and-brimstone fury to isolationist politics.33  Even more centrally, 
membership in Christian churches exceeded two billion in the new millennium, a 
growth of roughly 1.2 billion over 30 years.34  In America alone, the number of 
Christians have risen by over 200 percent in the past 50 years (to 171 million); 
membership in churches of all faiths now comprises over 60 percent of the 
population, or roughly twice what it was in the mid-nineteenth century.  These 
circumstances should give us pause.  Has the “cheerfulness” Nietzsche saw in a 
Europe released from the shadow of God already begun to fade, in both the Continent 
and the New World?
Clearly, Nietzsche’s assertion is debatable now, just as it was when written.  
In 1885, three years following the publication of the first edition of The Gay 
Science,35 Pope Leo XIII described church-state relations in organic terms, arguing 
that “[t]here must … exist between these two powers a certain orderly connection, 
which may be compared to the union of the soul and body in man.”36  What the 
German reviled as a slavish specter haunting human livelihood, the Roman extolled 
as natural and necessary.  What Nietzsche attacked as systematic self-inurement, Leo 
XIII lauded as both physically and spiritually healthy.  Neither vision triumphed 
wholly.  The relationship between religious and political institutions is still hotly 
33 The first book alone (of this as yet nine-book series) has sold over 7 million copies to date. See: 
Lexington, “Behold the Rapture.” The Economist, August 22, 2002.
34 “The fight for God.” The Economist, December 19, 2002.
35 Nietzsche first writes of “the death of God” in The Gay Science, §108.  He also discusses this 
phenomenon in §343, as well as in Thus Spoke Zarathustra pp. 124f., 191, 202, 294, 371-379, 398f. in 
The Portable Nietzsche, Walter Kaufmann, tr. (New York: The Viking Press, 1954).
36 Immortale Dei, Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, promulgated on November 1, 1885.
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contested, particularly when drawing boundaries according to liberal democratic 
principles of neutrality and equality under law.
A tension clearly relevant to contemporary democratic discourse, less evident 
is how it may be resolved.  Perhaps religion generally is neither reducible to the 
philanthropic salvation central to Bush’s vision, nor the vengeful violence of 
fundamentalist terrorism.  Perhaps its relationship to democracy is significantly more 
complicated, and begs further examination, rather than the reactionary regulation and 
surveillance advocated by Bédier and Copé.  To arrive at a more nuanced assessment 
we might turn to a thinker whose beliefs encompassed both poles, one enamored with 
and mistrustful of religion’s relationship to the secular state, who identified spiritual 
faith as a cornerstone of civic morality, and spiritual associations as potentially 
divisive sources of intolerance and exclusion.  To better assess the relationship 
between religion and politics generally, and Christianity and democracy specifically, 
we might cast our gaze back to one of the first modern democrats, himself a 
Protestant:37 Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
*   *   *   *   *
It is within Rousseau that we find both piousness and profanity, a secular 
theodicy in which man (rather than God) bears the burdens of enacting his own 
salvation.  Standing at a pivotal crossroads in political thought, one where 
37 Although Rousseau was born a Protestant, he converted to Catholicism at the age of 16.  For 
Rousseau’s own account, see: The Confessions, CW V.38-40; OC I.45-47.  In The Reveries of the 
Solitary Walker (Third Promenade), Rousseau adds this: “Given into my own keeping while still a 
child and enticed by caresses, seduced by vanity, lured by hope, forced by necessity, I became a 
Catholic, but I always remained a Christian.”  CW IX.19; OC I.1013.  For Rousseau’s description of 
his rejoining the Protestant faith in 1754, see: CW V.329-330; OC I.392-393.
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Enlightenment philosophes challenged the theologism dominant since the age of 
Augustine, the Genevan straddled awkward lines indeed.  On one hand he was a 
compelling secularist, a prolific author who championed radical reform drawn 
according to democratic principles of liberty and equality.  Rousseau’s vision of 
legitimate sovereignty was rooted in the common will of citizens (rather than God), 
and supported by the primacy of positive law.  Yet he was also enraptured with an 
incomprehensibly harmonious divine order revealed in nature, and urged men to 
willfully follow their God-given conscience to live in greater accord with this 
heavenly example.
Incorporating both Christian and secular sources within a singular model of 
legitimate democratic governance, Rousseau illustrates one possible means of 
reconciling religion and politics.  Guided by a dual sense of past failings and future 
potential,38 he neither categorically dismissed nor blindly accepted the compatibility 
of corporeal and spiritual associations.  Indeed, despite arguing for their integration, 
Rousseau took seriously the premise that man’s earthly and otherworldly needs can 
be either mutually exclusive or mutually enriching; the choice, as he presents it, is 
entirely up to us.  Religion can serve as a shared source of moral duty, a means of 
unifying individuals and cultivating our natural sense of brotherly love.  It can also 
breed artificial divisions between people of different creeds, acting as a catalyst to the 
sectarianism and violent persecution so destructive of common welfare.  Religion can 
38 Elsewhere I describe this dual sense of past failings and future potential as pessimistic realism and 
heuristic idealism.  These two stances are two mutually constitutive within Rousseau’s work.  His deep 
dissatisfaction with the status quo pressed to him envision a better possible future, even as it forced 
him to recognize the difficulties in bringing about substantive change.  This phenomenon is 
particularly evident in his assessment of positive religion: Rousseau’s condemnation of Catholicism 
provided impetus for him to found a more virtuous, civil alternative.
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damn man to hell, and also nurture a sense of interdependence and faith in better 
times.  As with politics, it can adopt different forms, some legitimate, some coercive; 
some enriching, some self-destructive; some polarizing, some unifying.  If papist 
dogma presented an example of religion at its most harmful, Rousseau struggled to 
clarify the terms of a truly beneficial piety: one that cultivated reverence towards God 
and man, binding us to our fellows, community and Creator alike.
The faith upon which his vision rested was paradoxical in both senses of the 
word: it contradicted the commonly held truths of his age, and drew upon apparently 
incompatible beliefs in man’s intrinsic innocence and his capacity for wickedness.  
Directly refuting orthodox Roman Catholicism, Rousseau revived the Pelagian heresy 
that humankind was naturally good.  Yet this belief was qualified by his equally 
vociferous insistence upon man’s capacity for wickedness, a propensity evidenced by 
our well-documented history of decline.  His solution to the problem of theodicy39—
namely, the question of how evil can exist in a world created by an omnipotent 
God—forced us to consider salvation in secular terms, taking recourse in the very 
faculties and traits (willing, pride, perfectionism) that led us astray from our 
inherently pure natures.  Yet he never failed to remind men of their self-incurred 
failings, the degree to which they had strayed from their state of natural harmony.  
Rousseau’s theory of redemption was simultaneously informed by this pessimistic 
view of human history and optimistic assessment of human nature; if man had made a 
mess of society, he also possessed the capacity to correct his self-incurred failings.  
Unlike Augustine, for whom free will offered a moral test geared towards post-
39 To compare Rousseau’s views with those of Leibniz see: Theodicy I.7-8.  For Rousseau’s self-
distancing from Leibniz see: Letter to Philopolis.  CW III.129-130; OC III.232-234.
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mortem salvation (and thus comprised God’s gift to humankind), man replaced God 
as the facilitator of a salvation possible in this world and this lifetime.
However, far from absolving religion of a role in politics Rousseau 
appropriated Christian tropes to serve civic ends, through secular measures.  His 
portrait of human history evoked a fall of Biblical proportions, yet he framed the 
means of possible redemption in exclusively corporeal terms.40  In this, the Genevan’s 
formula stood in sharp contrast to his Christian voluntarist forebears.  Augustine 
understood divine forgiveness as the sole antidote to Adam’s debilitating legacy.  
Salvation, if at all possible, lay in God’s merciful grace; human lives were grueling 
trials of which conformity was the aim.  Life was best served by emulating, to the 
best of our meager human ability, a magnificent, unified divine will.  Luther and 
Calvin shared this sentiment, arguing that man had little recourse to alter his divinely-
determined fate.41  For Luther, the “false idea of ‘free-will’ is a real threat to 
salvation, and a delusion fraught with the most perilous consequences”—namely, the 
misguided premise that human agency influences divine redemption.42  Calvin 
likewise insisted that the human will was emphatically not free, meaning neither 
40 It can be argued that this is untrue of all of Rousseau’s works.  To wit, Julie and the Reveries seek 
solace to varying degrees (and for varying reasons) after life ends.  But even these aims are established 
after earthly remedies have apparently failed.  Transcendent post-mortem redemption is a last resort, 
rather than (as for Augustine) a guiding principle.  Although this tension will be examined in greater 
detail in later chapters, I will side here with Starobinski, who urges his readers to locate consistency in 
Jean-Jacques’ work.  Clearly, the bulk of the Genevan’s writings grapple with secular solutions to 
moral and political problems.
41 There are obviously crucial differences between Luther and Calvin, not least of which involves the 
latter’s emphasis upon the role of good works in gauging the possibility of election.  For the purposes 
of this introduction, however, they both fall under the broad rubric of Protestant voluntarism, under 
whose terms God alone affects salvation.
42 Martin Luther, “Bondage of the Will,” in Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings, John 
Dillenberger, tr. and ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 189.
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strictly autonomous nor capable of emulating a divine, omnipotent will.43  Salvation 
rested solely on the shoulders of God, whose will alone dictated an individual’s fate.
In breaking with this tradition, Rousseau understood our decline as a temporal 
crisis in need of earthly solutions.  The woeful state of human affairs—emblematized 
by the ironic “triumph” of science and reasoning over nature—was empirically 
demonstrable throughout history, evidenced by growing inequality and individual 
alienation from our harmonious, divine natures.  Rousseau’s ambivalent view of 
progress did not, however, cause him to categorically condemn humankind as 
inherently sinful.  Rather, modern society was the object of his scorn, a source of 
moral indeterminacy in need of a political balm.  Two thousand years prior, Socrates 
famously argued that men never knowingly commit evil: acts of ill-repute revealed 
ignorance more than malfeasance.44  As Ernst Cassirer rightly noted, eighteenth 
century thinkers clarified this sentiment, condemning “not ignorance as such, but 
ignorance which pretends to be truth and wants to pass for truth.”45  Self-delusion—
that which “inflicts the mortal wound on knowledge”—found its most egregious form 
in superstition.  Presaging Kant, who famously described enlightenment as “man’s 
43 See: John Calvin, On God and Political Duty, Second Revised Edition, John Allen and Benjamin B. 
Warfield, eds. (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1956); Institutes of the Christian 
Religion in Two Volumes, John T. McNeill, ed. and Ford Lewis Battles, tr. (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1960).
44 As Socrates argued in Timaeus (86d), “almost all those affections which are called by way of
reproach ‘incontinence in pleasure,’ as though the wicked acted voluntarily, are wrongly so 
reproached; for no one is voluntarily wicked.”  Similarly, he asserted in Protagoras (345d-345e) that 
“I am fairly certain that no wise man believes anyone sins willingly or willingly perpetrates any evil or 
base act.  They know very well that all evil or base action is involuntary.”  And finally, the Athenian 
argued in The Laws (731c-731d) that “no unjust man is ever voluntarily unjust.  For no one anywhere 
would ever voluntarily take the greatest evil into his most honorable possession and keep it for the rest 
of his life.  So the unjust man, like the man who possesses bad things, is pitiable in every way, and it is 
permissible to pity such a man when his illness is curable.”  See: Protagoras and Meno, W.K.C. 
Guthrie, tr. (New York: Penguin Books, 1956), pp. 80-81; The Laws of Plato, Thomas L. Pangle, tr. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 117.
45 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Fritz C. A. Koelln & James P. Pettegrove, trs. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 161.
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emergence from his self-incurred immaturity … [namely] the inability to use one’s 
own understanding without the guidance of another,” 46 Rousseau expounded upon 
this idea, arguing that doing good depends on knowing and actively pursuing the 
good, a goal realized through education, and fortification against the vain temptations 
cultivated by societal pressures.  Such practical wisdom was gleaned through sober 
assessment and individual effort, rather than revelation or divine intervention.47
Hobbes had also stayed the hand of God in arguing for a radical corporeal 
solution to the pressing problems of political instability and resultant (apolitical) 
anarchy.48  Yet whereas Jean-Jacques’ Social Contract promised virtuous rapture, the 
Englishman’s renunciation of individual will (to the Monarch’s authority) offered a 
more physical assurance: protection in a world torn asunder by the war of all against 
all.  Hobbesian psychology, rooted in a hedonistic physics of appetite and aversion, 
allowed little room for nuance much less transcendence.  His was a world-view in 
which crisis was a universal condition; humankind had little hope for stability beyond 
self-abrogating, strong-armed rule.  As Charles Taylor noted, Hobbes “thought of our 
world picture as almost literally put together out of building blocks—which were 
ultimately the sensations or ideas produced by experience.”49  By contrast, 
Rousseau’s puzzle was built of more awkward pieces: innocence and guilt, 
46 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” in Political Writings, 
Second Enlarged Edition, Hans Reiss, ed. and H.B. Nisbet, tr. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. 54.
47 As we will discuss, Rousseau also stressed the necessity of following our divinely-instilled 
conscience, although he recognized the acute difficulties this task posed to denatured, socialized 
creatures.
48 This statement follows the basic assumption of C.B. MacPherson, who saw in Hobbes’ “state of 
nature” a thinly-veiled description of Civil War-torn England.  See: The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 64-67.
49 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), p. 197.
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involvement and retreat, freedom and chains, individual liberty facilitated by 
conformity to divine order and corporeal sovereignty, historical decline and the 
possibility of secular salvation.50
Given Rousseau’s cacophonous terms, and the critical tone of his own 
exegeses, a specific problem confronts us from the outset: how can man claim purity 
of heart if history (and Jean-Jacques himself) suggest quite the opposite?  It is 
tempting to suppose that he cannot: the evidence weighs too heavily against him.  
Following Rousseau’s own account, society is of man’s making; amour propre and 
urbanity are perverse human predilections.  Given this assessment, Jean-Jacques’ 
insistence upon individual innocence seems inconsistent at best.  Redemption, after 
all, presupposes guilt.  One cannot rise again without having first fallen.  In the 
Christian tradition, the source of our guilt (free will) is axiomatic; in Rousseau’s 
analysis, blame is more ambiguous.  Although Jean-Jacques follows a Biblical 
narrative replete with innocence, corruption, and redemption, he insists throughout 
that individuals en générale are not culpable because we are not beholden to Adam’s 
sinful legacy.51  He adheres to an orthodox narrative of decline, while subverting the 
very foundations of Roman Catholic ontology.  Yet perhaps this tension is not as 
incoherent as it might appear.  Recalling Rousseau’s famous plea to forgive him of 
his paradoxes,52 the dialectic born of these competing visions serves a substantive 
purpose: it makes Rousseau’s visionary perfectionism remarkably compelling.  The 
50 As we will discuss, Rousseau also maintained his faith in eternal redemption.  Indeed, following his 
exile after the publication of Emile, he increasingly embraced the afterlife as a source of solace, a point 
when God (in contrast to his peers) would recognize and reward his goodness.
51 As we will examine in Chapters 2 and 3, this proved to be Rousseau’s most controversial paradox.
52 “Common readers, pardon me my paradoxes.  They are necessary when one reflects, and no matter 
what you might say, I prefer to be a man of paradoxes than a man of prejudices.”  OC IV.323; E 93.
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strength of his solution lies in its stubbornness, in its steadfast adherence to both 
Biblical form and secular means.  It is powerful precisely because it speaks of 
salvation, and identifies common man as catalytic agent.
Writing amidst an age of accelerated spiritual debauchery, of urbanization and 
cosmopolitan hubris, Rousseau finds redemption in the very faculties which have led 
humankind to stray from its sympathetic nature.  We can, the abbreviated lesson goes, 
save ourselves only by being true to ourselves: by redirecting our naturally pure wills, 
and recasting the objects of our desires.  A shepherd of sorts, Jean-Jacques challenges 
us to follow him in simply being, in cultivating our intrinsically virtuous natures on a 
moral and practical path towards earthly redemption.  Although we are good at heart, 
society has swayed our judgment and clouded our conscience.  We must therefore re-
educate ourselves, solidify our resolution with Spartan fortitude and forge a strong 
general will to combat the errant appetites of modern particularism.  More precisely, 
the means of existential improvement employ the very faculties (such as self-interest) 
which have perverted our natural goodness.  Man himself has strayed from a virtuous 
course, and man himself must right his own ship.  Prophetic punch combined with 
clear heresy: such is Rousseau’s attachment to and break from orthodox theological 
discourse, a dissonant rupture that begs clarification.
Examining the confluence of theological and secular sources in Rousseau’s 
work therefore serves three purposes.  First, it reveals which aspects of his philosophy
are Pagan in origin and which are indebted to earlier Christian traditions.  Second, it 
clarifies both the radical, paradoxical newness of Rousseau’s vision (how it departed 
from existent tradition and commonly held opinion) and the genuine connectedness 
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he shared with Christian voluntarism.53  And third, exploring these linkages offers a 
means of reassessing the relationship between spiritual and secular values.  Using 
Rousseau as a lens, we might revisit a “strong” model of democracy enriched and 
invigorated by its diverse roots, one that sacrifices neither earthly nor otherworldly 
welfare, balances a skeptical view of positive religion with an undying faith in divine 
order, and encourages us to move beyond the overly simplistic dichotomies that 
characterize discussions of the relationship between religion and politics.
Given these terms, this work is best understood as descriptive, restorative and 
argumentative.  Descriptive, in that it identifies Rousseau’s appropriation of both 
Christian and Pagan concepts of virtue.  Restorative, in that it involves—not unlike 
either Confessions—the recollection and attempted reconciliation of these divided 
(conceptual) histories.  And argumentative, in that it finds within Rousseau’s 
awkward alliance of conflicting traditions a compelling means of incorporating 
religion into the fabric of a virtuous democracy.
In l’Ancien régime et la révolution, Alexis de Tocqueville argued that the 
Jacobin “campaign against all forms of religion was merely incidental to the French 
Revolution, a spectacular but transient phenomenon, a brief reaction to the ideologies, 
emotions, and events which led up to it—but in no sense basic to its program.”54  This 
work is also, therefore, in part a rejoinder to the prescient Frenchman.  I use 
53 We may consequently read Rousseau not simply as a “modern” with “ancient” affinities, but as a 
complicated amalgam of competing philosophical, political, ontological and religious world-views.  
Allan Bloom famously disagreed.  As he argued, the “Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns” 
dominated philosophical discourse in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.  For Bloom, “[n]o 
issue is more important in the history of thought, and Rousseau emphatically takes the side of the 
ancients… at least so far as literature and morals are concerned.”  Although this conclusion is lacking 
in nuance, we might still accept his claim that “[n]o study of Rousseau can be serious which does not 
take seriously ‘The Quarrel.’” See: Bloom, Emile, p. 492 n. 86.
54 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Stuart Gilbert, tr. (New York: 
Anchor Books/Doubleday, 1955), pp. 5-6.
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“rejoinder” rather than “repudiation” because I agree with Tocqueville’s basic 
premise: the spirit of the French Revolution seemed rightly cosmopolitan, and 
aggressively agonistic; it aimed at the overhaul of humankind, a revision which 
heralded the death of obsolete hierarchies and mores, secular and spiritual institutions 
alike.  Yet l’Ancien régime errs in drawing a sharp distinction between supposedly 
enlightened, anarchistic, revolutionary upheaval and the attack of specific political 
and religious institutions.55
As Rousseau’s writings make plain, the political landscape of pre-
revolutionary France was dominated by papal interests.  Political reform required 
religious reform because the two authorities were so deeply linked.  Although 
Tocqueville concurred, in Democracy and America he also identified the New 
World’s religiosity as a primary source of its admirably fierce liberal spirit.56
According to Tocqueville, religion (free of clerical dogmatism) fostered community 
and solidarity, a phenomenon exemplified by American constitutional faith.  Given 
this predilection, it should come as no surprise that when assessing his native land he 
carefully distinguished between the populist “resuscitation” of man and the “studious 
ferocity” of anti-Church sentiment.57  He was quick to draw a line between popular 
sovereignty and anti-religiosity because, as America demonstrated, the two were not 
mutually dependent.  Yet in so doing, Tocqueville concealed a point I will attempt to 
problematize: that the democratic revolution envisioned by Rousseau was both 
55 Readers should note that although Tocqueville argues that the events of 1789 were neither explicitly 
political nor religious in aim, he nonetheless details similarities between the Reformation and the 
French Revolution.  Ibid., §I.3.
56 As with Rousseau, Tocqueville’s writings force a crucial distinction between anticlericalism and 
irreligiosity.  Arguing that papists exerted a corrupting influence upon the ancient régime, he also held 
that America’s religious spirit was a crucial component of its robust civic culture. 
57 Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, p. 6.
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indebted to and radically dismissive of theological tradition.  If Jean-Jacques praised 
religiosity’s moral role within secular polities, so did he repudiate papal authority 
(which cultivated subordination and political alienation) and Catholic ontology 
(rooted in the narrative of Original Sin).58
According to Rousseau, society could hardly rise from the ashes of our self-
incurred wickedness were we not first been able to place trust in our intrinsic 
innocence as creations of a benevolent deity.  Nor, more generally, could the French 
Revolution have occurred sans le Siècle des lumières, an age characterized by its 
simultaneous embrace of reason and sharp critique of clericalism.  Although Voltaire, 
Diderot, Helvétius, Holbach and d’Alembert made Church-bashing a spectator sport, 
far less obvious is the degree to which this period of thought—like, following 
Tocqueville, the Jacobin fervor and the France of his day—was still deeply mired in 
Christian tropes of redemption, rebirth and enlightenment itself.59  Rousseau offers 
the best example of a thinker at such a nexus of spiritual faith and scientific reason, 
one whose work at turns drew upon and rejected both traditional theology and 
Enlightenment rationalism.
58 This is not to say that democracy and Christian ontology are necessarily mutually exclusive, but 
rather to stress this relationship within Rousseau’s works.
59 By contrast, David P. Jordan argues the following: “Robespierre would speak at significant moments 
in his career about some providential scheme of which he was a part, but his providence is so 
politically conceived, so deliberately tailored to the immediate needs of the French Revolution, that it 
would be wrong to think of these appeals in traditional religious terms.”  Although the French 
Revolution falls beyond the immediate scope of this work, I would argue merely in passing that this 
assertion follows the “error” already identified in Tocqueville: that the semantic and substantive use of 
“providence,” in this instance, does reveal a connection to “traditional religious terms,” even if these 
terms are opportunistically, politically, purposefully, or even perversely employed.  See Jordan, The 
Revolutionary Career of Maximilien Robespierre. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 
p. 9.
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This dialectical quality permeated Rousseau’s religious, political and 
biographical60 works alike.  As Pierre Hadot rightly notes, the Genevan consistently 
conveyed “both the echo of ancient traditions and the anticipation of certain modern 
attitudes.”61  A radical visionary wedded to classical virtue, he applied a deeply 
Protestant perfectionism to secular politics.  No stranger to personal sin,62 he waged a 
veritable holy war of innocence regained in hell-bent times.  From the early spitfire of 
the discourses, to his final Reveries (whose longing spirit is well-captured by 
Matthew 5:8:  “Blessed are the pure of heart for they shall see God”), Rousseau’s was 
a will at war not so much with itself—unlike Augustine—but with society.  He drew 
an emphatic line in the sand, daring men of letters to quell the revolution of the 
common man: he was the harbinger of a revolution in politics founded firmly upon 
the broad shoulders of les peuples, their exemplar and liberator alike.
Given the severity of Rousseau’s project—his do-or-die terms, his moral 
righteousness—it should come as no surprise that the standard range of critiques 
applied to Jean-Jacques mirrors modern critiques of Christianity’s place in politics.  
The Genevan was, by diverse accounts, anything from a hopeless Utopist to a proto-
60 Rousseau makes his life central to his political philosophy.  He wrote numerous autobiographical 
texts (The Confessions, The Dialogues, and the Reveries, as well as fragments, documents, and letters) 
that, significantly, comprise the first volume of the Pléaide edition of his Oeuvres Complètes.  The 
bulk of his additional works also bear marks of intimacy: he addressed readers as Jean-Jacques, 
revealed intimate details of his life, and stressed the openness of his writings as a testament of his 
honesty and sincerity.  As such, any study of Rousseau must recognize the unusual personal tenor of 
his works, and treat his life as he suggested: as a text to be read in conjunction with his more 
traditional philosophical and political writings.  Towards this end, Christopher Kelly succeeds 
wonderfully with Rousseau’s Exemplary Life: The Confessions as Political Philosophy.
61 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Michael Chase, tr. and Arnold I. Davison, ed. (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1995), p. 259.
62 In The Confessions, Rousseau admits to—amongst other things—a bizarre sexual appetite (being 
spanked, flashing strangers), his erotic relationship with the older Mme. de Warens (whom he called 
‘maman’), his escapades with various women in France, the abandonment of his children on the
footsteps of an orphanage, and lying and thieving as a youth.
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Totalitarian.63  These charges prove equally worthy of consideration when applied to 
Christianity, which classically urges men to place faith in an afterlife, to renounce 
their individual desires and conform to a divine will.  There is a reason such critiques 
are levied against both Christianity and Rousseau—both tradition and man are prone 
to similar excesses.  Prominent authors from Tocqueville to, more recently, William 
Galston and Manning Marable have argued for the inclusion of religious groups into 
the fabric of pluralist politics.64  But compelling evidence suggests that religion in 
practice—the positive worship and tenets of organized congregations and creeds—is 
the proverbial oil to democratic water, a force historically at odds with popular 
sovereignty.65
Democracy is, after all, a politics of pragmatic consensus reflective of its 
citizenry’s general will.  Rule of the masses can hardly be confused with Platonic 
elevation or Christian humility.  The strength of democratic theory rather lies in its 
emphasis upon the common good, an embrace of temporal progress and potential.  A 
government which allows each to pursue his own vision without infringing upon the 
rights of others surely upholds these values.  Yet perhaps a democracy which also 
adopts transcendent plateaus offers a productive balance to pure proceduralism.  
Succumbing neither to the surreal remoteness ridiculed by Aristophanes,66 nor the dry 
63 See: J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy; Lester G. Crocker, Rousseau’s Social 
Contract; Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty; J. H. Huizinga, Rousseau: The Self Made Saint; 
Arthur M. Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau’s Thought.
64 See: William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political 
Theory and Practice. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Manning Marable, The Great 
Wells of Democracy: The Meaning of Race in American Life. (New York: BasicCivitas Books, 2002).
65 As we will discuss in Chapter 5, Rousseau himself makes precisely this point in On Civil Religion.
66 See: The Clouds in Four Plays by Aristophanes, William Arrowsmith, Richard Lattimore, and 
Douglass Parker, trs. (New York: Meridian, 1994).
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conciliation pioneered by Dewey,67 we may foster a democracy guided by a vigorous 
dialectic between reason and spirit, pragmatism and idealism, what is and what ought 
to be.68  Might we not, as Rousseau did, keep one foot firmly planted on our home 
turf, whilst our gaze is cast towards a better future?
The problem, of course, is that a politics which seeks both the here and now
and the proverbial pie in the sky seems divided by mutually exclusive aims.  Karl 
Lowith made precisely this point regarding modernity writ large, arguing that modern 
man is tragically torn between competing senses of history.69  “The modern mind,” he 
wrote, “has not made up its mind whether it should be Christian or Pagan.  It sees 
with one eye of faith and one eye of reason.”70  The modern world “is the outcome of 
an age-long process of secularization”; it is “worldly and irreligious and yet 
dependent on the Christian creed from which it is emancipated”; in sum, “it is 
Christian by derivation and anti-Christian by consequence.”71
Georges Poulet located a like-minded dissonance in contemporary concepts of 
time.72  During the Eighteenth Century, he observed, “[m]an is revealed as the 
feckless creator of man,” an awkward burden under which we invariably fail to meet 
our own lofty, self-imposed standards.73  Echoing Nietzsche, he argued that amidst 
this intoxicating moment “man suddenly feels for the first time in the Christian era 
that the instant of his existence is an instant free of all dependence, liberated from all 
67 See: John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems. (Athens, Ohio: Swallow Press/Ohio University 
Press, 1954).
68 Again, readers should consult: The Social Contract.  CW IV.131; OC III.351.
69 See Karl Lowith, Meaning in History, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), especially 
pp. 19, 194, 207.
70 Ibid., p. 207.
71 Ibid., pp. 201-202
72 See Georges Poulet, Studies in Human Time, Elliott Coleman, tr. (New York: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1956), especially pp. 25-29.
73 Poulet, p. 26.
32
duration, equal to all its own potentialities … It knows itself to be faultless.”74
Although neither Poulet nor Lowith specifically addressed Rousseau in these 
instances, the Genevan is not above either charge.  Caught between ancient and 
modern notions of fraternity and autonomy, societal guilt and individual innocence, 
future grace and corporeal redemption, perfectionism and fallibility, Jean-Jacque’s 
“man” stood at a complicated crossroads indeed.
How, then, did people and politics look for Rousseau, in the real world?  To 
paraphrase Christopher Wallace, was it all a dream, or are his reveries coherent?75  If 
we follow Lowith and Poulet, perhaps not.  Perhaps the confluence of modern and 
ancient, Christian and secular, divine and human, subverts the constancy 
characteristic of a strong theory.  But perhaps we may yet accept these analyses and 
still find in their effects some measure of strength: not one gleaned from the sole 
standard of either Christian piety or Pagan virtue, but from a democratic amalgam 
enriched by its eclectic roots.  Was this not the conclusion Rousseau himself 
solicited?  Appropriating contrasting traditions within a single model of reform, he 
forced us to envision a democratic polity supported by religious practice, one which 
sacrificed neither the spiritual nor secular welfare of its citizens.
This was a peculiar reverie indeed.  As Jean Starobinski rightly notes, 
“Rousseau formule sans doute ici une morale toute profane, mais elle ne se comprend 
qu’en référence à un modèle religieux.”76 Jean-Jacques himself told us as much.  He 
slammed his ill-matched cards on the table for all to see, calling our bluff.  He alone 
was a virtuous homme á Paris, wandering much as Diogenes the Cynic combed 
74 Poulet, p. 21.
75 Notorious B.I.G., “Juicy.” From the album: Ready to Die, Bad Boy Records, 1994.
76 Starobinski, La transparence et l’obstacle, p. 83 (tr. p. 63).
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Athens’ streets nearly four centuries Before Christ, searching with lit lantern in broad 
daylight for another real man.77  With the original Cynic’s force, and religious zeal, 
Jean-Jacques dared us to follow him in enacting a plan previously left in God’s hands.  
The bait lies in full sight: Spartan stoicism and civil religion; a defense of natural 
innocence corrupted by artifice and hubris; Enlightenment Deism which rejects 
philosophe atheism; a patriotic hymn shunned by Geneva; Rousseau’s own 
conversion from Protestantism to Catholicism, back to Protestantism; an ode to fallen 
man (both himself and others) raised by the sheer force of his own divinely-guided 
will; the fervor of a vision which accepts no compromise.  If Rousseau’s secular 
stylings marginalized divinity as never before, they bore the divine marks of an all-
seeing eye and a master plan.  It is, in the final analysis, this mixture of piousness and 
profanity that makes the Genevan’s prescriptions so provocative.
By fleshing out this challenging dialectic, we might achieve some measure of 
clarity regarding Rousseau’s peculiar faith generally, and his practical contribution to 
the reconciliation of religion and politics specifically.  Plagued by potentially 
irreconcilable divisions, how does his amalgam of Christian and Pagan ideals allow 
us to reconceptualize the relationship between spiritual and secular values within 
democratic polities?  Are Rousseau’s contradictory aims fatally debilitating?  Does he 
merely prop humankind up to fail, charging us with a task (secular salvation) we are 
incapable of fulfilling?  Or do his discordant sources offer an unlikely foundation for 
democratic meliorism, specifically one that recognizes a positive role for religion?
77 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers: Volume II, R.D. Hicks, tr. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1925), p. 43.
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It is my belief—and this work’s central argument—that Rousseau offers a 
uniquely revealing lens through which to examine the tensions between religion and 
politics.  Yet because the value of his contribution lies precisely in its recourse to 
conflicting traditions (Pagan and Christian) and sentiments (deep pessimism and 
profound optimism), the coherence and (dare we say) utility of his paradoxical project 
is far from self-evident.  Attacked as heretical, Rousseau’s reverie of secular salvation 
drew heavily upon Christian ideals and assumptions.  Mistrustful of religious 
associations, he urged us to accept divine reverence as a foundation for moral duty 
and civic unity alike.  Contemptuous of society, he found solace in the natural order 
of God’s creation, and nurtured a faith in mankind’s intrinsic innocence.  An 
awkward mix that coalesced as a singular contention, Rousseau insisted that 
religiosity both encouraged and preserved democratic virtue.  Was his vision 
practicable, much less compelling?  Because the unity of his aim so sharply belies the 
dissonance of his means, it remains to be seen.  Until that point in time we might 
summon our courage, and even a bit of faith, as we follow our provocative, peculiar 
guide down this thorny path.
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Chapter 2: The Virtue of Paradox
As Jannes and Jambres opposed Moses, so these men also oppose the truth, men of 
corrupt mind and counterfeit faith; but they will not get very far, for their folly will be 
plain to all.
—The Second Letter of Paul to Timothy, 3.8, The New Testament78
I believe in God quite as strongly as I believe any other truth.
—Rousseau, Letter to Voltaire79
A study of Rousseau’s religiosity serves at least three purposes: it sheds light 
on his broader philosophic project; it offers a possible means of locating the 
consistency he claimed was intrinsic to his works; and it provides a lens through 
which to reconsider the relationship between spiritual and secular values.  Still, critics 
of Rousseau have contended that his collective musings on God, human nature, and 
society were of little utility because, taken as a whole, they were neither consistent 
nor coherent.  Naysayers attributed this failing to our peculiar author’s penchant for 
paradox, a charge from which he hardly retreated.
Consider, for example, Rousseau’s request (polite yet insistent) in Book II of 
Emile: “Common80 readers, pardon me my paradoxes.  They are necessary when one 
78 2 Timothy 3.8.  All Biblical passages not quoted in primary sources are taken from the following 
edition: The New Oxford Annotated Bible, Revised Standard Version, Herbert G. May and Bruce M. 
Metzger, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
79 Letter to Voltaire, August 18, 1756.  OC IV.1071; CW III.117.
80 Rousseau uses the word vulgaire, which is understood as common when coupled with reader.  It is 
worth noting that vulgaire has a more confrontational (and negative) connotation than other, more 
familiar word choices, such as commun or ordinaire.
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reflects, and no matter what you might say, I prefer to be a man of paradoxes than a 
man of prejudices.”81
Pardon me my paradoxes.  Not even halfway through his massive pedagogical 
tome, the Tutor’s confession stands out like a sore thumb; it seems a lot to ask.  In 
common contemporary usage, paradox often implies contradiction, or even 
irreconcilable confusion.  Could it be that Rousseau was subverting himself at this 
early stage?  Was he merely presaging the criticisms of a text whose reception 
pressed him into exile for his remaining years?  Was it self-deprecation, or brutally 
honest self-scrutiny?  Should we don investigative caps and uncover the hidden 
context?  Or must we, common readers, take him at his oft-repeated word to take him 
at his word.
Rousseau never claimed to be a virtuous man, and his Confessions make clear 
an early pattern of less than upright actions.  But he did claim to be a good man, a 
unique man, and a consistent and honest man.82  Giving him the benefit of the doubt, 
and seeking clarity, I turned to the Oxford English Dictionary and found this under 
Paradox:83
81 “Lecteurs vulgaires, pardonnez-moi mes paradoxes.  Il en faut faire quand on réfléchit, et quoi que 
vous puissiez dire, j’aime mieux être homme à paradoxes qu’homme à préjuges.”  OC IV.323; E 93.
82 In his Letter to Beaumont, Rousseau applies this consistency to his own defense: “Thus the foolish 
public vacillates about me, knowing as little why it detests me as why it liked me before.  As for 
myself, I have always remained the same: more ardent in my quests, but sincere in everything, even 
against myself; simple and good, but sensitive and weak, often doing evil and always loving the 
good…” CW IX.22;        OC IV.928-9; and: “…all these Books [of mine], which you have read, since 
you judge them, breath the same maxims; the same ways (manières) of thinking are not more disguised 
in them.” OC IV.933; CW IX.26.
83 We might also consider the etymology.  Paradox comes from the Latin paradoxum, from the Greek 
paradoxus, meaning “contrary to received opinion or expectation,” and “past, beyond, contrary to 
opinion.”  According to Raymond Trousson and Frédéric S. Eigeldinger, the Encyclopédie entry for
paradoxe (penned by d’Alembert) presented a relatively new meaning of the word most frequently in 
used in relation to the sciences.  This sense implied an “iconoclastic idea, if not heretical, that is to say 
a false idea.”  In fact, d’Alembert’s definition was more ambiguous: “en Philosophie, c'est une 
proposition absurde en apparence, à cause qu'elle est contraire aux opinions reçues, & qui néanmoins 
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A statement or tenet contrary to received opinion or belief; often with 
the implication that it is marvelous or incredible; sometimes with 
unfavourable connotation, as being discordant with what is held to be 
established truth, and hence absurd or fantastic; sometimes with 
favourable connotation, as a correction of vulgar error.84
Pardon me my paradoxes might therefore be rephrased as pardon me my statements 
which stand in contrast to commonly held opinion.85
On this—the contrariness and correlative uniqueness of his thought—
Rousseau was certainly consistent.  Throughout Emile, as in many of his other works, 
he reminded us of his opposition to the two major intellectual forces of his age: the 
Christian ecclesiasts and the philosophes.  No meager foes, Church and academy 
dominated the production and dissemination of political, social and spiritual thought.  
This was no mean feat in a century described then—and, nearly three centuries later, 
now—as an age driven by ideas, by the illumination born of inspired reasoning.
est vraie au fond, ou du - moins peut recevoir un air de vérité.”  (“in Philosophy, it is a seemingly 
absurd proposition, because it is contrary to received opinions, & it nevertheless is basically true, or at 
least can hold an inkling of truth.”)  See: Trousson and Eigeldinger, Dictionnaire de Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau. (Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur, 2001), p. 683.  For d’Alembert’s definition see: Diderot, 
Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts, et des Métiers, par une société de gens 
de lettres, première édition de 1751-1780. (Neuchâtel: Chez Samuel Faulche & Compagnie, 1765), 
Tome XI, pp. 894-895.
84 The Oxford English Dictionary.  Long before Rousseau, Socrates popularized paradox as a 
philosophical method of seeking the truth.  Throughout Emile, Rousseau affirms the most central 
Socratic injunction to “know thyself.”  His Socratic lineage is often raised in relation to this Delphic 
command.  Less frequently mentioned is their common insistence upon the pedagogical value of 
paradox—the exercise of contradictory opinion as a means of seeking and uncovering the truth.  For 
examples of the importance of self-knowledge in Emile see: E 48, 74, 83, 213, 240, 243-4, 270, 287.
85 Three French dictionaries confirm this reading.  In his 1690 Dictionnaire Universel, Furetière
describes “paradoxe” as a “[p]roposition surprenant et difficile à croire, à cause qu’elle choque les 
opinions communes et reçues.”  As examples, he cites the Stoics and Copernicus.  The Grand 
Larousse likewise lists “paradoxe” as both an “[o]pinion contraire aux vues communément admises,” 
and (more negatively) as something “qui paraissent défier la logique parce qu’ils présentent en eux-
mêmes des aspects contradictoires.”  Hugo’s label of Rousseau—the “Don Quixote of Paradox”—is 
attributed to the former sense.  The Dictionnaire historique de la langue française confirms this less 
critical usage in the eighteenth century.  Although as early as 1662 Pascal implied that paradoxes 
clashed with “good sense” (a charge clearly shared by Rousseau’s critics), this more pejorative 
connotation was not formally adopted in dictionaries until 1832.  See: Antoine Furetière’s Dictionnaire 
Universel, Tome III.  (The Hague and Rotterdam: Chez Arnout & Reinier Leers, 1690).  Grand 
Larousse de la langue française en sept volumes: tome cinquième. (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1976), p. 
3956.  Dictionnaire historique de la langue française, Alain Rey, ed. (Paris: Dictionnaires LE 
ROBERT, 1992), p. 1422.
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Contemporary readers may scoff at priests or professors, as purveyors of 
pedophilia, or a tweedy clan totally removed from the machinations of real world 
politics.  But during Rousseau’s age, these men of the cloth and men of letters 
wielded an influence far beyond the scope of their professional domains.  To attack 
either one was a feat of daring, and (because they were mutually antagonistic) a 
corresponding proclamation of allegiance to either philosophy or the papacy.  
Attacking both might have seemed, especially in hindsight, to possess the reckless 
energy of a suicidal mission.  At the very least, it left so bold a protagonist with few 
compatriots.
Such was Rousseau’s fate.  The tragedy, the inevitability, the sheer weight of 
that ancient term holds particularly true to a thinker for whom truth-telling (as he saw 
it) was less an option than an obligation, a destiny, a civic duty.86  He alone was 
poised to tell the truth, because he alone recognized so clearly the problems of and 
prescriptions for his age.  Urgent necessity underscored Rousseau’s descriptions of 
human history’s abject spiral, and his prescriptions for the possible means of our 
redemption.  By his own admission, he had little choice; our collective future 
depended upon bringing these truths to light.
It was this dire term—not personal safety, security, welfare, or reputation—
that drove the Genevan’s quest.  Consider this soliloquy, taken from the twelfth 
fragment of his Letter to Christophe de Beaumont:
86 The compulsive nature of Rousseau’s confessional style notwithstanding, he was deeply ambivalent 
about his career as an author.  I explore this dynamic elsewhere in greater detail, addressing issues 
such as: his epiphany and subsequent “conversion” en route to Vincennes; his insistence that he 
defends himself in writing only out of necessity; his elusions to being “forced” to take up his pen; and 
his aspiration to abandon writing and the public life for a solitary, self-contained existence.  This study 
draws much from Jean Starobinski’s reading of Rousseau as a fundamentally passive figure in 
Transparency and Obstruction.
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My own interest is to say what is useful to others without regard to my 
own utility, and that honor which I alone will have among the authors 
of my century will always cause me to be distinguished from them all 
and will compensate me for all their advantages.  If one wishes they 
will be better philosophers and finer wits, they will be more profound 
thinkers, more precise reasoners, more pleasing writers; but I, I will be 
more disinterested in my maxims, more sincere in my sentiments, 
more an enemy of satire, bolder in speaking the truth, when it is useful 
to others without troubling myself about my fortune nor about my 
safety.  They may deserve pensions, employments, places in 
academies, and I, I will have only insults and slights; they will be 
decorated and I, I will be stigmatized, but it does not matter, my 
disgraces will honor my courage…87
Voltaire may revel in his witticisms.  Diderot’s plays may delight more people.  
Philosophers may enjoy their profundity and sophistication.  Others may be honored 
in academies and salons, and decorated by their governments.  But these gains were 
of little concern to Jean-Jacques.  He had only his claim to the truth, and the courage 
to press this upon a people ‘tyrannized’ by irresponsible élites.
Rousseau’s argument drew upon classical tales of individual courage 
legitimized by both resistance to authority and an ascetic aversion to prosperity; 
persecution and privation actually offered testimony of his sincerity.88  In so 
defending himself, he resurrected tropes pioneered by Socrates, the Stoics, and the 
figure of Jesus.  Socrates famously refused compensation for his teachings, and 
87 Letter to Beaumont.  OC IV.1022; CW IX.94.  The original passage reads: “Mon intérêt à moi est de 
dire ce qui est utile aux autres sans égard à ma propre utilité, et cet honneur que j’aurai seul parmi les 
auteurs de mon siècle me fera toujours distinguer d’eux tous et me dédommagera de tous leurs 
avantages.  Ils seront si l’on veut meilleurs philosophes et plus beaux esprits, ils seront penseurs plus 
profond[s], raisonneurs plus exacts, écrivains plus agréables ; mais moi je serai plus désintéressé dans 
mes maximes, plus sincère dans mes sentiments, plus ennemi de la satire, plus hardi a dire la vérité, 
quand elle est utile aux autres sans m’embarrasser de ma fortune ni de ma sûreté.  Ils pourront mériter 
des pensions, des emplois, des places d’académies et moi je n’aurai que des injures et des affronts ; ils 
seront décorés et moi je serai flétri, mais n’importe, mes disgrâces honoreront mon courage…”
88 The word testimony has strong Biblical connotations.  In Scriptural language, it refers to the Mosaic 
Decalogue.  See, for example, Exodus 31.18: “And he gave to Moses, when he had made an end of 
speaking with him upon Mount Sinai, the two tables of the testimony, tables of stone, written with the 
finger of God.”
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presented his poverty as an exhibit of self-defense during his trial.89  Seneca and the 
Stoics shunned material possessions as a virtuous means of living in greater accord
with nature.  And Jesus, Saint Paul revealed, willfully abandoned riches for rags, a 
sacrifice committed for the spiritual wealth of his followers.90
Rousseau made a similar claim.  For the sake of his fellow citizens and, 
indeed, the human race, he willfully denied his material best-interests.  Even if his 
own age misunderstood him, in the end he trusted his reputation to the hindsight of 
history.  His “disgrace will honor his courage” because eventually his paradoxes 
would reveal the goodness of his heart, the truthfulness of his writings, the practical 
value of his vision, and the short-sightedness of those contemporaries scornful of his 
insights.
Truth be told, no matter the cost; his Confessions drives this point home, 
exposing past episodes of untruthfulness in explicit detail.  The shame of his petits 
mensonges are left to public domain, a testament to his honesty even when it reveals a 
pattern of dishonesty.  His second apprenticeship to the engraver M. Ducommun gave 
him “vices that I would have hated, such as lying, laziness, theft.”91  After being 
cajoled by a journeyman named Verrat, he commits his first theft, stealing asparagus 
and reselling it for pocket change.92  He reveals an unsavory penchant for flashing 
strangers “of the opposite sex” from dark alleys.  After one such episode he was 
chased down and, upon being caught, attempted to excuse himself by way of a tall 
89 See: The Apology, 19D-21A in Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, Hugh Tredennick, tr. (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 48-49.
90 2 Corinthians 2 8.9: “For you know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet 
for your sake he became poor, so that by his poverty you might become rich.”
91 The Confessions.  CW V.39; OC I.31.
92 The Confessions.  CW V.27-8; OC I.32-33.
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tale: he claimed to be “a young foreigner of high birth whose brain was deranged.”93
Most memorably, he forces himself to admit “the long remembrances of crime and 
the unbearable weight of remorse with which my conscience is still burdened after 
forty years,”94 the stealing of a pretty pink ribbon whose theft he imputed to a young 
innocent, a local girl named Marion.
Ribbons and vegetables, a proclivity for perversity, an adolescent streak of 
erratic judgment.  A riches of embarrassment, certainly, but necessary to understand 
Rousseau as he truly was.  His was a heart unmasked, a life laid bare to the public.  
His work turned on this principle of honesty: the honesty with which he presents both 
himself and his age, with which he reveals strengths and weaknesses with equal 
candor.  Humankind was naturally good, society artificially bad.  In so arguing, was 
Rousseau not compelled to press this critique upon himself?  He too was a good man 
guilty of actions with ignoble consequences.95  To hide such memorable 
transgressions would have been, not in poor taste, but in poor faith.  Guarding his 
missteps would have been, not an act of paradox, but an act of self-subversion that 
undermined the very quest to which Rousseau had dedicated his life: to seek and 
reveal the truth.
As he wrote unabashedly in Emile, “[z]eal and good faith have taken the place 
of prudence for me up to now.  I hope these guarantors will not abandon me in time 
of need.  Readers, do not fear from me precautions unworthy of a friend of the truth.  
93 The Confessions.  CW V.74-75; OC I.88-90.
94 The Confessions.  CW V.70; OC I.84.  For Rousseau’s full account see CW.V 70-73; OC I.84-87.
95 As he makes plain in The Confessions, “I have shown myself as I was, contemptible and low when I 
was so, good, generous, sublime when I was so.”  CW V.5; OC I.V.
42
I shall never forget my motto.”96  His motto, clipped from Juvenal’s Satires, was 
Vitam impendere vero (Dedicate life to truth).97  Truth cast a broad swath indeed, and 
took its sharpest stabs when revealing flaws: of his own, of the Church, of the 
academy, of human society.  This critical acumen proved a costly profession, 
particularly for a mere man of the peoples, a Genevan set loose in the hotbed that was 
eighteenth century Paris, an expatriate slowed by a urinary tract disorder no less.  
Truth be damned, the odds were against him; an individual attacking both papists and 
philosophers was bound to lose something.
Yet attack he did.  Rousseau has been accused of many things by his 
compatriots and posthumous critics alike, but cowardly he was not.  He targeted 
theological and intellectual élites with equal force and candor.  Although mutual 
enemies, Rousseau charged both with similar offenses: they were deceptive 
dogmatists cultivating private interests under the auspices of public good.  Both were 
grossly self-promoting, driven by vanity and amour-propre, rather than a concern 
with the welfare of society and ses peuples.  They were fundamentally dishonest, 
preaching salvation through subservience (to either dogma or reason), while 
subordinating the welfare of all to exclusive, sectarian interests.  Presenting 
themselves as above reproach, they deserved our greatest censure.
96 Emile.  E 206.
97 Rousseau also mentions this “motto” in his Letter to d’Alembert, the epigraph to Letters Written 
From the Mountain, and The Reveries of the Solitary Walker (Fourth Promenade).  Its original context 
is quite revealing.  The Satire in which it appears is a story illustrating the Emperor Domitian’s tyranny 
and absurdity.  Domitian summons his cringing court to solve a ridiculous problem: how to cook a fish 
too large for its pan.  We are told that one of these members, Crispus, never spoke out against him and 
thus “he survived for eighty winters and as many summers, protected by that armour” of passive 
obedience. (IV.92-93)  As Juvenal writes, “Crispus never struck out against the current, nor was he 
ever that noble type of Roman subject who could freely state his opinions and risk his life for the 
truth.” (IV.89-91)  In adopting this last line as his motto, Rousseau identifies himself precisely with the 
“noble” citizen who would—and did—risk personal livelihood “for the truth.”  See: Juvenal, The 
Satires, Niall Rudd, tr. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 28.
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The Church, for example, taught a “barbarous education which sacrifices the 
present to an uncertain future, which burdens a child with chains of every sort and 
begins by making him miserable in order to prepare him from afar for I know not 
what pretended happiness which is to be believed he will never enjoy.”98  With their 
“insipid lessons,” “long-winded moralizing,” and “eternal catechisms,”99 they 
promoted a “false wisdom which incessantly projects us outside of ourselves, which 
always counts the present for nothing, and which, pursuing without respite a future 
that retreats in proportion as we advance, by dint of transporting us where we are not, 
transports us where we shall never be.”100  The chimera of post-mortem redemption 
lures us to seek an ever-elusive salvation.  In the process, it discourages the 
possibility of genuine reform and salvation in this world, instead fixing our gaze on 
an indeterminate future while chaining us to a grim present.
Philosophers were no better.  “Raised in all the corruption of the colleges,”101
enraptured by their own hubris,102 their vanity and pride was no less pernicious than 
that of their orthodox enemies.  “Where,” Rousseau asked, “is the philosopher who 
would not gladly deliver mankind for his own glory?  Where is the one who in the 
secrecy of his heart sets himself any other goal than that of distinguishing 
himself?”103  His contemporary hommes à lettres claimed to possess truth, but taught 
only vainglory.  “Under the haughty pretext that they alone are enlightened, true, and 
of good faith, they imperiously subject us to their peremptory decisions and claim to 
98 Emile.  E 79.
99 Emile.  E 316.
100 Emile.  E 79.
101 Emile.  E 221.
102 “I know of no philosopher who has yet been so bold as to say: this is the limit of what man can 
attain and beyond which he cannot go.  We do not know what our nature permits us to be.”  (Emile.  E 
62.)
103 Emile.  E 269.
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give us as the true principles of things the unintelligible systems they have built in 
their imagination.”104  Their purported truths were elaborate feats of fancy whose 
want of substance was rivaled only by a conspicuous incoherence.  Philosophic 
perfectionism mixed Spartan coercion and Athenian frivolousness, to decidedly 
deleterious consequences.  Rather than aiding society, they increased the speed of its 
downfall.  Rather than putting their erudition and learning to practical purposes, they 
wasted their time (and ours) on vain frivolities.
The church and the academy were, in short, two birds of a feather.  “The two 
parties attack each other reciprocally with so many sophisms,”  yet neither fostered 
virtue, goodness or meaningful enlightenment.105  Put more strongly, they actually 
caused much harm.  Both falsely claimed to possess a monopoly on truth, and used 
this self-anointed grace to subject humankind to the tyranny of elaborately justified 
opinions.  Peddling ideals unfulfilled in practice, priest and philosopher alike 
demanded contrition to hollow promises.  As such, they epitomized society’s most 
perverse influence: the denaturing rule of doxa.
It was a story of muses whose lulling tunes promise big payoff but lead to 
swift demise.  Jean-Jacques ignored their refrains, and refused to bow to their 
authority.  Instead, he countered with paradox in its sharpest form: a severe mistrust 
of these dominant poles of opinion whose empires—Christian dogmatism and 
philosophic rationalism—were enemies of truth and societal welfare alike.
To better gauge Rousseau’s request of pardon, we must therefore bear in mind 
the contentious nature of his paradoxes, and the vigorous charges he levies against the
104 Emile.  E 312.
105 Emile.  E, 312n.
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established “truths,” and so-called truth-tellers, of his age.  To pardon Rousseau, we 
must first accept the substance of his accusations.  Doing so, in turn, requires 
acknowledging his candid evaluations of his influential adversaries.  Forgiveness in 
this instance is an act of solidarity.  Rousseau demands not simply siding with him 
(both the “honest” author and the “good” man), but rejecting the targets of his wrath.
Rousseau was perhaps the most famous to press this demand upon his readers, 
but certainly not the first.  His much-maligned foil Hobbes said just as much in 1656, 
in a moment of aggressive self-defense.  In 1645, Hobbes and the Anglican Bishop 
John Bramhall, both Royalists forced into exile during the Civil War, were invited by 
William Cavendish, the Marquess of Newcastle, to debate the question of human 
freedom at his Paris home.  These discussions led to the publication some nineteen 
years later of Hobbes’ The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance.  In 
this work, Hobbes railed against Bramhall and linguistic ignorance in one fell swoop:
The Bishop speaks often of Paradoxes with such scorn or detestation, 
that a simple Reader would take a Paradox either for Felony, or some 
other heinous crime, or else for some ridiculous turpitude; whereas 
perhaps a Judicious Reader knows what the word signifies; And that a 
Paradox, is an opinion not yet generally received.106
“Simple” readers conflate paradox with unpardonable offense.   The more “judicious” 
exercise greater restraint in judgment.  They understand that paradoxes are 
unfashionable, but not necessarily erroneous.
To punctuate this point, Hobbes reminds us that even “Christian religion was 
once a Paradox.”107  Historically, he is correct.  As Karl Jaspers argued, although “it 
is not possible to base a portrait of Jesus on compelling historic proof, his reality is 
106 Thomas Hobbes, The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance. (London: Printed for 
Andrew Crook, 1656), p. 239.
107 Ibid., p. 239.
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clearly discernible through the veil of tradition.”108  For reasons unclear, we know 
that Jesus did in fact go to Jerusalem preaching what were then paradoxes, and was 
crucified for his teachings.109
Hobbes’ reminder is twofold: popular opinion is fallible and relative in 
character, and contrary opinions may be redeemed in time.  Nonconformity 
demonized in one age or locale can pass for gospel in another.  In fact, canonization 
and martyrdom occur only through the passage of time (through reification).  This is 
particularly true of Christianity, a phenomenon whose appreciation emerged in 
hindsight, and drew legitimacy from its resistance to the remarkable hostility with 
which it was first received.  What was once paradox, what once begged a sentence of 
death, became the most wildly influential spiritual, political and intellectual force of 
Hobbes’ realm.
Again, the lesson is simple: paradoxes are relative by definition.  They are 
measured in relation to temporal opinion, rather than objective standards of truth or 
virtue.  Although paradoxes run contrary to general opinion, they are neither 
inherently ill-conceived, nor categorically criminal.  Yet for Rousseau, this distinction 
was moot.  As with Jesus, the Genevan’s paradoxes did criminalize him, particularly 
following the publication of Emile.  And here, Hobbes’ example sounds a powerful 
108 Karl Jaspers, Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus: The Paradigmatic Individuals, Hannah Arendt, 
ed. and Ralph Manheim, tr. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962), p. 64.  Jaspers also 
demonstrates the relative unimportance of historic accuracy to Christian believers, a point compatible 
with Rousseau’s own appreciation of myth.  (See pp. 64-86.)  For an extended discussion of this theme 
in Rousseau’s works, see below.
109 “This God who for Jesus was not physically present—not in visions and not in voices—was able to 
put absolutely everything in the world in question,” Jaspers writes.  The consequences were radically 
contrary: “Jesus broke free from every practical order in the world.  He saw that all orders and habits 
had become pharisaical; he points to the source in which they melt to nothingness.  All earthly reality 
is deprived of its foundation, absolutely and definitively.  All orders whatsoever, the bonds of piety, of 
law, of reasonable custom, collapse.”  Humankind kind is left only with the absolute imperative “to 
follow God into the kingdom of heaven.”  See: Jaspers, p. 79.
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note.  The once-hunted—Christian religion—had become the hunter; Jean-Jacques, 
condemned for impiety, was its prey.
*   *   *   *   *
Rousseau should have known better.  Evidence suggests that he in fact did.  In 
Fragment VII of Institutions politiques, 110 “Luxury, Commerce, and the Arts,” he 
admitted that “I have learned through experience the damage that demonstrated 
propositions can suffer from being called Paradoxes.”111  Rousseau was referring to 
the abundant criticism that followed the publication of his Discourses.  As Genevan 
naturalist Charles Bonnet (under the antagonistic pseudonym M. Philopolis, or “Mr. 
City-lover”) wrote in a letter dated August 25, 1755, Jean-Jacques “has adopted ideas 
that seem to me so opposed to the truth and so ill suited to make happy people” that 
“[m]uch will, without doubt, be written against this new Discourse, as much has been 
written against the one that won the prize of the Academy of Dijon.”112  Rousseau 
paraded banners of natural goodness and truth, but presented only misery and 
falsehoods.  This was “a paradox that he has cherished only too much.”113  In closing,
110 In its preface, Rousseau describes The Social Contract as a “short treatise… taken from a more 
extensive work, which I undertook in the past without considering my strength, and have long since 
abandoned.”  (Social Contract.  CW IV.131; OC III.349).  The “more extensive work” was his 
intended masterpiece, Institutions politiques.  Rousseau began writing this unfinished work sometime 
between 1754 and 1759.  Fragment VII was likely written no earlier than 1756, and no later than 1758.  
This would place its composition after the publication of the Second Discourse, and before the 
publication of the Letter to d’Alembert.  For Rousseau’s description see: The Confessions.  CW V.340-
341; OC I.404-405.
111 Political Fragments.  CW IV.46; OC III.518.
112 Letter from M. Philopolis on the Subject of the Discourse of M. J.-J. Rousseau of Geneva on the 
Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men.  CW III.123; OC III.1383.
113 Letter from M. Philopolis.  CW III.123; OC III.1383.
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Bonnet struck an incredulous note: “Had we ever presumed that a Writer who thinks, 
would advance in a century like ours this strange paradox”?114
According to Bonnet, Jean-Jacques was a depressing rabble-rouser, his 
writings desolate tirades, and his inexplicable contrariness an affect to garner 
attention.115  Rousseau bristled at the charges.  He was particularly upset with the 
implication that his paradoxes were falsehoods, and perverse sources of personal 
pride.  “Let us suppose,” he wrote in rebuttal, “that a singular mind (esprit), bizarre, 
and in fact a man of paradoxes, then dared to reproach others for the absurdity of 
their maxims, to prove to them that they run to death in seeking tranquility, that by 
dint of being reasonable they do nothing but ramble.”116
The note of pardon struck later in Emile here smacks of indignation.  
Rousseau the contrary, Rousseau the unique, was merely holding his peers 
accountable for the “absurdity” of their “ramblings.”  At this early date he was 
conscious of the practical dangers of writing paradox; he simply threw caution to the 
wind.  The truth of one was all the more important considering the falsehoods of 
many.  Drawing courage from faith in his own truthfulness, Rousseau was firmly 
convinced that his contemporaries were in the wrong.  Their maxims posed the 
philosophical equivalent of lemmings, leading us from steep cliffs towards 
accelerated demise.  His Discourses offered an alternate path to tread.
114 Letter from M. Philopolis.  “Eût-on jamais présumé qu’un Écrivain qui pense, avanceroit dans un 
siècle tel que le nôtre cet étrange paradoxe, qui renferme seul une si grande foule d’inconséquences, 
pour ne rien dire de plus fort ?”  OC III.1385; CW III.125.
115 This follows Diderot’s charge that Rousseau had reversed his position on the arts and sciences, 
implying that a critical stance would garner more attention than an affirmative case.
116 Letter from J.-J. Rousseau to M. Philopolis.  OC.III.231; CW III.127.  (My emphasis.)
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In asking pardon some years later, Rousseau softened his tone—though not 
his resolve.  Still convinced of the value of his contentiousness, he turned to readers 
for reprieve.  Demanding that we pardon him his paradoxes, Jean-Jacques was 
certainly begging an important question; he was just asking it of the wrong people.
“Common readers” were clearly not his most pointed critics.  In the years 
following his exchange with Bonnet, Julie became the best-selling novel of the 
eighteenth century.117 Le Devin du village, an opera composed in the Italian style, 
opened in Fontainebleu to a stunningly positive reception.  In spite of unequivocal 
censure and censoring, Emile was widely read and followed (to the extent that 
breastfeeding became très chic amongst French mothers).  And his Social Contract
was embraced as far as Poland, for whose government he wrote a commissioned 
piece on political reform.
Although Rousseau’s influential detractors multiplied their protests following 
his 1762 publications,118 evidence in the form of letters suggest that the public had 
not yet followed suit.  On June 15, 1762, d’Alembert wrote Rousseau to assure him 
that the French peoples applauded his controversial writings.119  And one day later, 
Genevan minister Paul-Claude Moultou comforted his friend that a majority of his 
117 Robert Darnton labeled Julie Rousseau’s “supreme best-seller.”  The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-
Revolutionary France, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), p. 66.
118 Namely, The Social Contract and Emile.
119 Raymond Trousson and Frédéric S. Eigeldinger, Rousseau au jour le jour: Chronologie. (Paris: 
Honoré Champion Éditeur, 1998), p. 172.  Notably, d’Alembert was the only philosophe to offer such 
support, save Charles Duclos.  In The Confessions, Rousseau seems characteristically ungrateful, 
underscoring the fact that d’Alembert had not signed the letter.  For Rousseau’s account see: The 
Confessions, OC I.574; CW V.480.  Quoted in Maurice Cranston, The Solitary Self: Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau in Exile and Adversity. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 2-3.  Letter 
appears in CC XI.1874.82-84.
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fellow Swiss (“nos bourgeois”) admired The Social Contract as the “arsenal of 
liberty.”120
Common readers were certainly far more forgiving than the subjects of his 
scorn.  Rousseau’s intellectual peers, a proud lot of atheists and anti-Clericalists, 
might have been more supportive had he not already alienated and infuriated them.  
His friendship with Diderot deteriorated over a controversy dating from 1757.  In his 
play Le fils naturel , Diderot attacks the idea of a solitary individual (whose part is 
played by Dorval, a character based on Rousseau) with a line much to Jean-Jacques’ 
disliking: “il n' y a que le méchant qui soit seul.”121  On August 30, 1755, Voltaire 
wrote a letter to Rousseau in which he described the Second Discourse as a “book 
against the human race.”122  Voltaire sounds both hostile and dumbfounded, quipping 
that “[n]ever has so much intelligence been used in seeking to make us stupid.”123
Following Rousseau’s Letter to d’Alembert (denouncing a proposed Genevan theater) 
nearly three years later, Voltaire wrote his own letter to d’Alembert dismissing 
Rousseau as “a Diogène barking.”124 “There is a double ingratitude in him,” Voltaire 
120 “Nos bourgeois n’en disent pas moins que ce Contrat social est l’arsenal de la liberté, et tandis 
qu’un petit nombre jette feu & flammes, la multitude triomphe.”  Le minister Paul-Claude Moultou à
Rousseau.  CC XI.1877.90.
121 The full sentence is actually quite inflammatory.  Diderot’s character Constance uses a Rousseauist
argument (an ‘appeal to the heart’) to convince Dorval that the “good man” exists only in society: “ 
J'en appelle à votre coeur; interrogez-le; et il vous dira que l'homme de bien est dans la société, et qu' il 
n' y a que le méchant qui soit seul.” From Le fils naturel, Act IV, Scene 3.  In: Diderot: Œuvres, Tome 
IV: Esthétique – Théâtre, Laurent Versini, ed. (Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont, S.A., 1996), p. 1113.  
For Rousseau’s reaction to this “scathing and harsh sentence without any qualification,” see: The 
Confessions.  CW V.382; OC I.455.
122 Letter from Voltaire to Rousseau (August 30, 1755).  CW III.102; CC III.317.156.
123 Letter from Voltaire to Rousseau (August 30, 1755).  CW III.102; CC III.317.157.  Voltaire’s 
sentence reads: “On n’a jamais tant employé d’esprit a vouloir nous rendre Bêtes.”
124 Quoted in Cranston, The Noble Savage: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1754-1762. (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 137.  Voltaire here compares Rousseau to Diogenes the Cynic, 
one of the most colorful figures in the history of Greek philosophy.  An exile himself (from his native 
Sinope), Diogenes’ practice of Cynicism was notably flamboyant.  Embracing hardship as a training 
method for self-sufficiency, he earned an (in)famous reputation for spectacles such as public 
masturbation, begging to statues, and sleeping in hard tubs.  He was often described as a “mad dog” 
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continued.  “He attacks an art which he practices himself, and he has written against 
you, who have overwhelmed him with praises.”125  Years later, Rousseau’s reputation 
as an ingrate magnified.  Retreating from the continent following the furor of 1762, 
he even managed to enrage his host, the notoriously mild-mannered Hume, who 
vilified him as “the blackest and most atrocious villain, beyond comparison, that now 
exists in the world.”126
If Rousseau’s personality incensed his peers, his paradoxes—particularly 
those detailed in The Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar—aroused the wrath of 
Church and state alike.  Despite his fame as an author throughout Europe, official 
critics in France and Geneva greeted his 1762 publications with swift orders of 
interdiction.  In Moultou’s same June 16 letter pledging Swiss popular support, he 
also warned Rousseau that the Petit Conseil had banned The Social Contract and 
begun a formal investigation of Emile.127
The news came as no surprise.  One week prior, on June 9, the French 
Parlement had issued a warrant for his arrest.  The Genevan was charged with 
penning a work of “impious and detestable principles” contemptuous of religion, 
and a “Socrates gone mad.”  See: Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers: Volume II, pp. 
23-85.
125 Quoted in Ibid., p. 137.  Voltaire vigorously repeated these charges in a subsequent letter to 
d’Alembert.  (See Ibid., p. 278).  These correspondences followed his biting (and very personal) 
attacks on Julie and its author, written under the pseudonym Marquis de Ximénès.  See: Lettres à M. 
de Voltaire sur La Nouvelle Héloïse (Geneva: 1761, 25 pages in octavio).
126 Quoted in Cranston, The Solitary Self, 168.  In leaving England, Rousseau also rejected the one 
hundred pound yearly pension granted him by King George III.  For a concise exposition of the sudden 
demise of the relationship between Rousseau and Hume, see pp. 165-169.  See also: Edward Duffy, 
Rousseau in England: The Context for Shelley’s Critique of the Enlightenment. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1979).
127 Moultou à Rousseau.  CC XI.1877.90.  Dates confirmed in Trousson and Eigeldinger, Rousseau au 
jour le jour, p. 172.  The works were formally investigated, beginning on June 11, 1762.  By June 14, 
both were officially deemed “very dangerous.”  See: James Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy, 
pp. 81-82.
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Church and King alike.128  The court order condemned him as a blasphemer “who 
subjects Religion to the examination of reason, who establishes nothing but a purely 
human faith, and who accepts neither truths nor dogmas in the matter of Religion.”129
Adding insult to impiety, Rousseau also asserted “propositions which tend to give a 
false and odious character to the sovereign authority, to destroy the principle of 
obedience due to him, and to weaken the respect and the love of the People for their 
King.”130
Rousseau had struck a passionate nerve, one not easily calmed.  Nearly three 
months later, on August 28, Archduke Christophe de Beaumont continued the robust 
denouncement.  In a Pastoral Letter, he condemned Emile for 
containing an abominable doctrine, suited to overturning natural Law 
and to destroying the foundations of the Christian Religion; 
establishing maxims contrary to Evangelical morality; tending to 
disturb the peace of States, to stir up Subjects against the authority of 
their Sovereign; as containing a very great number of propositions 
respectively false, scandalous, full of hatred against the Church and its 
Ministers, departing from the respect due to Sacred Scripture and the 
Tradition of the Church, erroneous, impious, blasphemous, and 
heretical.131
Beaumont described the work’s author as “a character given to paradoxes of opinions 
and conduct, zeal for ancient maxims with the rage for establishing novelties, the 
obscurity of retreat with the desire to be known by everyone.”132  The ensuing order
128 These quotes appear in the Extrait des Registres du Parlement, Arrêt de la cour de Parlement, Qui 
condamne un Imprimé ayant pour titre Émile, ou de l’Éducation, par J. J. Rousseau, imprimé à La 
Hage… M.DCC.LXII., à être lacéré & brûlé par l’Exécuteur de la Haute Justice.  The text is 
reproduced in the beginning of Rousseau’s Letter to Beaumont, 1763 edition.  See: Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Citoyen à Genève, à Christophe de Beaumont, Archevêque de Paris, Duc de St. Cloud, Pair 
de France, Commandeur de l’Ordre du St. Esprit, Proviseur de Sorbonne, &c. (Amsterdam: Chez 
Marc Michel Rey, 1763).  See also: CC XI.A254.262-266.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Pastoral Letter of His Grace, the Archbishop of Paris.  CW IX.16.
132 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.4.
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of contraband reiterated what the Parlement had previously made plain.  Emile was a 
work deeply threatening to the very fabrics of eighteenth century order.  It was 
immoral, revolutionary, hateful, and fundamentally wrong.  Rousseau’s “paradoxes” 
were irresolvable contradictions, the public ravings of a supposedly solitary 
individual who evoked traditionalism in the service of its own destruction.  They also 
carried the stigma of a communicable disease: not only were they offensive, they 
would infect the masses with dreams of overthrowing Church and Sovereign alike.  A 
work of imminent danger, its distribution had to be stopped, its author held 
accountable.
It should now be clear why Maurice Cranston describes, without exaggeration, 
this latter third of Jean-Jacques’ life as a period of “exile and adversity.”133  Woody 
Allen once dubbed paranoia another word for realism; for Rousseau, the hostile 
suspicion which swelled within him after 1762 was rooted in an all-too-real 
persecution waged on theological, political and intellectual fronts.
Given this turn of events, Rousseau’s request of pardon in Emile seems 
particularly prescient and all the more compelling.  As contemporary readers armed 
with historical hindsight, we are surely poised to grant him reprieve.  Still, before 
doing so we must answer two questions: what, specifically, were the theological and 
political paradoxes put forth, and why were they necessary to his thought, as he so 
forthrightly claimed?
*   *   *   *   *
133 Cranston, The Solitary Self: Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Exile and Adversity.
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Emile holds the dubious distinction of being Rousseau’s most controversial 
book.  Burned and banned for impiousness in 1762, critics were especially incensed 
by its third-person Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar.  A substantial section of 
Book IV, this deistic sermon preached two particularly unpopular paradoxes: the 
pressing need for religious tolerance, and the Pelagian heresy that man was naturally 
innocent.  If these proved to be Rousseau’s most threatening ideas, their exposition 
was not without precedent.  He had argued analogous points eight years prior in the 
Discourse on Inequality.  Presented as searing socio-political critique, Rousseau’s 
Second Discourse tempered a deeply critical genealogy of human history with the 
radical optimism of a doctrine of natural goodness. 
Even then, Rousseau understood the dangers in making such claims.  He 
began the Discourse with a declaration of courage: the questions raised within its 
pages were “not proposed by those who are afraid of honoring the truth.”134  The 
Genevan had no such fear; but to honor veritas, he first abandoned the facts.135
Without a hint of irony, he urged his readers to follow him, to
begin by setting all the facts aside, for they do not affect the question.  
The Researches which can be undertaken concerning this Subject must 
not be taken for historical truths, but only for hypothetical and 
conditional reasonings better suited to clarify the Nature of things than 
to show their genuine origin.136
Rousseau’s logic here offers yet another paradox, a rejoinder to the scientific method 
popularized by his Enlightenment peers.  But it also reflects a methodology privileged 
134 Second Discourse.  CW III.18; OC III.131.
135 By contrast, Bloom writes that in Emile, “Rousseau banishes poetry altogether and suppresses all 
lies.”  (E 8)  As noted above, this is not entirely accurate.  Rousseau was, indeed, a self-proclaimed 
“friend of truth.”  But his relationship with the arts and fiction reflects deep ambivalence rather than 
categorical condemnation.  Rousseau clearly appreciates arts which serve a specific social function 
(such as the education of virtue).
136 Second Discourse.  CW III.19; OC III.132-133.
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throughout his works: namely, the use of subjective memory in writing political 
philosophy.  The clearest example is that of his autobiography.  Halfway through the 
text Rousseau himself reminded us that the “first part [of The Confessions] was 
written entirely from memory and I must have made many errors in it.  Forced to 
write the second from memory also, I will probably make many more.”137  Recent 
scholarship has confirmed greater historical accuracy than Jean-Jacques would have 
us believe, yet the discrepancies to which he drew our attention have been verified.138
Even more dramatically, scholars have described in detail the dissonance between 
Rousseau’s ideal vision of Geneva and the city in practice in works such as Letters 
Written From the Mountain, Letter to d’Alembert, La Nouvelle Héloïse, and the 
dedicatory epistle to the Second Discourse.139
For Rousseau, these inaccuracies actually served a distinct purpose.  As he 
reiterated in Emile, facts are not always useful in teaching virtue.  He gleaned this 
lesson from ancient Pagan histories, epic works of men like Plutarch “filled with 
views which one could use even if the facts which present them were false.” 140 His 
age, by contrast, ignored the vitality of this lesson.  “Critical erudition absorbs 
everything, as if it were very important whether a fact is true, provided that a useful 
teaching can be drawn from it.”141  In their haste to compile and systematize 
knowledge, the encyclopedic lumières discounted the pedagogical value of fabled 
137 The Confessions.  CW V.233; OC I.277.
138 By far the most impressive of such efforts is Raymond Trousson and Frédéric S. Eigeldinger, 
Rousseau au jour le jour: Chronologie.  Although certainly not aligned with the spirit Rousseau here 
articulates, the Chronologie is a remarkable feat of scholarship tracing nearly every day in the life of 
Jean-Jacques, and detailing what he did, where he went, and with whom he corresponded.
139 See: Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy, pp. 93-96; Benjamin Barber, “How Swiss is 
Rousseau?” Political Theory, Vol. 13, No. 4, November 1985.
140 Emile.  E 156; OC IV.415.
141 Emile.  E 156; OC IV.415.
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histories.  Unlike the dissemination of cold facts, tales of glorious deeds—of Spartan 
rigor, of Robinson Crusoe’s self-sufficiency142—serve the most noble of aims: they 
lead by example, allowing us to revel in reveries of greatness.  “Critical erudition” 
might enhance our knowledge of science or refine philosophic discourse, but it 
contributes little to the subject of instituting virtue amongst individuals in a corrupted 
society.143
Such was the scope of Rousseau’s ambition.  By his own admission, education 
had less to do with child-rearing than the pursuit of a more enlightened social order.  
Rousseau reiterated this point in the Letters Written From the Mountain, insisting that 
“[i]t is a question of a new system of education the plan of which I offer to the 
examination of the wise, and not of a method for fathers and mothers, about which I 
never dreamed.”144
Emile—like Plato’s Republic—taught us how to reclaim virtue amidst a 
society in decline.  Rousseau pointed us towards this very connection in Book I: “Do 
you want to get an idea of public education?  Read Plato’s Republic.  It is not at all a 
political work, as think those who judge books only by their titles.  It is the most 
142 Rousseau makes countless glowing references to Sparta throughout his works.  Robinson Crusoe, 
the story of solitary virtue par excellence, is the first and only book Emile reads: “Since we absolutely 
must have books, there exists one which, to my taste, provides the most felicitous treatise on natural 
education.  This book will be the first that my Emile will read… What, them, is this marvelous book?  
Is it Aristotle?  Is it Pliny?  Is it Buffon?  No. It is Robinson Crusoe.”  E 184; OC IV.454-455.
143 Rousseau uses this standard of general merit in his own defense in Letters Written From the 
Mountain.  “My God, what would happen if, in a great work full of useful truths, lessons of humanity, 
piety, and virtue, one was allowed to go looking with a malicious precision for all the errors, all the 
equivocal, suspect, or ill-considered propositions, all the inconsistencies that amid the detail can elude 
an Author overburdened with his material, overwhelmed by the numerous ideas it suggests to him, 
distracted from some by the others, and who can hardly assemble in his head all the parts of his vast 
plan?”  Even the Gospel, Rousseau concludes, would fare poorly in the face of such “slanderous 
analysis.”  CW IX.150-151; OC III.708-709.  From a moral standpoint, intent is more significant than 
execution.  As Rousseau writes in the Reveries (Fourth Promenade), “Only the intention of the speaker 
gives them their worth and determines their degree of malice or goodness.”  CW VIII.32; OC I.1029.
144 Letters Written From the Mountain (Fifth Letter).  CW IX.211; OC III.783.
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beautiful educational treatise ever written.”145  As in Emile, Plato presented a model 
of how to live virtuously.  And like Rousseau, he employed myth to teach this 
difficult lesson.146
Methodology notwithstanding, Socrates opened Book X of the Republic by 
emphasizing the dangers of poetry.  Poesis, he reminded us, was misleading; it 
provided only seductive simulacrums of ideal forms.  Even the works of “tragic 
poets… seem to maim the thought of those who hear them and do not as a remedy 
have the knowledge of how they really are.”147  Socrates’ objection echoed his belief 
that philosophers must always prefer true wisdom to a pale or distorted shade; 
anything less, particularly an imitative art, distracts us from our pursuit of the good.
For Socrates, “[t]he maker of the phantom, the imitator” was essentially 
superficial; he “understands nothing of what is but rather of what looks like it is.”148
Imitation was a form of “wizardry”; it ruled from the throne of doxa, tended towards 
imprudence, and reflected a fundamental disunity of the soul (the dissonance between 
reality and appearance).149  Poetry was also dangerous because it unleashed excessive 
spiritedness: “we give ourselves over to following the imitation; suffering along with 
145 Emile.  E 40.
146 In the Laws, Plato’s Athenian counters those who “opine that the gods exist, but scorn and neglect 
human affairs.” (900b)  Against “him who loves to censure the gods for neglect,” he first uses force 
before conceding that “he needs also, as it seems to me, some words of counsel to act as a charm upon 
him.” (903b)  To do so, the Athenian evokes Odysseus and the myth of transported souls to illustrate 
his lesson.  Myth here plays a vital role in the philosophic education, persuading where force alone 
cannot.  (903b-905d)  See: Plato, Laws, R. G. Bury, tr. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), 
pp. 353, 363-371.  See also: Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy, pp. 92-104.
147 The Republic X.595b. (Bloom 277)  All quotes are taken from: Plato, The Republic of Plato, Second 
Edition, Allan Bloom, tr. (New York: Basic Books, 1968 & 1991).
148 The Republic X.601b (Bloom 284).
149 See: The Republic X.602d, 603a-c. (Bloom 285-287).
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the hero in all seriousness, we praise as a good poet the man who most puts us in this 
state.”150
The Athenian sage seemed to draw a Manichaean line.  Yet immediately after, 
he introduces Homer151 as neither a philosopher nor an imitator, but a class in-
between “able to recognize what sorts of practices make human beings better or 
worse in private and in public.” 152  Homer is redeemed from the status of phantom-
menace because he both understood and taught virtuous conduct: “it is told that 
Homer, while he was himself alive, was in private a leader for education for certain 
men who cherished him for his intercourse and handed down a certain Homeric way 
of life to those who came after.”153  His art possessed normative value because it 
lighted the path to pursue higher goods.
Rousseau’s simultaneous (and at face value, awkward) embrace of truth and 
‘dismissal’ of facts fulfils a similar purpose.  For Rousseau, pseudo-fictionalized 
histories conjured visions of possible virtue unrealized in his modern world.  Tales of 
inspired heroism, epic wisdom, or ideal polities offered heuristic models that both 
inspired appreciation and urged action.154
Socrates—and, for that matter, the poetic Plato—demonstrated this dynamic 
by evoking the myth of Er.  The latter part of Republic’s Book X recounts this fable 
150 The Republic X.605d (Bloom 289).
151 This follows Socrates’ condemnation of Homer in Book II: “we mustn’t accept Homer’s—or any 
other poet’s—foolishly making this mistake about the gods” being “the cause of everything” for 
humans.  See: The Republic II.379c-d (Bloom 57).
152 The Republic X.599d (Bloom 282).
153 Plato adds that “Pythagoras himself was particularly cherished for this reason, and his successors 
even now still give Pythagoras’ name to a way of life that makes them seem somehow outstanding 
among men.”  The Republic X.600a (Bloom 283).
154 Furthermore, Rousseau believes such fictions to possess meaningful truths.  “Fictions which have a 
moral purpose are called allegories or fables; and as their purpose is or ought to be only to wrap useful 
truths in easily perceived and pleasing forms, in such cases we hardly care about hiding the de facto 
lie, which is only the cloak of truth; and he who merely sets forth a fable as a fable in no way lies.”  
Reveries (Fourth Promenade).  CW VIII.32; OC I.1029.
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of a warrior’s descent into a demonic place where souls must choose hosts to inhabit.  
Odysseus, remembering the honor of past deeds, wisely claims “the life of a private 
man who minds his own business.”155  This story is one of redemption that 
demonstrates through allegory the significance of sound judgment in both this and the 
next life.156  Socrates’ company learns a persuasive lesson of agency—“[t]he blame 
belongs to him who chooses, god is blameless”157—and are reminded of mankind’s 
challenge “always to choose the better from among those that are possible.”158  In so 
doing, Odysseus demonstrates the practical benefits of wisdom and the eternal 
repercussions of choice.
Regardless of the facts, the myth is useful if the lesson holds.  As Socrates 
tells Glaucon, “a tale was saved and not lost; and it could save us, if we were 
persuaded by it, and we shall make a good crossing of the river of Lethe and not 
defile our soul.”159  Rousseau was perhaps more concerned with this life than the 
next,160 but the point he undoubtedly drew from the Republic stands: parable can offer 
a powerful tool of learning.161
Unlike poetry for Plato, or theater and the hollow speech of philosophes, Jean-
Jacque’s historical conjecture serves a practical and virtuous aim: an education 
committed to social transformation.  Reverie acts as a heuristic device, a pseudo-
fictional means of posing both clear and present problems (our history of decline) and 
155 The Republic X 620c (Bloom 303).
156 It is worth noting that Rousseau also accepted the immortality of the soul.
157 The Republic X.617e (Bloom 300).
158 The Republic X.618b-c (Bloom 301).
159 The Republic X.621b-c (Bloom 303).
160 We must, however, bear in mind that Rousseau placed increasing faith in future redemption as the 
persecution of his works and person increased: in an afterlife, in the annals of history, from readers.  
As we will later see, this was particularly evident in his posthumously-published Reveries.
161 Readers should compare this position to Rousseau’s assessment of the arts in his Letter to 
d’Alembert and the First Discourse..
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viable solutions (sociopolitical reform).  Epic histories encourage a process of 
discovery and improvement by painting vivid canvasses of how life might have been
and how it ought to be.  In Rousseau’s own works, this dual purpose serves a single 
end: teaching humankind to enact a better future as both individuals and citizens.162
As he writes near the end of Emile, if “[t]he golden age is treated as a chimera,… 
What, then, would be required to give it a new birth?  One single but impossible 
thing: to love it.”163  Such love—of our fellow citizens, of society, of mankind’s 
future—begins precisely with the courage to dream the virtuous dream.
At this point, skeptical readers may charge Rousseau with the very crimes he 
imputes to theologians and academicians.  If his philosophical musings indeed present 
“a reality to be encountered, experienced, and savored,”164 why are they not also 
guilty of vain or misguided perfectionism?  The answer lies in an indelicate balance.  
If Rousseau embraces myth as a form of pedagogy, his idealized images—of Geneva, 
162 Judith Shklar takes a grim view of Rousseau’s worldview, one which she believes “offers no 
occasion for happiness or civic virtue.”  Shklar ends her book with this overstatement: “When he 
called upon his readers to choose between man and the citizen he was forcing them to face the moral 
realities of social life.  They were asked, in fact, not to choose, but to recognize that the choice was 
impossible, and that they were not and would never become either men or citizens.” (p. 214)  This is 
misleading in two significant ways.  First, Rousseau’s concept of moral individualism is coterminous 
with society in the sense that morality is nonexistent in the state of nature.  The duties and relations 
born of citizenship constrict and pervert individual goodness, particularly in large cosmopolitan cities 
such as Athens and Paris.  But Rousseau’s vision of virtue also finds fruition within societies—whether 
those of quaint Geneva, or the self-contained community under Wolmar’s watchful eye (in Julie), or 
through the general will.  His attempt to apply The Social Contract to the politically-challenged nation 
of Poland also illustrates an effort to institute a greater measure of virtue under less-than-ideal 
conditions.  Still, in her Appendix, Shklar notes the dismal failures of Emile and Sophie to reenter 
society in Les Solitaires: “The happy end of Emile is false,… and Emile’s character cannot reveal itself 
until he really becomes a man, that is, a suffering victim.” (p. 235)  Again, it is hard to argue against 
the extreme difficulty of living virtuously within society.  It is quite another thing to take this as 
evidence that Rousseau condemns the human condition to one of permanent, necessary suffering.  At 
the very least, readers must reconcile this conclusion with the abject optimism of his Pelagianism, and 
the sincerity of his efforts to promote political reform.  If this tension is irreconcilable, it still suggests 
Rousseau is a dialectician rather than an abject pessimist.  See: Shklar, Men and Citizens.  For a more 
balanced assessment of Rousseau’s sense of futility as an idea later adopted by nineteenth-century 
conservatives, see: Starobinski, p. 100.
163 Emile.  E 474.
164 Barber, “How Swiss is Rousseau?” p. 477
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of Poland, of society—are always moderated by blunt honesty.  The Church demands 
abject deference.  Philosophy cultivates egregious hubris.  Rousseau’s worldview, by 
contrast, combines both critical realism and active idealism; he worked within the 
boundaries of the actual in outlining the horizons of the possible.  This is why Poland 
may yet democratize, even though the nation fulfilled so few of the essential tenets 
outlined in The Social Contract.  This is why theater—so deadly a threat to virtuous 
Geneva—must be accepted in cosmopolitan Paris, a city already given to sin.  As for 
society, he writes to Voltaire, “a time comes when the evil is such that the very causes 
that gave birth to it are necessary to prevent it from becoming larger.  It is the sword 
that must be left in the wound for fear that the wounded person will die when it is 
removed.”165  In dreaming of a better future, Rousseau is always nagged by this 
sword in his side.
This is not simply dramatic overstatement; virtuous reform necessarily begins 
with such an honest awareness of man as he is.  As described in the preface to the 
Second Discourse, “[t]he most useful and least advanced of all human knowledge 
seems to me to be that of man; and I dare say that the inscription of the Temple of 
Delphi alone contained a Precept more important and more difficult than all the thick 
Volumes of the Moralists.”166  Know thyself!  Political philosophers must invoke the 
Oracle’s inscription.167  As with Socrates, wise or useful speculation proceeds only 
from self-knowledge.168  It is from this understanding of the “very Nature of man,… 
165 Réponse à Voltaire, September 10, 1755. CW III.106; OC 227.
166 Preface to the Second Discourse.  CW III.12; OC III.122.
167 Readers should consult Socrates’ description of the Delphic injunction in Apology 20D-22E.  See: 
Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, pp. 49-51.
168 By contrast, Tracy Strong argues that for Rousseau it is “precisely ‘becoming someone else’ that 
enables him to know himself.”  “The purpose of knowing himself is not in the end self-knowledge,” 
but a means of painting “a portrait of himself as he is, as a human being… [that] will then be available 
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his constitution and his state, that the principles of that science [of natural right] must 
be deduced.”169  Likewise, as Rousseau later asserts in the Social Contract, only by 
understanding “men as they are” might we deduce “laws as they can be.”170
No mean feat, studying man involves a good deal of conjecture.  Philosophers 
possess a meager understanding of nature, and “one notes the little agreement which 
prevails on this important matter among the various Authors who have discussed 
it.”171  Yet neither this lack of consensus, nor the difficulty of the enterprise, deterred 
Rousseau.  As he wrote in the Preface to the Second Discourse, 
The same study of original man, of his true needs, and of the 
fundamental principles of his duties, is also the only good means one 
could use to remove those crowds of difficulties which present 
themselves concerning the origin of moral inequality, the true 
foundations of the Body politic, the reciprocal rights of its members, 
and a thousand similar questions as important as they are ill 
explained.172
Genealogy, we are reminded, is an essentially negative enterprise.  It looks backwards 
and reveals problems, as in Nietzsche’s exposé of Judeo-Christian morality and 
Foucault’s histories of punishment and sexuality.173  For Rousseau, genealogy is also 
to others.”  Strong uses this argument to debunk the possible conclusion that Rousseau is engaging in a 
precursory form of identity politics.  Perhaps.  But as I argue here, self-knowledge is a necessary 
starting point for species-knowledge, without which prescriptive politics are untenable.  Rousseau’s 
image of himself certainly provides a pedagogical model for others.  Yet structurally, in the Second 
Discourse for example, self-knowledge precedes the transformation of society (the phenomenon 
Strong labels “becoming someone else”).  Simply put, to envision reform, we must first understand the 
subject of reform.  For Rousseau, this clarity begins with following the Delphic injunction.  See: Tracy 
B. Strong, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Politics of the Ordinary, New Edition. (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), p. 17.
169 Preface to the Second Discourse.  CW III.13; OC.III.124.
170 The Social Contract.  CW IV.131; OC III.351.
171 Preface to the Second Discourse.  CW III.13; OC III.124.
172 Preface to the Second Discourse.  CW III.15; OC III.126.
173 See: Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, Walter Kaufmann and R.J. 
Hollingdale, tr. (New York: Random House, 1967); Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth 
of the Prison, Alan Sheridan, tr. (New York: Random House, 1979); Foucault, The History of 
Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, Robert Hurley, tr. (New York: Random House, 1978).
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practical and prescriptive.174  Exploring our origins and development allows us to 
contrast our unfettered selves in nature with our denatured political identities.  In turn, 
we can define and distinguish between natural and political rights, natural freedoms 
and political obligation.  Virtuous political reform demands understanding our present 
woes, which logically follows the study of our physical, social and moral 
evolution.175
There is an additional motive at play in Rousseau’s use of speculative history, 
one that returns us to the problem of paradox.  In his narrative of the fall, he 
challenged the Christian ontology of Original Sin as a false opinion.  To pacify an 
audience which accepted Adam’s legacy as gospel truth, Rousseau qualified his 
counter-narrative as conjecture.  As he described,
Religion commands us to believe that since God Himself took Men out 
of the state of Nature immediately after creation, they are unequal 
because He wanted them to be so; but it does not forbid us to form 
conjectures, drawn solely from the nature of man and the Beings 
surrounding him, about what the human Race might have become if it 
had remained abandoned to itself. 176
Rousseau here understood “religion” as Christianity.  Scripture taught us that God 
banished man from Eden.  Our fall was our fault, the result of a sinfully curious (and 
174 Interestingly, Robert Nozick—whose worldview is fairly categorized as antithetical to Rousseau’s 
own—makes a similar claim.  As Nozick argues, “State-of-nature explanations of the political realm 
are fundamental potential explanations of this realm, and pack explanatory punch and illumination, 
even if incorrect.”   Additionally, “We learn much by seeing how the state could have arisen, even if it 
didn’t arise that way.  If it didn’t arise that way, we would also learn much by determining why it 
didn’t; by trying to explain why the particular bit of the real world that diverges from the state-of-
nature model is as it is.”   As with Rousseau, Nozick’s endeavor is not, by his own description, 
necessarily accurate.  A state-of-nature argument may not explain every event in the real world.  
Actual events may well deviate from this theoretical model.  But even if nature and state, theory and 
event, follow divergent paths, investigating this schism is itself revealing, and necessary in defining the 
state’s legitimacy.  See Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974), pp. 
4, 6, 8-9.
175 As Rousseau writes in The Confessions, “[t]o establish the duties of man one must go back to their 
principle.”  CW V.77; OC I.91.
176 Second Discourse.  CW III.19; OC III.133.
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curiously sinful) nature, and the imperfection of our less-than-divine, errant free will.  
Yet because God crafted us, this fateful descent conformed to His divine design.  
Papal logic therefore placed Original Sin above reproach; challenging the notion was 
tantamount to attacking the will of the “Author of all things.”  Undeterred, Rousseau 
identified a loophole.  This doctrine of Original Sin came from Scripture as 
interpreted by man.  As another mere mortal, was he not also free to speculate?  Was 
this not the very enterprise undertaken by the Church itself in cultivating such myths?  
And if freed from the punitive fable of a vengeful God, he wondered, what might we 
look like?  How might we shape our future, and wherein lies the key to our 
redemption?
For starters, we must redress the guilt of crimes imputed to us by the Christian 
narrative.  It is precisely on this point of intrinsic goodness that papists and
philosophers have erred.  Hobbes, for example, incorrectly concluded that “because 
man has no idea of goodness [in the state of nature] he is naturally evil; that he is 
vicious because he does not know virtue.”177  In typically paradoxical fashion, 
Rousseau argued precisely the contrary, outlining his first concise doctrine of natural 
goodness.  This goodness is defined by its innocence, sheltered in a natural state from 
the pernicious effects of society and social interactions.  In this pre-moral, pre-human 
state, envy, hubris, and the most destructive human passions have yet to be born.  We 
feel only simple amour-de-soi and pitié.
Pitié, a “natural feeling,” fulfills several functions: it 
contributes to the mutual preservation of the entire species.  It carries 
us to the aid of those whom we see suffer; in the state of Nature, it 
177 This is a slightly misleading description of Hobbes, for whom man in nature was morally neutral 
and aggressively self-interested.  Second Discourse.  CW III.35; OC III.153.
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takes the place of Laws, morals, and virtue, with the advantage that no 
one is tempted to disobey its gentle voice; it will deter every robust 
Savage from robbing a weak child or an infirm old man of his hard-
won subsistence if he himself hopes to be able to find his own 
elsewhere.178
The Hobbesian state of nature portrayed a war of all-against-all waged by calculating, 
rationally self-interested individuals.179  For Rousseau, Hobbes’ confusion was 
conceptual.  He imputed denatured developmental faculties (reason, avarice) to 
natural creatures.  Our natural state was plagued by none of these vices.  More 
precisely, vice (and virtue) followed societal development, particularly civic 
interactions, mores, and laws.  Rousseau’s depiction of the natural state was by 
contrast a benign condition of individuals characterized by instinctual self-
preservation (amour-de-soi), and bound by an innate recognition of interdependence, 
the intuition that survival is somehow linked to that of one’s fellow creatures (pitié).
Rousseau gleaned a golden rule from these concepts, one that supplanted “that 
sublime maxim of reasoned justice, Do unto others as you would have them do unto 
you” with “this other maxim of natural goodness, much less perfect but perhaps more 
useful than the preceding one: Do what is good for you with the least possible harm to 
others.”180  We possess natural sentiments of both self-preservation and 
connectedness to our species.  This combination of amour-de-soi and pitié provides a 
178 Second Discourse.  CW.III.37; OC.III.156.
179 From De Cive, Chapter I, “In men’s mutual fear,” §12: “…it cannot be denied that men’s natural 
state, before they came together into society, was War; and not simply war, but a war of every man 
against every man.”  Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne, trs. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 29.  From Leviathan, Part I, Chapter 13: “Hereby 
it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are 
in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as if of every man, against every man.”  
Hobbes, Leviathan, Revised Edition, Richard Tuck, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 88.
180 Second Discourse.  CW III.37-38; OC III.156.
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pre-moral code which, unlike juridical law, we instinctively obey to mutually 
beneficial results.
“In a word,” Rousseau argued, “it is this Natural feeling, rather than in subtle 
arguments, that we must seek the cause of the repugnance every man would feel in 
doing evil.”181  The evidence of our capacity to cohabitate lies inscribed in our very 
natures.  Where a justification based upon “subtle argumentation” requires reason and 
reflection, Rousseau’s proofs were unmediated by the intellect.  His argument speaks 
directly to our hearts, and may be confirmed by the mind.  It intuitively makes sense.  
And it assumes, of course, that humankind is not sinful by nature.
Long before the Savoyard Vicar, then, Rousseau was preaching a form of 
Pelagianism.182  His vision of reform—of creating more virtuous bonds in an 
unnatural world, thereby reinstituting our natural freedom—presupposed this positive 
foundation of natural goodness.  Freed from Adam’s legacy, we might drastically 
improve our fates; an innocent nature suggested nothing less.  This assertion that 
untainted by society, we would seek what is best for ourselves and those around us, 
therefore preceded the more explicit denial of Original Sin found in Emile.  But the 
essential charge remained: the problem of vice is social, and therefore of man’s 
making, not ontological, or of God’s making.  Adam’s legacy was swiftly debunked, 
replaced by an unnecessarily self-incurred fall.
Vice came from without, from the advent of social relations in denatured
societies.  How, then, did society emerge?183  Humankind, increasing in numbers, 
aligned in herds, free associations held together by passing needs, limited obligations, 
181 Second Discourse.  CW III.38; OC III.156.
182 For a further discussion of this connection see Chapter 3 below.
183 For Rousseau’s full account see: Second Discourse, CW III.43-55; OC III.164-179.
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and immediate interests.  From this occurred the “first revolution”: the familial unit,
where language and conjugal love develop.  Families over time evolved into tribes, 
which in turn gave rise to social distinctions and morality, virtue and vice.  The 
turning point occurred when “[t]he first person who, having fenced off a plot of 
ground, took it into his head to say this is mine and found people simple enough to 
believe him.”184  This concept of private property, the true foundation of civil society 
and an idea born slowly over time, led us to “forget that the fruits belong to all and 
the Earth to no one.”185  It also transformed natural inequalities into social 
inequalities.  The stronger and the smarter, for example, used these natural benefits to 
acquire property, and establish and secure social institutions that privileged the fruits 
of their labors.  The dangerous pride of possessive self-interest subsequently took 
root, and the rest, as they say, is history—woeful, at that.
Rousseau’s narrative was received by many as the pessimistic polemic of a 
deranged luddite.  Prodded by his paradoxes, people not only vilified the Genevan; 
they also misread him.  He was most commonly charged with promoting a retarding 
socialism, with seeking to send us back to egalitarian nature, tails between our legs.  
As Voltaire put it, “[o]ne acquires the desire to walk on all fours when one reads your 
work.”186  But Rousseau’s ideas were far more threatening.  In an age of progress and 
perfectionism, he dared to propose that human development had ambivalent 
consequences.  To Christian nations, he had the temerity to reject Original Sin.  And 
against the upper classes, he attacked property generally and vested interests 
specifically.  His pessimism and optimism alike were affronts to the age.
184 Second Discourse.  CW III.43; OC III.164.
185 Second Discourse.  CW III.43; OC III.164.
186 Letter from Voltaire to Rousseau (August 30, 1755).  CW III.102; CC III.317.157.
68
Rousseau made plain that humankind neither should nor can (by definition) 
return to a pre-human existence.  We might and must, however, redirect the miserable 
course of our history.  We must redouble our efforts not on an impossible return, but 
on social solutions which redeem and protect natural freedom and goodness, while 
correcting the damage wrought of artificial inequalities.
*   *   *   *   *
If history offers any indication, the odds of success seem unlikely.  After all, 
our fall was steady and precipitous; reversing this trend requires nothing less than 
social reformation.  On these points, the Second Discourse is unequivocal.  
Redressing our self-incurred wrongs calls for a radical reeducation, a pedagogy which 
both inures us to and recasts the social relationships which subject our freedom to the 
tyrannies of inequality and opinion.
It is thus that Rousseau’s educational treatise necessarily employs paradox.  
Not only does he challenge the educational paradigms of his age, he questions the 
very mechanisms of society, the very essence of contemporary opinion.  Chained by 
adverse attachments and desires, individuals might reclaim their natural goodness 
only by first resisting the coercive pull of social relations.   To reverse our fall we 
must strike at the heart of our misery, challenging opinions such as Original Sin 
(which leave us hopelessly at God’s post-mortem mercy), but also the opinions of our 
fellow creatures (which cultivate perverse passions and destructive desires). 
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If The Social Contract envisioned a good society to promote natural goodness, 
Emile wondered how individuals may preserve their goodness in a bad society.  We 
quickly learn that the well-educated individual—one raised in accord with nature—
must be sheltered from harmful influence.  As Rousseau advised in Book II of Emile, 
“the first education ought to be purely negative.  It consists not at all in teaching 
virtue or truth but in securing the heart from vice and the mind from error.”187
Education is negative in the defensive sense: it guards individuals against external 
corruption.  Such resistance is possible only if we allow children to develop their 
natural instinct and judgment.  “Reason alone teaches us to know good and bad,” 
Rousseau writes.  “Conscience, which makes us love the former and hate the latter, 
although independent of reason, cannot therefore be developed without it.”188
Conscience (emotion and will), not reason (mind and intellect) provides humankind 
with a natural moral compass.189  As the Vicar reminds, “I have only to consult 
myself about what I want to do.  Everything I sense to be good is good; everything I 
sense to be bad is bad.”190  Conscience, that “innate principle of justice and virtue 
according to which, in spite of our own maxims, we judge our actions and those of 
others as good or bad,”191 is nonetheless
timid; it likes refuge and peace.  The world and noise scare it; the 
prejudices from which they claim it is born are its cruelest enemies.  It 
flees or keeps quiet before them.  Their noisy voices stifle its voice and 
prevent it from making itself heard.  Fanaticism dares to counterfeit it 
and to dictate crime in its name.  It finally gives up as a result of being 
dismissed.”192
187 Emile.  E 93.
188 Emile.  E 67.
189 In this, Rousseau follows a classically voluntarist trope which identifies the will (and not the 
intellect) as humankind’s most Divine faculty.
190 Emile.  E 286.
191 Emile.  E 289.
192 Emile.  E 291.
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If Rousseau presupposed human goodness, he also assumed society’s perverseness.  
Conscience, a timid woodland creature, must therefore be nurtured in nature away 
from the prejudices of the cruel, noisy world.
Given this corrupting dynamic of social interactions, people require 
compelling force to follow their natural instincts.  Until they are capable of clear 
reasoning and sound judgment, pupils must be unknowing subjects discouraged from 
acquiring social attachments.  In Rousseau’s ominous words, “Let him always believe 
he is the master, and let it always be you who are.  There is no subjection so perfect 
as that which keeps the appearance of freedom.  Thus the will itself is made 
captive.”193
Emile’s positive moral lessons are also drawn in negative terms: “The only 
lesson of morality appropriate to childhood, and the most important for every age, is 
never to harm anyone.”194  We have already seen this “golden rule” introduced in the 
Second Discourse.  In addition, it draws upon a discussion of justice in the Republic
in which Socrates concludes that “it has become apparent to us that it is never just to 
harm anyone.”195  Rousseau also follows Luther, who argued that good works (which 
we can control, unlike motives or good faith) are no measure of a grace free of 
193 Emile.  E 120.  Sentences such as these do not help Rousseau’s reputation as a totalitarian thinker.  
The tutor-pupil role clearly evokes Antonio Gramsci’s definition of hegemony as a coercive system 
strengthened by its insidiousness.  In Rousseau’s defense, the control of a young pupil’s will is 
necessary for two reasons: first, youth are not yet developmentally capable of sound judgment and self-
rule; and second, his extreme stance is dictated by an extreme situation.  Raising people according to 
nature while shielding them from society demands holding their uncorrupted wills in captivity.  The 
Tutor must “force” Emile to be free in order to manipulate his pupil to follow his natural conscience.  
Readers should compare this to The Social Contract, I.VII: “whoever refuses to obey the general will 
shall be constrained to do so by the entire body; which means only that he will be forced to be free.”  
CW IV.141; OC III.364.
194 Emile.  E 104.
195 The Republic I.335e (Bloom 13).
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contrivance.196  Good works do not offer a normative moral standard, for “[w]ho does 
not do good?  Everybody does it—the wicked man as well as others.  He makes one 
man happy at the expense of making a hundred men miserable; and this is the source 
of all our calamities.”197  What is good for one is not necessarily good for many.
Recalling Rousseau’s study of inequality, this simple reminder reinforces the 
dangers of particular self-interest, even when acted upon under the auspices of public 
good.  The architects of Lisbon, for example, may well have believed that they were 
serving society’s best interests in building the eighteenth-century equivalent of sky-
scrapers.  But the earthquake of 1755, and the subsequent damage precipitated by the 
destruction of such unnatural constructions, multiplied our misery.198  As such, 
Rousseau concludes that caution is sometimes in order.  “The most sublime virtues 
are negative” because restraint reduces the likelihood that we will harm our 
fellows.199
Finally, even the Savoyard Vicar begins his sermon with a negative lesson.  In 
matters of speculation he learns “to limit my researches to what was immediately 
related to my interest, to leave myself in a profound ignorance of all the rest, and to 
worry myself to the point of doubt only about things it was important for me to 
196 For Luther, a good heart (not good works) reveals the depth of human faith.  If anything, good 
works are misleading, allowing those of impure motives an easy way of serving God.  Clearly for 
Luther, “ease” had no role in true piousness.  As he writes in Preface to the Epistle of Saint Paul to the 
Romans: “God judges according to your inmost convictions; His law must be fulfilled in your very 
heart, and cannot be obeyed if you merely perform certain acts.”  And in The Freedom of a Christian: 
“Let this suffice concerning the inner man, his liberty, and the source of his liberty, the righteousness 
of faith.  He needs neither laws nor good works but, on the contrary, is injured by them if he believes 
that he is justified by them.” From: Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings, pp. 20, 66-67.
197 Emile.  E 105.
198 Readers should consult Pope’s Essay on Man and Voltaire’s Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne.
199 Emile.  E 105.
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know.”200  Against the vain grasp of philosophers generally and the dysfunctional 
doubt of skeptics specifically, he preaches the practical value of self-imposed limits.
Following these examples, Emile’s tutelage may be described as negative in at 
least four respects.  First, it reflects a critical assessment of contemporary education.  
Second, it understands virtue as a passive value (doing “no harm” rather than doing 
“some good”).  Third, it describes development as a process of sheltering and 
resistance.  And fourth, it guards against the cultivation of unnatural desires, urges 
defined by the weakness of unnecessary want or perceived lack.
In brief, Emile’s education finds fortitude through resistance.  As late as Book 
IV Jean-Jacques notes with some satisfaction that “[o]pinion, whose actions [Emile] 
sees, has not acquired its empire over him.”201  Soon after, he writes that “[i]t suffices 
that, enclosed in a social whirlpool, [Emile] not let himself get carried away by either 
the passions or the opinions of men.”202  And finally, we are asked “who in the world 
is less of an imitator than Emile?  Who is less governed by ridicule than the man who 
has no prejudices and does not know how to concede anything to those of others?”203
In other words, who is more immune to the empire of opinion than the Tutor’s prized 
pupil?
Rousseau’s education inures Emile to the opinions of others, and for as long 
as possible.  But why?  Prior to Vicar’s Profession of Faith, he justifies this practice 
in terms reminiscent of the Second Discourse’s fall.  Amidst a discussion on love, 
200 Emile.  E 269.  Rousseau reiterates this claim (in his “own” voice) in the Reveries.  Describing how 
he overcame the doubts instilled in him by his philosophe peers which left him “not wiser, more 
learned, or of better faith than when I settled all those great questions,” he concludes that “I therefore 
limited myself to what was within my reach, without getting myself involved in what went beyond it.”  
See: Reveries (Third Promenade).  CW VIII.25; OC I.1021-1022.
201 Emile.  E 244.
202 Emile.  E 255.
203 Emile.  E 331.
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Rousseau describes the evolution of human attachment.  We begin with hearts 
naturally overflowing with love, yet lacking companionship.  In a desire to secure 
reciprocal adoration, we acquire a mistress.  This new intimacy in turn creates a 
correlative need for friendship.  From this apparently harmless (and undoubtedly 
natural) pull, we suddenly fall prey to the opinions of others.  “With love and 
friendship are born dissensions, enmity, and hate.  From the bosom of so many 
diverse passions I see opinion raising an unshakable throne, and stupid mortals, 
subjected to its empire, basing their own existence on the judgment of others.”204
The turn of events is somewhat shocking.  We start, innocently enough, with 
pure hearts and motives, and end under the rule of doxa’s “unshakable throne,” 
trapped by the attachments to which we were naturally drawn.  Here, then, is the 
evolution of amour-de-soi to amour-propre described in social terms, with no less 
disastrous consequences.  To preserve Emile’s freedom and natural goodness, the 
Tutor must occlude his reliance upon others.  The impressionable youth must rely 
upon the singular judgment of his ward until he is capable of self-legislation.  He 
must be sheltered from society until he is strong enough to resist its pull.
The pupil must also avoid exposure to that which his mind cannot yet 
comprehend.  This is why the Tutor withholds religion.  “I foresee how many readers 
will be surprised at seeing me trace the whole first age of my pupil without speaking 
to him of religion,” Rousseau writes.  “At fifteen he did not know whether he had a 
soul.  And perhaps at eighteen it is not yet time to learn it; for if he learns it sooner 
than he ought, he runs the risk of never knowing it.”205  The argument is logistical, 
204 Emile.  E 215.
205 Emile.  E 257.
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not theological.  Children are not developmentally capable of understanding religion, 
any more than they are capable of fine reasoning or self-rule.  Rousseau therefore 
does “not see what is gained by teaching [catechisms] to children, unless it be that 
they learn how to lie early.”206  The mysteries of God and divinity are lost on youth 
for whom, “[a]t the age when everything is mystery, there are no mysteries strictly 
speaking.”207  If “[t]he obligation to believe assumes the possibility of doing so,” 
children are simply not able.208
Where the Second Discourse painted in broad, sweeping strokes, Emile is 
much more specific.  The Church requires children to learn lessons contrary to 
nature.209  It inundates pupils with ideas which they cannot yet comprehend.  This 
emphasis on rote repetition reflects a more significant problem: by privileging their 
own hollow platitudes, the Church fails to cultivate genuine faith.  If “[i]t is especially 
in matters of religion that opinion triumphs,” there is no greater culprit than a Church 
whose righteous opinions take the dangerous form of aggressively intolerant 
gospel.210
By Rousseau’s description, papists also ground their authority on a tautology: 
“The Church decides that the Church has the right to decide.”211  The certainty of 
their judgment is matched only by the circularity of their logic.  More dangerously, 
the dogmatism of this conviction breeds despotic conformity.  Presaging Rousseau’s 
own censure, the Vicar asks “what is there to do?  If someone dared to publish among 
206 Emile.  E 257.
207 Emile.  E 257.
208 Emile.  E 257.
209 Given Rousseau’s description of nature as a product (and reflection) of the divine will, this also 
represented an offense against God.
210 Emile.  E 260.
211 Emile.  E 304.
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us books in which Judaism were openly favored, we would punish the author, the
publisher, the bookseller.  This is a convenient and sure policy for always being right.  
There is a pleasure in refuting people who do not dare to speak.”212
Rousseau was no deliberative democrat, as the Social Contract makes clear.213
But neither was he a totalitarian.214  The general will is by definition the will shared 
by all in common, not the will imposed upon us from above.  By contrast, the Church 
would have us believe that they alone possess true faith, and criminalize opposing 
visions.  But if we simply look around us, piety is evident in all peoples.  “Cast your 
eyes on all the nations of the world, go through all the histories,” the Vicar urges.  
“Among so many inhuman and bizarre cults, among this prodigious diversity of 
morals and characters, you will find everywhere the same ideas of justice and 
decency, everywhere the same notions of good and bad.”215  Even in Pagan cultures 
has “[t]he holy voice of nature, stronger than that of the gods, made itself respected 
212 Emile.  E 303-304.  In an author’s note, Rousseau earlier takes the Stoics to task for similarly 
discounting the value of discussion: “Plutarch reports that the Stoics maintained, among other bizarre 
paradoxes, that in an adversary proceeding it was useless to hear the two parties.” (E 302n)  The 
reference is to Plutarch’s essay “On Stoic Self-Contradictions,” 1034E: “Against him who said / Nor 
give your verdict till you’ve heard both sides / Zeno asserted the contrary with an argument something 
like this: The second speaker must not be heard whether the former speaker proved his case (for then 
the inquiry is at an end) or did not prove it (for that is tantamount to his not having appeared when 
summoned or to having responded to the summons with mere gibberish); but either he proved his case 
or he did not prove it; therefore, the second speaker must not be heard.  After he had propounded this 
argument, however, he continued to write against Plato’s Republic, to refute sophisms, and to bid his 
pupils to learn dialectic on the ground that it enables one to do this.  Yet either Plato proved or did not 
prove what is in the Republic, and either way it was not necessary but was utterly superfluous and vain 
to write against it.  The same thing can be said about sophisms also.”  See: Plutarch, Moralia: Volume 
XIII, Part II, Harold Cherniss, tr. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 427 & 429.  
213 See: The Social Contract Book II, Chapter 3, “Whether the General Will Can Err.”
214 For “totalitarian” critiques of Rousseau see: Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy; 
Crocker, Rousseau’s Social Contract; Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty; Huizinga, The Self Made Saint.  
Arthur M. Melzer also argues that Rousseau promotes an “antiliberal” democracy “not to establish, but 
to eliminate men’s rights against the state.  All private, natural rights are to be totally alienated in 
exchange for political rights, for a share in control over the absolute and unlimited state.”  At the very 
least, this reading misappropriates Rousseau’s strict division between general (public) and particular 
(private) rights, and obscures his definition of the general will as the will that each individual shares in 
common.  See: The Natural Goodness of Man, p. 109.
215 Emile.  E 288.
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on earth and seemed to regulate crime, along with the guilty, to heaven.”216  Well 
before the Church, reverence of nature—much like pitié and more than polytheism—
served a normative social function in the form of a regulative moral code.  Its 
authority was rooted not in the sophistication of human reasoning, but in a simple 
appreciation of the natural world order.  It is in such divine—not human—creations 
that we may find evidence of the “Author of all things,” and glean necessary 
inspiration from His perfection.
By forcing us to comply to their mediated vision, Christians ironically debase 
faith and breed intolerance.  Speaking on salvation, the Vicar explains: “You must 
believe in God to be saved.  This dogma badly understood is the principle of 
sanguinary intolerance and the cause of all those vain instructions that strike a fatal 
blow to human reason in accustoming it to satisfy itself with words.”217  But 
salvation, like true piety, is more than a matter of rote repetition: “if in order to obtain 
it, it is enough to repeat certain words, I do not see what prevents us from peopling 
heaven with starlings and magpies just as well as with children.”218
If the Church parades dogma as spirituality, reduces worship to compulsory 
recitation, and peddles it to unawares, what is Rousseau’s alternative vision of true 
religion?  What is genuine faith?  It appears as a form of both rational appreciation 
and an awareness of the limitations of human reason: appreciating God’s creation, 
and accepting the incomprehensible wisdom of his order.  As the Vicar expounds,
216 Emile.  E 288-289.
217 Emile.  E 257.
218 Emile.  E 257.  For a similar argument, readers should also consult Montaigne’s Of Pedantry in The 
Complete Essays of Montaigne, Donald M. Frame, tr. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 
97-106.
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The greatest ideas of the divinity come to us from reason alone.  View 
the spectacle of nature; hear the inner voice.  Has God not told 
everything to our eyes, to our conscience, to our judgment?  What 
more will men tell us?  Their revelations have only the effect of 
degrading God by giving Him human passions.  I see that particular 
dogmas, far from clarifying the notions of the great Being, confuse 
them; that far from ennobling them, they debase them; that to the 
inconceivable mysteries surrounding the great Being they add absurd 
contradictions; that they make man proud, intolerant, and cruel; that, 
instead of establishing peace on earth, they bring sword and fire to it.  I 
ask myself what good all this does, without knowing what to answer.  I 
see in it only the crimes of men and the miseries of mankind.219
Teaching by negation, we learn that religion is not a particularly misguided vision of 
God.  It is not the imposition of human passions upon a Being surely devoid of these 
qualities.  If the Author of all things is characterized by immaculate order, 
contradictions and confusions do not describe him.  If he is a wise, benevolent deity 
who loves his creations, his worship should not facilitate cruel intolerance.  To 
understand religion we must first reject the dogmas preached by an historically 
violent church and look to nature, whose wonder and coherent order is a clearer 
testament of God’s grace than any catechism.
Although spoken by the Vicar, the charge reveals themes consistent with 
Rousseau’s own beliefs.  Foremost amongst them is his abhorrence of mediation.220
Papists have attributed vengeance and justified bloodshed to the service of a surely 
munificent God.  And in so doing, they have committed an act of vile 
transubstantiation, imputing their own malicious, particular interests to the One they 
purportedly serve.  As Rousseau later writes in the first of his Letters Written From 
the Mountain, his enemies “put themselves in the place of God to do the work of the 
219 Emile.  E 295.
220 In Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, Starobinski persuasively identifies this 
love of immediacy and detestation of mediation as the unifying theme of Rousseau’s oeuvres.
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Devil.”221  Entranced by “that dangerous amour-propre which always wants to carry 
men above his sphere,” they have lowered God to ours while placing themselves in-
between.222
The empire of their opinion knows no bounds.  The papacy has extended their 
rule to the heavens.  They would have us accept their interpretation as gospel, and 
God as their puppet.  “As soon as peoples took it into their heads to make God speak, 
each made Him speak in its own way and made Him say what it wanted,” the Vicar 
laments. 223  Yet “[i]f one had listened only to what God says to the heart of man, 
there would never have been more than one religion on earth.”224
This argument for religious tolerance is grounded in a classically voluntarist 
belief in the impenetrable mysteries of divinity.  Neither Rousseau, nor the Vicar, nor 
M. de Beaumont can tell us who God really is, what He looks like, or when He speaks 
only to us.225  And unlike mythic Pagan history, such interpretations have served 
decidedly unvirtuous ends.  Instead of solidifying universal brotherhood, the Church 
has used dogma and Scripture to create divisions, to bring blood and fire upon the 
earth of God’s creation.  Instead of affirming the truth that God created us all, they 
221 Letters Written From the Mountain (First Letter).  OC III.697; CW.IX.141.
222 Emile.  E 296.
223 Emile.  E 295.
224 Emile.  E 295.
225 Although voiced by the Vicar, this mirrors Rousseau’s own condemnation of miracles as vain 
presumptions that God would take the time to speak directly to select individuals.  In this position, 
Rousseau follows Malebranche, who argued that God was defined by simplicity and consistency in His 
perfection, not intrusion into the particular affairs of humankind.  In Elucidations of the Search After 
Truth, Malebranche says that sinners “would have God perform miracles in their favor and not follow 
the ordinary laws of grace.”   More directly, in the Fourth of his Dialogues on Metaphysics, he states 
that “God never performs miracles.  He never acts by special volitions contrary to His own laws which 
Order does not require or permit.  His conduct always manifests the character of His attributes.”  
Miracles clearly “do not follow His general laws.” (Eighth Dialogue)  From: Nicolas Malebranche: 
Philosophical Selections, Steven Nadler, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1992), 
pp. 109, 188-189, 242.  For a convincing, clear and thorough discussion of this connection see: Riley, 
The General Will Before Rousseau.
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cultivate violent artificial boundaries.  Yet rather than accept such deadly 
interpretations as God’s word, we can (and should) intuitively feel His existence, and 
recognize our common bond as His creations.  This heartfelt sentiment is confirmed 
by observation: by appreciating the world of his making, by finding examples of 
pious love and fraternity in peoples of all nations.
Following in the Protestant tradition, the Vicar reminds us to 
not confuse the ceremony of religion with religion itself.  The worship 
God asks for is that of the heart.  And that worship, when it is sincere, 
is always uniform.  One must be possessed of a mad vanity indeed to 
imagine that God takes so great an interest in the form of the priest’s 
costume, in the order of the words he pronounces, in the gestures he 
makes at the altar, and in all his genuflections.226
Worship is a matter of individual conscience, not conformity to sectarian ceremony.  
If God truly presides over this and all other worlds, his adulation should be equally 
unconstrained.  This, after all, “is the duty of all religions, all countries, all men” who 
serve a (or more precisely the) single deity.227
Beyond that, particular forms of worship are somewhat arbitrary.228  “The 
226 Emile.  E 296.
227 Emile.  E 296
228 Paolo Toscanelli (1397-1482), an accomplished mathematician and scholar, believed that ships 
could sail to Asia far more quickly than had previously been imagined by altering traditional westward 
routes.  He presented a chart of his findings to the Court of Portugal.  Although King John II was wary, 
Christopher Columbus—then a mapmaker and entrepreneur—was intrigued.  This conclusion 
reaffirmed the work of classical geographer Marinus of Tyre, the travelogues of Venetian merchant 
Marco Polo, and Columbus’ own study of the Apocrypha (particularly II Esdras 6:42) that argued the 
earth was almost entirely (six-sevenths) composed of land. Armed with Toscanelli’s support, 
Columbus eventually convinced the Spanish monarchy (under Ferdinand) to fund an Oriental 
expedition.  This voyage, of course, led him eastwards, where he “discovered” a New World inhabited 
by “savages”—peoples untouched by Christianity.
Columbus’ accidental discovery led many others to follow his mistaken path to the Americas.  
One of these explorers was his friend Amerigo Vespucci who, beginning in 1502, made several
voyages to the New World.  It was during this period that Vespucci’s cousin Agostino served as both 
confidant and assistant to Niccolo Machiavelli (assisting, for example, on an ambitious engineering 
project of Machiavelli’s between 1503 and 1506).  Machiavelli, famously denounced by Jesuits, 
Humanists, Roman Catholics, counter-Reformationists, Huguenots, and French Monarchists (amongst 
others) was seen as an intellectual threat to the political and philosophical dominance of Christian 
theology in the pre-Enlightenment world.
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faith of children and of many men is a question of geography.”229  Choice of religion 
is likewise “the effect of chance; to blame [non-Catholics] for it is iniquitous.  It is to 
reward or punish them for being born in this or in that country.  To dare to say that 
God judges us in this way is to insult His justice.”230  Intolerance is anything but 
pious.  As the Vicar elaborates, “[i]f there were a religion on earth outside of whose 
worship there was only eternal suffering, and if in some place in the world a single 
mortal of good faith had not been struck by its obviousness, the God of that religion 
would be the most iniquitous and cruel of tyrants.”231
But He is not.  His justice and grace are both indisputable and universal, and 
must be confirmed by appealing to conscience and reason, not dogmatism and 
Machiavelli’s godlessness was widely assumed, although (like Rousseau) he is more 
accurately described as anticlerical.  His Discourses identify religion as a crucial catalyst to ancient 
Rome’s republican virtue: Numa, not Solon, is credited with this accomplishment. Machiavelli’s 
blatant hostility towards the church is storied, but his connection to the New World explorers often 
goes unnoticed.  The two, I believe, are related.
Christianity assumed a privileged role amongst religions because it was said its missionaries 
graced the entire world.  The exposure of a vast continent of peoples untouched by the hand of a 
Christian God severely tested this supposition.  Machiavelli, closely privy to such information, was 
certainly aware of this demystifying discovery, whose influence may be gleaned in his denouncement 
of the Church.  The argument Rousseau makes in the Emile on the arbitrariness of particular forms of 
worship—written especially in rebuttal to the Papal order—similarly assumes that non-Christians may 
be pious, even if they are ignorant of the Church raised in His name.  In so doing, he draws upon 
precisely such discoveries of heathen lands.
Consider this argument posed by the Vicar: “Two-thirds of mankind are neither Jews nor 
Mohammedans nor Christians, and how many million men have never heard of Moses, Jesus Christ, or 
Mohammed?  This is denied; it is maintained that our missionaries go everywhere.  That is easily said.  
But do they go into the still unknown heart of Africa,… to deepest Tartary,” Japan or Asia?  “Do they 
go into the immense continents of America, where whole nations still do not know that peoples from 
another world have set foot in theirs?” (E 304)  The conclusion is glaring: Christianity is just another 
religion.  This argument rests specifically upon the discovery of “the immense continents of America” 
(also the subject of Rousseau’s early opera, La Découverte du Nouveau Monde), and its non-Christian 
communities.  Given this evidence, deism is the only form of piety capable of reconciling the universal 
truth God’s existence with the seeming savagery of a continent untouched by the Church’s mores.
Readers should consult: Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Julia Conaway Bondanella and 
Peter Bondanella, trs. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), I.11, pp. 50-53; La Découverte du 
Nouveau Monde.  OC I.815-841; CW X.12-36.  In addition, I am grateful to Roger D. Masters for 
bringing this matter to my attention, and taking the time to sketch its significance.
229 Emile.  E 258.
230 Emile.  E 297.
231 Emile.  E 297.
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revelation.  As the Vicar quips, it matters not what the Church commands in questions 
of faith: “I need reasons for subjecting my reason.”232  Demonstrative proofs, not 
human mediation, reveal the will of God: “When I believe what he says, it is not 
because he says it but because he proves it.  Therefore the testimony of men is at 
bottom only that of my own reason and adds nothing to the natural means God gave 
me for knowing the truth.”233
The Church therefore deals in the worst form of sophism, a manipulation of 
opinion which compromises our highest, most natural relationship.  Consider the 
following paragraph, written with an indignation worthy of Luther:
Apostle of the truth, what then have you to tell me of which I do not 
remain the judge?  “God Himself has spoken.  Hear His revelation.”  
That is something else.  God has spoken!  That is surely a great 
statement.  To whom has He spoken?  “He has spoken to men.” Why, 
then, did I hear nothing about it?  “He has directed other men to give 
you His word.”  I understand: it is men who are going to tell me what 
God has said.  I should have preferred to have heard God himself.  It 
would have cost Him nothing more, and I would have been sheltered 
from seduction.234
This is a mock dialogue in both senses of the word.  Taking the form of a hypothetical 
conversation with a cleric, it ridicules the idea that only a select few may mediate and 
dictate our relationship with God.  The very suggestion leaves the Vicar incensed.  
“What!  Always human testimony?  Always men who report to me what other men 
have reported!  So many men between God and me!”235  So many fallible human 
opinions perverting the practice of faith!  So many meddlers confounding the natural 
purity of conscience!
232 Emile.  E 297.
233 Emile.  E 297.
234 Emile.  E 297.
235 Emile.  E 297.
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Rousseau was not simply nay-saying.  He firmly believed that dogmatism 
discouraged the pious adoration of God.  In dictating the terms of external worship, 
papal intrusion into corporeal affairs carries unjust consequences.  Specific religious 
customs, accidents of history and geography but also the free interpretations of the 
Divinity’s creatures, are a matter settled amongst citizens, not man and God.  “As to 
the external worship,” the Vicar advises, “if it must be uniform for the sake of good 
order, that is purely a question of public policy; no revelation is needed for that.”236
Religious custom boils down to a political question of “public policy”; its form must 
support the “good order” of strong civil society.237
This is a social prescription, one which presses upon us the necessity for 
living in mutual harmony.  Papists (like philosophers) sacrifice society’s general 
welfare for the sake of their own (particular) interests.  Rousseau, by contrast, insists 
that all forms of religion must be allowed so long as they encourage virtuous 
(general) order.  Conversely, sects which divide and conquer must be banned; they 
serve neither God nor state.  This becomes a problem of practical fruition, one whose 
difficulty is compounded by Rousseau’s own claims.  We are innocent by nature and 
literally guilty by association.  Our fall was ushered by our interactions in society, 
which corrupt individual virtue.  If the empire of opinion (a ripe phenomenon 
amongst religious sects) is particularly blameworthy, how might we find a religion 
which retains its civic benefits while avoiding its social pitfalls?
Rousseau outlined his solutions in Emile and The Social Contract, but his 
prescriptions were overshadowed by the grating character of his paradoxes.  Jean 
236 Emile.  E 296.
237 Readers should consult Rousseau’s concept of Civil Religion in The Social Contract, IV.8 and the 
Geneva Manuscript, Book III, both of which I discuss elsewhere in detail.
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Starobinski illuminates the irony of this predicament, noting that “Rousseau made 
himself a stranger to man in order to protect against the alienation that makes men 
strangers to one another.”238  His “renunciation of the world’s vanities and… 
conversion to ‘another moral world’239 took Rousseau not toward the Church but 
toward the forest and the life of the vagabond.”240  It would still take Rousseau some 
ten years after Emile’s publication to return to the woods for good, to reintroduce 
himself to botany and write his final works.  But his estrangement began long before 
his final retreat.
This rift was facilitated by Rousseau’s paradoxical nature.  It was also a 
consequence of his inimitable style, the force and certainty with which he pursued 
truth and exposed ideas.  Prior to 1762, Rousseau nonetheless cast blame elsewhere.  
It was the opinions of others which rightfully deserve the loaded label of paradox.  As 
he asserted in the Introduction to his Fragments politiques, 
But since I have learned through experience the damage that 
demonstrated propositions can suffer from being called Paradoxes, I 
am relieved to remove this resource in advance from those who have 
none other to argue against what I am about to prove.  I warn them, 
therefore, that it is the opinion I attack that should be called a paradox, 
as unheard of to this day as it is ridiculous and pernicious; and that by 
refuting this soft and effeminate Philosophy whose convenient maxims 
have won it so many supporters among us, I only add my voice to the 
cry of all nations, and plead the cause of common sense as well as that 
of society.241
This dual cause—of (naturally) good sense and social welfare—inspired his 
contrariness.  In the matter of religion, piety is essential and true to both society and 
238 Starobinski, p. 41
239 Starobinski’s reference is to the following quote: “Une grande révolution qui venoit de se faire en 
moi, un autre monde moral qui se devoiloit à mes regards…”  Reveries (Third Promenade).  OC
I.1015; CW VIII.20.
240 Starobinski, pp. 39-40.
241 Political Fragments 1.  CW IV.46; OC III.518.
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human nature.  God’s very magnificence—the scope and effect of his will—reminds 
us of his existence, and our mutually-supportive duties as His creations.  But the faith 
of men as dictated by the Catholic Church discourages such reverence.
As Rousseau’s paradoxes grew even more specific they elicited more severe 
consequences.  Just as he was compelled to write as he felt, so did he feel compelled 
to defend himself from mounting attacks.  In the self-justifying works following 
1762, he turned to readers to rescue him from the judgments levied by his age.  Too 
many men of power had too many interests vested in the ideas he opposed.  This, 
finally, is why Rousseau begged “common readers” to pardon him his paradoxes; 
they were, supposedly, written on behalf of the people to whom he appealed.
His request of pardon still belies the insistence of his prose.  Paradox was 
necessary, Rousseau writes—and therefore not, strictly speaking, a matter of choice.  
But common people—of society, and also of God and nature—might still choose.  
Pardon him?  The choice is ultimately left neither to Church nor state nor academy, 
but to fellow men and citizens.  Defending the Vicar’s deism in his Letters Written 
From the Mountain, Rousseau makes the question characteristically blunt:
[T]he doctrine in question is good for the human race and bad for its 
oppressors.  In what absolute category must it be put?  I have faithfully 
stated the pros and cons.  Compare and choose.242
Was he right or wrong, decent or vicious, worthy of praise or blame?  In the end, was 
his belief in man’s innocence, society’s guilt, and divine beneficence of any use to the 
human race?  Such are the choices laid before us.  Our response either redeems 
Rousseau’s perplexing paradoxes, or casts them from the realm of virtuous reverie to 
one of well-forgotten memory.
242 Letters Written From the Mountain (First Letter).  CW IX.146; OC III.702.
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Chapter 3: A Claim of Innocence
And so it was “not I” that brought this about “but sin which dwelt in me,” sin 
resulting from the punishment of a more freely chosen sin, because I was a son of 
Adam.
—Augustine, Confessions243
True innocence is ashamed of nothing.
—Rousseau, Emile244
When Rousseau begged us to pardon his paradoxes,245 the request was hardly 
hollow.  The proliferation of contradictory thought—at odds with others and, 
according to critics,246 itself—gives us ample opportunity to do so.  The decision is 
still ours to make, but before either granting or denying Rousseau his wish we might 
revisit his most compelling, controversial (and hence potentially unpardonable) 
paradox: namely, innocence.
243 Saint Augustine, Confessions, Henry Chadwick, tr. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991),  
VII.x.22, p. 149.  Augustine’s Biblical reference is to Romans 7:17, 20.
244 Emile.  E 217.
245 Emile.  E 93; OC IV.323.
246 Most notably J.H. Huizinga who, citing Benjamin Constant, writes that Rousseau “thrashes about 
among a thousand contrary ideas as in a dark night lit up by frequent flashes of lightening.”  Rousseau: 
The Self-Made Saint, p. 268.  Huizinga also lists amongst Rousseau’s notable critics William Ralph 
Inge, a Christian Platonist and dean of London’s St. Paul’s Cathedral.  “The influence of this 
sentimental rhetorician,” Inge wrote, “has perhaps been more pernicious than that of any other man 
who has ever lived.”  Inge, Christian Ethics and Modern Problems. (New York: The Knickerbocker 
Press, 1930), pp. 249-250.  French literary critic Jules Lemaître (“thanks to human credulity and 
stupidity no man had ever done more harm to mankind than the writer who, it seems, hardly knew 
what he was writing”) and François Mauriac, 1952 winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature (“the 
modern era is rooted in his lies… It has taken a century and a half for his poison to accomplish its 
work”) likewise saw Rousseau’s legacy as catastrophic.  See also: Jules Lemaître, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau. (New York: The McClure Company, 1907); François Mauriac, Trois grands hommes devant 
Dieu. (Paris: Editions du capitale, 1930).
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Throughout his works, Rousseau maintained his innocence in three crucial 
senses:247 as an individual whose writings revealed a uniquely good soul bared to the 
public; as a human being, an ontological claim that contradicted the orthodox 
Christian narrative of Original Sin; and as a defendant, a refutation of the charges 
levied against him following the publications of Emile and The Social Contract.  
Despite his paradoxes, Rousseau claimed his oeuvres were characterized by their 
consistency.248  A thread linking his most provocative positions, innocence offers a 
means of locating this continuity.
Such common ground is particularly helpful when reconciling Rousseau’s 
religious and political beliefs.  After all, his spiritual optimism (epitomized by his 
rejection of Original Sin) and social pessimism (revealed in his stark critiques of 
contemporary society and human history) seem to push readers in opposite directions.  
Rousseau framed the fall of humankind in decidedly Edenic terms as a genealogy of 
decline from a blissful natural state to one corrupted by illegitimate societal chains.  
Yet he based this dour history upon an optimistic heresy, a renunciation of Original 
Sin and correlative faith in the intrinsic goodness of man.
This paradoxical stance left him open to charges of hypocrisy.  A virulent 
social critic who exalted human nature, Rousseau insisted that society had corrupted 
otherwise benevolent creatures.  Marveling at the wonder of a natural world alienated 
by human artifice, he urged us to follow our God-given consciences and embrace our 
divinely-created natures.  This is a refrain sung throughout Rousseau’s writings, one 
247 Together, this triple claim evokes the four major senses of innocence cited by the Oxford English 
Dictionary: “freedom from sin, guilt, or moral wrong in general” or “moral purity”; “freedom from 
specific guilt” or “not being guilty of that with which one is charged”; “freedom from cunning or 
artifice” or “guilelessness”; and “harmlessness, innocuousness.”
248 As I later discuss, Rousseau makes this consistency central to his defense of Emile.
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concisely captured in Emile’s famous opening line: “Everything is good as it leaves 
the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man.”249
An individual uniquely attuned to this intrinsic goodness, Rousseau presented himself 
as a testament to the possibility of regeneration.250
Of course, as his autobiographical writings make clear, Jean-Jacques was no 
saint.  Far from it, his life was characterized by impulsiveness and fluctuation, from 
his early abandonment of Geneva, to his rather capricious conversion to Catholicism, 
to his sudden epiphany on the road to Vincennes.  He was also guilty of what is 
generally considered unsavory or immoral behavior: romantic affairs, indecent 
exposure, lies and theft.  A man of such blatantly self-described faults who frequently 
succumbed to his overwhelming passions should hardly claim absolution from guilt.  
Yet for Rousseau, innocence was rooted in something deeper than acts: namely the 
goodness of our natural will, a faculty often led astray by social interactions.251
Given his own suspect personal history, such self-exculpation proved 
unconvincing to the many who found him abjectly guilty of crimes against the 
church, his patrie, and his religion, and breaches of friendship, civic duty, and 
249 Emile.  E 37.
250 By this, I do not mean to suggest that Rousseau asks us to follow his life as a model.  After all, it is 
not entirely evident that this is possible.  Consider, for example, his emphasis upon his uniqueness (the 
prefatory note to The Confessions describes the work as “the only portrait of a man, painted exactly 
according to nature and in all its truth, that exists and that probably will ever exist”), and discrepancies 
between his own autonomous education (self-directed immersion and remarkable erudition) and that of 
Emile’s (which, under the guidance of a highly controlling tutor, actively discourages reading).  I do 
believe that Rousseau reveals himself as a testament to the possibility of living more naturally.  If he 
himself is an anomaly, his life is still exemplary, and therefore serves a heuristic purpose.
251 As Rousseau writes in Emile, “let us set down as an incontestable maxim that the first movements 
of nature are always right.  There is no original perversity in the human heart.”  By contrast, “there is 
not a single vice to be found in it of which it cannot be said how and whence it entered.”  Because the 
natural will never errs and all vice is artificially constructed, actions guided by inner sentiment follow 
innocent motives.  A return to our innocent nature occurs only in society through this act of free will.  
Emile. E 92.  For the foundation of this argument see: Second Discourse.  CW III.36-38; OC III.155-
157.
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philosophic decorum.  Condemned as an author, an individual, and a human being, 
his claim of innocence also constituted a self-defense.  Pardoning Rousseau this 
paradox therefore determines his culpability—where he errs, where his accusers make 
legitimate claims, and (most broadly) where his renunciation of guilt informs a 
coherent philosophical vision rather than a convenient self-acquittal.
Whatever the verdict, Rousseau’s triple claim of innocence can hardly be 
confined to a question of individual reputation.  More than a matter of narrow 
interest, it underlies his faith in both religion as a virtuous moral guide and 
democracy as the self-rule of essentially good creatures.  Do his caustic accusations 
and personal misdeeds compromise this optimism?  More specifically, does his 
renunciation of Original Sin stand at irreconcilable odds with his deeply pessimistic 
view of human society?  Or does Rousseau’s paradoxical insistence unfold as a 
compelling catalyst for politico-theological reform?
To investigate these questions, we will begin by addressing Rousseau’s 
testament of personal innocence particularly as revealed in his Confessions.  Next we 
will turn to a discussion of Pelagianism as the foundation of his religious thought, a 
creed he most clearly develops in the voice of the Savoyard Vicar.  We will then 
explore his response to the charges raised in the censure of Emile, a defense in which 
Rousseau reiterates both his individual and ontological innocence.  After examining 
this concept in its three major guises, we will be poised to judge the coherence and 
cohesion of his claim.  In so doing, we will determine not only whether we may 
pardon him his most illustrious paradox; we may also see how this controversial 
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notion illuminates the dialectic between spiritual perfectionism and secular pessimism 
so central to his political philosophy.
*   *   *   *   *
To read Rousseau as he requested we must allow him his manifold paradoxes 
while struggling to find unity between his many discourses and novels, letters and 
plays, treatises and personal reveries.  Reading Rousseau therefore demands not 
simply a strong constitution; it also requires a good deal of patience.  To hold him to 
his oft-repeated claims of consistency and honesty, utility and acuity, we must treat 
his massive oeuvre as an old Genevan watch: dissect it with courage and caution, 
while wondering whether the parts still fit a working whole.
Answers are far from self-evident.  In different styles and tones Rousseau 
revealed sharply different takes on humankind’s past (a descent from natural harmony 
to artificial subjugation), present (a disastrous empire of opinion guided by academic 
and papal hubris), and possible future (legitimizing the chains of our mutual 
attachments through radical democratic reform).  The very faculties—free will, 
imagination, sociability—that contributed to our decline allowed us the possibility of 
redemption.  This purported solution was further complicated by Rousseau’s 
subversiveness: both his pessimistic realism and optimistic perfectionism were based 
upon stark critiques of his own age.
Rousseau’s contentious, contradictory methodology clearly evokes the role of 
Socrates, the gadfly immortalized for his prodding attempts to awaken the great, lazy 
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beast that was Athens.252  In delivering his social criticism as the accusations of a 
truth-seeking man, Rousseau likewise urged his peers to know—and question—
themselves and the society of their making.  Reform was hardly possible without 
honest self-assessment;253 this was the challenge pressed upon his audience as both 
individuals and members of society, and the first stage in reclaiming the hereditary 
fruits of our natural goodness.
To paint Rousseau as an Enlightenment-era Socrates is nonetheless hasty.  
After all, as Christopher Kelly reminds us, Rousseau was no Socrates.254  The 
Athenian never left his city’s walls save for a brief military expedition and one 
conversation with Phaedrus;255 the Genevan, by contrast, spent most of his life away 
from his birthplace.  Socrates accepted death by hemlock after his final, ill-fated 
apology; Rousseau never even stood trial, fleeing his home before Parisian authorities 
arrived to execute the Parlement’s arrest warrant.  The most telling difference, 
however, is revealed in a simple fact: in discussing his life and writings, Rousseau 
was wholly unapologetic.256  Not only did he justify the supposed misdeeds of his 
life, he made their candid revelation a testament of his individual innocence.  
Nowhere is this more clear than in his autobiography.
252 As Socrates argues in The Apology, “It is literally true (even if it sounds rather comical) that God 
has specially appointed me to this city, as though it were a large thoroughbred horse which because of 
its great size is inclined to be lazy and needs the stimulation of some stinging fly.”  Plato, The Last 
Days of Socrates, pp. 62-63.  For a comparison of how Rousseau’s shamelessness differs from that of 
Diogenes the Cynic (the “Socrates gone mad”), see Chapter 4 above.
253 For a fine summary of the scholarly debate surrounding Rousseau’s ability to honestly appraise 
himself see: Kelly, Rousseau’s Exemplary Life: The “Confessions” as Political Philosophy, pp. 5-8.
254 Ibid., pp. 10, 54-57, 64-75.
255 See: Plato, Phaedrus and the Seventh and Eighth Letters, Walter Hamilton, tr. (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1973), p. 21.
256 Socrates’ own “apology” was clearly not devoid of ironic criticism.  However, the very fact that he 
accepted the verdict of his peers greatly distinguishes him from Rousseau.
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The subtitle to The Neuchâtel Preface257 of The Confessions claims to contain 
“the detailed account of the events of [the author’s] life, and of his secret feelings in 
all the situations in which he has found himself.”258  In its final printed version, 
Rousseau reiterates this declaration as a hypothetical monologue:
Behold what I have done, what I have thought, what I have been.  I 
have told the good and the evil with the same frankness.  I have been 
silent about nothing bad, added nothing good… I have shown myself 
as I was, contemptible and low when I was so, good, generous, 
sublime when I was so.259
That he presents these lines as the speech he will “loudly” deliver to God on his day 
of judgment is of no small consequence.  Taken alone, this admission possesses a 
notable dearth of humility; when read as a proclamation of merit to “the Sovereign 
Judge” it sounds abjectly heretical.
After all, Augustine’s own archetypal Confessions eloquently espoused 
mankind’s unworthiness in relation to God.  In the Saint’s narrative, salvation was a 
gift bestowed upon humankind solely by the mercy and grace of God.  Man had little 
hope of incurring redemption by affecting His will, much less by fearlessly 
proclaiming innocence on Judgment Day.  For Augustine the hallmark of human 
nature was inescapable guilt, a hereditary affliction levied against the descendents of 
Adam as punishment for Original Sin.  Man could only hope for salvation through 
divine mercy, a fate stipulating unassertive deference before God.  In stark contrast, 
Rousseau suggests that he has nothing to fear (much less regret) on his day of 
257 This is the earlier, incomplete draft of The Confessions.  Of the two completed editions—the 
“Geneva” and “Paris” manuscripts—neither is considered definitive.  For an explanation see: CW 
V.xxxv.
258 The Neuchâtel Preface to The Confessions of J.-J. Rousseau.  CW V.585; OC I.1148.
259 The Confessions.  CW V.5; OC I.5.
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judgment.260  When Kierkegaard later lamented Rousseau’s conspicuous dearth of 
Christian humility, he surely had this episode in mind.261  Was it not pride in a life 
well-lived, rather than the burdens of incurable sin, that Jean-Jacques trumpets at the 
gates of heaven?262
Even the non-God-fearing must cringe slightly at Rousseau’s resoluteness.  
He is certain of his thoroughness, having revealed “what I have done, what I have 
thought, what I have been.”  He is convinced of his objectivity (“I have shown myself 
as I was”).  He suggests that forthrightly admitting his “contemptible” deeds merits 
his salvation.  And he delivers all of this in a defiant tone, begging the question of 
whether or not God, as Rousseau pictured Him, really appreciates anyone raising his 
or her voice in His presence.  Yet such are the uncompromising terms of Rousseau’s 
openness, a value championed from the outset of an autobiography whose author 
makes plain that he will hide nothing.  The text itself is a realization of this 
transparency, a revelation of far more than the mere details of one man’s life.  As 
Rousseau declares to God, “I have unveiled my interior as Thou hast seen it 
Thyself.”263 The Confessions is his testament, its readers his witnesses.264
Such grandiose claims seem to ignore the difficulty of self-revelation.  As 
Philippe Lejeune reminds us, autobiography poses a distinct methodological problem: 
260 See: Reveries. (Third Promenade).  CW VIII.22; OC I.1019.
261 Søren Kierkegaard, Journals (4: 252-253).  I address Kierkegaard’s claim in further detail in 
Chapter 4.
262 Compare this with Julie’s description of her “Christian end” emboldened by a clear conscience.  
Julie.  CW VI.586-589, 598; OC II.713-718, 729.
263 The Confessions.  CW V.5; OC I.5.
264 Although this speech is ostensibly delivered before God such revelation is superfluous because, as 
Rousseau reminds us, God sees all.  This is therefore a testament made before man, a declaration of 
innocence and not (as with Augustine) a public display of humility.
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“Est-il possible de raconteur sa vie?”265 Is it, he elaborates, possible to truly recall, 
disseminate, and articulate the essence (or even events) of one’s own life?  Rousseau 
appears untroubled by the subjective complexity of his enterprise.  Not only has he 
told his life’s story, he has peered within his very soul and “unveiled” his interior, 
revealing the insight of a gaze often exclusively attributed to divine beings.266
Furthermore, he challenges anyone who would cast aspersions.  “Eternal Being,” he 
requests, “assemble around me the countless host of my fellows: let them listen to my 
confessions, let them shudder at my unworthiness, let them blush at my woes.  Let 
each of them in his turn uncover his heart at the foot of Thy throne with the same 
sincerity; and then let a single one say to Thee, if he dares: ‘I was better than that 
man.’”267
We must take the term “unworthiness” lightly, for little in these opening lines 
suggest anything of the sort.  Rousseau is, in fact, claiming precisely the opposite.  He 
is worthy: to stand before God, without shame or fear, openly touting the goodness of 
his bared soul.  He has nothing to fear, not because he was better behaved than the 
next man.  He has nothing to fear because he is like any man—exhibiting faults and 
failings, goodness and generosity—with one monumental caveat: he has looked 
within himself, and delighted in the natural innocence to which he is closely attuned.  
Augustine also looked inward, albeit to a decidedly different conclusion.  Soul 
searching left the Saint with an ineradicable sense of shame.  Bowed under the weight 
265 Philippe Lejeune, L’autobiographie en France, Deuxième Édition. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1998), p. 
58.
266 Judith Shklar discusses the all-knowing eye of Wolmar the atheist in great detail in Men and 
Citizens.  The Vicar also claims similar insight: “I can observe and know the beings and their relations, 
I can sense what order, beauty, and virtue are, I can contemplate the universe and raise myself up to the 
hand which governs it.”  Emile.  E 278.
267 The Confessions.  CW V.5; OC I.5.
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of his own human sinfulness, he had little hope but to pay deference to the One whose 
goodness immeasurably surpassed his own, and dictated the course of his fate.  By 
contrast, Rousseau drew courage from the insights borne of self-examination.  
Unveiling his soul revealed a source of solace in a corrupt world: an individual, a 
human being, whose natural innocence remained intact.
If Rousseau seems prone to self-glorification, his affirmation posed a far more 
compelling problem to Catholic authorities.  It conveyed an abject heresy 
(conspicuous pride in human nature), one that sharply distinguishes The Confessions 
of Rousseau from that of Augustine.  Although the works bear substantive and 
structural similarities,268 this fundamental difference divides them: Augustine is 
consumed by the certainty of his own guilt, while Rousseau bears little in the way of 
regret.  More specifically, while Augustine holds himself (as both an individual and a 
descendent of Adam) accountable for his sinfulness, Rousseau attributes his own 
wavering will to “mitigating factors” beyond his control.269  Kelly wonderfully 
illustrates this schism by contrasting each author’s recollection of youthful 
misdemeanors.270  Reactions worth revisiting, consider first Augustine’s:
I wanted to carry out an act of theft and did so, driven by no kind of 
need other than my inner lack of any sense of, or feeling for, justice.  
Wickedness filled me.  I stole something which I had in plenty and of 
268 Lionel Gossman, “The Innocent Art of Confession and Reverie,” Daedalus, Vol. 7, No. 103 
(Summer, 1978), p. 60.  For a careful comparison of these works see: Ann Hartle, The Modern Self in 
Rousseau’s Confessions: A Reply to St. Augustine.
269 Kelly, p. 105.
270 Ibid., pp. 100-108.  It is worth noting that Kelly uses a different example, focusing on Rousseau’s 
first theft (of asparagus).  Kelly uses this to demonstrate the centrality of private property within 
Rousseau’s concept of injustice.  Readers might compare this with Emile’s experience of ruining a 
farmer’s melon seeds by planting his own beans in the same soil.  In Emile, both parties reach a 
mutually acceptable compromise, and thus learn how to navigate the difficult tension between self-
interest and the common good.  For Rousseau’s first theft (and candid discussion of his thieving 
techniques) see: The Confessions.  CW V.27-30; OC I.32-36.  For the beans and melons incident see: 
Emile.  E 98-99.
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much better quality.  My desire was to enjoy not what I sought by 
stealing but merely the excitement of thieving and the doing of what 
was wrong.271
The object of theft in question—pears from the tree of a plentiful vineyard—were 
carried off in a “huge load… not for our feasts but merely to throw to the pigs.”  This 
seems a routine juvenile prank, quaint by contemporary standards and harmless 
enough to all save the pigs and perhaps a disgruntled farmer.  But Augustine 
describes his actions as a “foul” example of “wickedness itself,” a testament to his 
“lack of any sense of, or feeling for, justice.”  His recollections lead him to a 
humorless conclusion, one whose gravity far outweighs the physical act itself: “I 
loved the self-destruction, I loved my fall, not the object for which I had fallen but my 
fall itself.  My depraved soul leaped down from your firmament to ruin.  I was 
seeking not to gain anything by shameful means, but shame for its own sake.”272
In relatively light-hearted contrast, Rousseau opens his Confessions with a 
“short and veracious history of all my childish misdeeds.”273  Admitting to a doting 
upbringing (at the expense of his neglected older brother), Rousseau writes that “the 
children of Kings could not have been cared for with greater zeal than I was during 
my earliest years.”274  Idealized pampering notwithstanding, he still possessed “the 
flaws of my age; I was a babbler, a glutton, sometimes a liar.  I would have stolen 
fruits, candies, food.”275  He even recalls “once having pissed into the cooking pot of 
one of our neighbors… while she was at church,” a memory that “still makes me 
271 Augustine, Confessions, II.iv.9, p. 29.
272 Ibid., p. 29.
273 The Confessions.  CW V.9; OC I.10.  Although Rousseau elsewhere draws ample attention to his 
various misdeeds (including theft), this short paragraph marks The Confessions’ first mention of vice.
274 The Confessions.  CW V.9; OC I.10.
275 The Confessions.  CW V.9; OC I.10.
97
laugh.”276  This rather disgusting (and decidedly unneighborly) episode elicits only 
mirth in recollection, and immediately follows a claim of personal innocence oddly 
detached from the act to which he has just confessed: “I never took pleasure in doing 
harm, damage, in accusing others, in tormenting poor animals.”277
This comparison underscores the striking discrepancy with which each author 
holds himself accountable for his actions.  What Augustine identifies as symptomatic 
of eternal, hereditary sin, Rousseau dismisses as the tomfoolery of a well-nurtured 
lad.  What leads Augustine to grueling self-examination and a tortured assessment of 
his own depravity leaves Rousseau mildly amused.  While Augustine interprets his 
theft as a microcosm for the failings of his entire species, Rousseau couches his 
“misdeeds” within a declaration of individual goodness, a natural quality cultivated 
by his loving upbringing amongst “the best people in the world.”278
Differences notwithstanding, we must recall that Rousseau’s Confessions 
adhere to Augustine’s formula in one decisive fashion: both works involve “a 
repudiation of worldly signs and pleasure, of art and literature; both offer themselves 
therefore not as art, but as inmost truth.”279  The 17th Century contributed its share of 
such autobiographical literature—most notably Duclos’ 1741 Confessions du Comte 
de ***—which, as Lionel Gossman describes, “drew attention to the private 
personality, the inner life and time of the individual as opposed to the public events, 
the public personalities, and the external chronology and history, to which the 
276 The Confessions.  CW V.9; OC I.10.
277 Rousseau’s mention of “tormenting poor animals” seems particularly incongruous, unless we read 
in it a sly critique of Augustine (who had, as just noted, confessed to throwing pears at pigs).  The 
Confessions.  CW V.9; OC I.10.
278 The Confessions.  CW V.9; OC I.10.  Given his upbringing, Rousseau finds the very idea that he 
might have possessed a vicious nature to be inconceivable: “How could I have become wicked, since 
under my eyes I had only examples of gentleness, and around me only the best people in the world?”
279 Gossman, p. 60.
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authors… bore witness.”280  Yet few before Rousseau had paraded their flaws with 
such simultaneous straightforwardness and obvious lack of regret.  It was the 
unrepentant conclusions his quest unearthed, rather than the journey inwards, that 
most clearly distinguished him from the confessional tradition.  He established a 
pattern of admission and qualification (revealing sundry details as pardonable 
reactions to external circumstances), shifting the source of accountability from 
indigenous failings to exogenous forces.  Peer pressure, locked city gates, the sinful 
culture of Paris, a desire to please, honest self-assessment, and an overflowing heart 
explain (in order) his first theft, his leaving Geneva, his argumentative writings, his 
conversion to Catholicism, the abandonment of his children, and his romantic affairs.  
In each instance Rousseau exculpates himself, requesting that we judge him on his 
intentions rather than his actions.281
Given his illustrious past, such a standard seems baldly self-serving.  After all, 
Jean-Jacques was a naughty boy.  We know this because he tells us, over many pages 
and through many incidents in The Confessions.  Yet from the outset he initiates a 
trend that continues throughout the work: Rousseau is unrepentant.  Because he never 
sought to harm (the maxim of his “golden rule” from the Second Discourse),282 he 
can reflect upon misdeeds with a clear conscience.  In examining and revealing his 
life he never pleads mea culpa, but rather reduces errant behavior to either 
developmental immaturity or weakness in the face of exogenous pressures.  What 
280 Ibid., p. 60.
281 As Rousseau later writes in the Reveries (Fourth Promenade): “Only the intention of the speaker 
gives them their worth and determines their degree of malice or goodness.”  CW VIII.32; OC I.1029.
282 Second Discourse.  CW III.38; OC III.156.
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Augustine accepted as evidence of an intrinsically sinful nature, Rousseau deflects to 
forces external (and thereby foreign or alien) to himself.
By several accounts, this pattern of admission and rationalization presented 
the eighteenth century with a radically new vision of self-examination.  As Lejeune
writes, “Rousseau est le premier à s’apercevoir qu’il faudrait un ‘langage nouveau,’ et 
inaugure un critique des techniques du récit au nom du réalisme subjectif.”283 This 
generous assessment—one made by Rousseau himself in the famous first lines of The 
Confessions284—was not shared by those who found his “subjective realism” to be 
entirely more subjective than real.  As Hérault de Séschelles wrote in 1800, 
Rousseau’s was an “errant life,” one “abandonnée aux hasard et aux passions.”285
This was a common charge amongst critics of the age who found such unbridled 
passion ill-suited for an author of his stature, let alone a self-proclaimed bearer of 
truth.286
More recently, Edgar Quinet reiterated and clarified this concern.  “Les seuls 
livres dangereux pour moi sont ceux où l’on me donne comme réel ce qui ne l’est 
pas.”287 Rousseau was dangerous for precisely this reason.  He presented interior 
narratives and reverie as objective manifestations of a truth more useful than 
283 Lejeune also identifies Rousseau as a founding member of the first generation of a “new form of 
biography” which spoke in the first-person, emphasized training, displayed a pre-romanticist 
sensitivity, and demonstrated a deep involvement with the contemporary world.  Lejeune, pp. 31, 24, 
58.
284 “I am forming an undertaking which has no precedent, and the execution of which will have no 
imitator whatsoever.  I wish to show my fellows a man in all the truth of nature; and this man will be 
myself.  Myself alone.”  The Confessions.  CW V.5; CW I.5.
285 Hérault de Séschelles, Voyage à Montbard, (Paris: 1800), pp. 37-38.  Quoted in Bernard Gagnebin, 
“L’Étrange accueil fait aux ‘Confessions’ de Rousseau au XVIII Siècle,” Annales de la Société Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Tome 38, 1969-1971 (Geneva: A. Jullien, Éditeur), p. 119.
286 For additional examples of this criticism see: Gagnebin, pp. 108-112, 121-123.
287 Edgar Quinet, Histoire de mes idées. (Paris: Flammarion, 1972), p 47.
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empirical certainty.288  Echoing de Séschelles, Quinet finds such musings 
fundamentally irresponsible: they point us down a slippery slope of self-justification 
wherein hyper-subjective “feelings” are conflated with, and presented as, impartial 
“reality.”  To be fair, Rousseau’s writings offer an anticipatory rebuttal.  In an age 
ruled by the empire of opinion, the sophisticated logic of philosophers and the 
righteous dogma of papists were the real enemies of truth masquerading self-interest 
as certainty.  Such adroit minds twisted supposedly objective facts to serve 
particularist agendas “good only at destructive criticism.”289  By contrast, Rousseau 
argued that his internal sentiments were uncontrived, and served only the common 
good.  The certainty that Quinet finds perilously misrepresented might only be 
uncovered by looking inwards. 
Amongst Rousseau’s contemporaries, this standard was typically (and in the 
case of Voltaire, sarcastically)290 dismissed as ill-conceived self-justification or 
inflated pride; far more menacing were his practical claims.  In assailing private 
property, ridiculing scientific advancement, rejecting Original Sin, and calling for 
religious tolerance and legitimized self-rule, he threatened Church, state and 
Academy alike.  His image as an anti-hierarchical thinker was only confirmed by The 
Confessions, a work that defied conventional boundaries of Enlightenment society 
288 As Plutarch reminds us, facts are only valuable if they help to instill virtue.  In Rousseau’s age, by 
contrast, “Critical erudition absorbs everything, as if it were very important whether a fact is true, 
provided that a useful teaching can be drawn from it.”  Emile.  E 156; OC IV.415.  For further 
discussion of this position see Chapter 2 above.
289 Emile.  E 268.  The ensuing paragraph further discusses the limits of reason and the utility of 
imagination.  Delivered by the Vicar, these lines conform to Rousseau’s hierarchy of human faculties.
290 Voltaire’s most famous quip against Rousseau followed the Second Discourse: “One acquires the 
desire to walk on all fours when one reads your work.”  Letter from Voltaire to Rousseau, August 30, 
1755.  CW III.102; CC III.317.157.  In a similar spirit, following the Letter to d’Alembert, Voltaire 
wondered if Rousseau had “become a priest of the Church?”  Theodore Besterman, ed., Voltaire's
Correspondence. (Genève: Institut et Musée Voltaire, 1953-1965), XIX.D7864.
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and elicited shrill “disapproval of the author’s rejection of the neoclassical 
discriminations of noble and base, high and low, public and private, tragic and 
comic.”291  As Gossman explains, Rousseau’s “candor about the details of his sexual 
life was not in itself shocking; what was, was the seriousness with which he treated 
them and asked the reader to treat them,” an approach that blatantly ignored 
traditional dismissals of the body as a crass domain ill-suited for philosophical 
inquiry.292
If Jean-Jacques was guilty of indecent exposure,293 Gossman locates a 
democratic impulse in his breach of propriety, a tacit valorization of common (in both 
senses of the word) experience.  Rousseau’s somatic emphasis also offered a sharp 
rejoinder to Augustine, who had urged his audience to look beyond the corporeal 
world in anticipation of an eternal life freed from physical desire.294  For Augustine, 
the body was a symbol of man’s most visible weakness (concupiscence) and a 
reminder of our fall from grace and distance from God; physical shame was a 
logically pious stance given the sins of our flesh.  His writings therefore take the body 
seriously only as a threat to salvation, an object of denial and repression, and a 
hereditary punishment levied upon man for Adam’s transgression.  In defying this 
tradition Rousseau was not merely titillating his audience or challenging the literary 
291 Gossman, pp. 60-61.
292 Ibid., pp. 60-61.
293 I use this term both literally and figuratively.  In The Confessions, Rousseau admits to a penchant 
for seeking out “dark alleys, hidden nooks where I could expose myself from afar to persons of the 
opposite sex.”  CW V.74; OC I.88-89.  He was also charged with slandering the memories of 
upstanding citoyens such as Mme. de Warens by revealing unsavory details of his romantic affairs.  As 
M. Geoffrey wrote in the Année littéraire (1783, V.vii.99-100), such candor was particularly indecent 
for “a Philosopher, a Sage, a Legislator of morals.”  For examples of similar critiques see: Gagnebin, 
pp. 110-112, 121, 123.
294 This reflects a classical bias of philosophy as well, one epitomized by Plato (for whom wisdom was 
an absolute form encumbered by physical trappings).  For a thorough overview of this problem see: 
Richard Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
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standards of a prudish élite.  His elevation of somatic concerns reveals, more 
pointedly, a repudiation of the denigration of the corporeal life.295  Dwelling on his 
sexual proclivities, uncontrolled appetites, and sundry weaknesses was necessary 
given his commitment to revealing the truth.  But such exposure also taught an 
affirmative lesson, one accessible to those of all walks of life: fear not our corporeal 
sins, for they are only skin-deep.296
At heart of Rousseau’s argument is a faith in the innocence of human nature.  
Rather than teaching us to humble ourselves as woefully inadequate creatures before 
God, he urged us to follow his lead in The Confessions, to draw courage from our 
status as divine creations.  Jean-Jacques’ candor was therefore calculated or 
purposeful in that it lighted a hopeful path to reform.  It was also deeply problematic, 
for it left him open to charges of blatant hypocrisy and gave detractors a convenient 
means of dismissing him.297  His authority as a moral critic lay in his relative lack of 
culpability.  But by unveiling the sundry details of his life he presented the portrait of 
an individual objectively ill-suited to exculpate himself.
In his own defense, Rousseau reiterated his guiding principals (natural 
goodness, and a pursuit of truth that demanded unmitigated revelation) while 
deflecting the significance of his actions.  In a world of corrupting attachments, he 
ascribed guilt to external sources.  The radical implications of his rationalization 
295 From his very first Discourse, Rousseau had argued that “the needs of the body are the foundations 
of society.”  First Discourse.  CW II.5; OC III.6.
296 In this, Rousseau falls between Machiavelli and Nietzsche who both recognized “slavishness” in 
Christian morality.  See: Discourses on Livy, II.2.159.
297 Rousseau was particularly insulted by this charge.  As he asks Beaumont, “Why would I be a 
hypocrite, and what would I gain from being one?  I attacked all particular interests, I aroused all 
factions against me, I upheld only the cause of God and humanity, and who cares about that?”  
Rousseau suggests that he would have been far less prosecuted if, following the philosophes, “I had 
openly declared myself in favor of atheism.”  Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.50; OC OV.964.
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cannot be understated.  In it we find a neophyte theory of political victimization, one 
that attributes blame to unjust social forms rather than intrinsically flawed beings.298
Nurture, not nature, is the culprit in this equation.  As an individual raised in idyllic 
circumstances, Rousseau was uniquely nurtured to follow his nature, an exemplar of 
goodness particularly resistant to society’s influence.  His personal innocence 
therefore supports his claim of ontological innocence: the life he revealed to the 
public offered testament to his species’ inherent worth.  
This is the “truth” put before the audience to whom he bears his very soul, an 
argument pressed upon his peers.  After all, Rousseau was far more anxious about 
being misjudged by men than God.  If he begins his Confessions by testifying before 
the Sovereign Judge, he reminds us of the superfluity of this revelation.  God sees us 
for who we are; this is why Rousseau is unafraid to assert his innocence in His 
presence.  By contrast, human judgment is far more fallible, our reason woefully 
limited.299  This boundary is acutely evident in our comprehension of divinity, a 
failing discussed at length by the Savoyard Vicar in Emile.  The Vicar chastises 
humankind for believing “we possess intelligence for piercing… [such] mysteries,” 
when in fact “all we have is imagination.”  It is “through this imaginary world [that] 
each blazes a trail he believes to be good.  None can know whether his leads to the 
goal [of salvation].  Nevertheless we want to penetrate everything, to know 
298 Inge labeled this “sentimental humanitarianism” Rousseau’s single worst contribution to the 
modern world, a “mawkish travesty of Christianity which transforms morality by basing it solely on 
pity, and transfers guilt from the individual to the state under which he lives.  Man is always innocent, 
the government always guilty.”  (Inge, p. 250)  Arthur Melzer offers a more judicious assessment, 
noting that Rousseau “initiates the philosophic tendency, which has dominated almost all subsequent 
thought, to understand the human problem in terms of historical, social, or environmental causes rather 
than natural or divine ones.”  Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man, p. 17.
299 Compare with René Descartes’ Sixth Meditation in Meditations on First Philosophy, Revised 
Edition, John Cottingham, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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everything.”300  Although raised by the Vicar, this concern articulates a problem later 
posed in The Confessions.301  Not only do we believe ourselves capable of 
comprehending God, we parade these “imaginary” visions as righteous, intolerant 
truths.  This vanity is twofold: because the limits of our reasoning prevent us from 
clearly comprehending the divine state we personalize God, reducing Him to an 
extension of our own particular predilections and worldviews.302  As Rousseau 
elaborates,
In general, believers make God as they are themselves, the good make 
him good, the wicked make him wicked; the devout who are spiteful 
and choleric see only Hell because they would like to damn the whole 
world: loving and gentle souls hardly believe in it.303
The reduction of God to the self-image of the worshipper is therefore morally 
ambiguous.  It can have wicked (for the wicked) and just (for the just) consequences.  
Given his scathing criticism of Catholic dogma, Rousseau likely had papists in mind 
as those who “damn the whole world” to Hell.  But he also poses a positive 
alternative, the “loving and gentle souls” who place faith in a benevolent deity.
To illustrate this, Rousseau presents Mme. de Warens as a unique figure in a 
corrupt age, a “soul without bitterness, which could not imagine God as vindictive 
and always wrathful, saw only clemency and mercy where the devout saw only 
300 Emile.  E 268.
301 This argument is also consistent with the Second Discourse.  In this case, artificial desires 
(encouraged by amour-propre) are self-destructive because they surpass both our natural needs and 
capacities for fulfillment.
302 In this, Rousseau follows Malebranche who similarly preached the generality and simplicity of 
God.    For a thorough study of this connection see: Riley, The General Will Before Rousseau.
303 The Confessions.  CW V.192; OC I.228-229.  It is worth noting that the pressure exerted by the 
Church was overwhelming, affecting even the noble Fénelon: “one of the astonishing things from 
which I cannot recover is to see the good Fénelon speak about it in his Telemachus, as if he truly 
believed it: but I hope that he was lying then; for in the end however truthful one may be, one certainly 
must lie sometimes when one is a Bishop.”  In the Dialogues, Rousseau describes Fénelon as one of 
the few virtuous men who “did honor to modern times,” praise affirmed by Telemachus’ role in 
Emile’s education.  CW I.158; OC I.863-864.
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justice and punishment.”304  A woman of rare gentleness, de Warens’ vision of divine 
mercy lies in sharp contrast with the vengeful figure propagated by the Catholic 
Church.  She hardly believed the Author of all things had endowed His creations with 
an irreparably sinful nature.  Rousseau’s beloved maman found failing not in God, 
but in His misleading portrayal by men: “It seemed to her that Scripture was 
explained too literally and too harshly,” and when discussing specific articles of the 
Bible “it happened that she saw [each] completely differently from the Church, even 
while always submitting to it.”305  More specifically, she believed Purgatory—not 
eternal damnation—offered a suitable fate for the wicked, a group “always very 
vexing both in this world and in the other.”306
What begins as a passing (and seemingly innocent) plea for theological 
moderation immediately leads to a radical renunciation.  As Rousseau hastily 
concludes, “one sees that the whole doctrine of original sin and redemption is 
destroyed by this system [of Purgatory], and the basis of vulgar Christianity is shaken 
by it, and that at least Catholicism cannot subsist.”307  The certainty of his conclusion 
is matched only by the suddenness of its intrusion into the text.  Rousseau, it appears, 
is eager to remind readers that Adam’s supposed legacy of hereditary sin is a fallacy 
propagated by men, one debunked with as little effort as the passing mention of 
Purgatory.  In one fell swoop, he claims a startling accomplishment: crippling 
Catholicism by shaking the “vulgar” foundations upon which it rests.
304 The Confessions.  CW 192; OC I.229.
305 The Confessions.  CW 192; OC I.229.
306 Given the rosy glow that often shades Rousseau’s recollections of de Warens, his account may be 
inaccurate.  If this were the case, Rousseau would be repeating the crime imputed to him by Christophe 
de Beaumont of presenting impious beliefs in “chimerical voices,” a charge discussed in greater detail 
below.
307 The Confessions.  CW 192; OC I.229.
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Rousseau’s antagonism towards the Church reflects what Ernst Cassirer 
described as a principal fear of Enlightenment philosophers, that to “change religion 
into mere opinion… [is to] deprive it of its real moral and political force.”308  Unlike 
his philosophe peers, however, Rousseau shared this concern without abandoning his 
faith in God.  More strongly, he insisted that religious associations provided a 
necessary moral foundation for virtuous democratic societies.309  Yet papal faith 
should not be considered genuine; it denuded religion of its ethical and practical 
value, supplanting divine truths with vicious myths.  Nowhere was the blasphemy of 
their orthodoxy more evident than in the narrative of Original Sin.
*   *   *   *   *
The innocence of which Rousseau speaks is surely personal, yet its 
implications extend far beyond the author himself.  This is evident in his self-
justification: Jean-Jacques, more natural than his denatured peers, was subsequently 
more innocent.  In ontological terms, this position assumes that humankind is good by 
nature and not tainted by Adam’s fall.  Far from it, we have corrupted ourselves, 
introducing evils that place us at sharp odds with our divinely-crafted natures.  
Rousseau’s rebuke of hereditary guilt lies at the heart of The Confessions, just as it 
rests at Emile’s center.310  It was also the reason he fled Paris in 1762: he escaped an 
arrest warrant issued by the Parlement and applauded by the Church, both of whom 
308 Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 165.  This claim is demonstrable in the influence 
of Bayle upon the philosophe circle, particularly Diderot (and his Encyclopédie article on Pyrrhonism).
309 See Chapter 5 below.
310 Not only does Rousseau describe the Profession as Emile’s moral core, it appears literally halfway 
through the text.
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viewed his renunciation of Original Sin as a threat to spiritual and political order.311
What might strike contemporary readers as a dry and distant debate was a life-
changing event for Rousseau.  In this, he was not alone; roughly fourteen centuries 
prior, the Christian ascetic Pelagius rejected hereditary guilt to equally momentous 
consequences.312
Rousseau’s indebtedness to Pelagius is typically assumed.  This was true as 
early as 1765 when, in passing, the Abby Laurent François identified Pelagianism in 
Rousseau’s diminution of grace as a means of salvation.313  More recently, Karl Barth 
described the Genevan’s doctrine of natural goodness as “the apogee of humanist 
Pelagianism,” while Jean Guehenno located a Pelagian legacy within Rousseau’s 
mistrust of metaphysics, his “sentimental” emphasis upon freedom, and the righteous 
tenor of his social criticism.314  Pierre Burgelin saw shadows of Pelagius in Saint-
Preux’s defense of human liberty, a figure commonly assumed to be modeled after 
Rousseau himself.  And Jean-François Thomas—in the only work devoted 
exclusively to this relation—concluded that Rousseau was indeed a semi-Pelagian, 
albeit one very much indebted to Molinism and Jesuit writings on freedom and 
311 Extrait des Registres du Parlement, June 9, 1762.  CC XI.A254.262-266.
312 Accused of heresy in Jerusalem in 415, newly condemned for his De libero arbitrio (On Free Will) 
in 416, Pelagius was finally condemned and excommunicated in 417 by Pope Innocent I, a ruling 
confirmed by Innocent’s successor Zosimus in 418.  This verdict was influenced by the verbose wrath 
of Augustine, who wrote volumes against Pelagius and went so far as to demand his public censure: “I 
do not hesitate at once to affirm that such a man [as Pelagius] ought to be removed from the public ear, 
and to be anathematized by every mouth.”  Augustine, A Treatise Concerning Man’s Perfection in 
Righteousness, Chapter XXI (44) in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church: Volume 
V, Benjamin B. Warfield, tr. (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1971), p. 
176.
313 Robert Derathé, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau et le Christianisme,” in Revue de Métaphysique et de 
Morale (1948), p. 379.
314 Jacques-François Thomas, Le Pélagianisme de J.-J. Rousseau. (Paris: Librairie Nizet, 1956), pp. 8-
9.
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grace.315  Although many have labeled Rousseau’s concept of innocence Pelagian, 
few have explored the association in any detail.316  Correcting this paucity allows us 
to both impart coherence to an oft-bandied yet ill-defined term, and shed light upon 
the seeds from which Rousseau’s most controversial theological paradox grows.317
Before discussing parallels between Pelagius and Rousseau, we might begin 
with an obvious difference.  Unlike the well-documented Genevan, the figure of 
Pelagius is marked by relative obscurity.318  We know little of the details of his life 
save that he was well-educated and born some time after 350 AD, probably in 
Britain.319  We also know that he was an exile of sorts.  He left his birth land for 
reasons unknown320 and arrived in Rome circa 380 AD, becoming a spiritual advisor 
315 In the late sixteenth century in works such as Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis (The 
Harmony of Free Will with Gifts of Grace), the Jesuit theologian Molina attempted to reconcile a 
concept of free will with his faith in divine justice and mercy.  He presented a notably optimistic view 
of human nature, one that allowed man sufficient grace to aspire towards redemption.  For a thoughtful
exposition of the Jesuit influence upon Rousseau during his stay in Montmorency see: Gilbert Py, 
“Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la Congrégation des Prêtres de l’Oratoire de Jésus,” Annales de la Société 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Tome 38 (Geneva: A. Jullien, 1969-1971), pp. 127-153.
316 More striking than the typical brevity with which this connection is raised are the thoughtful studies 
that fail to even mention Pelagius’ name.  Allan Bloom examines Rousseau’s concept of goodness in 
great length.  P. M. Masson’s unrivaled three-volume La Religion de J. J. Rousseau work investigates 
the heretical foundations of Rousseau’s theological thought.  And in The Natural Goodness of Man, 
Arthur Melzer discusses Rousseau’s radical renunciation of Original Sin.  In all of these studies, 
Pelagius is conspicuously absent.
317 I do not mean to suggest that Rousseau was steeped in (or even directly influenced by) the writings 
of Pelagius, but rather argue that a study of Pelagianism illuminates a problem central to Rousseau: the 
concomitant concern with spiritual and secular values.  A figure who also expressed deep faith in 
heretical terms, Pelagius is far more helpful on this count than Augustine (who similarly described sin 
as a self-incurred disease, yet concluded that only God might cure us).
318 “The writings of the Pelagians are notoriously anonymous,” Peter Brown notes, “and so are their 
supporters.”  Much of what we know about Pelagius and his followers comes from writings assumed to 
be theirs, references in works of their contemporaries (most notably Augustine and Jerome), and a 
small number of primary sources (governmental and ecclesiastical documents).  B. R. Rees attributes 
Pelagianism’s “poor press” to this scarcity of definitive primary sources.  See: Peter Brown, Religion 
and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine. (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), p. 208; and The Letters of 
Pelagius and His Followers, B. R. Rees, tr. (Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 1991), p. 1.
319 See: Pelagius’s Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, Theodore de Bruyn, tr. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 10; Rees, Pelagius: A Reluctant Heretic. (Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 
1988), pp. xii-xiv.
320 The two most common explanations are career ambitions and a spat with his father.  Rees, Ibid., p. 
xiii.
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to Roman Christian aristocrats.321  Pelagius entered Rome during a period of wealth 
and flamboyance but also insecurity and striving, one ruled by a gluttonous 
aristocracy both habituated to and increasingly disgusted with its routine 
decadence.322  The practical consequence of such ambivalence was a demand for 
guidance.  Nobles were “in constant need of mentors—from teachers of literature to 
father-confessors”—to instruct them to rise above the concupiscence so rampant 
amongst their socially-illustrious ranks.323
It was an age “clouded with doubts” not simply about the plight of the 
privileged, but around a core tenet of the Catholic Church: the origin and legacy of 
the Fall of the human soul, a subject of protracted (and indeterminate) writings, 
debate and dialogue.324  Before Pelagianism “there had been little open debate about 
matters of doctrine and belief.”325  Indeed, history suggests that the Catholic Church 
lacked a “coherent body of doctrine tried, tested and refined in the furnace of 
321 This was a popular practice amongst the wealthy and spiritually ambitious.  Brown, pp. 186-188.
322 Brown describes the privileged class of statesmen and orators as “a heterogeneous and, in part, a 
nondescript body of men.”  Yet they could hardly be accused of dullness, baring all the exaggerated 
marks of ancient decadence: conspicuous consumption, lusty indiscretions, a propensity for gambling, 
and a distaste for scholarly work.  Roman élites were also notably competitive, “determined to live 
according to… distinctive standards of excellence”—an aspiration guided by both “their sense of high 
birth” and the desire to distinguish themselves from their peers.  There was also a vocal conservative 
backlash reared by the pagan orator Symmachus (who upheld strict protocol and ceremony in the 
Senate) and the Christian Senator Jerome (who no less disapprovingly beseeched his peers to “learn 
from me a holy arrogance”).  Ibid., pp. 186-188.
323 In becoming a spiritual advisor, Pelagius was simply joining a well-established and increasingly 
popular profession.  The neo-Platonist Plotinus, an influence upon the young Augustine, was one of the 
earliest figureheads of this tutorial tradition.  Ibid., p. 188.
324 Ibid., p. 220.  The free-will debates had spanned over 200 years.  Augustine’s eventual victory over 
Pelagius was aided more by the Saint’s tireless public sermons and growing influence than unified 
doctrinal consensus amongst Church fathers.
325 Rees, The Letters of Pelagius and His Followers, p. 10.  Rees goes so far as to suggest that “[t]here 
had been no heresy before this one, if one excludes Priscillianism which arose in the peripheral area of 
Spain.”  One must also exclude Arianism (an early fourth century movement rejecting the divinity of 
Jesus Christ), as well as smaller sects such as the Manichaeans and Gnostics (from which 
Priscillianism is derived).  It is worth noting that in his 1690 Dictionnaire Universel, Furetière names 
only three examples of heretics: Arius, Luther and Calvin; Pelagius is conspicuously absent.  See: 
Furetière’s Dictionnaire Universel, Tome II.
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controversy.”326  Although Pelagius and his followers claimed to be integri Christiani
(authentic Christians), prior to his writings there existed little consensus as to what 
this term actually meant.327
If by the late fourth century orthodox dogma was still a work in progress,328 a 
definitive position had begun to coalesce around Augustine’s influential sermons on 
free will.  According to Augustine, Scripture is unequivocal on the origins and 
transmission of sin: Genesis 3 describes the fall of man as punishment for Adam’s 
errant appetite; 1 Corinthians 15 teaches that Christ died for our sins and was raised 
by God as a redeemer; and Romans 5 describes sin as an ineradicable hereditary 
disease.  Adam was held accountable for tasting fruit from the tree of knowledge 
because he was told not to (by God) and free not to (through an act of will).  In falling 
to temptation, Adam revealed the weakness of a will whose divided nature stood in 
hideous contrast to the unified Divine will.  Such was the legacy passed on to his 
species.  Fatally self-subverting and the source of enduring shame, our very natures 
predisposed us to stray from God’s righteous example.329
At first glance, Pelagius’ teachings may seem compatible with this 
Augustinian (and decidedly un-Rousseauist) world-view.  He urged his brethren to 
live a stern, disciplined life, envisioning a Christian community connected by what 
Peter Brown describes as an “icy puritanism,” hither unto binding ideals of propriety 
326 Rees, Ibid., p. 10.
327 Brown, pp. 192-3.
328 Rees, Pelagius: A Reluctant Heretic, p. 56.  For a summary of the two main theories of Original Sin 
in the second and third centuries—what N. P. Williams describes as “Hellenic, once-born or 
minimizing” and “African, twice-born or maximizing”—see pp. 57-58.
329 Under this view, our only hope for redemption lay after earthly penance was paid, at the 
postmortem, grace of the Being whose laws we are incapable of following.  For Augustine, then, the 
first penalty of Adam’s eternal gaffe—mortality—also provides our only hope.  Because Original Man 
had sinned, all men must die; yet because we all lay at God’s mercy, salvation might only be attained 
following death.
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and piousness, secular conduct aimed at spiritual elevation consummated by the grace 
of Christ.330  Yet Pelagius understood asceticism as redemptive corporeal vigilance 
rather than shameful self-denial.  Far from discounting human action, he granted 
somatic reform a central role in the grueling struggle towards Christian elevation.  
Unlike Augustine, for whom salvation depended solely upon God’s grace, Pelagius 
shifted the burden of redemption upon man’s meager shoulders.  Where Augustine 
understood human free will as the catalyst for sin, Pelagius located the means of 
training ourselves to live righteously.  Where Augustine saw grace as the only means 
of transcending Adam’s legacy, Pelagius identified an antidote independent of God’s 
will.  Where Augustine felt sin permeate the marrow of his soul, Pelagius saw a 
superficial (albeit ubiquitous) condition—bad habits reified through the ages—in 
need of a corporeal remedy.331  Pelagius therefore presented a twofold offense to the 
teachings of Augustine: not only did he soften the impact of the Fall, he claimed that 
Christians should and could raise themselves.332  Because man was not irreparably 
330 Brown, p. 194.  Although Rees affirms the severity of the Pelagian “evangelical, salvationist and 
didactic” vision (Letters, p. 12), not everyone agrees.  De Bruyn reminds us that “[f]or most Christians, 
both clergy and laity, the regime advocated by zealots was too severe.  Even those who approved of 
asceticism in general were disturbed by extreme manifestations.”  He describes Pelagius as just such a 
moderate, citing his position on a heated dispute of Manichaean origins: whether or not Christians 
should eat meat.  Pelagius carefully abstains from passing categorical judgment, instead claiming that 
scripture does not explicitly require vegetarianism of the faithful.  De Bruyn overly signifies this 
concession, one that hardly conforms to Pelagianism’s broader Christian “ascetic program” that 
“envisaged not the end of corporeal existence, but rather the extirpation of the passions which obscured 
the vision of God.”  Furthermore, this isolated instance of compromise does not even distinguish 
Pelagius from Augustine who arrived at a similarly cautious defense of meat-eating in the Confessions
(xxxi.45).  See: De Bruyn, pp. 2-7, 12, 15; and Pelagius’ Commentary on the Romans 14:1-23, pp. 
140-144.
331 Rousseau shared a skeptical view of habit.  In an author’s note to Emile he describes a vicious 
circle: “The appeal of habit comes from the laziness natural to man, and that laziness increases in 
abandoning oneself to habit.”  Both he and Pelagius faced criticism for failing to explain habituated sin 
in light of natural goodness.  See: De Bruyn, p. 24; Emile.  E 160n.
332 This divergence is acutely evident in their competing beliefs about baptism.  Augustine preached 
the necessity of infant baptism as the first stage of redeeming ourselves in God’s eyes.  By contrast, 
Pelagius understood baptism as a commitment to self-conscious change, one only meaningful to 
mature adults.  Rousseau makes a similar argument about religion in Emile, stressing the need 
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burdened with guilt, human agency in addition to divine grace could cleanse us of our 
sins.
In works such as the Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans and On 
Nature, Pelagius argued that sin was not a hereditary condition but a habituated lapse 
in judgment.333  Predating Rousseau’s description of denatured man, he argued that 
corruption “lives as a guest” in humankind “as an accidental quality, not a natural 
one.”334  Drawing upon the metaphor of an unwanted disease attacking a host-victim, 
Pelagius claimed that “carnal habit,” far from characterizing human desire, actually 
“opposes the will.”335  As with Rousseau, corruption distorts and disserves (rather 
than epitomizes) our divinely-crafted natures.
In framing this argument, Pelagius draws upon a vision of a tough-but-fair 
God, a figurehead who would hardly set us up to fail by establishing a standard of 
conduct impossible to fulfill.336  Nor would He levy eternal punishment upon 
creatures whom He both loved and created in His image.  Rather than wait for 
salvation in an afterlife, we must rethink the mantra of accountability that plays so 
prominent a role in Augustine’s narrative of the Fall.  We must bear responsibility for 
our own actions, using Adam’s model as a lesson of malfeasance rather than proof of 
introduce God only after human beings are developmentally capable of comprehending Divinity (“for 
if he learns it sooner than he ought, he runs the risk of never knowing it”).  E 257.
333 It is in these works that Pelagius developed what Augustine later described as the “three principal 
heads in the Pelagian heresy”: the denial of Original Sin; the contention that “the grace of God 
whereby we are justified is not given freely, but according to our merits”; and the argument that “in 
mortal man, however holy and well doing, there is so great righteousness that even after the washing of 
regeneration [Baptism], until he finishes this life of his, forgiveness is not necessary to him.”  His 
influence as a spiritual leader had grown with his role as a pedagogue, but it was not until 
approximately 405 AD, after these works had reached Augustine’s disapproving eye, that he became 
embroiled in controversy.  See: Augustine, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, Book III, Chapter 24.  
(Warfield, p. 414)
334 Commentary on the Romans, 7:17.  (De Bruyn, p. 104)
335 Ibid., 7:18, p. 104.
336 Readers should note this parallels the position Rousseau approvingly attributes to de Warens in The 
Confessions.
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irredeemable guilt.  As Pelagius concludes, “I myself have provided myself with this 
compulsion.”337  If “I” am the agent, it follows logically that “I” must take 
responsibility for curing my self-incurred concupiscence.
To support his case, Pelagius distinguished between rational instinct and 
irrational desire.  “Habitual desires, or the persuading of the enemy” is opposed to 
“The law of my mind.  Namely, of natural conscience, or of the divine law, which 
resides in the mind.”338  In terms clearly presaging Rousseau, “divine law” is 
inscribed upon our “natural conscience.”  Wickedness results from a failure to 
comprehend and follow this order, an estrangement whose redress requires the 
cultivation of our natural God-given ability to determine right from wrong.  As 
Pelagius argues, we must retrain our wills, not damn our natures, because “the will 
was arraigned, not the nature, which God created in such a way that it [was able] not 
to sin.”339  Carnal impulse does not mask the stench of irredeemably tainted flesh; it
rather reveals the force of habit and the prevalence of poor decision-making amongst 
humankind.  As with Rousseau, a stifled conscience is no sign of irredeemable fault; 
it rather punctuates the need to reawaken this innate faculty through meaningful 
corporeal reform.
Augustine found in these urgings utter blasphemy.340  Defining corruption as 
habitual rather than necessary reduced sin to a problem of human “negligence,” one 
curable through an act of will.341  Where Augustine saw “confirmed invalids,” 
337 Commentary on the Romans, 7:20.  (De Bruyn, p. 104)
338 Ibid., 7:22, p. 107.
339 Commentary on the Romans, 8:3, (De Bruyn, p. 107).
340 Augustine found this position Scripturally unsound.  Citing Psalms 12:1 & 8; 41:4, he reminds us 
that the “[t]he nature of which our author [Pelagius] speaks is corrupted.”  Augustine, On Nature and 
Grace, Ch. 57 (Warfield, pp. 140-141).
341 Ibid., Ch. 14 [XIII] (p. 125).
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Pelagius envisioned humankind “like the man found wounded on the road from 
Jerusalem to Jericho—saved from certain death… [yet] resigned to spending a 
lifetime of precarious convalescence in the Inn of the Catholic Church.”342  Neither 
might be confused with a libertine, and despite Augustine’s portrayal Pelagius was 
hardly an unqualified optimist.  Like Rousseau, he recognized the ubiquity of societal 
corruption and—in a tone reminiscent of Seneca343—the difficulty of reform.  Yet as 
with Rousseau, Pelagius looked squarely in the eyes of what he believed was a 
decadent culture, and challenged the necessity of this decline.  Where Rousseau later 
invoked our divinely-crafted nature as evidence of inherent innocence, so did 
Pelagius take recourse in our intrinsic God-given goodness.  Rousseau and Pelagius 
agreed that men had made a mess of a divine creation; man must therefore halt his 
self-incurred fall, reorient himself to follow his conscience with the knowledge that 
sin was actually the logical and finite consequence of improvident action.
Because God is the “Author” of nature (a phrase Rousseau also frequents), 
natural order must reflect his unquestionable goodness.  Pelagius applied this logic to 
human nature which, as a divine creation, possessed the capacity for goodness.  Yet 
in making the ontological claim that humankind is naturally good and not necessarily 
342 Brown, p. 203.
343 The Stoic sage, according to Seneca, is of so rare character that one “perhaps springs into existence, 
like the phoenix, only once in five hundred years.” (Epistulae Morales xiii.1)  Sages are beings 
hardened to external circumstances and worldly forces who follow a moral code drawn in accordance 
with nature.  Despite manifold difficulties, Seneca advises that the human will, can, with enough effort, 
achieve this plateau through personal fortification, an act of will that overcomes “weakness of the 
mind,” (De Ira II.ii.2) and an indifference to forces beyond one’s control, a state Martha C. Nussbaum 
labels “radical detachment” (both external resistance and internal command of one’s emotions).  For a 
discussion of this term see: The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 363-364.  On Tertullian’s reference to Seneca as 
“often one of us [Christians]” see: A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, Second Edition. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986), p. 236.  Saint Jerome also makes this connection in Against 
Rufinus.  See: Dogmatic and Polemical Works, John N. Hritzu, tr. (Washington, DC: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1965), p. 210.
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beholden to sin, Pelagius rendered an unqualified blasphemy: he negated the value of 
Jesus Christ’s sacrificial death on the cross.  As Augustine lamented, the mere 
possibility of man’s innocence “renders the cross of Christ of none effect.”344
Denying man’s hereditary guilt as descendents of Adam did not merely disserve the 
obedience we owe God (as the only possible cause of our redemption), or brazenly 
raise our self-estimation; it meant that “Christ [is] dead in vain.”345  Jesus could not 
have died a sacrificial death (bearing a brutal punishment for our sins) were we not all 
sinners.  By reducing a crime of eternal guilt to one of temporal circumstance, human 
goodness renders the terms of his sacrifice moot.
Not that Pelagius was lenient.  If eating from the tree of knowledge did not 
elicit eternal punishment, God’s vengeance was still indisputably fierce.  After all, 
Adam received “the death-penalty for breaking one single prohibition; and even he 
was less to blame than us, for he did not have the great benefit of the previous 
execution of a human being to deter him.”346  To understand Pelagius’ feud with 
Augustine as a conflict over severity is therefore inaccurate; Augustine was far more 
agitated by Pelagius’ emphasis.
Let us recall the Saint’s two distinct albeit related lines of criticisms: first, 
Pelagianism gives man an inflated sense of the value of his actions; and second, so 
doing demeans the role of God in our lives.  If humankind is endowed with 
conscience, free will and a universal potential to rise above sin, this might also 
suggest a democratic vision of egalitarian reform.  However, asceticism—a practical 
remedy for societal decay—posed a challenge few would except, one that conformed 
344 Augustine, On Nature and Grace, Ch. 21, p. 127.  See also: Ch. 9, p. 124.
345 Ibid., Ch. 9, p. 124.
346 Brown, p. 204.
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to a rigid and grueling vision of the Christian life prone, much like Seneca’s quest for 
enlightened wisdom, to failure.  In the end, and unlike Rousseau, Pelagius was neither 
republican nor Protestant; he was simply “looking for better Christians and not for a 
more democratic form of government.”347
In the Social Contract, Rousseau makes a strong distinction between “the 
Religion of man and that of the Citizen” and demands that we choose.348  For 
Pelagius, there was hardly a choice; Christians, not citizens, were his overarching 
concern.  Furthermore, “he sincerely believed that his teaching was orthodox and 
consistent with that [Catholic] Church’s tradition.”  As B. R. Rees argues, this belief 
guided his protracted self-defense: “it was in order to prove [his orthodoxy] to his 
critics that he allowed himself to become involved in an arduous and prolonged 
controversy for which he was by ethos and training quite unsuited.”349  If, as Rees 
concludes, we should consider Pelagius a “reluctant” heretic we might also consider 
him a “stubborn” heretic, so certain was he of his own piety.
Whatever the qualifying adjective, Pelagius’ heresy is indisputable in 
hindsight.  He maintained theological doctrine in opposition, or held to be contrary, to 
the Roman Catholic Church.  Yet Brown reminds us that Augustine—not Pelagius—
“abandoned a great tradition of Western Christianity” by denying that “it was ever 
possible for a man to slough off his past; neither baptism nor the experience of 
conversion could break the monotonous continuity of a life that was ‘one long 
temptation.’”350  By contrast, Pelagius adhered to the “the idea that conversion and 
347 Rees, A Reluctant Heretic, p. 112.
348 The Social Contract.  CW 219; OC III.464.
349 Rees, A Reluctant Heretic, p. 131.
350 Brown, p. 200.
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initiation could make a total break in personality,” a belief that W. H. C. Frend 
describes as “the Christianity of discontinuity.”351  In claiming that man might be 
reborn through an act of will, Pelagius revealed himself to be “the last, the most 
radical, and the most paradoxical exponent” of the ancient faith.352
And here we return to this chapter’s initial concern.  Heresies are, by 
definition, paradoxical; they are defined by the rejection of commonly held truths.  
Pelagian heterodoxy offers an additional paradox—one charged to Rousseau as 
well—by using traditional values as the foundation of radical revisionism.  Both men 
preached ontological innocence as a heuristic catalyst to reform; both refused to 
abandon core Christian doctrines including the existence of an afterlife and the moral 
guidance provided by God (as revealed in either the natural world or scripture); and 
both set redemptive doctrines against the backdrop of pessimistic realism (stark 
sociopolitical critique).  Most significantly, both insisted upon the righteousness of 
their paradoxical faiths, maintaining the conviction that they were more pious than 
their many detractors.
*   *   *   *   *
If the messages were similar, the messengers were less so.  Pelagius was an 
austere ascetic who lived as he preached.  Rousseau was neither sternly disciplined 
nor God-fearing, facts that did not prevent him from passing judgment.  Curiously, 
for a thinker wedded to the idea of innocence life appeared anything but.  Man may 
be intrinsically good but the society of his making was undoubtedly corrupting, “fit 
351 Ibid., p. 200.  See also: W. H. C. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church (1964), p. 
402.
352 Ibid., p. 200.
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only for making double men.”353  In evoking this image Rousseau hearkened back to 
Augustine, whose Confessions provides the locus classicus of divided individualism.  
As the Saint described, “in the process of deliberation a single soul is wavering 
between different wills” that pull us towards mutually exclusive loves of spiritual and 
carnal gratification.354  This morbid, painful condition “pull[s] apart the human heart” 
and debilitates the mind.355  Yet for Augustine, such was man’s lot: this internalized 
“struggle of myself against myself” was a manifestation of the “‘sin which dwelt in 
me,’ sin resulting from the punishment of a more freely chosen sin, because I was a 
son of Adam.”356
By contrast, Rousseau understood such contradictory impulses as a struggle 
between nature and artifice, natural instincts and social pressures, man (as divine 
creations) and men (as socially distorted creatures):
Swept along in contrary routes by nature and by men, forced to divide 
ourselves between these different impulses, we follow a composite 
impulse which leads us to neither one goal nor the other.  Thus, in 
conflict and floating during the whole course of our life, we end it 
without having been able to put ourselves in harmony with ourselves, 
and without having been good either for ourselves or for others.357
Far from epitomizing human nature, divergent wills oppose it.358  In broader terms, 
“conflict and floating” is symptomatic of a disconnect between the way things truly 
353 Emile.  E 41.
354 Augustine, Confessions, VIII.x.23, p. 149.
355 Ibid., VIII.ix.21 & VIII.x.24. pp. 148 & 150.
356 Ibid., VIII.xi.27 & VIII.x.22, pp. 152 & 149.  Augustine’s reference is to Romans 7: 17, 20.
357 Emile.  E 41.
358 In works such as The Social Contract and Poland, Rousseau sought to reform society by 
legitimizing political institutions.  Yet in Emile he seems far more withdrawn, suggesting we raise “a 
man… uniquely for himself.”  Such “negative” or defensive education protects individuals from a 
corrupt world while cultivating their natural goodness.  “To form this rare man” we must “prevent 
anything from being done.”  (E 41) As he elaborates in his Letter to Beaumont, “If man is good by his 
nature, as I believe I have demonstrated, it follows that he remains so as long as nothing foreign to 
himself spoils him.  And if men are wicked, as [papists] have gone to the trouble of teaching me, it 
follows that their wickedness comes from elsewhere.  Close the entrance to vice, then, and the human 
119
are by nature and the way they are made to seem in a denatured world.  For Rousseau, 
this condition was a source of tremendous angst, one which he repeatedly confronts 
throughout his works.359  It was also, as Jean Starobinski believes, a preoccupation 
rooted in personal experience.360
As a youth in Bossey, Rousseau was a house servant to the Lambercier 
family.  Alone in a room where his master’s comb was found broken and “no one but 
myself had entered,” he appeared guilty of vandalism.361  Despite the weight of 
evidence and the Lamberciers’ dogged interrogations, he “stubbornly persisted” in 
denying any wrongdoing.  “I would have suffered death and I was resolved to do so,” 
he thunders, rather than suffer the indignation of taking responsibility for a crime he 
had not committed.362  As his vivid recollection of an incident that occurred more 
than fifty years prior makes plain, Rousseau was still haunted by the memory of this 
false accusation.  It marked his conversion from naive innocent to outraged victim.  In 
his own words, he was transformed from
a child always governed by the voice of reason, always treated with 
gentleness, equity, kindness; who did not even have the idea of 
injustice, and who suffers such a terrible one for the first time from 
precisely the people he loves and respects the most.  What a reversal of 
heart will always be good.  On this principle, I established the negative education as the best or rather 
as the only good one.  I show how all positive education, no matter how it is pursued, follows a path 
contrary to its goal.  And I show how one tends to the same goal and how one reaches it by the route I 
have sketched.”  CW IX.35; OC IV.945.
359 Here I follow Starobinski, who cites “transparency” as Rousseau’s primary unifying concern.  This 
manifests itself both positively (as baring his soul in The Confessions, for example), and negatively—
as the rejection of mediating bodies in religion (the church), politics (representative democracy), and 
the arts (theater).
360 It is worth noting that Kelly disagrees: “Contrary to what Starobinski claims, Jean-Jacques feels no 
split between appearance and truth.  He feels a split between the Lamberciers’ past gentleness and their 
present injustice.” (Kelly, p. 94)  However, these points are not mutually exclusive.  The “present 
injustice” of denatured society, for example, also indicates a failure to act in accord with our “true” 
natures.
361 The Confessions. CW V.16; OC I.18.  For Rousseau’s full account see: CW V.16-17; OC I.18-20.
362 The Confessions.  CW V.16-17; OC I.19.
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ideas!  what disorder of feelings!  what an upheaval in his heart, in his 
brain, in all his little intellectual and moral being!363
Falsely impugned guilt left him with a “feeling of violence and injustice,” one that 
“has remained so deeply engraved on my soul, that all the ideas related to it give me 
back my first emotion.”364  An enduring source of indignation, Rousseau drew upon a 
general hatred from this particular experience: “my heart is inflamed at the spectacle 
of all unjust actions—whatever their object might be and wherever they are 
committed—just as if their effect fell on me.”365  This was a point of no return, one 
which evoked a bitter conclusion: “From that moment I ceased to enjoy a pure 
happiness, and even today I feel that the remembrance of the charms of my childhood 
stops there.”366
Under Rousseau’s adroit pen, a broken comb adopts the significance of 
Adam’s fall from Eden.  It is an event replete with crime, accusation, punishment, 
breach of trust, epiphany, and a sudden and enduring loss of innocent bliss—with one 
crucial caveat.  He insists that his Original Sin was a crime in appearance only: “Jean-
Jacques appears to be guilty although in fact he is not.  He appears to lie when in fact 
he is sincere.”367  His experience becomes a sacrificial testament of integrity, one 
where an innocent victim bears the individual burden of a general failure to determine 
truth from opinion.  Furthermore, an error of this sort carries dire consequences.  
363 The Confessions.  CW V.17; OC I.19.
364 The Confessions.  CW V.17; OC I.20.
365 The Confessions.  CW V.17; OC I.20.
366 The Confessions.  CW V.18; OC I.20.
367 Starobinski, Transparency and Obstruction, p. 7.
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Rousseau was forced not simply from his masters’ home, but from the very “serenity 
of my childlike life.”368
In Edenic terms, this rude awakening forces us to consider the significance of 
a Fall in which man is not guilty.  It was an idea first developed (in relatively 
impersonal terms) in the Second Discourse where, as with Jean-Jacques himself, 
humankind begins in a natural state of benign bliss and falls victim to apparently 
arbitrary, corrupting circumstances beyond its immediate control.  As in The 
Confessions, an underlying claim of innocence appears to contradict empirical 
evidence.  In each instance, readers must dismiss the facts Rousseau himself 
introduces—be it ubiquitous corruption or his sole access to a broken comb—in order 
to arrive at a deeper truth.  Whether the subject is Jean-Jacques or humankind, readers 
are asked to sympathize with the innocent wronged.
Rousseau repeats this request in Emile, lamenting that sometimes a youth “is 
chastised before he is able to know his offenses or, rather, to commit any.”369  Yet by 
falsely imputing malice we actually awaken it.  “We fill up his young heart at the 
outset with the passions which later we impute to nature.”370  This unfounded 
ascription epitomizes societal corruption for two reasons: it attributes intrinsic guilt to 
innocent creatures, and plants “the development of the artificial seeds” of amour 
propre and malicious self-interest.  A child so reared grows to become a dangerous 
man, a “slave and tyrant, full of science and bereft of sense, frail in body and soul 
alike.”  Inept and proud, a carrier of vice, this unnatural product “becomes the basis 
368 The Confessions. CW V.18; OC I.20.
369 Emile.  E 48.
370 “After having taken efforts to make him wicked, we complain about finding him so.”  Emile.  E 48.
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for our deploring human misery and perversity.”371  Such a dour conclusion is, 
however, misguided.  “He is the man of our whims; the man of nature is differently 
constituted.”372
At heart of this argument is an undying faith in the ontological innocence of 
humankind, a connection Rousseau reinforces by suddenly directing us to his most 
provocative Pelagian treatise, The Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar.373 The 
Profession itself makes an equally conspicuous entrance into Emile.  Neither taught to 
the prized pupil nor told in the tutor’s voice, it follows an introductory caveat: “I am 
not propounding to you the sentiment of another or my own as a rule.  I am offering it 
to you for examination.”374  The “other” in question is the “decent ecclesiast,” a 
nameless Vicar375 who begins his soliloquy with a refrain suspiciously familiar to 
Jean-Jacques himself.  “Do not expect either learned spectacles or profound reasoning 
from me,” he warns.  “I am not a great philosopher, and I care little to be one.  But I 
sometimes have good sense, and I always love the truth.”376
This humble sense of limitation immediately leads the Vicar to question his 
obligations as a Catholic cleric.  As he admits, “it was not long before I sensed that in 
371 Emile.  E 48.
372 Emile.  E 48.  Hobbes, for one, got it wrong when he “called the wicked man a robust child.”  This 
is somewhat misleading.  As Hobbes wrote in the Preface to De Cive, children are pre-moral only 
because they are not bound by duty: “because not having the use of reason, they are totally exempt 
from duties.  If they continue to do the same things when they are grown up and have acquired the 
strength to do harm, then they begin to be evil and to be called so.  Thus an evil man is rather like a 
sturdy boy, or a man of childish mind, and evil is simply want of reason at an age when it normally 
accrues to men by nature governed by discipline and experience of harm.”  Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 
11.
373 Amidst a discussion of innate moral sense, conscience, and natural love of goodness, Rousseau 
writes: “See hereafter the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar.”  Emile.  E 67
374 Emile.  E 260.
375 The Vicar is based on two Abbés Rousseau encountered (and admired) as a youth: “the decent M. 
Gaime” and “the most gentle of men,” M. Gâtier.  See: The Confessions.  CW V.76-77, 99-100; OC 
I.90-92, 118-119.
376 Emile.  E 266.
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obliging myself not to be a man I had promised more than I could keep.”377  His sense 
of imminent failure—of the unnatural demands pressed upon him—caused him to 
question his piety.  “I was in that frame of mind of uncertainty and doubt that 
Descartes demands for the quest for truth.”  This “disturbing and painful” state, one 
“hardly made to last,” compounded his misgivings of doubt itself.  “How can one 
systematically and in good faith be a skeptic,” he asks?  “I cannot understand it.  
These skeptic philosophers either do not exist or are the unhappiest of men.”378
Rousseau knew perfectly well that such philosophers did exist, and—from 
Pyrrho to Montaigne—were famous for their preternatural calm.  But the Vicar’s 
sensational claim establishes his creed’s guiding principle: given the limits of human 
reasoning, piety cannot rest upon reason alone.  As evidence he points to the 
“diversity of sentiments,” the variety of religious opinions whose sheer numbers 
subvert any one’s claim to possessing an exclusive truth.379  Their incongruity reveals 
not righteousness but “the insufficiency of the human mind” guided by excessive 
“pride.”  “Insufficiency” prevents us from truly comprehending God, while hubris 
deludes us into thinking otherwise.  Divine mysteries are nonetheless impenetrable:
[They] surround us on all sides; they are above the region accessible to 
the senses.  We believe we possess intelligence for piercing thee 
mysteries, but all we have is imagination.  Through this imaginary 
world each blazes a trail he believes to be good.  None can know 
whether his leads to the goal.  Nevertheless we want to penetrate 
everything, to know everything.  The only thing we know is how to be 
ignorant of what we cannot know.  We would rather decide at random 
and believe what is not than admit that none of us can see what is.  We 
are a small part of a great whole whose limits escape us and whose 
Author delivers us to our mad disputes; but we are vain enough to 
377 Emile.  E 367.
378 Emile.  E 367-368.
379 Emile.  E 268.  On this point, Rousseau’s influence can be seen in William James’ The Varieties of 
Religious Experience.
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want to decide what this whole is in itself and what we are in relation 
to it.380
Definitive knowledge of the divine is, however, nothing short of self-delusion.  More 
specifically, such claims are both dangerous and unnecessary.  Dangerous because, as 
the history of the Catholic church illustrates, dogmatic certainty leads to violent 
intolerance; and unnecessary because they do not cultivate true piety.  The Vicar 
accepts as “true” only that which he feels “in the sincerity of my heart.”  Everything 
else is left in a sort of spiritual purgatory, a state of “uncertainty without rejecting it 
or accepting it and without tormenting myself to clarify it if it leads to nothing useful 
for practice.”381
Admitting not to “know why the universe exists,” he approaches it “like a man 
who saw a watch opened for the first time,” admiring the craftsmanship without 
understanding the mechanics.382  He is also certain that its parts “are moving in 
harmony only for a common end which it is impossible for me to perceive.”  But such 
380 Emile.  E 268.  Compare this with the Vicar’s remarks on the difficulties of contemplating God 
(285), and the tutor’s description of God as an “incomprehensible Being who embraces everything, 
who gives motion to the world and forms the whole system of beings, Is neither visible to our eyes nor 
palpable to our hands; He escapes all our senses.” (255).  This position adheres to a traditional 
voluntarist belief in the incomprehensibility of God, one shared by thinkers as diverse as Augustine, 
Ockham, Duns Scotus and Malebranche.
381 Emile.  E 270. The Vicar’s skepticism sets the stage for his diminution of belabored reasoning.  
Although conscience (our moral compass) never errs, the faculty of comparison is prone to error—it 
relies upon “understanding, which judges the relations, mixes its errors in with the truth of the 
sensations, which only reveal the objects.” (E 271)  Descartes reached a similar conclusion in his Sixth 
Meditation, but understood man’s “confusion” as a consequence of his nature, “a combination of mind 
and body… that is bound to mislead him from time to time.”  The Vicar modifies this dualism: man’s 
dividedness is a consequence of denaturization.  Pitié and amour-de-soi are the sole impulses guiding 
our will in the natural state, and they never lead us astray.  In the Second Discourse, Rousseau 
describes willing as a “purely spiritual act.”  Perception and sentiment defines man’s first state, while 
willing, desire and fear “will be the first and almost the only operations of his soul.” (CW III.26-27; 
OC III.142-143.)  As evidence, he offers two articles of faith.  First, “a will moves the universe and 
animates nature.” (E 273)  And second, because “moved matter” reveals a causal act of will, “matter 
moved according to certain laws shows me an intelligence.” (E 275)  A retreat to conscience therefore 
offers a point of communion with God, a deference to the “intelligence” that orders the natural world.  
See also: Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, VI.88, p. 61.
382 Emile.  E 275.
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absolute comprehension is unnecessary.  Where reason requires certitude, faith is 
affirmed through simple observance of a divine order, one revealed “not only in the 
heavens which turn, not only in the star which gives us light, not only in myself, but 
in the ewe which grazes, in the bird which flies, in the stone which falls, in the leaf 
carried by the wind.”383  Such is evidence of a “supreme intelligence” neither 
“healthy mind” nor “unprejudiced eyes” can refute.384
Lest we think him an incurable romantic or a long-gone hippie, the Vicar turns 
his gaze to the real world.  The results shock him from his starry-eyed sentimentality.  
“What a spectacle!  Where is the order I had observed?  The picture of nature had 
presented me with only harmony and proportion; that of mankind presents me with 
confusion and disorder!... Beneficent Being, what has become of your power?  I see 
evil on earth.”385  As with Pelagius, the Vicar concludes that corruption is self-
inflicted.  “Our sorrows, our cares, and our sufferings come to us from ourselves.  
Moral evil is incontestably our own work.” 386  Of this he is certain.
Man, seek the author of evil no longer.  It is yourself.  No evil exists 
other than that which you do or suffer, and both come to you from 
yourself.  General evil can exist only in disorder, and I see in the 
system of the world an unfailing order.  Particular evil exists only in 
383 Emile.  E 275.  Invocations such as these have led many to associate Rousseau with Deism, the 
belief that religious sentiment is inborn and not acquired strictly through revelation or Church 
teachings.
384 By contrast, theological “sophisms” are not simply contestable; they lead to debilitating doubt and 
actually make it “impossible to recognize the harmony of the beings and the admirable concurrences of 
each piece in the preservation of others.”  (E 275)  This “harmony”—the ordered expression of divine 
will—justifies the Vicar’s celebration of humanity: “content with the place in which God has put me, I 
see nothing, except for Him, that is better than my species.”  As with Pelagius, evidence of man’s 
innocence “lies precisely in his being a peculiar, special creature of God.”  Robert F. Evans, Pelagius: 
Inquiries and Reappraisals. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1968), p. 92.  For a discussion of this 
“new idealism” (which, along with radical skepticism and humble realism informs Rousseau’s concept 
of natural goodness) see: Melzer, p. 26.
385 Emile.  E 278.
386 Emile.  E 281.  (My emphasis.)
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the sentiment of the suffering being, and man did not receive this 
sentiment from nature: he gave it to himself.387
Evil is a corporeal affliction, one that exists only as a finite sentiment.  Attributing its 
cause (and absolution) to the will of God disserves both the Author and His creation 
alike.  To do so “is to want Him to do my work while I collect the wages for it.  Not 
to be contented with my condition is to want no longer to be a man, it is to want 
something other than what is, it is to want disorder and evil.”388  If, as the Vicar 
laments, we were only “satisfied to be what we are, we would not have to lament our 
fate.”389  Rather than embrace our divinely-crafted natures we seek “imaginary well-
being,” a process that “give[s] ourselves countless real ills.”  An argument familiar to 
Rousseau’s readers, the unfettered pursuit of unnatural desires has disastrous 
consequences.  As the Vicar makes plain, “take away our fatal progress, take away 
our errors and our vices, take away the work of man, and everything is good.”390
A return to God is clearly in order.  But if, as the Vicar confides, “the more 
effort I make to contemplate His infinite essence, the less I can conceive it,” how 
might we commune?391  Given the limits of reason we must look within.  “Let us 
return to ourselves,” the Vicar exclaims!  “Let us examine, all personal interest aside, 
387 Emile.  E 282.  In stressing the coherence of a general divine order Rousseau again follows 
Malebranche.
388 Emile.  E 294.  Following Pelagius, because our sins are self-inflicted their remission does not 
require divine grace.  As the Vicar makes plain, “death is the remedy for the evils you do to 
yourselves; nature”—and therefore God—“did not want you to suffer forever.”  (E 281)  Note that this 
both precedes and supports Rousseau’s “purgatory” argument from The Confessions.
389 Emile.  E 281.  As in The Confessions, the Discourses, and the Letter to d’Alembert, man’s desire to 
live beyond his natural limits is the source of significant woe.
390 Emile.  E 282.  Rousseau began Emile with a similar claim: “Everything is good as it leaves the 
hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man.”  (E 37)
391 Emile.  E 286.
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where our inclinations lead us.”392  It is this very examination that, as with Rousseau, 
leads him to affirm his natural goodness:
All the morality of our actions is in the judgment we ourselves make 
of them.  If it is true that the good is good, it must be so in the depths 
of our hearts as it is in our works…  If moral goodness is in 
conformity with our nature, man could be healthy of spirit or well 
constituted only to the extent that he is good.  If it is not and man is 
naturally wicked, he cannot cease to be so without being corrupted, 
and goodness in him is only a vice contrary to nature.393
Here is a Pelagian manifesto of notable assertiveness and simplicity.  Man is either 
good or bad.  “If he were made to do harm to his kind, as a wolf is made to slaughter 
his prey… virtue would leave us with remorse” because it would contradict our God-
given natures.394  But it does not.  We are gratified by the happiness of others, find 
beneficent acts more agreeable than wicked ones, and possess “admiration for heroic 
actions” and “raptures of love for great souls.”  Furthermore, the Vicar notes, 
“[a]mong so many inhuman and bizarre cults, among this prodigious diversity of 
morals and characters, you will find everywhere the same ideas of justice and 
decency, everywhere the same notions of good and bad.”395  Such sentiments attest to 
an underlying universal order, one to which all men are naturally drawn regardless of 
their social differences.  As creatures of the same God, we are beholden to the same 
divine law.396
“If one had listened only to what God says to the heart of man,” the Vicar 
argues, “there would never have been more than one religion on earth.”397  Because a 
392 Emile.  E 287.
393 Emile.  E 287.
394 Emile.  E 287.
395 Emile.  E 288.
396 Emile.  E 286.
397 Emile.  E 295.
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“just heart is the true temple of the divinity,” one accessible to “every country and 
every sect,” the “true duties of religion are independent of the institutions of men.”398
Specific forms of worship are therefore somewhat arbitrary, based upon 
contingencies such as birthplace and familial tradition, but not the embodiment of 
exclusive truths.399  A positive argument for religious tolerance, this also serves as a 
renunciation of revelation.  “View the spectacle of nature; hear the inner voice,” he 
urges.  “Has God not told everything to our eyes, to our conscience, to our judgment?  
What more will men tell us?”400  Not only is human testimony superfluous, it is also 
demeaning.
[R]evelations have only the effect of degrading God by giving Him 
human passions.  I see that particular dogmas, far from clarifying the 
notions of the great Being, confuse them; that far from ennobling 
them, they debase them; that to the inconceivable mysteries 
surrounding the great Being they add absurd contradictions; that they 
make man proud, intolerant, and cruel; that, instead of establishing 
peace on earth, they bring sword and fire to it.  I ask myself what good 
all this does, without knowing what to answer.  I see in it only the 
crimes of men and the miseries of mankind.401
As in The Confessions, man’s meddling only corrupts religion’s spiritual and practical 
value.  “As soon as peoples took it into their heads to make God speak, each made 
Him speak in its own way and made Him say what it wanted.”402  Reduced to a 
reflection of human passions and “absurd contradictions,” God becomes a puppet of 
those who arrogantly assume to represent him.
398 Emile.  E 311.
399 Nature “made itself respected on earth and seemed to relegate crime, along with the guilty, to 
heaven.”  Emile.  E 288-289.  Compare this with the Vicar’s dismissal from E 296: only “a mad 
vanity” could convince us “that God takes so great an interest in the form of the priest’s costume, in 
the order of the words he pronounces, in the gestures he makes at the altar, and in all his 
genuflections.”  External worship “is purely a question of public policy” and civil harmony.  By 
contrast, true piety—“that of the heart”—is nourished internally.
400 Emile.  E 295.
401 Emile.  E 295.
402 Emile.  E 295.
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The Vicar suggests his provocative creed should only inspire “reasons for 
doubt,” and demands that we “seek the truth” for ourselves.  This qualification 
precedes a condemnation of those who, by contrast, believe “that they alone are 
enlightened, true, and of good faith,” and “imperiously subject us to their peremptory 
decisions.”403  It is at this point that we find Rousseau’s most revealing intrusion in 
his own voice, in an author’s note.  He takes the Vicar’s critique as an opportunity to 
air his own grievances, specifically against papists.  “Are the people who traffic in 
religion those who are religious?  All the crimes committed among the clergy, as 
elsewhere, do not prove that religion is useless, but that very few people are 
religious.”404  Thus an argument for tolerance ends as an attack against the self-
anointed mediators of God’s will.405
A claim of innocence that contradicts Catholic orthodoxy; a strike against the 
vanity of those who purport to comprehend and represent God; a defense of religious 
tolerance and condemnation of fanatical dogmatism.406  All this coupled with a 
forthright accusation against the self-proclaimed faithful who prove “that very few 
people are religious.”  Should there be any surprise that this work was anathematized?  
What began as a skeptical quest to uncover simple answers to complicated questions 
unfolds as a renunciation of Original Sin and Catholic authority alike.  Rousseau was 
403 Emile.  E 295, 312.  For a extended discussion of this claim see: Ch. 4, “Rousseau as Recluse.”
404 Emile.  E 313.
405 This was precisely the line of argumentation Rousseau adopted in The Social Contract’s discussion 
of Civil Religion.  Readers should consult Chapter 5 below for a detailed examination. 
406 However, in typically paradoxical fashion, Rousseau actually defends fanaticism as preferable to 
irreligion: “fanaticism, although more deadly in its immediate effects than what is today called the 
philosophic spirit, is much less so in its consequences.”  In a tone presaging Nietzsche, Rousseau 
laments that “indifference to the good” born of the “philosophic spirit” is the greater of two evils, one 
that “quietly saps the true foundations of every society.” Emile.  E 312.
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soon held accountable for these heresies and forced, yet again, to defend his 
innocence.
*   *   *   *   *
Reaction to Emile was unprecedented.  As P.-M. Masson notes, it marked the 
first time the publicly-sold work of a celebrated author approved by the censor 
Malesherbes had elicited such severe reprobation.407  Rousseau’s critical attitude 
towards Catholicism hardly distinguished him from the philosophes of his age, but his 
writings lacked their “ordinary hypocrisies” and “irony.”408  He attacked papal 
authority as neither an atheist nor a libertine, but a champion of genuine religious 
faith.  The resultant scandal was so loud, the refutation so imperious, “que la justice 
fut obligée si sévir.”409  Ruthless it was: on June 7, 1762 Emile was brought before 
the general assembly and publicly burned in Paris four days later.  On June 19, the 
Genevan government burned both Emile and The Social Contract following the 
Conclusions du Procureur général.410  And on July 18, Emile was banned in notably 
tolerant Amsterdam.411
In The Confessions Rousseau professed obliviousness to these impending 
storms, although his private correspondence suggests otherwise.412  He had previously 
expressed anxiety over Emile’s reception in a November 30, 1761 letter to 
407 Masson, La Religion de J. J. Rousseau, vol. III, p. 47.
408 Ibid.,  vol. III, p. 47.
409 Masson, “La profession de foi du Vicaire Savoyard” de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, édition critique. 
(Fribourg-Paris, 1914), pp. liii-liv.
410 Conclusions du Procureur général sur deux livres intitulés de Contract Social & de l’Education.  
CC XI.A266, pp. 298-301.  See also: la Condamnation.  CC.A267, pp. 301-302.
411 Les Etats de Hollande et de West-Frise à la Municipalité d’Amsterdam.  CC XI.A268, pp. 302-303.
412 See: The Confessions.  CW V.481-482; OC 575.
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Malesherbes.413  And in a May 29, 1762 letter to his publisher Michel Rey, he 
described The Social Contract as a work that would be neither “admitted nor tolerated 
in France.”414  Reaction to his political treatise was decidedly more muted, most 
threatening to the Genevan Council who viewed it as a radical critique of their own 
government415 yet greeted in France as “one of many abstract books on the 
philosophy of law, which, because of its obtuse nature, could not have a great 
influence on the public.”416 Emile, however, received no such reprieve.
Marcel Françon described its censure as an “injustice and cruelty without 
equal,” arguing that the charge of blasphemy was a “pretext” obscuring the malicious 
machinations of “Voltaire et son clan pour perdre Rousseau.”417  This was, of course, 
the argument Jean-Jacques presented in his autobiography.  So convinced was he of 
both his own piety and a “Holbachian” plot against him that he reduced Emile’s 
condemnation to an elaborate personal vendetta.418  Françon’s accord 
notwithstanding, Rousseau’s conspiracy theory is at best incomplete: it hardly 
acknowledges the unmistakably heretical substance of his condemned work.419
413 Quoted in Marcel Françon, “La condamnation de ‘l’Émile,’” Annales de la Société Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Tome 31 (Geneva: A. Jullien, 1946-1949), p. 227.
414 Quoted in Ibid., p. 233.
415 Rousseau’s most elaborate response to the Genevan Council’s condemnation of the Social Contract
is found in his Letters Written From the Mountain.
416 “During the commotion caused by the Emile and the religious ideas that it contained,” Rosenblatt 
continues, “the Social Contract had practically been ignored in France.”  Helena Rosenblatt, Rousseau 
and Geneva, p. 271.
417 Françon, p. 244
418 The Confessions.  CW V.482;OC I.576.
419 In its entry on Heresy, the 1957 edition of A Catholic Dictionary makes an apparent concession to 
Protestants: “Such Protestants as are in good faith and sincerely desirous of knowing the truth are not 
heretics in the formal sense, inasmuch as they do not pertinaciously reject the Church’s teaching.  
Their heresy is material only—their tenets are in themselves heretical, but they are not formal heretics: 
they do not incur the guilt of heresy.”  This conclusion is indebted to Aquinas, for whom the heretic’s 
guilt was incurred by willfully contradicting orthodoxy: “certain doctors seem to have differed either in 
matters the holding of which in this or that way is of no consequence, so far as faith is concerned, or 
even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined by the Church; although if anyone were 
obstinately to deny them after they had been defined by the authority of the universal Church, he 
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As we have already seen, the Profession of Faith renounced Original Sin, 
Catholic revelation and papal authority alike.  Espoused by the Vicar, it nonetheless 
developed views Rousseau presented elsewhere in his own voice.  This concordance 
did not escape his most vociferous critics.  As the Archbishop of Paris Christophe de 
Beaumont commented, the use of an “assumed character who serves him as 
mouthpiece” was a literary sleight-of-hand, the thinly-veiled attempt of an author to 
distance himself from what he surely knew were inflammatory paradoxes.  By 
renouncing Original Sin “through the organ of a chimerical character,” Rousseau was 
not simply blasphemous; he was also a coward.420
More gravely, Beaumont’s Pastoral Letter presents the author of Emile as 
living proof that the “perilous days” of Saint Paul’s predictions had come to pass.421
An exemplar “of corrupt spirit and perverted Faith,” Rousseau’s disbelief took many 
forms: the “light, pleasant, frivolous style” of novels (such as Julie) aimed at stoking 
the imagination, seducing the mind, and corrupting the heart; the feigned “air of 
profundity and sublimity” in works like The Second Discourse that pretend “to go 
back to the first principles of our knowledge… in order to shake off a yoke that, 
according to it, dishonors humanity, even the Divinity”; “enraged” attacks “against 
Religion’s zeal,” and misguided defenses of “universal tolerance.”  Sometimes, 
Beaumont concludes, disbelief unites 
all these diverse languages, it mixes the serious with playfulness, pure 
maxims with obscenities, great truths with great errors, Faith with 
blasphemy; it undertakes, in a word, to harmonize light with shadows, 
would be deemed a heretic.”  (Summa Theologica, 2.2.11)  Although Rousseau claimed to be in good 
faith, he clearly rejected Catholic orthodoxy; his heresy was therefore more than merely “material,” 
and indisputable even by these relatively generous standards.
420 Pastoral Letter of His Grace the Archbishop of Paris.  CW IX.8.
421 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.3.  Beaumont’s Biblical reference is to 2 Timothy 3:1-4, 8.
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Jesus Christ with Belial.  And such is especially, My Very Dear 
Brethren, the object that appears to have been proposed in a recent 
Work, which has as its title Emile, or on Education.422
Emile was a perverse amalgam, a paradoxical pairing of God and Satan that paraded 
purity as obscenity, error as truth, heterodoxy as faith.  It was also woefully 
impractical, proposing “a plan of education that, far from agreeing with Christianity, 
is not even suited to making Citizens or Men.”423  Rousseau spoke in “contradictory 
language,” ignored empirical evidence (“an infinite number of facts, even prior to that 
of Christian Revelation, that it would be absurd to doubt”),424 and exhibited “glaring 
bad faith.”425  He slandered the papacy (“in clouds, he cunningly imputes to us 
dealings that dishonor reason”),426 Catholics (as evidenced by the “revolting… 
language he puts into the mouth of a supposed Catholic,” the Vicar), and monarchs 
(“Kings who are the images of God”).427
In short, Rousseau posed a theological and political threat.  A heretic who 
took “pleasure in poisoning the sources of public felicity, by inspiring maxims that 
tend only to produce anarchy and all the calamities that follow from it,”428 he 
undermined both Church and state.  These ruling bodies were intimately linked and 
literally above reproach, their authority synonymous with that of Christ Himself, the 
“one through whom Kings reign.”429  Because “there is no Power that does not come 
422 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.3.
423 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.4.
424 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.9-10.
425 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.12.  Beaumont repeats his charge of “bad faith” on pp. 10 & 13.
426 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.10. 
427 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.13.
428 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.14. 
429 “The constitution of Christianity, the Spirit of the Gospel, even the errors and the weakness of the 
human mind lead to the demonstration that the Church established by Jesus Christ is an infallible 
Church.” Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.13.  Beaumont’s Biblical reference is to Proverbs 8:15.
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from God,”430 Beaumont argued, anyone who “resists the Powers resists the order of 
God.”  As with Adam, such offenders “draw damnation upon themselves.”431
Rousseau was therefore guilty on two counts.  As an author, he refused to submit to 
this “Doctrine of a Book that cannot have been invented by men.”432  And as a human 
being, he carried the legacy of “the deplorable fall of our first Father,” the “striking 
mixture of greatness and baseness, of zeal for truth and taste for error, of inclination 
to virtue and penchant to vice” that defines our very nature.433
According to Beaumont, only a “delicate and laborious” Christian education 
might uproot, “as much as possible, those vicious inclinations that are the sad effects 
of our hereditary corruption.”434  In rejecting Original Sin, Rousseau disagreed.  
Because corruption was self-inflicted, healing began by first embracing our natures; 
the Catholic Church actually impeded convalescence by preaching that sin was 
intrinsic.435  The Archbishop bristled at this “erroneous, impious, blasphemous, and 
heretical” suggestion.436  By renouncing orthodox precepts as unnecessary to 
salvation, Beaumont concluded that Jean-Jacques had sealed his own eternal fate.
430 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.14.  Beaumont’s Biblical reference is to Peter 2:17 which teaches us to 
“Fear god, respect the King.”
431 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.14.  Beaumont’s Biblical reference is to Romans 13:1-2.
432 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.11-12.
433 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.4-5.  If Adam’s legacy imparts any lesson it is “to live in this world with 
temperance according to justice and with piety, while waiting for the beatitude for which we hope!” 
(15) Beaumont’s Biblical reference is to Titus 2:12-13.  For Paul’s pedagogy, see also 2 Timothy 4:1-2.
434 Pastoral Letter.  CW IX.14-15.
435 As Beaumont warns: “Woe to you, woe to society, if your children were brought up in accordance 
with the principles of the Author of Emile!  Just as there is nothing but religion that has taught us to 
know man, his greatness, his misery, his future destiny, it also belongs to it alone to form his reason, to 
perfect his morals, to procure for him a solid happiness in this life and in the other.” Pastoral Letter.  
CW IX.14.
436 Beaumont’s final ruling reads very much like the Parlement’s court order: “We condemn the said 
Book [Emile] as contained an abominable doctrine, suited to overturning natural Law and to destroying 
the foundations of the Christian Religion; establishing maxims contrary to Evangelical Morality; 
tending to disturb the peace of States, to stir up Subjects against the authority of their Sovereign; as 
containing a very great number of propositions respectively false, scandalous, full of hatred against the 
Church and its Ministers, departing from the respect due to Sacred Scripture and the Tradition of the 
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As Rousseau’s response made clear, he did not take such damning lightly.  
His retort—the November 18, 1762 Letter to Beaumont—opened, provocatively 
enough, with a quote from Augustine: “Pardon me if I have spoken too freely—it was 
not to dishonor you, but to defend myself.  I have relied on your seriousness and 
prudence, because you can measure how great [a] necessity you imposed on me of 
answering you.”437  If Rousseau felt forced to respond he did so with great verve, 
issuing a rebuttal more than four times the length of the Pastoral Letter.  He began 
his passionate defense by recalling the facts that led to his censure: 
A Genevan has a Book printed in Holland,438 and by degree of the 
Parlement of Paris this Book is burned without regard for the 
Sovereign whose authorization it bears.  A Protestant poses objections 
to the Roman Church in a Protestant country, and a warrant is issued 
against him by the Parlement of Paris.  A Republican states objections 
against the monarchic State in a Republic, and a warrant is issued 
against him by the Parlement of Paris.  The Parlement of Paris must 
have strange ideas about its dominion and believe itself the legitimate 
judge of the human race.439
In one terse paragraph, Rousseau defends his legal rights, suggests a violation of 
sovereign jurisdiction,440 and attributes this abuse to an unholy alliance between 
Church, erroneous, impious, blasphemous, and heretical.  In consequence We very expressly forbid all 
people of our Diocese to read or possess said Book, under penalty of law.”  Pastoral Letter.  CW 
IX.16.
437 The lines Rousseau uses as his dedicatory epistle to the Letter to Beaumont are taken from 
Augustine’s Epistle 238.  This was the first of two letters written to Pascentius, an Arian count and tax-
collector known for his vocal attacks against Catholicism and the “energetic” (read: greedy) execution 
of his office.  Following a public debate with Augustine that he claimed to have won (although he
presented little in the way of argument save personal opinion), Pascentius ignored further 
correspondence from Augustine.  The context of this letter makes its invocation all the more 
inflammatory.  Not only did Rousseau appropriate Beaumont’s most beloved theologian, he has 
usurped a letter written against a heretic.  Note also that the preceding line—“truth must necessarily 
prevail, whether we deny it or admit it”—expresses a markedly Rousseauist faith in the righteousness 
of truth against the delusion of opinion.  Saint Augustine: Letters, Volume V (204-270), Sister Wilfrid 
Parsons, tr. (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1956), p. 209.
438 This was the only version authorized by Rousseau for printing.  Françon, p. 234.
439 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.23; OC IV.929.
440 As we will discuss in Chapter 5, this jurisdictional boundary was crucial to Rousseau’s Civil 
Religion as well.
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Church and state.  He raises issues of discrimination and tolerance, legitimate 
authority, and the rights individuals possess in relation to unjust institutions.  And he 
concludes that Catholic, monarchal Parisian authorities possessed neither the legal, 
political nor moral authority to censure a work printed with the permission of the 
Holland government and written by a Protestant, republican Genevan.441  But they did 
and, as with the comb incident, the fate of the free world seemed to hinge on their 
ruling.  “I do not know how this fits with international law, but I know very well that, 
with such procedures, every man’s freedom and perhaps his life is at the mercy of the 
first Printer.”442
Although the implications of this case extend far beyond Jean-Jacques 
himself, Rousseau cannot help but lament his own particular fate.  Having taken up 
his pen “only for the good of my fellows,” his reward was the encroachment of 
bailiffs and an arrest warrant.  At a time “when I hoped that my life’s troubles were 
about to end,” he rues, “my greatest misfortunes began.”443  This was not the first 
moment Rousseau described as his life’s worst,444 but we may here allow him his 
histrionics.  For once, he was not exaggerating.
The censure of Emile indeed marked new heights of persecution, and it was 
due in large part to the Profession of Faith.  Yet rather than defend this work as his 
own, he initially attempted to absolve himself of responsibility.  Rousseau was the 
441 As Rousseau had written in an earlier draft, “I admit to you that it is not without surprise that I see 
myself summoned in some manner before you, and that I would not have understood very well on what 
grounds J.J. Rousseau, Citizen of Geneva, would have been accountable for his writings to a catholic 
Prelate.”  Letter to Beaumont  (Fragment 5).  CW IX.86; OC IV.1012.
442 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.23; OC IV.929.
443 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.22; OC IV.929.
444 In addition to the comb incident, Rousseau rued his epiphany en route to Vincennes, his fame as an 
author, various plots hatched by his enemies, and his stay with Hume in England (to cite just a few 
examples).
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self-proclaimed “editor” (not the author) of the Vicar’s sermon.  In a fragment 
entitled On Proceedings against Writers, he was the hapless victim held accountable 
simply because “I put my name at the head of the book.”445  And in dissociative 
language, he argued that “one cannot… impute [the Vicar’s] sentiments to him [the 
editor] unless he has expressly adopted them.”446  This initial strategy seems facile, if 
not downright specious.  After all, Rousseau never refers to himself as an “editor” in 
Emile itself; all but two of his major works bore his name; and if he did not 
“expressly” adopt the Vicar’s soliloquy as his own, he presents it as the thoughts of “a 
man more worthy than [himself].”447
Most significantly, however, Rousseau’s self-distancing collapses within the 
Letter to Beaumont itself, which on no uncertain terms reiterates the controversial 
core of the Vicar’s creed: man’s natural innocence.  As Rousseau soon points out, this 
Pelagian faith unites his entire oeuvres:
The fundamental principle of all morality about which I have reasoned 
in all my Writings and developed in this last one with all the clarity of 
which I was capable, is that man is a naturally good being, loving 
justice and order; that there is no original perversity in the human 
heart, and that the first movements of nature are always right.448
445 On Proceedings Against Writers.  CW IX.100; OC IV.1029.  Readers should note that anti-papal 
works were almost always published anonymously in the eighteenth century.  Rousseau’s openness 
both underscored his courage as an author (despite Beaumont’s charge to the contrary), and suggested 
a tacit critique of philosophes such as Voltaire, Helvétius, and Holbach whose controversial writings 
on religion never bore their names.
446 On Proceedings Against Writers.  CW IX.100; OC IV.1029.
447 Emile.  E 260.
448 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.28; OC IV.935-936.  (My emphasis.)  As Rousseau continues:  “I have 
shown that the only passion born with man, namely amour de soi, is a passion in itself indifferent to 
good and evil; that it becomes good or bad only by accident and depending on the circumstances in 
which it develops.  I have shown that all the vices imputed to the human heart are not natural to it; I 
have stated the manner in which they are born.  I have followed their genealogy, so to speak, and I 
have shown how, through continuous deterioration of their original goodness, men finally become 
what they are.”  This reiterates what Rousseau makes explicit in Emile (E 92) and the Second 
Discourse (CW III.36-38; OC III.155-157).  Note that “amour de soi” reflects the corrected version of 
the “manifestly false” original edition which read “amour-propre.”  OC IV.1734 (936a).
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His courage raised, Rousseau proceeds to interrogate his Catholic rival.  “You say we 
are sinners because of our first father’s sin,” he continues.  “But why was our first 
father himself a sinner?”449  At loss for a coherent explanation450 he concludes that 
Adam’s transgression “seems to me less a true prohibition than paternal advice.  It is 
a warning to abstain from a pernicious fruit that brings death.”  This account is 
“surely more consistent with the idea one should have of God’s goodness.”451
Still, Rousseau is not content to merely challenge the myth of hereditary guilt.  
He compounds his heresy by trivializing the gravity of Adam’s fatal choice.
There is… such a natural motive of indulgence and commiseration in 
the tempter’s ruse and in the woman’s seduction452 that, considering 
Adam’s sin in all its circumstances, it can be found to be only the 
slightest of faults.  Yet according to them, what a fearful punishment!  
It is even impossible to conceive of a more terrible one.  For what 
other castigation could Adam have sustained for the greatest crimes453
449 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.30; OC IV.939.
450 This assumption is inadequate for three reasons: it follows faulty logic (“Why wouldn’t the same 
reason by which you explain his sin apply to his descendants without original sin”?); disserves God (to 
whom “we impute an injustice… by making ourselves sinners and punishable because of the vice of 
our birth”); and rests upon a circular argument (explaining “everything except its own principle”).  By 
contrast, Rousseau “illumines even the fault of the first man.”  But “the only thing [Beaumont] can see 
is man in the hands of the Devil, while I see how he fell into them.  The cause of evil, according to 
you, is corrupted nature, and this corruption itself is an evil whose cause had to be sought.  Man was 
created good.  We both agree on that, I believe.  But you say he is wicked because he was wicked.  
And I show how he was wicked.”  Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.30-31; OC IV.939-940.
451 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.31; OC IV.940.   Rousseau also makes a philological argument, noting 
that “as for the menace of double death, it has been shown that this term morte morieris does not have 
the emphasis they give it and is merely a Hebraic turn of phrase used in other places where this 
emphasis cannot apply.”  Theologians, in other words, are quick to distort the message of the Old 
Testament.  This reference is to Genesis 2:17 (“of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall 
not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die”).  For examples of the diverse usage of morte 
morieris see: Genesis 20:7; Samuel 14:44, 22:16; 2 Kings 1:4, 6, 16; and Ezekiel 3:18, 33:8, 14. 
452 This view of women as “tempters” and men as helpless victims, while not inconsistent with 
Rousseau’s broader sentiment of victimization, is the understandable source of debate.  For critiques of 
his stance particularly as developed in Emile, see: Lynda Lange, “Rousseau and Modern Feminism”; 
Leah Bradshaw, “Rousseau on Civic Virtue, Male Autonomy, and the Construction of the Divided 
Female”; Linda Zerilli, “‘Une Maîtresse Impérieuse’: Women in Rousseau’s Semiotic Republic”; and 
Rebecca Kukla, “The Coupling of Human Souls: Rousseau and the Problem of Gender Relations” in 
Feminist Interpretations of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Lange, ed. (University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002).
453 An earlier draft of this sentence reads: “But do you consider that the more you extenuate the fault 
the more cruel you render the punishment, for what more terrible punishment could Adam have borne 
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other than being condemned to death, himself and all his race, in this 
world and to spend eternity in the other one consumed by the fires of 
hell?  Is that the penalty imposed by the God of mercy on a poor 
wretch for letting himself be fooled?454
Adam was just a man, one “fooled” by the opposite sex.  This was a vulnerability 
with which Rousseau clearly identified and, as The Confessions detail, one to which 
he frequently succumbed.  To condemn Adam for falling to this temptation was to 
admit his own culpability.  Yet because this weakness is instinctual, it is a desire 
instilled in us by God, rather than an affront to His order.455  Guilt is instead ascribed 
to those who bitterly damn man for simply adhering to his nature.  “How I hate the 
disheartening doctrine of our harsh Theologians,” Rousseau decries!  “If I were 
tempted for a moment to acknowledge it, that is when I would believe I were 
blaspheming.”456
But he did not.  He insisted upon his piety, finally summoning the confidence 
to defend the Profession directly.  We learn that the Vicar’s creed is composed of two 
sections.  “The first part, which is the longer, the more important, the more filled with 
striking and new truths, is intended to combat modern materialism, to establish the 
existence of God and natural Religion with all the force of which the Author is 
capable.”457  This is the Vicar’s ode to God and rebuttal to philosophic atheism.  
Although the second part, “very much shorter, less regular, and less thorough, raises 
for the greatest crimes…”  The phrase “could Adam have borne” replaced “could God have inflicted.”  
Letter to Beaumont (Fragment 5).  CW IX.89; OC IV.1016, 1758 (1016b).
454 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.31; OC IV.940.
455 As Rousseau writes in Emile, “Our passions are the principal instruments of our preservation.  It is, 
therefore, an enterprise as vain as it is ridiculous to want to destroy them—it is to control nature, it is it 
is to reform the work of God.  If God were to tell men to annihilate the passions which He gives him, 
God would will and not will; He would contradict himself.  Never did He give this senseless order.  
Nothing of the kind is written in the human heart.”  E 212.  Compare with E 445-446.
456 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.31; OC IV.940.
457 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.75; OC IV.996.
140
doubts and difficulties about revelations in general,” it does so purposefully “to make 
each more circumspect from within his own Religion about accusing others of bad 
faith within theirs, and to show that the proofs of each one are not so conclusive to all 
eyes that those who do not see them with the same clarity as we do must be treated as 
guilty people.”458
The Profession is therefore above reproach: it pays deference to the Creator; 
addresses only what is “truly essential to Religion”; arrives at these powerful truths 
by confronting the Vicar’s “objections, his difficulties, his doubts”; is supported by 
appeals to both conscience and reason; teaches circumspection; and uncovers 
certainty only “about essential dogmas,” maintaining “a respectful skepticism about 
the others.”459  This was Rousseau’s recipe for cultivating true faith, a sentiment 
nourished in the heart, not pressed upon the will or convoluted in the mind.  If these 
views were heretical, he maintained that they were not irreligious.  Rather, he argued, 
Catholic orthodoxy—not the Vicar—was guilty of disserving God.
If such ideas shocked Beaumont, Rousseau insisted that they could be found 
in all his works.  “I have written on various subjects, but always with the same 
principles: always the same morality, the same belief, the same maxims, and if you 
will the same opinions.  Yet,” he laments, “contradictory judgments about my books, 
or rather, about the Author of my books, have been made.”460  Following the First 
Discourse, he was labeled a man of paradoxes; after his Letter on French Music, he 
became “the avowed enemy of the nation.”  The Second Discourse changed his 
reputation to that of “an atheist and a misanthrope,” the Letter to d’Alembert 
458 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.75; OC IV.996-997.
459 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.75-76; OC IV.996-997.
460 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.22; OC IV.928.
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presented him as “the defender of Christian morality,” and Julie was considered 
“tender and mawkish.”461  The inconsistency of his audience is clearly a point of 
contention:
the foolish public vacillates about me, knowing as little why it detests 
me as why it liked me before.  As for myself, I have always remained 
the same: more ardent than enlightened in my quests, but sincere in 
everything, even against myself; simple and good, but sensitive and 
weak, often doing evil and always loving the good… demanding 
nothing of men and not wishing to depend on them, yielding no more 
to their prejudices than to their wills and keeping my own as free as 
my reason; fearing God without being afraid of hell, reasoning about 
Religion without libertinism, liking neither impiety nor fanaticism; but 
hating intolerant people even more than freethinkers.462
Here, then, is Rousseau as he sees himself: sincere in an insincere world; asking little 
and giving much; a seeker of truth loathed by dogmatists and their gullible subjects; 
loving God without bitterness; hating intolerance (especially when directed towards 
him) and artifice.  An innocent man condemned, he wanted only to reveal himself to 
the public, “to hide my ways of thinking from no one, without pretense, without 
artifice in all things, telling my faults to my friends, my sentiments to all the world, 
and, to the public, the truths that concern it.”463
In the end this confession reads very much like his autobiography, and 
culminates in an equally confrontational conclusion.  “Such are my crimes, and such 
are my virtues,” Jean-Jacques declares; readers are again pressed to judge.  Still, he 
461 Rousseau adds: “Now [following Emile] I am impious.  Soon perhaps I will be devout.”  Letter to 
Beaumont.  CW IX.22; OC IV.928.
462 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.22; OC IV.928-929.
463 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.22; OC IV.929.
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seemed ill-equipped to handle a negative ruling, particularly the vilification of 
Emile.464
My Discourse on Inequality circulated throughout your Diocese, and 
you did not write a Pastoral Letter.  The New Heloise circulated 
throughout your diocese and you did not write a Pastoral Letter.  Yet 
all these Books, which you have read, since you judge them, are 
imbued with the same maxims.  The same modes of thought are not 
more disguised in them.  If the subject was not suited to developing 
them to the same extent… the Author’s profession of faith is found 
expressed there with less reserve than that of the Savoyard Vicar.465
This is especially true of Julie, whose heroine’s dying soliloquy reads like a 
condensed Profession.466  Yet unlike the virtuous matriarch’s fictional speech (or 
even the speculative history of the Second Discourse), the Vicar’s sermon stands as 
the moral core of a pedagogical treatise.  Delivered as a lesson for its audience to 
absorb by no less than a Catholic cleric, this heretical teaching was not easily 
dismissed.
Although Rousseau claimed all his writings exposed “my sentiments in 
matters of Religion… as they have always been in my mouth and in my heart,” he 
himself felt Emile was different.467  As he confessed to Beaumont, “I will always 
consider [The Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar] the best and most useful 
464  At one point he insists that Beaumont was politically motivated and would not have attacked him 
“if my Book had not been denounced in Parlement.”  Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.26; OC IV.933.
465 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.26; OC IV.933.  Rousseau repeats this claim in The Confessions: 
“Everything that is bold in The Social Contract was previously in the Discourse on Inequality; 
everything that was bold in Emile was previously in Julie.”  CW V.342; OC I.407.
466 La Nouvelle Héloïse appeared to applause although “the profession of faith of that very Héloïse is 
exactly the same as that of the Savoyard Vicar.”  The Confessions.  OC V.342; OC I.407.  Rousseau 
also argued that his Profession of Faith was a reiteration of Julie’s dying soliloquy: “In Emile one finds 
the profession of faith of a Catholic Priest, and in Heloise that of a pious woman: These two Pieces are 
sufficiently in accord that one can explain one of them by the other.”  Letters Written From the 
Mountain (First Letter).  CW IX.139; OC III.694.  The novel itself justifies these claims.  See: Julie, 
Part VI, Letter XI, esp. pp. 584-590.  See also Part VI, Letter XII on Julie’s “confession without 
shame” of her love for Saint Preux.  She is innocent of this indiscretion because she upheld her duty as 
a wife and matriarch, even though her will could not alter her heart.  CW VI.608-609; OC II.740-741.
467 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.46; OC IV.960.
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Writing in the century during which I published it,” an estimation that “neither the 
stake nor arrest warrants” might change.468  The Vicar taught a Christian morality 
essential to man’s well-being, one that emphasized our natural, divinely-scribed 
potential (universally applicable to creations of the same God) rather than artificial 
sectarian difference.  No matter the pressure placed upon Rousseau by papists or 
philosophes, he refused to abandon this conviction.  “In ordering me to be humble, 
the Theologians will not make me false; and in taxing me with hypocrisy, the 
philosophers will not make me profess unbelief.  I shall speak of my Religion, 
because I have one, and I shall speak of it loudly because I have the courage to do so 
and because it would be desirable for the good of men if it were that of the human 
race.”469
Attacked by atheists and Ecclesiasts alike, Rousseau maintained a belief in his 
own piety.  As he pled to Beaumont, “Your Grace, I am Christian, and sincerely 
Christian, according to the doctrine of the Gospel.”470  But his faith carried a crucial 
caveat: “I am Christian not as a disciple of the Priests, but as a disciple of Jesus 
Christ.471  My Master quibbled little over dogma and insisted much on duties.”  
Foremost amongst these duties is brotherly love: “whoever loves God above all things 
468 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.46-47; OC IV.960.
469 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.47; OC IV.960.
470 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.47; OC IV.960.  Rousseau repeats and expands this claim (“I declare 
myself Christian”) in Letters Written From the Mountain (Third Letter).  CW IX.168; OC III.729.  
471 By “Christian” Rousseau clearly means “Protestant” and not “Catholic.”  As explained to 
Beaumont, “fortunate to be born into the most reasonable and holy Religion on earth, I remain 
inviolably attached to the worship of my Fathers.  Like them, I take Scripture and reason for the unique 
rules of my belief.  Like them, I challenge the authority of men and agree to submit to their formulas 
only to the extent I perceive their truth.  Like them, I join in my heart with the true servants of Jesus 
Christ and the true adorers of God, to offer him the homages of his Church in the communion of the 
faithful.”  CW IX.47; OC IV.960.
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and his neighbor as himself is a true Christian.”472  Because it “seems certain” that 
“man is made for society, the truest Religion is also the most social and the most 
humane.”473  Still, Rousseau admitted that empirical evidence hardly confirmed his 
conclusion.  His peculiar faith was “subject to great difficulties from the historical 
account and the facts that contradict it.”  Despite insisting that religion benefited 
society, Jews (they “began their establishment by destroying seven nations”), 
Christians (“all… have had wars of Religion”), and the celibate demonstrated that 
religious practice often disserves man’s best interests.474
Rather than discourage him, this harsh reality only affirmed his belief in the 
value of the Vicar’s sermon.  To bridge the gap between how things are and how they 
should be, we must maintain faith in man’s innocence despite overwhelming evidence 
to the contrary.  The Vicar provides such hope amidst despair because, like God 
Himself, he speaks directly to the heart independently of both mind and will.475
Unlike papal dogma, he convinces without coercion.  And unlike atheism, he raises 
doubts, dissentions, and objections to human religion without abandoning God.  This 
is why “every man who believes in God, of whatever religion he might be, will never 
read the profession of the Savoyard vicar without being moved by it.”476  No matter 
what others claimed, this creed offered a genuinely beneficial faith to denatured 
individuals desperately in need of guidance from their benevolent, omnipotent 
Creator.
472 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.47; OC IV.960.  Citing Matthew 7:12 and Galatians 5:14, Rousseau 
reminds us that when Christ “summed up the Law and the Prophets, it was more in acts of virtue than 
in formulas of belief, and he told me himself and through his Apostles that the person who loves his 
brother has fulfilled the Law.”
473 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.54; OC IV.969.
474 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.54-55; OC IV.970.
475 Julie.  CW VI.609; OC II.741.
476 Letter to Beaumont (Fragment 14).  CW IX.98; OC IV.1026.
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*   *   *   *   *
The Vicar’s profession ends as it began, with a declaration of love of the truth.  
Its pursuit is our principal duty on earth, he concludes, one to uphold no matter the 
costs.  “Whether they love you or hate you, whether they read or despise your 
writings, it does not matter; speak the truth; do the good.”477  Taking this love “as my 
whole philosophy,” he wonders where is “the philosopher who would not gladly 
deceive mankind for his own glory?  Where is the one who in the secrecy of his heart 
sets himself any other goal than that of distinguishing himself?”478  By his own 
account, Rousseau himself.  In adopting Juvenal’s lines as his motto, he had dedicated 
his life to this very aim.479
Less well known is an earlier maxim that graced only two of his published 
writings.  Taken from Ovid’s Tristia, it first appears in the closing of a January 17, 
1742 correspondence to François-Joseph de Conzié: “Here it is that I am a barbarian, 
understood by nobody.”480  In this letter the quote is used quite literally: Jean-Jacques 
hopes the comte will “take his frankness in the meaning in which it is offered,” not to 
offend but as the honest testimony of an oft-misread man “who speaks from 
477 Emile.  E 313.
478 Emile.  E 269.
479 See: Juvenal, The Satires, IV.89-91.  Rousseau mentions this motto in Emile  (E 206), Letter to 
d’Alembert, the epigraph to Letters Written From the Mountain, and The Reveries of the Solitary 
Walker (Fourth Promenade).  
480 Rousseau à François-Joseph de Conzié, comte des Charmettes, January 17, 1742.  CC I.43.139.  
Translation from Tristia V.x.36 taken from Ovid, Volume VI, Arthur Leslie Wheeler, tr. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 249.  In the letter, Rousseau adds line 37 (“the Gatae laugh 
stupidly at Latin words”) which does not appear in the dedicatory epistles to the First Discourse and 
Dialogues.
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experience.”481  As with falsely impugned guilt Rousseau abhorred misunderstanding, 
particularly of his forthright oeuvres.  Expecting that his age would identify within 
them “the heart of a good man,” he encountered only scorn.  “The people hate me, I 
know it, but that is not their fault; this hatred is again the work of its tyrants; it is not 
me that it hates, it is what it has been told I was.”482
Rousseau’s paranoia is, however, misleading.  The people did not hate him: he 
was acclaimed throughout Europe, Julie was the century’s bestselling novel, and he 
received an inordinate amount of fan mail from readers who felt personally touched 
by his passionate works.483  Even more striking than the inaccuracy of Rousseau’s 
assessment is the helplessness he attributes to his peers.  They are easily manipulated 
by “tyrants,” cruel, “self-interested and jealous men” like the papists, philosophers 
and Parlement officials who used pastoral letters, stakes and warrants to “disturb and 
deceive.”  Even as he trusted les peuples to read his heart, he seemed convinced of 
their incapacity to do so.  Yet like himself they were innocent victims subject to the 
wicked machinations of forces beyond their control, and therefore not to blame.
Awash in discouragement, Rousseau looked for redemption in a possible 
future.484  One day his enemies’ “outcries will finally end and my writings will 
481 CC I.43.139.  When Ovid’s quote appears again (as the dedicatory epistle of the First Discourse), it 
raises a striking paradox: Rousseau initiated his literary career by attacking the arts, and used as his 
dedication the words of a misunderstood poet.  Puffendorf also quotes the same verse in his Right of 
Nature and of Nations (IV.I.vi) when discussing the origin of languages.
482 Letter to Beaumont (Fragment 12).  CW IX.94; OC IV.1021-1022.
483 See: Darnton, “Readers Respond to Rousseau: The Fabrication of Romantic Sensitivity”; The 
Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France.
484 “One day perhaps what is the shame of my century will be its glory, and those who will read my 
book [Emile] will say with admiration: How angelic those times must have been in which a book like 
that was regarded as impious, doubtless then all writings breathed the most sublime devoutness and the 
earth was covered with nothing but saints.”  Letter to Beaumont (Fragment 14).  CW IX.98; OC 
IV.1026.  Dripping with sarcasm, this claim prepares us for the opening to The Confessions in which 
Rousseau suggests to his audience that they were certainly no better than he.  Note that in the final 
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remain to [their] shame.”  Only then would he be avenged by “less prejudiced 
Christians” who might recognize the concord, charity, and “morality of their divine 
master” imbued in his ideas.485  In so casting his gaze, Rousseau looked as he often 
did, in different directions—towards a better future while dwelling on a disappointing 
past.  Possible redemption offered some solace, and he was willing to sacrifice his 
present happiness to serve a higher good.486  This sense of martyrdom placed him in 
the shadows of Jesus and Socrates.  “They crucified my master and gave hemlock to a 
man who was worth more than I,” Rousseau confides.487  If he was not their equal he 
nonetheless felt their burden.  Preaching truths to a vengeful, intolerant society, he 
assumed history would treat his paradoxes as kindly as it did those of his forebears.  
Only then would “the glory to which I laid claim” be recognized.488
If such faith seems irreconcilable with his acute doubt, we must remember 
that Rousseau never conflated natural goodness with incorruptibility.  Far from it, the 
Vicar notes, “the fact that I act in good faith does not mean I believe myself 
infallible.”489  Nor did Jean-Jacques.  As his own testimony proves, he was a man of 
many flaws, one who (despite insistence otherwise) occasionally acted in bad faith.  
He simply did not take his errancy as proof of irredeemable guilt.  Rather, to 
printed version, he removes an explicit mention of the Vicar’s faith.  Compare with: Letter to 
Beaumont.  CW IX.60; OC IV.984-985.
485 Letter to Beaumont (Fragment 12).  CW IX.94; OC IV.1021.
486 “I said to myself, oh what good would be done for men by the one who would tell them the truth 
without disguise, without fear, without satire and without flattery, the one who, uprooting their base 
prejudices, would dry up the source of their miseries, the one who would make them see that they are 
wicked only because they are dupes, and unhappy only because they are foolish, the one who would 
teach them that they are made to be happy and good and what they have to do to be so… I have tried to 
be that man; at least I dared to be him, and what is most difficult in this enterprise is courage.”  Letter 
to Beaumont (Fragment 10).  CW IX.91-92; OC IV.1018-1019.
487 Letter to Beaumont (Fragment 5).  CW IX.89; OC IV.1016.
488 Rousseau describes this “glory” as “a sincere desire to be useful and true, disinterestedness, and 
good faith.”  His faith is evidenced by both his dedication to public welfare and his non-partisanship. 
Letter to Beaumont (Fragment 10).  CW IX.92; OC IV.1019.
489 Emile.  E 294.
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Rousseau and society alike, lapses merely reiterated the need for positive guidance.  
“As I justly distrust myself,” the Vicar divulges, “the only thing that I ask of [God], 
or rather that I expect of His justice, is to correct my error if I am led astray and if this 
error is dangerous to me.”  Yet if the strength to stay a steady course fails, “of what 
can I be guilty?  It is up to the truth to come nearer.”490
This, finally, was Rousseau’s objective: to bring the truth nearer.  This is what 
drove him to explain how we had fallen from our natural state; how everything 
degenerates in human hands; why man was/is491 born free, yet everywhere in chains; 
why divine guidance was both accessible and necessary; where society erred, and 
how individuals might still be redeemed by rekindling the divine sentiment within us.  
Yet how can we be both free and in chains?  Inherently good and authors of sin?  
Deeply innocent yet demonstrably guilty?  Ruled by dogmatists if God’s order is so 
evident and compelling?  Paradoxes such as these have beguiled readers for more 
than two hundred years; are they only now resolvable, much less pardonable?
If we approach Rousseau’s paradoxes not as contradictions demanding 
definitive resolutions, but as antinomies intrinsic to the human condition, they might 
yet serve a practical purpose: stoking our courage and desire to change a world itself 
characterized by vicious contradictions, without letting us lapse into cynical apathy.  
After all, Rousseau himself believed that his combined expression of acute discomfort 
and unbounded faith was a necessary catalyst for reform.  Still, we need not rush to 
judgment.  Before assessing the coherence and practical utility of his dissonant vision, 
490 Emile.  E 294.
491 The original sentence—“L’homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers”—is ambiguous.  In 
French, it can refer to both a past and present condition: man either “was” or “is” born free.  The Social 
Contract.  OC III.351.   For a discussion of the implications of each translation see CW IV.xiii.
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we might first turn to another theme that illustrates the confluence of religious and 
secular traditions so crucial to his work: reclusiveness.
150
Chapter 4:  The Reluctant Recluse
A truly happy being is a solitary being.  God alone enjoys an absolute happiness.  But 
who among us has the idea of it?
—Rousseau, Emile492
Il n' y a que le méchant qui soit seul.
—Diderot, Le fils naturel,  Act IV, Scene III.493
As with innocence, reclusiveness is a theme prominent within Rousseau’s life 
and works, and one that illustrates his peculiar incorporation of Christian and Pagan 
traditions.494  In praising solitude, Rousseau (in)famously distanced himself from his 
peers, stressing his uniqueness while levying stark critiques upon the society of his 
contemporaries’ making.  He championed the virtues of Geneva as an expatriate in 
France, and waxed eloquent on mankind’s natural state of ignorant, innocent 
isolation.  What began as a largely theoretical enterprise—a public figure’s praise of 
isolation and withdrawal—took a highly politicized turn towards the literal.  
Following the publication of his most controversial work—Emile, and its chapter The 
Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar—Rousseau was exiled, forced into the very 
seclusion he had for so long argued was an antidote to corrupting social relations.
492 Emile.  E 221.
493 “Only the wicked are alone.”  Diderot, Œuvres, Tome IV, p. 1113.
494 The etymology of the word “recluse” confirms its religious overtones.  According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, “recluse” refers to persons “secluded from society, especially as a religious 
discipline.”  A recluses can describe either “[a] person shut up from the world for the purpose of 
religious meditation” (such as monks or hermits), or someone “who lives a retired life, one who mixes 
little with society.”
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If Rousseau is far more religious than is commonly held, his religiosity is 
nonetheless qualified by a concurrent commitment to temporal aims and secular 
values.  This phenomenon is particularly evident in his appropriation of Christian and 
Pagan models of withdrawal.  To support this claim, I will examine Rousseau’s 
evolution as a recluse from the demonstrative self-distancing of his early career, to a 
more mature incorporation of isolation into a model of civic education, to his final, 
literal retreat from Montmorency following the censure of Emile and The Social 
Contract.
Despite its many guises, the theme of reclusiveness remained central to 
Rousseau’s thought.  He was, in practice if not by design,495 a consummate outsider.  
This applies in three senses of the word.  First, figuratively, as “[o]ne who is outside 
any enclosure, barrier, or boundary.”496  Second, practically, as “[a] person who is 
isolated from or does not ‘fit’ into conventional society either through choice or on 
account of some social, intellectual, etc., reason.”497  And third, literally, as “[o]ne 
whose position is on the outside of some group or series,” “a non-member.”498
Throughout his works, Rousseau reminds us that he was “not made like any 
[other] that exist.”499  A “natural” individual in a denatured society, an honest author 
at odds with his vain philosophical peers, and a truly pious believer deeply critical of 
495 The self-consciousness with which Rousseau pursued his highly unfashionable claim to the truth 
supports the argument that his solitude was in fact calculated from the outset.  Numerous examples in 
his early writings stress the fact that he understood and accepted the alienating consequences of his 
political philosophy.  At the same time, Rousseau can be read as a highly unaccountable author, a 
phenomenon discussed at great length by Jean Starobinski as evidence of his passivity and propensity 
towards personal deflection.  In this sense, Rousseau’s solitude may be read as the consequence of 
forces beyond his control, a description particularly suited to his discussion of his flight from 
Montmorency in The Confessions.
496 The Oxford English Dictionary, Sense 1A.
497 Ibid., Sense 1C.
498 Ibid., Sense 2 and 1A.
499 The Confessions.  CW V.5; OC I.5.
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the Catholic church, these distinctions established his unabashed uniqueness.  He was 
also a man of unbounded temperament: the force of his writings, the frequency of his 
fractured relationships, and his willingness to adopt unfashionable stances—to attack, 
for example, both atheists and papists alike—testify to this fierce independence.
Rousseau’s resistance to assimilate was the result of choices made, but ones 
over which he professes to have had very little control.500  The reasons were in part 
social.  He was born to a petty bourgeois family and identified himself with the 
common man; he abhorred the vacuous privileges of the upper class and the hierarchy 
of European social castes; he abandoned fashionable garb for Cossack robes, and 
stressed his inability to master social conventions;501 and he repeatedly subverted any 
chances he had in securing a life of upward mobility.502  In defying convention, 
Rousseau challenged boundaries both formally and substantively, using opera, novels, 
letters, plays, prose and dialogues as vehicles for his sharp social commentary.
The Genevan was particularly an outsider in his religious thought.  Convinced 
of his piety yet charged with heresy, he condemned Church and academy alike for 
furthering their own particular aims at the expense of the general good.  Catholic 
500 Starobinski interprets Rousseau’s passivity as a justification for his lack of control.  As he writes in 
Transparency and Obstruction, “Rousseau almost always prefers to avoid action and effort.”  See: 
Transparency and Obstruction, p. 91.
501 Rousseau also claimed to have practical reasons for wearing robes: they purportedly alleviated the 
pains of his well-publicized urinary tract disorder.
502 To this point, consider Rousseau’s following recollection: “I renounced forever every project of 
fortune and advancement.  Determined to pass the little time I had left to live in independence and 
poverty, I applied all the strength of my soul to breaking the irons of opinion, and to doing 
courageously everything that appeared good to me, without bothering myself in any way about the 
judgment of men.”  The Confessions.  CW V.303-304; OC I.362.  Rousseau offers numerous additional 
examples, including his frequent (and abrupt) career changes, his failure to meet the King of France 
one day after Le Devin du Village premiered, and his dispute with Hume and subsequent rejection of 
King George III’s offer of an annual pension.
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leaders labeled him a dangerous heretic,503 while his attack on the arts and sciences 
prompted Voltaire to wonder, “What about Jean-Jacques’ book against the theater?  
Has he become a priest of the Church?”504  It is no mean feat to simultaneously 
alienate atheists and papists; but for Rousseau, solitaire extraordinaire, such 
estrangement exemplifies the isolating effects of his thought.
Taken within the context of his broader political project, we may understand 
Rousseau’s aggressive self-distancing as the means to a coherent end: society’s 
redemption, an aspiration at times facilitated by active withdrawal.  Yet even if we 
allow him the consistency he claimed was a hallmark of his entire oeuvres,505 how 
might we make sense of the apparent contradictions at play?  An outsider so deeply 
involved with the in-crowd, so insistently proud of a nation to which he never 
returned (and eventually renounced),506 so scornful of the public eye his writings 
resoundingly drew, Rousseau was a man of conundrums if not outright 
contradictions.
A natural individual caught in the perverse machinations of a denatured world, 
he sought recourse in solitude.  But what, specifically, did his praise of withdrawal 
suggest?  Was it the wicked rumination of a misguided misanthrope, as Diderot 
implied?  The embrace of a ‘horrible’ life opposed to society, as described in the
503 The Archbishop Christophe de Beaumont condemned Emile (and, by implication, its author) as 
“containing an abominable doctrine, suited to overturning natural Law and to destroying the 
foundations of the Christian Religion… tending to disturb the peace of States, to stir up Subjects 
against the authority of their Sovereign,” in short, a “scandalous” work, “erroneous, impious, 
blasphemous, and heretical.”  Pastoral Letter of his Grace the Archbishop of Paris.  CW IX.16.
504 Besterman XIX.D7864.  See also: Cranston, The Noble Savage, p. 137.
505 Rousseau begins his religious self-defense in the Letter to Beaumont by stressing his consistency: “I 
have written on various subjects, but always with the same maxims, and if you will the same 
opinions.”  This is an oft-repeated claim of Rousseau’s, specifically evoked to defend himself from the 
increasing controversy his works generated.  See: Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.22; OC IV.928.
506 Rousseau renounced his Genevan citizenship on May 12, 1763.
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Encyclopédie?507  The retreat of a religious individual unconcerned with earthly 
affairs?  Or the compelling reaction of a good man caught in a less-than-virtuous 
society?508  What forms did it take, and what does this reveal about the broader 
tension in his works between spiritual and secular salvation, heuristic idealism and 
pessimistic realism?  How does a study of this theme illuminate our understanding of 
Rousseau generally, and his secular appropriation of Christian themes specifically?  Is 
his model of reclusiveness compatible with his dream of democratic virtue, or does it 
merely punctuate the incoherence of his enterprise?
The road to these answers winds through three stages and three different 
senses of retreat.  Before treading down this path, let us begin from the beginning, not 
of Jean-Jacques’ life, but of his career.
*   *   *   *   *
Rousseau was a recluse.  To anyone familiar with the author, this point should 
hardly seem contentious.  According to his Confessions, even the most perfunctory of 
social obligations left him deeply disconcerted.509  A sensitive soul whose life’s work 
507 In his entry, Jaucourt condemns solitude as an horreur (even, notably, for the Christian) and “[un]
état opposé à celui de la société.”  The solitary man is no less spared: “Cet état est celui où l'on conçoit 
que se trouveroit l'homme s'il vivoit absolument seul abandonné à lui-même, & destitué de tout 
commerce avec ses semblables. Un tel homme seroit sans doute bien misérable, & se trouveroit sans 
cesse exposé par sa foiblesse & son ignorance à périr de faim, de froid, ou par les dents de quelque 
bête féroce. L'état de société pourvoit à ses besoins, & lui procure la sûreté, la nourriture & les 
douceurs de la vie.”  Diderot, Encyclopédie, Tome XV, p. 325.
508 In his introduction to the English translation of The Confessions, Christopher Kelly distinguishes 
between “goodness” and “virtue” in Rousseau’s works: “Goodness allows one to follow one’s 
inclinations without (usually) harming anyone else.  Virtue allows one to overcome one’s inclinations 
on those occasions when they would lead to harming someone else.  While goodness is a natural 
quality, virtue is a moral quality made necessary by the complexity of social life.”  This distinction 
helps reconcile the tension posed by Rousseau’s formulation that man is naturally good although 
society lacks virtue.  For Kelly’s full discussion see: CW V.xxiii-xxiv.
509 According to Rousseau, his social skills were subverted by “slowness in thinking joined with… 
liveliness in feeling,” a condition that afflicted him both alone and in company.  “So little master of my 
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thrust him into the public spotlight, the added attention caused him significant woe.  
In the 1763 preface to his First Discourse, Rousseau disparaged his “celebrity” as “an 
abyss of miseries.”510  Truth be told, not everyone has the stomach for such a life (as 
his remorse makes painfully clear).  But Rousseau’s “miseries” reflect much deeper 
concerns.  By the Second Discourse we learn that social attachments opened 
Pandora’s box.  Mankind—innocent, ignorant and content in the state of nature—was 
corrupted, subjugated by the inegalitarian relations borne of civil society.  
Rousseau—innocent,511 learned, profoundly malcontent—took this perverse 
development to heart.
His critique of inequality took sweeping aim at social relations, and drew 
resounding protest from those threatened by his assessments of private property and 
contemporary society alike.  Yet he continued to speak his mind, no matter the 
consequences.  Rousseau was well aware of the alienating effect his ideas had; the 
enmity of his contemporaries was simply not enough to deter him.  “I foresee that I 
will not easily be forgiven for the side I have dared to take,” he admits.  “Running 
counter to everything that men admire today, I can expect only universal blame.”512
But unlike Crispus, who appeased the tyrant Domitian with tactful silence, Rousseau 
vowed to do what the Roman courtesan had not: “freely state his opinions and risk his 
mind when I am all by myself, one can judge what I must be in conversation, where, in order to speak 
to the point one must think about a thousand things simultaneously and on the spot.  The mere idea of 
so many social conventions, at least one of which I am certain to forget, is enough to intimidate me.  I 
do not understand how one even dares to speak in a social circle.”  The Confessions.  CW V.95-96; OC 
I.113-115.
510 This comes from a Forward to the revised Preface, written approximately thirteen years after the 
First Discourse was first published.  First Discourse(1763 Forward).  CW II.3; OC I.1237.
511 I am referring to Rousseau’s triple claim of innocence: natural (the Pelagian heresy at the heart of 
the Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar); juridical (in the charges levied against Emile and The 
Social Contract); and personal (an individual who is good of heart and attuned to his natural 
innocence).
512 1763 Preface to the First Discourse.  CW II.3; OC III.3.
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life for the truth.”513  Taking these words as his motto, Rousseau drew a line between 
himself and his entire age, particularly “the Witty or the Fashionable”514 philosophes 
who wrote with smug self-satisfaction, and papists whose dogmatism dictated the 
terms of individual material worship.
Rousseau was no stranger to contrariness.  Yet in typically paradoxical 
fashion, he decried its frequency amongst philosophers as a form of sophistry, a vain 
method of self-promotion used to garner recognition.  Academics favored personal 
accolades above the public good, and cherished individual success more than genuine 
virtue.  As Rousseau clarified in his 1753 Preface to Narcisse, the “taste for letters… 
is born from the desire to distinguish oneself.”515  This desire “necessarily produces 
ills that are infinitely more dangerous than all the good that they do is useful,” and 
“makes those who surrender to it very unscrupulous about means for succeeding.”516
The philosopher’s quest is painted in terms reminiscent of the Bible’s Edenic lesson: 
the fruits of knowledge may be tempting, but their acquisition precipitates a morally 
crippling sacrifice.  In the zeal to acquire individual enlightenment, to distinguish 
themselves from their peers, philosophers succumb to self-interest while shirking 
their duties as citizens.
Although Rousseau does not categorically dismiss philosophical speculation, 
he wags a stiff finger at those who pursue wisdom under false pretenses and seek 
recognition at any cost.  In one frenzied stroke, and along these lines, he castigates 
513 Juvenal, The Satires, p. 28.
514 Rousseau strikes a grandiose concern for posterity: “One must not write for such Readers when one 
wants to live beyond one’s century.”  1763 Preface to the First Discourse.  CW II.3; OC III.3.
515 Preface to Narcisse.  CW II.191; OC II.965.
516 Preface to Narcisse.  CW II.191; OC II.965.
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two thousand years of Western political thought from ancient Greece to the Middle 
Ages:
The first Philosophers made a great reputation for themselves by 
teaching men the practice of their duties and the principles of virtue.  
But soon these precepts having become common, it was necessary to 
distinguish oneself by opening up contrary routes.  Such is the origin 
of the absurd systems of Leucippus, Diogenes, Pyrrho, Protagoras, 
Lucretius.  Hobbes, Mandeville and a thousand others have pretended 
to distinguish themselves among us; and their dangerous doctrine has 
borne such fruit, that although we still have some Philosophers ardent 
to recall the laws of humanity and virtue to our hearts, one is surprised 
to see to what point our reasoning century has pushed disdain for the 
duties of man and of citizen to its maxims.517
Those who seek “to recall the laws of humanity and virtue to our hearts” form a 
lonely minority.  Most philosophers are, by contrast, charged with grave negligence, 
vain ambition, and the correlative “fruit” of self-glorification.  In attempting to further 
their reputations, they privilege spectacle above substance or utility.  And from a 
moral standpoint, they neglect their most truly noble service: namely, the “duties of 
man and of citizen,” subsumed under the satiation of self-interest.  As Rousseau 
elaborates, “[t]he taste for letters, philosophy and the fine arts destroys love of our 
primary duties and of genuine glory.  Once talents have seized the honors due to 
virtue, everyone wishes to be an agreeable man and no one concerns himself with 
being a good man.”518
The harsh certainty of Jean-Jacques’ judgment soon proved ironic.  Two years 
later, fellow Genevan Charles Bonnet levied precisely the same charge against him, 
attacking the Second Discourse as the paradoxical work of a self-promoting rabble-
517 Preface to Narcisse.  CW II.191; OC II.965-966.
518 Preface to Narcisse.  CW II.191; OC II.966.
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rouser.519  This followed Diderot’s claim (echoed by Voltaire) that the First 
Discourse represented a deliberate change of heart, a position on the arts and sciences 
calculated to garner its author attention and notoriety.  Infuriated by the insinuation,
Rousseau rose to his own defense.520  Certain that his work served society’s best 
interests, he defended himself by stressing his own uniqueness.  Unlike his more 
decorated peers, he was both capable of recognizing the “absurdity” of their maxims, 
and bold enough to challenge them.521  The singularity of his vision was matched 
only by his dedication to revealing the truth, qualities that distinguished him as a 
champion of society’s salvation.522  It was this unique combination of clarity and 
courage in the face of overwhelming pressure that set him apart.  Far from serving his 
own self-interest, Rousseau was the sole author of his age who dared to challenge the 
mighty empires of both philosophe and Papal dogma.523
Compelled to respond against the very charges he had levied upon 
philosophers in his First Discourse, Rousseau’s defense came at a price: it further 
isolated him.  Having taken society to task, he was forced to emphasize his role as a 
recluse amongst philosophers, the sole intellectual who stood apart—and alone—on 
519 See: Letter from M. Philopolis.  CW III.123-126; OC III.1383-1386.
520 Although James Miller downplays Rousseau’s efforts to rebuke Voltaire’s barbs, Rousseau’s 
correspondence suggests that he responded passionately on numerous occasions.  See Rousseau: 
Dreamer of Democracy, p. 53.
521 As Rousseau replies, “Let us suppose that a singular mind (esprit), bizarre, and in fact a man of 
paradoxes, then dared to reproach others for the absurdity of their maxims, to prove to them that they 
run to death in seeking tranquility, that by dint of being reasonable they do nothing but ramble.”  Letter 
from J.-J. Rousseau to M. Philopolis.  OC.III.231; CW III.127.  It is also worth noting that Bonnet’s
pseudonym, “Mr. City-lover,” was certainly conceived in antagonism towards Rousseau.
522 Rousseau’s sense of his own uniqueness is, in this respect, greatly exaggerated.  There were, of 
course, dozens of other entries for the prize of Dijon that likewise attacked the arts and sciences as a 
corrupt influence upon society.  For a further discussion of this theme see: P-M Masson, La religion de 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Vol. I, pp. 259-261.
523 For Rousseau, Church and academy were birds of a feather: “The two parties attack each other 
reciprocally with so many sophisms,”  yet neither fosters virtue, goodness or meaningful 
enlightenment Emile.  E 312n.
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behalf of all.  The condemnation he had foreseen as a consequence of his contrariness 
was materializing.  In claiming his innocence, he merely drove a deeper wedge 
between himself and his culpable age.  Attacking ideas and occupations his powerful
counterparts held dear, he was forced to retreat from their ranks.  His praise of 
solitude, coupled with a condemnation of society, placed him in a lonely corner 
indeed.
A philosopher who attacked philosophers, a storied member of the 
Enlightenment who was also one of its most vociferous critics,524 Rousseau pulled 
few punches.  If vainglory was a capital offense, masquerading private interests as 
public goods was a cardinal sin.  Philosophers, that “troop of charlatans, each crying 
from his own spot on a public square: Come to me, I alone do not deceive,” were 
doubly guilty.525  Like Christian clerics, they presented their ideas as gospel, coercing 
men to bow under the authority of their vacuous reasoning.  “Under the haughty 
pretext that they alone are enlightened, true, and of good faith,” Rousseau’s Vicar 
chides, “they imperiously subject us to their peremptory decisions and claim to give 
us as the true principles of things the unintelligible systems they have built in their 
imagination.”526  Like Catholic clerics, philosophers abuse the privileges of their self-
anointed grace, parading elaborate, incoherent opinion as irrefutable truth.  And in so 
doing, they demand subservience to hollow ideals unfulfilled in practice, a 
524 Darrin M. McMahon describes Rousseau’s influence on anti-philosophes who “borrowed from him 
extensively, citing Rousseau’s passages against their common enemies; sharing his dissatisfaction with 
the corruption of the age; and echoing his belief that sentiment, emotion, and feeling were wellsprings 
of faith.” See: McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the 
Making of Modernity. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 35.
525 First Discourse.  CW II.20; OC III.27.
526 Emile.  E 312.
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phenomenon exemplifying society’s most perverse pressure: the denaturing rule of 
doxa.
By contrast, Rousseau presented himself to the public as a good, honest soul 
attuned to their best interests.  Yet he challenged the motives of philosophers while 
producing an enormous body of philosophical literature; he attacked their ersatz 
claims to supposed truths while dedicating his life to that very pursuit.  What, then, 
made Rousseau any different?  Why were his works alone free of the self-interested 
sophistry so rampant amongst his much-maligned peers?
For one, Jean-Jacques took shelter in his self-proclaimed commonness.  In the 
penultimate paragraph of his First Discourse, he addressed average readers as one of 
their ranks: “As for us, common men not endowed by Heaven with such great talents 
and not destined for so much glory, let us remain in our obscurity.  Let us not chase 
after a reputation which would escape us, and which in the present state of things 
would never be worth what it cost, even if we had all the qualifications to obtain 
it.”527  Rousseau was not entirely without cause in siding with the common man.  
After all, his origins were humble: the son of a Genevan watch-maker, a largely self-
taught runaway who toiled through various ignoble positions on a circuitous and 
surprising path to fame.  Yet what most set Rousseau apart from his fellow 
philosophes was the very insistence with which he set himself apart.  He cultivated 
his commonness as an antidote to their erudition,528 stressing his solidarity with a 
527 First Discourse.  CW II.22; OC III.30.  It is worth noting the language of Rousseau’s phrase: “As 
for us, common men…”  Bear in mind that this essay was written for the Academy at Dijon—and 
certainly not the so-called “hommes vulgaires” with whom Rousseau identifies and purportedly 
addresses.
528 Despite Rousseau’s charge, he was a notably erudite and voraciously self-educated figure.  What 
separates him from other “philosophers” was not his degree of learnedness, but rather his application 
of scholarly knowledge to practical problems such as civic duty and religious reform.
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general populace endowed with neither the means nor the motive to distinguish 
themselves.  Insistent upon his uniqueness, Rousseau took refuge in his affinity for 
the average.
At this beginning stage in his career, he had not yet achieved the fame and 
recognition that he would almost immediately rue.  As such, it would be premature to 
simply dismiss him as a blind hypocrite.  Yet the very fact that his career in letters 
began with a renunciation of a career in letters, that his arrival into the philosophe
circle was coupled with a hyperbolic criticism of philosophy, that he established his 
uniqueness by praising his commonness, attests to a curious methodology.  Had 
Rousseau been a recluse in the strictest sense of the word, he would have kept quiet 
(or, at the very least, less visible).  Instead, he raised his voice to a fevered pitch and 
in so doing invited scrutiny upon himself.  Why would someone so philosophically 
gifted subvert the very enterprise he had chosen to undertake?  Why would an author 
of operas and plays criticize the arts and sciences?  Why would Rousseau attack 
contrariness and self-promotion while trumpeting his own honesty, utility and 
forthrightness in decidedly contrary prose?
His simultaneous isolation and involvement sounded the demonstrative outcry 
of a social reformer.  If Rousseau was sincere in his praise of solitude, so was he 
equally concerned with civic welfare: the society in which he felt entirely ill at ease 
was desperately in need of salvation.  Although his acute discomfort certainly 
informed his recourse to retreat, in taking seriously his duty as a citizen he could not 
in good faith (nor in good conscience) abandon his fellow men.  For the Rousseau of 
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these early years, his reclusiveness was necessarily demonstrative: he was far too 
concerned to completely absolve himself, and far to critical to assimilate.
Alone amongst philosophers, his solitary role as champion of les peuples
served a distinct pedagogical purpose: to demonstrate the folly of his hubristic peers 
while reminding us of the true path to a more natural, virtuous existence.  As he 
rhapsodizes in the First Discourse’s final paragraph, “O virtue!  Sublime science of 
simple souls, are so many difficulties and preparations needed to know you?  Are not 
your principles engraved in all hearts, and is it not enough in order to learn your Laws 
to return into oneself and listen to the voice of one’s conscience in the silence of the 
passions?”529  The retreat is three-fold.  In claiming that true virtue—that “sublime 
science”—is engraved in our hearts and revealed through conscience, Rousseau 
discredits and distances himself from the mediating roles of Church and academy, 
withdraws into the company of the indeterminate and anonymous everyman, and 
retreats into the depths of his heart (with divinely-crafted conscience as guide) to 
recapture his innate moral sensibility.
The proposal is radical.  Retreat—from vain ambition, from the path to 
academic success, from the “vanity and emptiness of those proud titles that dazzle 
us,”530 from the seductions of sophistic logic, from self-serving erudition—is nothing 
short of necessary.  If virtue is inscribed on our very hearts (works of God’s 
authorship), its acquisition calls for little more than looking inwards, withdrawing 
from a perverse society to retrieve our natural goodness.
529 First Discourse.  CW II.22; OC III.30.
530 First Discourse.  CW II.12; OC III.16.
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The Pelagian overtones are explicit.  Despite his earlier description of 
philosophical wisdom as a dangerous “fruit,” any mention of Adam’s debilitating 
legacy is conspicuously absent in Rousseau’s praise of human nature.  Instead, he 
argues, we must place faith in our innate goodness.  Foreshadowing his later, more 
explicit denial of Original Sin in Emile,531 Rousseau insists from the outset that 
society—not man as God’s creation—is to blame.  Natural man is above reproach, 
but socialized men are prone to wickedness.  Rousseau’s unerring faith in natural 
goodness is nonetheless problematized by his polemics.  There appears to be a 
discrepancy between his ontology and his empiricism, between his description of 
human nature and his observations of human society: if man is good, how can men be 
so wicked?532
The Second Discourse clarified this dilemma, presenting a concise genealogy 
of humankind’s fall from grace.  In our natural state we are innocent and ignorant, 
pre-moral creatures bound only by amour-de-soi and pitié, sentiments that 
encouraged self-preservation and mutual sympathy.  It was not until the emergence of 
civil society—a revolution following the advent of private property—that natural 
531 The Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar spawned the Pelagian controversy central to Emile’s
censure.  In defense, Rousseau reiterated the consistency of his works, city his Second Discourse, 
Letter to d’Alembert, and Julie as being “imbued with the same maxims.  The same modes of thought 
are not more disguised in them… and the Author’s profession of faith is found expressed there with 
less reserve than that of the Savoyard Vicar.”  Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.26; OC IV.933.  Compare 
this with the following statement from The Confessions: “I dare to say… what seems almost 
unbelievable, the profession of faith of that very Héloïse dying is exactly the same as that of the 
Savoyard Vicar.  Everything that is bold in The Social Contract was previously in the Discourse on 
Inequality; everything that was bold in Emile was previously in Julie.  Now these bold things excited 
no clamor against the two former works; thus they were not the things that excited it against the latter.”  
CW V.342; OC I.407.
532 Rousseau stands by this logic in his Letter to Beaumont: “If man is good by his nature, as I believe I 
have demonstrated, it follows that he remains so as long as nothing foreign to himself spoils him.  And 
if men are wicked, as they have gone to the trouble of teaching me, it follows that their wickedness 
comes from somewhere else.”  CW IX.35; OC IV.945.  For an extended discussion of this tension, 
refer to note 18 (above).
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inequalities fostered social inequalities, that vicious divisions were introduced and 
reified by social institutions privileging the interests of few above the welfare of 
all.533
Although Voltaire famously chided that Rousseau would send us back to the 
woods crawling on all fours,534 the latter makes plain that humankind cannot retreat to 
a state of nature.  Rousseau adamantly maintained that “such a return would be a 
miracle both so great and so harmful that only God could do it and only the Devil 
could wish it.”535  Society is, for better or (more often) worse, a necessary facet of 
human life.  In later works such as The Social Contract, and writings on Poland, 
Corsica and Geneva, Rousseau presented concrete models of political reform, 
envisioning virtuous societies conducive to legitimized self-rule.  Yet at this early
stage, his prescriptive optimism was overshadowed by his brash skepticism.  
Although firm in his belief that human existence was inextricably tied to society, 
Jean-Jacques’ deep discomfort implied that if we could not return to nature, we might 
do well to withdraw.
Strong words notwithstanding, Rousseau removed himself in spirit more than 
flesh.  His initial period of withdrawal took the form of contrariness, vocal retaliation 
against his illustrious peers and soon-to-be former friends.  If anything, his 
533 For Rousseau’s full account see: Second Discourse. CW III.43-55; OC III.164-179.  He describes 
the “invention” of private property as a deceptively simple ruse: “The first person who, having fenced 
off a plot of ground, took it into his head to say this is mine and found people simple enough to believe 
him.” Second Discourse.  CW III.43; OC III.164.
534 As Voltaire quipped, “[o]ne acquires the desire to walk on all fours when one reads your work.”  
Letter from Voltaire to Rousseau, August 30, 1755.  CW III.102; CC III.317.157.  Rousseau himself 
invited such barbs in a long author’s note of the Second Discourse.  Although the note argues that there 
are “far better reasons to state in affirming that man is a biped” rather than a quadruped, his lengthy 
discussion prompted Voltaire’s famously biting dismissal.  See: Second Discourse (Note III).  CW 
III.68-71; OC III.196-198.
535 Letter from Rousseau to Voltaire, September 10, 1755.  CW III.105; OC III.226.
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unexpected decoration hardened this resolve.  As he laments in The Confessions, 
“[t]he success of my first Writings had put me in fashion… [and] stirred up curiosity: 
They wanted to know this bizarre man who sought out no one and cared about 
nothing except living freely and happily in his way.”536  Recognized with awards and 
adulation, the subject of rampant “curiosity,” well on his way to best-selling537 fame 
throughout the continent, the First Discourse left Rousseau embroiled in the very life 
he so passionately loathed.
Clearly discomforted, Jean-Jacques responded by reiterating his central 
concern—society was a catalyst for corruption—in increasingly hyperbolic prose.  
The Second Discourse, substantively similar to his prize-winning piece, proved 
significantly more controversial.  He attacked not simply the arts, but property, civil 
society, human history itself.  This forceful work garnered further notoriety and 
increasing mistrust.  Rousseau, a once-charming Luddite, had now ruffled far too 
many feathers.
If this paradoxical stance set him on a path to literal solitude, a turning point 
of sorts occurred in 1758 with his Letter to d’Alembert.  The piece began with a bold 
proclamation: “I am at fault if I have on this occasion taken up my pen without 
necessity.”538  In sharp contrast to the “vain philosophical chatter” of his 
contemporaries, Rousseau claimed to illuminate “a practical truth important to a 
whole people.”539  The “truth” to which he alluded was the danger of a theater taking 
root in his beloved Geneva.
536 The Confessions.  CW V.308; OC I.367.
537 This was, of course, prior to the publication of Julie, or the New Heloise.
538 Letter to d’Alembert.  CW X.253; OC V.3.
539 Letter to d’Alembert.  CW X.255; OC V.6.
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What is curious is not that Rousseau rose to the defense of his fatherland—a 
common practice prior to his renunciation of citizenship in 1763—but rather the 
severity of his rebuttal.  At first glance, Rousseau’s response outmatched on every 
level (passion, persuasiveness, depth, thoughtfulness, length) d’Alembert’s passing 
suggestions in an unremarkable Encyclopédie entry on Geneva.540  How, then, could 
this parenthetical interjection have elicited such a powerful reaction?  Why did 
Rousseau really take up his pen in arms?
The Genevan described his motivation with a mix of self-deprecation and 
obligation: “My [Swiss] compatriots have no need of my advice; I know it well.  But 
I have need to do myself honor in showing that I think as they do about our 
maxims.”541  In scribing d’Alembert, Rousseau’s humility was overcome by his sense 
of obligation.  Guided by honorific duty, he addressed an issue important, if not to a 
whole people, than certainly to his fellow citoyens.
Most striking in this brief introduction to d’Alembert is the seriousness with 
which Rousseau gauged the significance of his efforts.  He considered the idea of a 
Genevan theatre a matter of grave importance, an instance when the false 
consciousness and alienation born of theatrical performance threatened the city in 
which he found an exemplar of modern civic virtue.  The idea of a Swiss stage did not 
offend Rousseau because he putatively rejected theater (he had himself written 
several petit dramas, and directly dismisses such charges towards the end of 
540 The phrase that incensed Rousseau is as follows: “Genève auroit des spectacles & des moeurs, & 
joüiroit de l'avantage des uns & des autres: les représentations théâtrales formeroient le goût des 
citoyens, & leur donneroient une finesse de tact, une délicatesse de sentiment qu'il est très - difficile 
d'acquérir sans ce secours; la littérature en profiteroit, sans que le libertinage fît des progrès, & Genève
réuniroit à la sagesse de Lacédémone la politesse d'Athènes.”  Diderot, Encyclopédie, Tome VII, pp. 
576-577.  It is generally recognized that Voltaire had “planted” this suggestion, as part of his broader 
campaign to bring theater to Geneva.
541 Letter to d’Alembert.  CW X.255; OC V.6.
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d’Alembert).  Instead, a theater in Switzerland posed very real dangers to the body of 
its people: to its virtuous salon culture and civil society, to its economic welfare and 
harmonious social fabric.  What therefore drove Rousseau to write in this instance 
was his self-described citizen’s duty to defend civic virtue.
That he wrote this work as an expatriate in France, and that he denounced one 
of the few philosophes who would later defend him following the tumultuous 
reception of Emile and The Social Contract, is no small matter.  Rousseau, the self-
imposed exile defending a city in which he would never again settle, attacked the 
work of a fellow intellectual relatively sympathetic to his writings.542  These 
circumstances did not go unnoticed.  On September 29, 1758, in his own letter to 
d’Alembert, Voltaire charged Jean-Jacques with “a double ingratitude.”  In attacking 
both “an art which he practices himself” and an author who had “overwhelmed him 
with praises,” Voltaire decried Rousseau as an ingrate far more concerned with 
garnering attention than demonstrating loyalty to his friends, or adhering to his 
ideals.543  Jean-Jacques was unprincipled, sensationalist, and eminently 
untrustworthy; he was, in brief, a maverick unleashed, “a Diogène barking.”544
Voltaire here compares Rousseau to Diogenes the Cynic, one of the most 
flamboyant figures in the history of Western philosophy.  Diogenes earned his 
542 By relative, I am comparing d’Alembert’s sympathy for Rousseau with those of his peers—notably, 
Diderot, Voltaire and Holbach.  On June 15, 1762, d’Alembert wrote Rousseau to assure him that the 
French peoples applauded The Social Contract and Emile.  d’Alembert was the only philosophe to 
offer such support, save Charles Duclos.  In The Confessions, Rousseau seems characteristically 
ungrateful, harping on the fact that d’Alembert had not signed the letter.  For Rousseau’s account see: 
The Confessions, OC I.574; CW V.480.  Quoted in Cranston, The Solitary Self, pp. 2-3.  d’Alembert’s 
letter appears in CC XI.1874.82-84.
543 We must again recall Voltaire’s complicity in d’Alembert’s Genève article, and his own vested 
interest in establishing a Genevan theater.  Quoted in Cranston, The Noble Savage, p. 137.
544 Quoted in Ibid., p. 137.  From Besterman XIX.D7842.  See: Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers: Volume II, pp. 23-85.
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infamous reputation as a “mad dog” and a “Socrates gone mad” from spectacles such 
as masturbating in a public marketplace and urinating on a taunting crowd.545
Although Rousseau had earlier546 denounced the Cynic as a conspicuously absurd 
figure, their resemblance was commonly noted by the philosophes and even 
Rousseau’s later admirers.547  In his lectures on ethics, for example, Kant labeled 
Rousseau a “subtle Diogenes” whose work captured the Cynic “ideal of innocence or 
rather simplicity.”548  Whether affirmed in malice or praise, the similarities seemed 
obvious to those familiar with both men.  As Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting 
summarizes, “[t]he transition from Diogenes to Rousseau suggested itself, especially 
since Rousseau seemed to follow the tracks of the Cynic in his cultural critique and 
the idealization of untouched nature in the first and second Discours.”549  In short—
and despite his own deeply personal interest in establishing a Genevan theater—
Voltaire had a point.
Rousseau nonetheless actively resisted such comparisons.550  If the likenesses 
were as obvious and ubiquitous as Niehues-Pröbsting believes, Jean-Jacques turned a 
blind eye.  He directly refers to Diogenes only thrice in his major works: in the 
545 Both aliases were given him by Plato.  See: Laertius, VI.40 & VI.54 (pp. 41 & 55).  For Diogenes’ 
exploits see: VI.69 & VI.46 (pp. 71 & 27).
546 Preface to Narcisse.  CW II.191; OC II.965.
547 Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting, “The Modern Reception of Cynicism: Diogenes in the 
Enlightenment,” in The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, R. Bracht Branham 
and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 340.
548 Ibid., p. 340.
549 Ibid., p. 340.  In support, he cites Maximilian Forschner’s 1977 work Rousseau, and Jean 
Starobinski’s article “Diderot’s Satire ‘Rameau’s Neffe” (in Das Rettende in der Gefahr: Kunstgriffe 
der Aufklärung, 1990).
550 In circuitous fashion, Rousseau describes his Cynical attitude as a sort of temporary insanity 
brought on by urban living.  After leaving Paris for Montmorency, he notes that “the spectacle of that 
big City’s vices ceased to nourish the indignation it had inspired in me.  When I no longer saw men, I 
ceased to despise them; when I no longer saw the wicked I ceased to hate them.  My heart, which is 
hardly formed for hatred, could no longer do anything but deplore their misery…  and, without anyone 
noticing it, almost without noticing it myself, I again became fearful, accommodating, timid, in a word 
the same Jean-Jacques I had been before.”  The Confessions.  CW V.350; OC I.417.
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Preface to Narcisse, the Second Discourse, and The Dialogues.551  In Narcisse, 
Diogenes is quickly dismissed as a typical self-promoting philosopher.552  In the 
Dialogues, Rousseau refutes the charge that his onetime career as a music-copyist 
was “an affectation of simplicity or poverty to copy an Epictetus or Diogenes” as 
many had claimed.553  Only in the Discourse does Rousseau demonstrate even 
passing sympathy with the Cynic’s agenda: he concludes that “the reason Diogenes 
did not find a man was that he sought amongst his contemporaries the man of a time 
that no longer existed.”554
Rousseau here refers to the famous anecdote, recorded by Diogenes Laertius, 
that Diogenes “lit a lamp in broad daylight and said, as he went about, ‘I am looking 
for a man.’”555  Rousseau’s affinity for this spectacle seems logical enough.  If 
virtuous men were hard to find in ancient Athens, they were (he often reminded) 
nearly extinct in eighteenth-century Paris.556  Where Diogenes took to the streets, 
Rousseau took to his pen.  In both cases, onlookers were asked to judge themselves 
551 Rousseau also refers to Diogenes in a letter written to Laurent Aymont de Franquières dated 
January 15, 1769.  In it, Rousseau expresses a classically Cynical emphasis on action: “I think that 
everyone will be judged not concerning what he has believed, but concerning what he has done.”  
Later in the letter, he offers cautious praise of Diogenes who, in a fashion atypical of philosophers, 
followed his conscience when refuting Zeno: “Was it not this alone which made Diogenes walk as his 
only reply before Zeno who was denying movement?”  See: Letter to Franquières.  CW VIII.262 & 
264; OC IV.1137 & 1139.
552 Preface to Narcisse.  CW II.191; OC II.965.
553 Dialogues.  CW I.132; OC I.830.
554 It is worth noting that in the very next sentence, Rousseau evokes Cato—not Diogenes—as “the 
greatest of men” and a paragon of virtue “out of place in his century.”  See: Second Discourse.  CW 
III.65; OC III.192.
555 Laertius, VI.41 (p. 43).  This was a recurring theme in Diogenes’ repertoire.  Laertius records two 
other incidents with similar messages.  First: when the Cynic is “asked where in Greece he saw good 
men, he replied, ‘Good men nowhere, but good boys at Lacedaemon.’” (VI.27)  And second: “One day 
he shouted out for men, and when people collected, hit out at them with his stick, saying, ‘It was men I 
called for, not scoundrels.’” (VI.32)
556 Fénelon—whom Rousseau praised in the Dialogues as a virtuous man who “did honor to modern 
times”—provided one of the few notable exceptions to this rule.  CW I.158; OC I.863-864.
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against the weight of the accusation, to measure themselves against a standard of 
(natural) virtue far removed from their actual (social) condition.
At heart of these critiques was a shared appreciation of the self-sufficient life 
lived in greater accord with nature, and a vision of virtue rooted in simple adherence 
to this ideal.  Yet if the Cynic preached simplicity as an antidote to society’s 
corruptions, his life—like Rousseau’s—was anything but.  Indeed, even Diogenes’ 
unlikely path to philosophy was characteristically colorful.  Forced to flee his native 
Sinope over a money-laundering scandal and sold into slavery, this sudden escape 
transformed a banker’s greedy son into an unruly philosophic gadfly.557  It was 
precisely his exile that forced him to seek “the means of adapting himself to 
circumstances” which he found in a strenuous model of philosophy aimed at inuring 
himself to misfortune.558
As with Rousseau, the Cynic began his career as a foreigner in an urbane city.  
Set adrift in Athens (the Paris to Sparta’s Geneva), Diogenes grew disturbed by the 
decadence of his surroundings.  He reacted by embracing hardship as a catalyst for 
self-sufficiency, and shunning the shallow pleasures (physical comfort, refined 
appearance, gluttony) in which his peers indulged.  This aggressive asceticism taught 
him to become “capable of overcoming anything,”559 a resiliency he pressed upon his 
557 As Laertius recounts, Diogenes fled Sinope (a port town in northern Turkey on the Black Sea 
peninsula) “because his father [the banker Hicesius] was entrusted with the money of the state and 
adultered the coinage.”  Several accounts report very different findings: that Diogenes himself 
confessed to the crime; that he was coerced by workmen to do so; that the Delphic oracle gave him 
permission to alter currency and he mistook the god’s words.  See: Laertius, VI.20-21 (p. 23).
558 Ibid., VI.22 (p. 25).  “When someone reproached [Diogenes] with his exile,” Laertius writes, “his 
reply was, ‘Nay, it was through that, you miserable fellow, that I came to be a philosopher.’”  VI.49 (p. 
51).
559 Ibid., VI.71 (p. 73).
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students by insisting they conform to a Spartan standard of living.560  He told a 
perfumed boy that sweet smells might “cause an ill odor in your life.”561  He hugged 
snowy statues on cold days.  He made a bed of a bathtub, and begged to a statue “to 
get practice in being refused.”562
By all accounts, Diogenes “was great at pouring scorn on his 
contemporaries.”563  And like Rousseau, he saved his sharpest contempt for the 
privileged classes.  “He would,” Laertius recounts, “ridicule good birth and fame and 
all such distinctions, calling them showy ornaments of vice.”564  The marks of wealth 
signaled corruption: dependence upon trivial comforts and self-gratification, the 
antithesis of the Cynic ideal of autarkeia.565  Diogenes was particularly hostile 
towards philosophical esotericism, then epitomized by the teachings of Plato.566
Similar to Rousseau, the Cynic denigrated the value of philosophic discourse, arguing 
that actions spoke infinitely louder than words and were far more useful in teaching 
virtue.  This is why he labeled a man who had requested his writings “a simpleton,” 
chiding “you do not choose painted figs, but real ones; and yet you pass over the true 
training and would apply yourself to written rules.”567  Clearly, philosophy rings 
hollow if preached but not practiced, just as wisdom is worthless if disconnected from 
560 As Laertius recounts, “he taught them to wait upon themselves, and to be content with plain fare 
and water to drink.  He used to make them crop their hair close and to wear it unadorned, and to go 
lightly clad, barefoot, silent, and not looking about them in the streets.”  Ibid., VI.31 (p. 33).
561 Ibid., VI.66 (p. 69).
562 Ibid., VI.49 (p. 51).
563 Ibid., VI.24 (p. 27).
564 Ibid., VI.72 (p. 75).
565 Often translated as “self-sufficiency.”  This is a value championed by Rousseau as the basis of 
independence.  Autarchy was also a Stoic ideal, a “moral argument” Starobinski describes as the lesson 
that “the soul must seek its gratifications within itself and among its own possessions, without calling 
upon outside assistance.”  See: Starobinski, pp. 104-105.
566 According to Laertius, Diogenes regularly reproached Plato.  In one example the Cynic ridiculed 
Plato’s theory of the forms, quipping that “table and cup I see; but your tablehood and cuphood… I can 
nowise see.”  Ibid., VI.53 (p. 55).
567 Ibid., VI.48 (p. 51).
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life.  As if to punctuate his point, Diogenes (unlike Rousseau) left no writings: he 
conveyed lessons solely through vivid, often outrageous exhibitionism.568
Exiled in a decadent land, the Cynic’s flamboyant strategy served a concrete 
pedagogical purpose.  In order to demonstrate the folly of society, he acted out; in 
order to present a more virtuous alternative, he led by example; in order to disturb the 
status quo, he embraced absurd excess.  Furthermore, by welcoming difficulty (and 
not simply ignoring hardship), he offered constant reminders of his integrity.
To validate his own writings, Rousseau likewise had to lead by example.  
Following the embrace of his First Discourse, he had no choice but to reiterate his 
resistance to society’s corrupting influence; withdrawal offered proof of his critical 
detachment and testified to the sincerity of his writings.  What Voltaire dismissed as 
hyperbole and ingratitude, Rousseau understood as the only honest position for one of 
his beliefs.  In striking a self-distanced stance he stood much as Diogenes did two 
centuries prior, carrying a proverbial lantern through the streets of Paris to illuminate 
the failings of his peers.  With the original Cynic’s force and righteous moral zeal, 
Rousseau dared his readers to confront the dire direction human history had taken, 
and perhaps join him in standing apart.
*   *   *   *   *
Like his Pagan forebear Diogenes, Rousseau challenged his contemporaries to
assess themselves and embrace the simple virtues of a more natural subsistence.  He 
did so as an outsider, yet one deeply involved with the society whose welfare he so 
568 Most of what we know today about Diogenes comes to us from the anecdotes collected by the 
ancient Greek historian Laertius.
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steadfastly served.  In a similarly dissonant manner, Rousseau’s role as a recluse drew
upon conflicting traditions: the demonstrative stance of Cynical exile, a Pelagian 
vision of natural goodness, and the moralizing tone of an Edenic narrative.
Following the Second Discourse, Rousseau maintained this precarious 
balancing act.  Redoubling his efforts he published longer, more personally revealing, 
more ambitious works that touched upon the theme of reclusiveness.  Some of these 
efforts were explicit addendums to earlier writings.  The Essay on the Origin of 
Languages, for example, was described in a prefatory draft as being “at first merely a 
fragment of the discourse on inequality which I omitted from it as too long and out of 
place.”569  Revised several times before completion in 1763,570 the Essay revisited 
Rousseau’s idyllic depiction of the natural state:
Assume a perpetual spring on earth; assume water, livestock, 
pasturage everywhere; assume men leaving the hands of nature, once 
dispersed throughout all this; I cannot imagine how they would ever 
have renounced their primitive freedom and forsaken the isolated and 
pastoral life so suited to their natural indolence, in order needlessly to 
impose on themselves the slavery, the labors, the miseries inseparable 
from the social state.571
The bounty and freedom of nature is matched only by the “slavery” and “miseries” of 
society.  A study of extremes, Rousseau is hard-pressed to find a reasonable 
explanation for our socialization.  Yet the effects of this revolutionary event are clear: 
569 Essay on the Origin of Languages.  CW VII.289; OC V.373.
570 Believed to have been completed in 1763, dating the Essay on the Origin of Languages (as well as 
determining its relation to the Second Discourse) is a matter of some dispute amongst Rousseau 
scholars.  For a concise discussion of these matters, see: CW VII.xxvii-xxviii.  For two major critical 
discussions of the significance of the Essay in relation to both Western thought and Rousseau’s 
oeuvres, see (respectively): Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, tr. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); and Jean Starobinski, “Rousseau and the Origin of 
Languages,” in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction.
571 Essay on the Origin of Languages.  CW VII.310; OC V.400-401.
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the earth of God’s creation was now “adorned or disfigured by the hands of man.”572
For Rousseau, this development was born of desire rather than practical necessity.  As 
he laments, “[t]he first languages, daughters of pleasure and not of need, long bore 
the sign of their father; their seductive accent faded only with the feelings that had 
caused them to arise, when new needs introduced among men forced each to consider 
only himself and to withdraw his heart within himself.”573
Although “[s]peech distinguishes man from the animals”574 and thus 
constitutes an intrinsic human faculty, its spontaneous advent led us down a slippery 
slope.  Once introduced, language evolved from an expression of natural sexual desire 
to a catalyst for self-interest, from the simple spontaneous outpour of amour to the 
corrupting influence of amour propre.  The Essay on the Origin of Languages 
reinforced what the Second Discourse had already made plain: speech, like society, 
had innocent origins and unvirtuous consequences.
In both works, Rousseau refused to abandon a provocative dialectic: man may 
be naturally good, but his socializing inventions were deeply flawed.  Having led us 
far astray from the idyll pastures of our natural content, the gravest consequence of 
this transition was moral.  Consider Rousseau’s “golden rule” as taken from the 
Second Discourse: “Do what is good for you with the least possible harm to 
others.”575  This negative sense of freedom recurs in Emile: “O what good is 
necessarily done to his fellows by the one among them, if there is such a one, who 
never does them harm!  What an intrepid soul, what a vigorous character he needs for 
572 Essay on the Origin of Languages.  CW VII.312; OC V.403-404.
573 Essay on the Origin of Languages.  CW VII.315; OC V.407.
574 Essay on the Origin of Languages.  CW VII.289; OC V.375.
575 Second Discourse.  CW III.38; OC III.156.
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that!  It is not in reasoning about this maxim, but in trying to put it into practice, that 
one feels how great it is and how difficult of success.”576
The problem lies in the practice.  How might we protect individual freedom in 
society, particularly in congested urban cities such as Paris?  Perhaps, as Emile’s 
tutelage suggests, through withdrawal.  Given the terms of freedom, solitude adopts a 
practical value underscored by a moral dimension.  Isolated, we literally cannot harm 
peers with whom we have no contact; and in not causing another grief, we both act 
morally and revive some measure of natural goodness in a denatured world.  
Rousseau affirmed the value of retreat in an author’s note in Emile:
The precept of never hurting another carries with it that of being 
attached to human society as little as possible, for in the social state the 
good of one necessarily constitutes the harm of another.  This relation 
is in the essence of the thing, and nothing can change it.  On the basis 
of this principle, let one investigate who is the better: the social man or 
the solitary man.  An illustrious author says it is only the wicked man 
who is alone.  I say that it is only the good man who is alone.  If this 
proposition is less sententious, it is truer and better reasoned than the 
former one.  If the wicked man were alone, what harm would he do?  
It is in society that he sets up his devices for hurting others.577
In addition to clarifying his position, this paragraph offered a direct rebuttal to a line 
in Diderot’s play Le fils naturel.  Written shortly after Rousseau’s withdrawal to 
Montmorency, Diderot condemned solitude as the misguided reverie of a wicked 
misanthrope:578 “Il n' y a que le méchant qui soit seul.”579  Clearly, Rousseau 
576 Emile.  E 105.
577 Emile.  E 105.
578 For Rousseau’s recollections of the incident see: The Confessions.  OC I.455-456; Dialogues.  OC 
I.788-789.  Readers might also compare Rousseau’s “golden rule” to Plato’s Republic, (I.335e) where, 
during a discussion of justice, Socrates concludes that “it has become apparent to us that it is never just 
to harm anyone.”
579 The full sentence is actually quite inflammatory.  Diderot’s  character Constance uses a Rousseauist
argument (an ‘appeal to the heart’) to convince Dorval (a character based on Rousseau) that the “good 
man” exists only in society: “J'en appelle à votre coeur; interrogez-le; et il vous dira que l'homme de 
bien est dans la société, et qu' il n' y a que le méchant qui soit seul.” From Le fils naturel, Act IV, 
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disagreed.  Instead, it was “only the good man who is alone.”  Who is more harmful 
to his fellow citizens?  Whose actions are more likely to jeopardize the welfare and 
freedom of others?  A man removed from society, or a man caught within its 
nefarious webs?
Emile argues unequivocally for the former.  Turning upon the principle of 
fortitude through solitude, the pupil’s education is an attempt to instill virtue in a 
child raised in accord with his innocent nature.  In the final paragraph of Book III, the 
tutor summarizes Emile’s accomplishments.  The carefully reared youth is a model 
individual: “He considers himself without regard to others and finds it good that 
others do not think of him.  He demands nothing of anyone and believes he owes 
nothing to anyone.  He is alone in human society; he counts himself alone.  More than 
anyone else, he has the right to count on himself, for he is all that one can be at his 
age.”580  Here, then, is Rousseau’s idealized solitaire, a child raised sheltered from 
society.  Retreat has cultivated a faultless individual, one with “no errors,” “no vices,” 
“a healthy body, agile limbs, a precise and unprejudiced mind, a heart that is free and 
without passions.”581  Most significantly, “amour-propre, the first and most natural of 
all the passions, is still hardly aroused in him.  Without troubling the repose of 
anyone, he has lived satisfied, happy, and free insofar as nature has permitted.”582  In 
short, he is free at the expense of no one.
Yet this solitary bliss seems fatefully impermanent.  After all, Rousseau 
reminds us, our sociability is a necessary evil.  We have little choice in the matter; our 
Scene 3.  In: Diderot: Œuvres, Tome IV, p. 1113.  For Rousseau’s reaction to this “scathing and harsh 
sentence without any qualification” see: The Confessions.  CW V.382; OC I.455.
580 Emile.  E 208.
581 Emile.  E 208.
582 Emile.  E 208.
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very natures are defined by our interdependence.  “It is man’s weakness which makes 
him sociable; it is our common miseries which turn our hearts to humanity,” he 
explains.  Yet “we would owe humanity nothing [only] if we were not men.”583  Only 
God—completely independent and a model of perfect solitude—has no need of 
others.  Man has no such luxury.  “Every attachment is a sign of insufficiency,” 
Rousseau laments.  “If each of us had no need of others, he would hardly think of 
uniting himself with them.  Thus from our very infirmity is born our frail 
happiness.”584  Yet without this “very infirmity,” we would not be human.  Much as 
Rousseau might admire Robinson Crusoe, the lesson is clear: no man is an island.  
Put more strongly, every man has need of others.
Evoking classical voluntarist descriptions of God as a completely self-
sufficient, perfectly ordered whole unto himself, Rousseau reminds us that man is a 
far cry from such perfection: “A truly happy being is a solitary being.  God alone 
enjoys an absolute happiness.  But who among us has the idea of it?”585  By our very 
natures, no one; our mutual dependence defines our humanity.  It is from this honest 
assessment that Rousseau’s vision of reform flows.  He seeks to change our 
conventions, not our natures, employing the very faculties that have precipitated our 
fall from natural grace to legitimize the “chains” of our necessary attachments.586
However, to move forward we must sometimes first withdraw.  Under dire 
social circumstances and extreme social pressures, retreat provides a politically useful 
action.  Near the end of Emile, exile is presented as a necessary stage in the pupil’s 
583 Emile.  E 221.
584 Emile.  E 221.
585 Emile.  E 221.
586 To wit, such is the guiding principle of the general will under which self-interested individualism is 
applied in service of the common good.
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carefully planned pedagogy.  Ringing a clearly autobiographical note, the tutor 
describes with some melancholy a situation very much like Rousseau’s own:
There are circumstances in which a man can be more useful to his 
fellow citizens outside of his fatherland than if he were living in its 
bosom.  Then he ought to listen only to his zeal and to endure his exile 
without grumbling.  This exile itself is one of his duties.587
As an allusion to Rousseau’s own life, the lines read as a justification for his flight 
from Geneva.  Exile offers not an excuse for “grumbling,” but a civic duty to be 
accepted as the “most useful” means of serving a greater good (his patrie).  
Reiterating the utility of retreat, the tutor surmises that “[a]ll men who withdraw from 
the hub of society are useful precisely because they withdraw from it, since its vices 
come from its being overpopulated.  They are even more useful when they can bring 
life, cultivation, and the love of their first state to forsaken places.”588  His 
justification is twofold.  First, withdrawal serves a pragmatic aim: depopulating 
“overpopulated” society and diminishing the congestion conducive to social vices.  
And second, the recluse can act as a type of ambassador.  Removed from their 
homelands, stuck in “forsaken” cultures, their status and experience as outsiders 
allows them to import “life, cultivation, and the love of their first state.”
Exile is also a casualty of serving the truth, the very pursuit to which 
Rousseau had dedicated his life.  In his Fragments autobiographiques, he 
underscored the lonely, sacrificial fruits born of this calling: “Persecution has 
elevated my soul.  I feel that the love of truth has become dear to me because it has 
cost me dearly.  Perhaps at first it was no more than a system for me, now it is my 
587 Emile.  E 474.
588 Emile.  E 474.
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dominant passion… the most noble that can befall the heart of man.”589  Emile has no 
such bittersweet burden to bear:
But you, good Emile, on whom nothing imposes these painful 
sacrifices, you who have not taken on the sad job of telling the truth to 
men, go and live in their midst, cultivate their friendship in sweet 
association, be their benefactor and their model.  Your example will 
serve them better than all our books, and the good they see you do will 
touch them more than all our vain speeches.”590
Privileged with the self-sufficiency and sound judgment of an isolated education, free 
of the truth-bearer’s onus, Emile must reemerge, return from withdrawal and act as a 
beacon amongst men, a “benefactor” and “model” applying his virtuous education to 
the service of his fellow citizens.
After all, he must reenter society.  This is the final lesson pressed upon the 
pupil, and one whose events unfold to disastrous consequences in Emile’s sequel, Les 
solitaires.  Harping on this outcome, Judith Shklar reads in Rousseau a deep and 
unflinching pessimism.  Taking a grim view of his worldview, one which “offers no 
occasion for happiness or civic virtue,”591 Shklar notes the dismal failures of Emile 
and Sophie to live amongst their peers: “The happy end of Emile is false,… and 
Emile’s character cannot reveal itself until he really becomes a man, that is, a 
suffering victim.”592  As Rousseau readily admits, man surely suffers: “Always more 
suffering than enjoyment; this relation between the two is common to all men.  Man’s 
felicity on earth is, hence, only a negative condition; the smallest number of ills he 
can suffer ought to constitute its measure.”593  Furthermore, this condition is 
589 Fragments autobiographiques (18).  OC I.1164.
590 Emile.  E 474.
591 Shklar, Men and Citizens, p. 214.
592 Ibid., p. 235.
593 Emile.  E 80.
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symptomatic of human desire, a negative need defined by want or lack that “supposes 
privation, and all sensed privations are painful.”594
Given this dour assessment, we might well be tempted to follow Shklar’s lead 
and read Rousseau’s ontology as a manifesto of victimization.  But rather than 
succumb to the weight of his own analysis, he describes how we may yet attain a 
measure of peace.  As he writes in Emile,
In what, then, consists human wisdom or the road of true happiness?  
It is not precisely in diminishing our desires, for if they were beneath 
our power, a part of our faculties would remain idle, and we would not 
enjoy our whole being.  Neither is it in extending our faculties, for if, 
proportionate to them, our desires were more extended, we would as a 
result only become unhappier.  But it is in diminishing the excess of 
the desires over the faculties and putting power and will in perfect 
equality.  It is only then that, with all the powers in action, the soul 
will nevertheless remain peaceful and that man will be well ordered.595
Here is the lesson of the Second Discourse, concisely captured: contentment is 
possible only if our desires do not exceed our abilities to satiate them.  To achieve 
this balance we must accept, not lament, our natural limits as human beings.  We 
must, to paraphrase The Social Contract, recognize what we are while striving to 
realize what we should be.596
“What is more,” Rousseau elaborates, diminishing the distance between our 
wants and needs conforms to the will of God: “the Author of things provides not only 
for the needs He gives us but also for those we give ourselves; and it is in order to 
place desire always at the side of need that He causes our tastes to change and be 
594 Emile.  E 80.
595 Emile.  E 80.
596 Again, The Social Contract’s opening phrase—“I want to inquire whether there can be a legitimate 
and reliable rule of administration in the civil order, taking men as they are and laws as they can be”—
establishes the dialectic between heuristic idealism and pessimistic realism that guides much of 
Rousseau’s work.  The Social Contract.  CW IV.131; OC III.351.
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modified with our ways of life.”597  In society, our wants far outpace our needs.  
Rather than increase this artificial imbalance, we must recognize the virtue of self-
restraint and contain the excess of desires that so disserves denatured man.598
As is often the case with Rousseau, he couples unflinching criticism with 
programmatic optimism, an exegesis of how things are with a vision of how they 
could be better.  We should not therefore conflate his deep mistrust of society with 
abject pessimism.  As with Diogenes, Rousseau’s harsh criticism was fueled by 
concern; the depth of his remorse spoke to the necessity of active reform (rather than 
debilitating misery).  Similarly, retreat must not be confused with misanthropy; if 
anything, Rousseau loved far too deeply.  In this, he was not alone.  Taking recourse 
in solitude, he followed a Christian tradition in which withdrawal offers protection 
from temptation, allowing men to contemplate God while sheltered from the sinful 
distractions of society.  To clarify this point, we need only examine the hagiography 
of a Stylite.
Some fifteen hundred years before Rousseau, when martyrs cared little for 
writing or reception, Saint Antony fled society to resist Satan’s sway.  After retreating 
to a cave for twenty years, immersed in a life of self-imposed hardship, living on a 
strict diet of bread, salt and water while shunning humans and demons alike, Antony 
emerged with a clear sense of dutiful purpose: live humbly, do not fear hardship, 
place faith wholly in God.  “Virtue exists when the soul maintains its intellectual part 
597 Emile.  E 151.
598 By Rousseau’s description, aligning our wants and needs serves both God and humankind; it 
reflects a deference to the divine will, and limits the self-destructive consequences of excessive desire.
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according to nature,” he writes, “when it remains as it was made—and it was made 
beautiful and perfectly straight.”599
Predating Rousseau’s praise of natural harmony, Antony describes the human 
soul as God’s handiwork (and “God made nothing bad”).600  The virtuous life 
therefore demands that our minds embrace the divine model latent within our spirits.  
The challenge Antony imposes upon himself—and others seeking heavenly 
redemption—is to keep evil at bay, to resist the Devil’s malicious attempts to corrupt 
our pure relationships with God.  External and internal fortitude are demanded of a 
holy battle against evil (personified by demons), where integrity is not merely an 
eventual aim but an ever-present necessity to resist corruption.
For Antony, as with both Rousseau and Diogenes, such enlightened fortitude 
is not borne of scholarly rigor.  Rather, he proposes a decidedly anti-intellectual 
vision of wisdom, declaring that “none of us is judged for what he does not know, any 
more than one is counted blessed because he is learned and possesses knowledge.”601
Sincere observance, undying faith, and (above all) prayer are the true means of self-
betterment, for they offer proof of virtue (enlightened action), inspire personal 
determination, and solicit God’s spiritual support.  Indeed, “for those in whom the 
action through faith is present, the demonstration through argument is unnecessary, 
perhaps even useless.”602
True faith is demonstrated by certitude, stability and consistency, no matter 
the corporeal challenges.  If cultivating such strenuous devotion requires a concrete 
599 Athanasius, The Life of Antony and the Letter to Marcellinus, Robert C. Gregg, tr. (Mahwah, NJ: 
Paulist Press, 1980), p. 46.
600 Ibid., p. 47.
601 Ibid., p. 57.
602 Ibid., p. 87.
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model, Antony offers an unflinching example.  While God is benevolent, a prolific 
author of righteous covenants, he is unfortunately much duller than the Devil.  And it 
is this demon’s outrageous efforts to corrupt that dictate the severe terms of faith.  His 
efforts to tempt and torture the Desert Saint range from sloppy (throwing silver plates 
in his path) to severe (unleashing the apparitions of vicious beasts on his body).  
“How many wrestlings he endured… against destructive demons”603 in the desert, yet 
he maintained his poise and hurled holy words at them, and “they fled, being driven 
away by the remark as by a whip.”604  The desert molds Antony into a warrior monk, 
a hero-hermit who fights Satan’s many forms—greed, pride, doubt, deterrence, 
disgust, and lust—with righteous resistance strengthened by the courage of his 
convictions.
His methods proved wildly popular.  A social loner, Antony drew stadium-
sized crowds to observe him perched on a desert pole, where he won many over with 
physical proofs of the benefits of his faith (dispelling the demons of a man’s 
daughter, inspiring his sister’s virginity, foreseeing a despot’s death).  The ubiquity of 
Christian conversion only strengthened his resolve to serve God and spread His 
teachings no matter the consequences.  As Antony confidently argued, “the faith and 
teaching of Christ, ridiculed… and persecuted frequently by rulers, has [nonetheless] 
filled the world.”605  In spite of opposition, followers in every land had come to 
embrace the glorious truth of Christ.
No stranger to persecution, Rousseau also found solace in the physical proofs 
of his convictions.  As evidence he looked to nature, a testament of God’s 
603 Ibid., p. 69.
604 Ibid., p. 70.
605 Ibid., p. 88.
184
magnificence far more compelling than academic arguments or the catechisms of 
Clerics.  As with Antony, Rousseau found virtue in abandoning himself to a perfect 
order.  Yet because both recognized the imminence of temptation, be it the Devil’s 
seductive measures or society’s provocative pleasures (theater, recognition, wealth), 
they framed this quest in terms of aggressive isolation.  Both saw training as a 
necessary stage in the service of higher truths, a means of self-fortification to remain 
steadfast in the face of corruption.  And for Antony and Rousseau alike, the courage 
of their convictions was strengthened by looking inwards.
Furthermore, in both instances retreat was incomplete without reentry—
returning to the belly of the beast, to a society prone to vice, as a living model of man 
redeemed.  Antony returned from the mountains.  Emile was reared as society’s 
prodigal son.  Even Rousseau (the citizen of Geneva) fancied himself an exemplar of 
sorts in France.  Yet while Emile’s imaginary fate is a matter of speculation, 
Rousseau’s was not.
Just as Antony was followed and worshipped as a martyr to the truth, 
Rousseau was also revered throughout Europe, inundated with letters of praise and 
the author of his century’s bestselling novel.606  His popularity amongst readers 
notwithstanding, the publication of Emile and The Social Contract met with almost 
immediate censure and led, quite suddenly, to his unplanned retreat.  If Rousseau had 
seriously struggled to apply his ideas in practice, if he had praised withdrawal as a 
means to a civic end, he would have no chance to return bearing hope.  Twelve years 
after the First Discourse took top prize at Dijon, Jean-Jacques was delivered a harsh 
606 Namely, Julie.  See: Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural 
History.
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reproach: served with arrest papers and forced from his home, society had finally 
begged his leave.
*   *   *   *   *
From the sociological exegesis of his discourses, to the remote, self-styled 
community of Julie,607 to Emile’s virtuous education sheltered from society,608 to his 
final bittersweet ode to solitude in the Reveries, Jean-Jacques’ mistrust of social 
attachments grew ever more insistent and decidedly more personal.  Contemporary 
society had not only evolved contrary to man’s best interests; it had also done 
Rousseau a great personal injustice.609  Alienated by fractured relationships with 
friends and peers, condemned for subverting Catholic, aristocratic, and monarchal 
values, Rousseau was increasingly a man on his own.  Retreat was finally—and 
unequivocally—pressed upon him following the 1762 publications of Emile and The 
Social Contract.  These books were burned from Paris to Geneva,610 its author 
criminalized for their content.  Rousseau, the wunderkind who had denounced his 
own startling fame, excommunicated himself from his social and intellectual 
607 See, for example, Rousseau’s description of the Valais and his enchantment with the 
disinterestedness of its inhabitants: “The most agreeable part of their welcome, it seemed to me, was to 
detect in it not the slightest vestige of constraint either for them or for me.  They lived in their homes 
as if I was not there, and I was free to do as if I were there alone.”  In this instance, solitude enables a 
negative freedom, the lack of imposition of another’s will on his actions.  Julie.  CW VI 66; OC II.80-
81.  Readers should compare this to Rousseau’s description of Geneva in his Letter to d’Alembert, in 
which he stresses his native town’s independence as a mark of its freedom.
608 In contrast to Emile, The Social Contract envisions good citizens in a good society, a comparison 
beyond the immediate scope of this piece.
609 Rousseau’s indignation was evident in nearly all of his writings after 1762, including the Letter to 
Beaumont, Letters Written From the Mountain, The Confessions, The Dialogues, and The Reveries of 
the Solitary Walker.
610 According to Rousseau, “The Social Contract was not burned anywhere except Geneva where it 
was not printed.”  The Genevan magistrates were threatened by the work’s depiction of a constitution 
that very much resembled their own, and far less concerned with the more controversial Emile.  Letters 
Written From the Mountain (Sixth Letter).  CW IX.234; OC III.810.
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community, and dared to attack both Papal and Enlightenment ideals, was now finally 
forced to abscond from the society which had for so long served as the object of his 
wrath. 
Although this final stage of Rousseau’s life marked a bitter withdrawal from 
society, he fled neither strictly of his own volition, nor into silence.  On the morning 
of June 9, 1762, Omer and Guillaume Joly de Fleury, Attorney-General and 
Procurator-General of France, presented magistrate Maupeou’s Parlement with an 
unequivocal indictment of Rousseau.611  Condemning Emile (and, more precisely, its 
deistic Profession of Faith) as subversive, seditious, impious and unholy, the brothers 
de Fleury called for the immediate imprisonment and interrogation of its purportedly 
blasphemous author.612  The clock had not yet struck ten.  More than six hours later, 
when court officers arrived to execute their order by escorting Rousseau to the 
Bastille, their fugitive was already in flight to Switzerland and, soon after, the 
Prussian border.
Rousseau describes these events in great detail in The Confessions.  He 
greeted rumors of imminent legal proceedings with a mixture of stubbornness and 
naïveté.  “The dull roar that preceded the storm began to make itself heard and all 
slightly perceptive people saw very well that some plot was brewing over the subject 
611 Cranston, The Noble Savage, p. 358.
612 In the June 9 warrant issued for his arrest, the French Parlement accused Rousseau of promoting 
“impious and detestable principles” contemptuous of religion, Church and King alike.  From: Extrait 
des Registres du Parlement, Arrêt de la cour de Parlement, Qui condamne un Imprimé ayant pour titre 
Émile, ou de l’Éducation, par J. J. Rousseau, imprimé à La Hage… M.DCC.LXII., à être lacéré & 
brûlé par l’Exécuteur de la Haute Justice.  The text is reproduced in the beginning of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Citoyen à Genève, à Christophe de Beaumont, Archevêque de Paris, Duc de St. Cloud, Pair 
de France, Commandeur de l’Ordre du St. Esprit, Proviseur de Sorbonne, &c. (Amsterdam: Chez 
Marc Michel Rey, 1763).
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of my book [Emile] and myself that would not take long to burst out.”613  Still, he 
admits that he lacked such meager awareness: “my feeling of security, my stupidity 
was such that, far from foreseeing my misfortune, I did not even suspect its cause 
after I felt its effect.”614  French authorities sounded warning as they “began by rather 
skillfully circulating the idea that since they had dealt severely with the Jesuits they 
could not show a partial indulgence for books and authors who attacked Religion.”615
Sectarian tensions mounted, a development that acutely affected Rousseau’s own 
creed.  He learned in October, 1761 of the arrests of Francois Rouchette (a Protestant 
pastor) and the Grenin brothers (three Protestant laymen) in Toulouse, all of whom 
were executed weeks later.616
Dark clouds were gathering yet Rousseau “remained calm.”617  In spite of his 
megalomaniac paranoia—he speaks of “plots” hatched against him by 
“Holbachians,”618 certain that “it was very much me they were after”619—he still 
613 The Confessions.  CW V.481-482; OC 575.
614 The Confessions.  CW V.482; OC 575.
615 The Confessions.  CW V.482; OC 575-6.
616 The letter warning Rousseau was from fellow Protestant Jean Ribotte, who asked Rousseau to 
publish a manifesto on behalf of religious tolerance and write an appeal to the provincial Governor
Duc de Richelieu.  Rousseau refused, citing the Pauline doctrine of compliance.  Ribotte also made the 
same request of Voltaire, who failed to act before the executions.  For Ribotte’s letter see: CC IX.1498.  
For Rousseau’s response see: CC IX.1521.  For a concise account of these events see: Cranston, The 
Noble Savage, pp. 299-301.  It is also worth noting that only two months later, Ribotte alerted both 
Rousseau and Voltaire of the infamous Calas affair, again begging their intervention.  On October 13, 
1761, Huguenot merchant Jean Calas had discovered his oldest son dead (by hanging) in his Toulouse 
shop.  Attributing the death to suicide, Calas was charged by local magistrates with murdering the 
youth to prevent him from converting to Catholicism.  Incited by a wave of religious (and anti-
Huguenot) intolerance throughout the region, Calas was condemned to death on March 9, 1762, and 
publicly broken on the wheel, strangled, and burned the following day.  The execution led Voltaire, 
“l’homme de Calas,” to petition for religious tolerance.  A panel of fifty judges was appointed to 
review the case, and reversed the ruling on March 9, 1765.  Although this affair marked a catalyst in 
the reform of religious tolerance laws, it was not until 1787 that Louis XVI granted official tolerance to 
the Huguenots, and 1905 that Church and State were officially made separate in France.
617 The Confessions.  CW V.482; OC I.576.
618 As “[t]he rumors increased and soon changed their tone” and “the threats became addressed directly 
at me,” Rousseau admits that he “did not at all doubt that this [rumor of the Parlement’s censure] was 
an invention of the Holbachians to seek to frighten me and to incite me to flee.”  Rousseau is here 
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“could not resolve to flee.”620  Yet he was forced to confront mounting evidence.  In a 
letter to M. le Maréchal from the Curate de Deuil, Jean-Jacques learned from a 
reliable source that
Parlement was to proceed against me with the ultimate severity, and 
that on a certain day, which he noted, a warrant would be issued for 
my arrest.  I judged this warrant to be of Holbachian fabrications; I 
knew that Parlement was very attentive to legal formalities, and that to 
begin on this occasion with a warrant of arrest, before knowing 
juridically whether I acknowledged the book [Emile] and whether I 
was really its author, was to violate all of them.621
But Emile, like all of his major works save the First Discourse and Julie, was openly 
inscribed with his name and self-appointed title: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Citoyen de 
Genève.622  He had already corresponded with the censor Malesherbes over its 
content, and had publicly wrangled with the French publisher Duchesne to ensure that 
it went to press in a timely fashion.623
The obviousness of the situation still seemed to escape Rousseau.  Even after 
friends warned him of imminent legal action, he stubbornly refused to accept the 
increasing precariousness of his situation.
Since I felt very well that underneath all this there was some mystery 
which they did not want to tell me, I calmly awaited the event, 
referring to Baron d’Holbach, a prominent philosophe and avowed atheist.  The Confessions.  CW 
V.482;OC I.576.
619 The Confessions.  CW V.483;OC I.577.
620 The Confessions.  CW V.484;OC I.578.
621 The Confessions.  CW V.484;OC I.578.
622 The Discourse on the Sciences and Arts was attributed to a nameless “Citoyen de Genève.”  See: 
OC III.1.  Julie, the “Letters of Two Lovers Who Live in a Small Town at the Foot of the Alps,” was 
described as being “Collected and Published by Jean-Jacques Rousseau.” OC II.3.  In the Second 
Preface to Julie, Rousseau writes that he omitted the designation of his Genevan citizenship to “not 
profane the name of my fatherland; I only put it on writings I believe will do it honor.” CW VI.20; OC 
II.27.
623 Rousseau was concerned that the book would not be set in type in a timely fashion.  As Cranston 
describes, “Rousseau suggested there were only two ways to thwart the pirates [from printing 
unauthorized copies], secrecy and diligence; and since there was no longer any secrecy about Emile, 
diligence was all the more necessary.”  This supports the contention that people knew of Emile (and 
who its author was) long before it went to press. See: Cranston, The Noble Savage, pp. 300-301.
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counting upon my uprightness and my innocence in this whole 
business, and only too happy, whatever persecution was to await me, 
to be called to the honor of suffering for the truth.  Far from being 
afraid and keeping myself hidden, every day I went to the Chateau and 
in the afternoons I took my usual walk.624
Rather than face facts, he “was tempted to believe that the entire world had gone 
mad.”625  He attributes this to his certainty of vaguely defined conspiracy theories, a 
naïve faith in his own innocence, and a stubbornness to resist submission to the will 
of his persecutors.  He retired to bed with his “usual reading at night”626—the Bible—
and finished the Book of Judges, 19.  It was then (at two in the morning) that his wife 
Therese and M. la Roche entered with a letter on behalf on Mme. le Maréchal627 from 
M. le Prince de Conti.  “The fermentation,” Rousseau recalls the letter as having said, 
“is extreme; nothing can ward off the blow, the Court demands it, Parlement wishes 
it; at seven o’clock in the morning a warrant will be issued for his [Rousseau’s] arrest, 
and they will send to arrest him on the spot; I have obtained assurances that they will 
not pursue him if he gets away; but if he persists in wanting to let himself be arrested, 
he will be arrested.”628
After a brief conference with le Maréchal, Rousseau concluded that it was 
time to skip town.  “I did not feel that I had either enough presence of mind, or 
enough skill, or perhaps enough firmness to avoid compromising her if I was sharply 
pressed.  That made me decide to sacrifice my glory to her tranquility, to do for her 
624 The Confessions.  CW V.485;OC I.579.
625 The Confessions.  CW V.485;OC I.579.
626 In light of the charges (of impiety), the more suspicious amongst us might view this claim as 
pandering.  Regardless, Rousseau notably portrays himself as a pious Christian whose bedtime routine 
involved Bible study.
627 Mme. le Maréchal was a benefactor of Rousseau’s in Montmorency whom he describes earlier in 
The Confessions as “a lovable and powerful woman, to whom, in truth, I was becoming more attached 
day by day.”  CW V.446; OC I.532.
628 The Confessions.  CW V.485;OC I.580.  For the correspondence to which Rousseau refers, see: CC 
XI.1843.
190
on this occasion what nothing would have made me do for myself.”629  The claim is 
passive, stubborn, and sacrificial.  Rousseau leaves Montmorency to assuage the 
anxiety of his female friend.  He follows his heart against his reasoned judgment, 
foregoing personal “glory” to calm his companion’s fears.  Regardless of his 
retrospective reluctance, Rousseau’s flight was a harbinger of his life to come.  
Outlawed from Paris to Geneva, the publication of Emile set in motion Rousseau’s 
transformation from self-styled hermit to criminalized outcast.630
Rousseau’s resistance to retreat may still strike an odd chord.  Had he not 
spent a career reiterating the practical, political and moral benefits of solitude?  Yet 
even in his earlier embrace of reclusiveness, he never completely abandoned society.  
As Emile made plain, literal solitude was the fate of God, not man; the pupil’s 
seclusion was a prelude to the involvement so central to Rousseau’s concept of civic 
duty.
The Parlement’s arrest warrant changed everything.  No longer granted the 
luxury of peripheral asylum, Jean-Jacques was now an outcast.  Hounded from 
Môtiers to Bern, denounced by dear Geneva, he wandered in search of a homeland 
while decrying his fate.  During this “not all unwarranted” paranoia characteristic of 
Rousseau’s waning years, Maurice Cranston argues, he “came to see himself as a 
social outcast and concentrated on writing autobiographical works aimed at revealing 
his essential innocence and truthfulness.”631  He was indeed consumed with his own 
acquittal.  His ensuing works—from the Letter to Beaumont and Letters Written From 
629 The Confessions.  CW V.486;OC I.580-581.
630 Following this conversion of sorts, Jean-Jacques’ subsequent writings reflect an impassioned need 
for acquittal.  From The Confessions and Dialogues to the final Reveries, these later works bear the 
distinct burden of an author in search of redemption, either in the public’s or God’s eye.
631 Cranston, The Solitary Self, p. xii.
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a Mountain to the Dialogues and Reveries—were written with an eye for redemption, 
proffering numerous rejoinders to the grave injustice of his all-too-public persecution.
As an exile, Jean-Jacques felt compelled not only to defend himself but to 
confront the consequences of his now-literal solitude.  Where his retreat had earlier 
served demonstrative and pedagogical purposes, he now approached reclusiveness as 
an intensely personal matter.  This development is most evident in his final work, The 
Reveries of the Solitary Walker.  Rousseau begins his swansong by stressing its self-
involvement, admitting (to whom, it is unclear) that “[t]here will be much concerning 
me in them, because a solitary person who reflects is necessarily greatly preoccupied 
with himself.”632  Whereas Montaigne “wrote his Essays only for others,” Rousseau 
wrote “only for myself.”633  Taking self-examination as an enterprise in self-
edification, his work’s overarching concern was not society’s progress but its author’s 
individual growth: “I will be happy if… I learn to leave life not better, for that is not 
possible,” he confesses, “but more virtuous than I entered it.”634
Crazier things have happened.  After all, his entrance into the world was 
dubious at best.  “Cast from childhood into the whirlwind of the world,” Rousseau 
confides, “I soon learned from experience that I was not made to live in it and that in 
632 Reveries (First Promenade).  CW VIII.7; OC I.1000.
633 Reveries (First Promenade).  CW VIII.8; OC I.1001.  Rousseau’s charge is somewhat misleading.  
In his prefatory note “To the Reader,” Montaigne writes: “This book was written in good faith, reader.  
It warns you from the outset that in it I have set myself no goal but a domestic and private one.  I have 
had no thought of serving either you or my own glory.  My powers are inadequate for such a purpose.  
I have dedicated it to the private convenience of my relatives and friends.”  This is not, as Rousseau 
suggests, the “complete opposite” of writing only for oneself.  Furthermore, Montaigne’s work pursues 
self-knowledge through measured self-examination, the same “goal” (and methodology) that Rousseau 
sets for his Reveries: “to make myself aware of the modifications of my soul and of their sequence.”  
Reveries (First Promenade).  CW VIII.7; OC I.1000.  See also: Montaigne, The Complete Essays, p. 2.
634 Reveries. (Third Promenade).  CW VIII.27; OC I.1023.
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it I would never reach the state my heart felt a need for.”635  His life was plagued with 
adversity, the pernicious twist of fate personalized as “undoubtedly a great teacher… 
[that nonetheless] charges dearly for its lessons.”636  Unfortunately, Rousseau was a 
slow pupil.  “What benefits do I get from such late and painfully acquired 
enlightenment concerning my fate and concerning other people’s passions,” he asks 
during the Third Walk?  “By coming to know men better, I have only felt better the 
misery into which they have thrust me; and while this knowledge has shown me all 
their snares, it has not enabled me to avoid any.”637
By the Fifth Walk, however, Jean-Jacques sings a slightly different tune.  In 
reflecting upon his life’s experiences, he gleans not sadness but solace.  “I regret 
these experiences in no way,” he now concludes, “since through reflection they have 
given me new insights into knowledge of myself and into the true motives for my 
conduct in a thousand circumstances I have so often deluded myself about.”638  For 
the beleaguered solitaire, life was a grueling test characterized by “years of 
agitation”639 which, in reflection, yielded retrospective clarity and eventual calm in 
the face of adversity.640
Rousseau’s ruminations still lead him towards a lonely conclusion: “of all the 
studies I have tried to undertake during my life in the midst of men, there is hardly 
635 Reveries. (Second Promenade).  CW VIII.18; OC I.1012.
636 Reveries. (Third Promenade).  CW VIII.17; OC I.1011.
637 Reveries. (Third Promenade).  CW VIII.17; OC I.1011.
638 Reveries. (Sixth Promenade).  CW VIII.51; OC I.1052. 
639 Reveries. (Third Promenade).  CW VIII.24; OC I.1019.
640 Rousseau’s position here begs a comparison with Seneca.  Following his exile from Rome, Seneca 
approached his banishment as a period of “retirement.”  He used this opportunity for reflection to 
compose his Epistulae Morales, a work in which solitude is a catalyst for self-appraisal and measured 
self-growth.  I discuss Rousseau’s awkward relationship with Stoicism—his self-proclaimed affinity 
and his decidedly un-Stoic behavior—in greater length elsewhere.
193
any I could not just as well have undertaken alone on a desert island.”641  Far from 
facilitating his desire to engage with the world, his antagonists seemed to thwart him 
at every turn.  “The greatest care of those who rule my fate having been to make 
everything appear only false and deceptive to me, an occasion for virtue is never 
anything but a lure they hold to draw me into the snare they want to enlace me in.”642
The maliciousness of his nameless enemies weighs heavily upon his memories.  
Apparently resigned to being at their mercy and convinced that he cannot act 
independent of their influence, he retreats to a familiar refrain: “I know that the only 
good which might henceforth be within my power is to abstain from acting, from fear 
of doing evil without wanting to and without knowing it.”643
Presented as an epiphany of sorts, the sentiment was nothing new.  His pledge 
of abstention harkened back to the “golden rule” of the Second Discourse.644
Invoking the exile’s duty first described in Emile—“to bear the yoke of necessity 
without complaining”—he again embraces inactivity and withdrawal as the key to his 
liberation.  Could such passive resistance free him from the yoke of his antagonists?  
Only if Rousseau’s heart submitted to his mind; only if his reasoned conclusion 
regarding the chimerical folly of virtue could quell his desire to seek virtue.  In 
Rousseau’s writings, Starobinski observes, “[t]he reflective man knows how to 
641 Reveries (Third Promenade).  CW VIII.18; OC I.1013.  Readers might here recall Rousseau’s 
fascination with Robinson Crusoe, although even Crusoe had Friday by his side.  As the first book 
Emile is given to read see: Emile.  E 184; OC IV.454-455.
642 Reveries (Sixth Promenade).  CW VIII.50; OC I.1051.  Although the tone of this statement is 
unabashedly paranoid (and borderline deranged), its substance is consistent with statements from 
Rousseau’s earlier works on the safety and relative virtue of inactivity.
643 Reveries. (Sixth Promenade).  CW VIII.50; OC I.1051..  Because Rousseau maintains the innocence 
of the human heart, he is accurately identified with Pelagianism.  Yet he greatly mistrusts his active 
will when swayed by social or societal pressures.  If such “artificial” forces so frequently manipulate 
and distort his “naturally” good will, does this render his affirmation of natural goodness moot?  Put 
another way, might Rousseau’s mistrust of activity reflect a more orthodox vision of humankind’s 
sinfulness than his Pelagianism suggests?
644 Second Discourse.  CW III.38; OC III.156.
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govern the mind of the sensuous man.”645  Just as Wolmar guides Saint Preux and the 
Tutor controls Emile, so did Rousseau (the exile-in-reflection) now call upon Jean-
Jacques (the sensual dreamer) to submit.
If action had indeed become futile and vaguely self-incriminating, Rousseau 
presented himself two alternatives: to await salvation at the hands of divine 
Providence, or abandon himself to his transcendent reveries.  Although he began his 
Confessions invoking his day of reckoning (“Let the trumpet of the last judgment 
sound when it will; I shall come with this book in my hands to present myself before 
the Sovereign Judge”),646 his Reveries turned with equal eagerness to flights of 
imaginative fancy.  The Island of Saint-Pierre became, through recollection, an 
earthly heaven which sparked in him “[t]he sentiment of existence, stripped of any 
other emotion… a precious sentiment of contentment and of peace which alone would 
suffice to make this existence dear and sweet to anyone able to spurn all the sensual 
and earthly impressions which incessantly come to distract us from it and to trouble 
its sweetness here-below.”647  Retreating from the frustrations of his physical life, 
Rousseau once again found solace in nature and dream.
Although he recognized God’s hand in his own misfortunes—troubles too 
swiftly orchestrated and coherently executed to be rooted in mere human will or non-
determinate chance—he did “not go so far as St. Augustine who would have consoled 
himself to be damned if such had been the will of God.”648  Indeed, his deferential 
praise of God (the only true judge of innocence who alone is “the cause of my 
645 Starobinski, 215
646 The Confessions.  CW V.5; OC I.5.
647 Reveries (Fifth Promenade).  CW VIII.46; OC I.1047.  Reverie elevates Rousseau to a transcendent, 
divine-like state: “As long as this state lasts, we are sufficient unto ourselves, like God.”
648 Reveries. (Second Promenade).  CW VIII.16; OC I.1010.
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confidence”)649 rings somewhat hollow.  Rousseau did not, after all, rebuke his 
earthly deeds as unpardonable sins.  Quite the opposite, he stubbornly clung to his 
own experiences as the simultaneous evidence of his goodness (he lived honestly and 
truthfully) and source of his misery (others vengefully disagreed).  Although acting 
with integrity, speaking his mind, and trusting his friends furthered the severity of his 
downfall, these experiences were without disgrace and even worthy of praise.
Kierkegaard understandably saw in this claim a notable dearth of Christian 
humility: “What he lacks is the ideal, the Christian ideal, to humble him and teach 
him how little he suffers compared with the saints, and to sustain his efforts by 
preventing him from falling into the reverie and sloth of the poet.”  Far from a martyr, 
Rousseau simply “shows us how hard it is for a man to die to the world.”650  Despite 
asserting that self-examination has taught him the ability to accept hardship with 
Stoic (or even Cynic) aplomb, Rousseau suffered horribly.  More specifically, he 
suffered as a man convinced of his innocence, not as a Christian who accepted his 
ontological guilt.  He assumed his worthiness in the eyes of God, while deflecting 
culpability to those who controlled his corporeal fate.
Where men have failed Rousseau, the Lord will redeem him; of this he is sure.  
“God is just,” he concludes; “He wills that I suffer; and He knows that I am innocent.  
That is the cause of my confidence.”651  But, as Kierkegaard reminds, who amongst 
us is innocent?  Augustine spent every waking minute of a far more pious life 
affirming his own culpability.  Maintaining faith is a grueling struggle for a man—
649 Reveries. (Second Promenade).  CW VIII.16; OC I.1010.
650 Søren Kierkegaard, Journals (4: 252-253), as quoted in Starobinski, p. 384 n. 23.  For additional 
discussion of Kierkegaard and Rousseau, see: Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy, p. 190; 
Grimsley, Rousseau and the Religious Quest.
651 Reveries (Second Promenade).  CW VIII.16; OC I.1010.
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even a Saint—painfully aware that his very nature is tainted by sin.  Yet for 
Rousseau, “serene in my innocence,”652 Divine contemplation offered detached peace 
of mind.  “Let me, therefore, leave men and fate to go their ways.  Let me learn to 
suffer without a murmur,” he concluded.  “In the end, everything must return to order, 
and my turn will come sooner or later.”653  He was without blame, society guilty.  In 
confidently casting this stone, what was there to fear from One who surely grasped 
this truth?
Rather than dreading his “turn,” Rousseau awaited divine judgment as a 
framed man anticipates a noble trial.  Cherishing the inevitability of his redemption, 
he found one final companion in God—the only Being left who understood him.  In 
the end, Rousseau the recluse still sought solace in another, a final grasp that 
illuminates the extent of his all-to-human attachment to attachment.  Intoxicated by 
the comfort of his own reveries, certain that he had “never been truly suited for civil 
society,” convinced that “everything contributed to detach my affections from this 
world, even before the misfortunes which were destined to alienate me from it 
completely,” he seemed poised in the Reveries to finally retreat in peace.654
Still, one cannot help but sense that perhaps as he did with Emile (nature’s 
child pushed back into society), Rousseau had again set himself up to fail.  His feet 
straddled too many islands: a love of man and a mistrust of men, faith in political 
reform and fear of hegemonic coercion, civic duty and social aversion, Cynic 
shamelessness and Christian faith.  Was the solitude born of these tensions 
compelling, much less coherent?  Did his recourse to reclusiveness illustrate the 
652 Reveries (Third Promenade).  CW VIII.22; OC I.1019.
653 Reveries (Second Promenade).  CW VIII.16; OC I.1010.
654 Reveries (Sixth Promenade).  CW VIII.56; OC I.1059.
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political and moral value of retreat?  Did his appropriation of both spiritual and 
secular tropes coalesce into something practicable, or did his model of retreat collapse 
under the weight of its own conflicting concerns?
The temptation, as often befalls those confronting Rousseau, is to say that he 
failed—that his theory was too fraught with contradictions, his character too weak to 
realize the strength of his vision.  But if we take him both as he was and as he wished 
to be, perhaps we may still redeem him in the end.
For Rousseau, retreat provided a necessary means of enacting a noble plan, of 
resisting societal corruption and girding oneself for the strenuous task of reform.  
Return was its necessary correlative, the final, unavoidable test of applying lessons 
learned in seclusion from the world to which we are inescapably bound.  Only when 
Rousseau was fiercely unwelcome did he supposedly abandon his earthly ties, tilting 
his delicate balance by placing faith wholly in God and retreating into the solipsistic 
daydreams of a defeated, isolated man.
Still, it took Rousseau until the year of his death to convince himself that he 
had abandoned all hope.  At that late stage, his acquiescence seemed terribly forced 
and somewhat suspect.  If we survey the evidence of his life and thought we might 
instead conclude that Rousseau was never able to fully retreat, even when he had little 
choice.  What Kierkegaard identified as a lack of humility might therefore be 
appraised as a deep-seated fear of abandonment—of relinquishing his civic duty and 
leaving his peers to stumble towards a very suspect fate.  To be sure, Rousseau 
affirmed the virtues of passivity and inactivity, surrendering himself to nature, 
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reverie, and the forces that conspired against him.  Yet he did so, Starobinski notes, 
“with such energy as to belie the passivity in which he sought refuge.”655
In 1762, Frederick the Great had this to say of the man to whom he granted 
asylum in Neuchâtel:
I believe Rousseau missed his calling.  He clearly had what it takes to 
become a famous hermit, a Desert Father impressive because of his 
moral rigor and his self-castigation, or a stylite.  He would have 
performed miracles, would have been canonized, and would have 
increased the catalogue of martyrs even more.  Nowadays, however, 
he is seen only as a philosophical eccentric who tries to revive the sect 
of Diogenes after two millennia.  It does not pay to eat grass and make 
enemies of all contemporary philosophers.656
By this analysis, it was Rousseau’s involvement—not his solitude—that ushered his 
downfall.  Had he simply possessed the courage to abandon himself to an elusive 
ideal he might have achieved the glory of martyrdom.  But as history proves, he could 
not stomach the severity of either Cynicism or Sainthood.  Unlike Antony, he soiled 
his hands in the affairs of men and never fully transcended their influence.  And 
unlike Diogenes, his outrage was a conceit adopted to mask the deep sensitivity of his 
soul.  Rather than embrace either model wholly, Rousseau straddled the line.  His life 
as a recluse was both demonstrative and resigned, righteous and profane.  He found in 
solitude a value that only God possessed, and urged it upon a corrupt, congested 
world.  He retreated—from Geneva, from Paris, from his peers, within himself—to 
rekindle the divinely-scribed goodness lodged deep within his heart.  Yet in 
attempting to follow his conscience, he was freighted by the ever-present weight of 
social pressures and earthly concerns.
655 Starobinski, p. 248.
656 Taken from Frederick the Great’s letter to the Governor of Neuchâtel, Lord George Keith, in 
support of granting Rousseau asylum.  Support notwithstanding, Frederick obviously took this 
opportunity to air his grievances against Jean-Jacques.  Quoted in: Niehues-Pröbsting, 344-345.
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Rousseau might only have heeded Frederick’s advice to adverse 
consequences.  After all, the uniqueness of his vision lay in its amalgamation, its 
stubborn mix of heuristic idealism and pessimistic realism, spiritual transcendence 
and political virtue, piety and profanity.  There is something both humble and brash in 
a solitary thinker who nurtured both a Christian preoccupation with redemption and a 
Pagan emphasis on corporeal achievement.  Yet as he writes in The Confessions, “I 
wished to live in independence but still needed to survive.”657  Honest to the end, this, 
finally, is the lesson of Rousseau: dreamer and recluse certainly, but one very much 
involved with the society he never fully abandoned.
657 The Confessions.  OC I.363; CW V.304.
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Chapter 5: Church and State
…the true disciples of Christ must suffer persecution; but that the church of Christ 
should persecute others, and force others by fire and sword to embrace her faith and 
doctrine, I could never yet find in any of the books of the New Testament.
—Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration658
Now that there is no longer and can never again be an exclusive national Religion, 
one should tolerate all those religions that tolerate others insofar as their dogmas are 
in no way contrary to the duties of the Citizen.  But whoever dares to say there is no 
Salvation outside of the Church should be chased out of the State…
—Rousseau, The Social Contract659
Had Rousseau abandoned his concern with either spiritual welfare or secular 
reform, he would not have struggled to envision a model of religious practice 
compatible with democratic values of liberty, equality and tolerance.  He would not, 
in other words, have conceived of a Civil Religion.  In Letters Written from the 
Mountain, Rousseau describes this chapter of his Social Contract as “researches on 
the manner in which Religion can and ought to enter as a constitutive part into the 
composition of the body politic.”660  The Contract’s most controversial section,661 his 
effort to transform religious associations was met with immediate, unmitigated scorn 
by the Genevan Council.662  Over two centuries later, criticism persists.  Henri Gaston
Gouhier interpreted Civil Religion as an unabashed argument for total secularization 
658 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990), p. 25.
659 The Social Contract.  CW IV.223-224; OC III.469.
660 Letters Written From the Mountain (Sixth Letter).  CW IX.233; OC III.809.
661 Readers should consult Robert Derathé’s summary in OC III.1498-1500.
662 Helena Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva: From the First Discourse to the Social Contract, 1749-
1762 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 258.  For Rousseau’s response see: Letters 
Written From the Mountain.
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of the state.663  More common rejoinders—such as that of Ronald Ian Boss—portray 
Rousseau’s model as a thinly veiled justification for religious coercion.664  Alfred 
Cobban notes that Civil Religion has greatly contributed to Jean-Jacques’ reputation 
“as the apostle of tyranny and an enemy to liberty in the state.”665  And Lester G. 
Crocker is most blunt, arguing that the practical consequences of Rousseau’s civic 
faith “can only be imagined from the worst excesses of the Terror, or Stalinism, or of 
Chinese communism.”666
It seems fitting that our paradoxical author should again draw so much ire.  
Perhaps part of this backlash is attributable to his task (reconciling two oft-
conflicting, passionately-held belief systems) and personality (a controversial figure 
no matter his subject).  Yet in one crucial aspect, Rousseau rendered himself an easy 
target: earnest or no, his intentions were subverted by a sub-par effort.  Tersely 
developed as the last substantive chapter in The Social Contract, Civil Religion seems 
as conspicuously awkward a fit as the Profession of Faith did in Emile.  Of meager 
length and polemic in tone, his engagement with this spirited topic smacks of 
afterthought and ambivalence.667  On one hand, Rousseau appears to follow in the 
footsteps of thinkers like Montesquieu,668 espousing traditional republican beliefs in 
religion as a necessary foundation of civic virtue.  He also devotes a majority of the 
663 Henri Gaston Gouhier, Les méditations métaphysiques de Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Paris: J. Vrin, 
1970), p. 255.
664 See: Ronald Ian Boss, “Rousseau’s Civil Religion and the Meaning of Belief: An Answer to 
Bayle’s Paradox,” Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth-Century, 84, 1971, p. 123-193.
665 Alfred Cobban, Rousseau and the Modern State (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1934), p. 88.
666 Lester G. Crocker, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Volume II (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1963), p. 
184.
667 As Derathé notes, On Civil Religion was not in the draft of The Social Contract (the so-called 
Geneva Manuscript) that Rousseau initially sent to his publisher Michel Rey in December, 1760.  OC 
III.1498.  Only after one year, in a letter to Rey dated December 23, 1761, did Rousseau admit to 
adding this controversial section.  CC IX.346.
668 See: Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold 
Samuel Stone, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Part V Books 24-25.
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text to denouncing religious practice’s role within polities.  Discussing three inclusive 
strains of worship—interior, exterior, and ecclesiastical—he concludes that all fail to 
cultivate a strong, unified social body.  He insists upon the necessity of religious 
tolerance, yet his “civil” alternative regulates faith with an iron fist, even proposing 
the death penalty to non-compliers—a strong claim offered almost in passing, without 
due justification.669
Winston Churchill once quipped that politicians should be judged by the level 
of animosity they arouse amongst their opponents.670  If Rousseau were a politician 
today, he might give Bill Clinton a run for his money.  But he was a political theorist, 
and must be judged on the value of his thought rather than the passion of his 
detractors.  Considering its overwhelmingly negative reception, we might wonder if 
his glaringly brief chapter On Civil Religion possesses any value whatsoever.  Why 
approach this problematic text when its author provides us with other works relevant 
to our subject?  Because we are using Jean-Jacques as a lens through which to 
examine the relationship between religion and politics, and because Civil Religion 
offers the Genevan’s most famously concise practical application of this subject, it 
begs closer scrutiny.
A measure of caution is nonetheless needed.  In light of the heightened 
controversy we will proceed slowly, devoting considerable space to examining the 
development of Rousseau’s argument along with his more notorious contentions.  
Keeping an eye to Civil Religion’s internal coherence while locating its affinity with 
(and context within) his broader oeuvres, we will then assess its merits as the 
669 The Social Contract.  CW IV.223; OC III.468.
670 The full quote attributed to Churchill reads as follows: “I have always felt that a politician is to be 
judged by the animosities he excites among his opponents.”
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practical solution Rousseau envisioned.  In the final analysis, how does his “purely 
civil profession of faith” resolve the dialectic between secularism and spirituality?  
Does it present a viable means of reconciling the relationship between religious and 
political institutions?  Or does it merely add flame to this still-burning fire?
*   *   *   *   *
Rousseau began his chapter “On Civil Religion” with historical conjecture: 
“Men at first had no other Kings than Gods, nor any other government than 
theocracy.”671  Well before the period when “men could bring themselves to accept a 
fellow man as a master and flatter themselves that this was a good arrangement,” they 
looked to divine rulers for governance.672  Religion therefore served an explicitly 
political function from the outset of human history.  Long before the idea of self-
rule—even that exercised by a monarch or prince—seemed feasible, the 
contemplation of heavenly figures provided a source of normative authority.
As he had in the Second Discourse, Rousseau again argued that socialization 
changed everything.  Individuals formed loose congregations which (over time) 
evolved into nations, and citizens began to worship common deities legitimized by 
corporeal leaders.  “By the sole fact that God was placed at the head of every political 
society,” Rousseau notes, “it followed that there were as many Gods as there were 
peoples.”673  Subsequent homogenization and centralization of these divine 
figureheads within territorial borders helped to define national identities, but it also 
671 The Social Contract.  CW IV.216; OC III.460.
672 Compare with the Vicar’s similar observation in Emile.  E 288-289.
673 The Social Contract.  CW IV.216; OC III.460.
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enflamed national rivalries.  Because “peoples foreign to each other and nearly 
always enemies could not recognize the same master… [nor] obey the same leader,” 
politico-theological differences became a source of conflict.  “Thus,” Rousseau 
argues, “national divisions resulted in polytheism, and beyond that in theological as 
well as civil intolerance.”674  Despite these antagonistic conditions, he insists that 
religious wars were nonexistent in Pagan times.  This is because “each State, having 
its own cult as well as its Government, did not distinguish between its Gods and its 
laws.  Political war was also Theological.”675
This was certainly true of the Greeks, who brashly appointed themselves 
“natural Sovereigns” of foreign tribes.  This claim of dominion followed a theological 
assumption: barbarians fell under Greece’s political jurisdiction because both peoples 
worshipped the same Pagan Gods (even if unwittingly so).  Such rationale was also 
held by the Romans, for whom political and religious conquest was inextricably 
linked.676  Rome was, however, an Empire whose vast geopolitical expansion enabled
the unprecedented spread of its deities.  This phenomenon incurred a sort of 
theological globalization: “the Romans, having spread their cult and their Gods along 
with their empire, and having themselves often adopted the Gods of the vanquished 
by granting legal status… to them all, the peoples of that vast empire gradually 
674 In describing these prejudices as “synonymous,” Rousseau establishes a core contention of his 
chapter On Civil Religion: religious and civil liberty (like religious and civil intolerance) are connected 
values.  The Social Contract.  CW IV.216; OC III.460.
675 The Social Contract.  CW IV.216; OC III.460.
676 History confirms Rousseau’s analysis of the conflation between spiritual and secular authority.  It 
was during Rome’s territorial expansion that jus gentium and jus naturale were formally codified, a 
political necessity to institute and regulate Roman Catholicism throughout a sweeping Empire, when 
the Mosaic Decalogue no longer sufficed to bind colonizers to colonies.
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[came] to have multitudes of Gods and of cults, which were approximately the same 
everywhere.”677
Ironically, the very conditions which facilitated the proliferation of Rome’s 
religion also contributed to its diffusion.  Because the burgeoning Empire was 
logistically incapable of micro-managing worship in newly-acquired territories, its 
pantheon’s authority eroded.  Although Rome continued to export deities throughout 
it colonies, the sheer scope of its expansion prohibited the strict imposition and 
codification of Roman faith.  Religious cults flourished in this absence of strong, 
centralized religious authority.  In practice, nations incorporated into the Empire’s 
fold (that lay beyond their conqueror’s immediate grasp) continued to worship their 
own Gods even, Rousseau observes, with Rome’s legal approbation.
The emergence of autonomous cults within the Empire’s territories marked a 
catalyst for momentous change.  Specifically, it ushered the separation between 
church and state, a radical schism with decidedly deleterious consequences.  “By 
separating the theological system from the political system,” Rousseau laments, “this 
brought about the end of the unity of the State.”678  The divorce of religion from 
politics struck at the very heart of Pagan civic cohesion, and left subjects with two 
distinct, competing authorities.  “It was under these circumstances,” Rousseau argues, 
“that Jesus came to establish a spiritual kingdom on earth.”679  Initially, Jesus and his 
followers sought merely to practice their worship without persecution from the state.  
Skeptical Pagan leaders sensed a graver danger, regarding the sect “as true rebels 
who, beneath a hypocritical submissiveness, were only awaiting the moment to 
677 The Social Contract.  CW IV.217; OC III.462.
678 The Social Contract.  CW IV.217; OC III.462.
679 The Social Contract.  CW IV.217; OC III.462.
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become independent of the masters, and to usurp adroitly the authority they pretended 
to respect out of weakness.”680  Pagan fears were realized when, following Jesus’ 
cataclysmic death, “the humble Christians changed their language, and soon this 
supposedly otherworldly kingdom was seen to become, under a visible leader, the 
most violent despotism in this world.”681
Rousseau’s sudden, sharp conclusion begs emphasis: the destructive 
relationship between religion and politics began not with their integration but their 
radical separation.  To reiterate his argument, religious cults flourished as Rome’s 
political and spiritual authority weakened.  The most enduring and infectious amongst 
these—Christianity—rejected the jurisdiction of secular governments in spiritual 
affairs, and anointed Christ mankind’s unequivocal master.  As the Christian 
following increased so did its clergy’s political power extend, eventually ruling the 
very corporeal dominion it had originally shunned.  The once-hunted cult of “the 
Way” became a prolific hunter: “[t]he spirit of Christianity has won over everything,” 
Jean-Jacques observes, in spiritual and secular realms alike.682
It was a victory not without cost.  According to Rousseau, clerical dominance 
of secular polities crippled civil society.  The seeds of disunity planted during Rome’s 
downfall had blossomed into governments divided by mutually conflicting loyalties 
to God and monarch.  Civil and spiritual authorities butted heads, as this “double 
power has resulted in a perpetual conflict of jurisdiction that has made any good 
polity impossible in christian States.”683  Jurisdictional schizophrenia cultivated a 
680 The Social Contract.  CW IV.217; OC III.462.
681 The Social Contract.  CW IV.217-218; OC III.462. 
682 The Social Contract.  CW IV.218; OC III.462.
683 The Social Contract.  CW IV.218; OC III.462.
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perpetual confusion under which “no people has ever been able to figure out whom it 
was obligated to obey, the master or the priest.”684
This was true even when master was priest.  As Rousseau writes, the Kings 
and Czars of England and Russia—rulers who had “established themselves as heads 
of the Church”—were ultimately subordinate to ecclesiastical authority.  Dual 
allegiances to earthly and otherworldly interests rendered them impotent.  Their 
powers became more managerial than legislative: “They have acquired not so much 
the right to change [the church] as the power to maintain it.”685  As “ministers” 
subordinate to papal precepts (rather than autonomous “masters” of their realms), 
these leaders possessed neither the political nor moral authority to rule or reform the 
Church.
Papal dominance therefore posed a real-world threat to secular rule, one that 
Hobbes had identified a century prior.  Like Rousseau he “saw the evil and the 
remedy” of divided sovereignty and “dared to propose the reunification of the two 
heads of the eagle, and the complete return to political unity, without which no State 
or Government will ever be well constituted.”686  Still, Hobbes’ monarchal solution 
was ultimately impractical; he underestimated the Church’s influence upon a single 
ruler, no matter how powerful.  As Rousseau chided, he was a “Christian Author”687
who “ought to have seen that the dominating spirit of Christianity was incompatible 
with his system, and that the interest of the Priest would always be stronger than that 
684 The Social Contract.  CW IV.218; OC III.462.
685 The Social Contract.  CW IV.218; OC III.463. 
686 The Social Contract.  CW IV.218; OC III.463.
687 Despite Rousseau’s certainty, Hobbes’ religious beliefs were—and remain—a matter of significant 
dispute.  For a fine summary of the various arguments in recent scholarship see: Patricia Springborg, 
“Hobbes on religion,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, Tom Sorell, ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 346-347, 369 n. 1.
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of the State.”688  Hobbes should have known that his own solution failed to 
realistically anticipate organized religion’s predatory instincts.  Sword be damned,689
the Leviathan’s rule would inevitably be subjugated by the power of the priests.
In all fairness, Rousseau’s dismissal obscures the thoughtfulness with which 
Hobbes confronted the politico-theological problem.  After all, half of his Leviathan 
is devoted to the subject of religion.  In Chapter 43 he explicitly identifies the 
competing pulls of secular and spiritual loyalties as the principal cause of civil 
conflict: “The most frequent pretext of Sedition, and Civil War, in Christian 
Commonwealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently 
resolved, of obeying at once, both God, and man, then when their commandments are 
one contrary to the other.”690  Hobbes had a ready answer, one that showed deference 
to the divine will.  In such instances “when a man receiveth two contrary commands, 
and knows that one of them is God's, he ought to obey that, and not the other, though 
it be the command even of his lawful sovereign (whether a Monarch, or a sovereign 
Assembly,) or the command of his Father.”691
688 In an author’s note, Rousseau offers a very concise explanation of the clergy’s uniquely potent 
authority.  Fused “into a body” by a “social compact” (centered around communion and 
excommunication), priests cultivate a singular will.  A “political masterpiece,” their covenant unites 
adherents “from opposite ends of the earth” under one common authority.  This strong civil unity 
explains why the clergy “will always be master of [divided] peoples and Kings”: they, like the 
hypothetical citizens bound by Rousseau’s civil faith, derive political strength from adhering to a 
common, unified will.  The Social Contract.  CW IV.218n; OC III.463n.
689 Rousseau’s critique may sound hyperbolic, but he identifies a cogent problem with Hobbes’ 
formulation: namely, the fact that Hobbes’ source of regulative order—corporeal punishment, or “the 
sword”—holds little sway for those solely concerned with the afterlife and divine redemption.  See 
note 44 below.
690 Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 43 [321], p. 402.
691 To support this claim Hobbes cites Matthew 10:28: “Fear not those that kill the body, but cannot 
kill the soul.”  For Hobbes, divine retribution merits far more fear than the sovereign’s wrath.  As he 
explains: “If the command [of the sovereign] be such as cannot be obeyed without being damned to 
eternal death, then it were madness to obey it, and the counsel of our Saviour takes place.”  Ibid., Ch. 
43 [321], p. 403.
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This solution to the “most frequent pretext” of civil strife is not as naïve as 
Rousseau would have us believe.  Hobbes immediately recognized that his emphasis 
upon obedience raised a logistical difficulty: “men when they are commanded in the 
name of God, know not in diverse Cases, whether the command be from God, or 
whether he that commandeth, do but abuse God’s name for some private ends of his 
own.”692  Although more staid in tone, these concerns revealed a sentiment consistent 
with Rousseau’s own mistrust of ecclesiasts.  Just as “many false Prophets”693
bolstered their own reputations amongst ancient Jews with “feigned Dreams, and 
Visions,” Hobbes continued, “so there have been in all times in the Church of Christ,
false Teachers, that seek reputation with the people, by fantastical and false 
Doctrines; that seek reputation (as is the nature of Ambition,) to govern them for their 
private benefit.”694  He, like Rousseau, was acutely aware of the dangers 
manipulative, ambitious priests posed to a gullible flock.
This common mistrust notwithstanding, they diverged sharply on two major 
theological points.  First, Hobbes believed that “we are all guilty of disobedience to 
God’s Law” both ontologically (as descendents of Adam) and individually (“by our 
own transgressions”).695  And second, in De Cive he argued that the right to interpret 
692 Ibid., Ch. 43 [321], p. 403.
693 Rousseau directly levied this charge of “false prophecy” against Beaumont, evoking Moses in 
support of his refutation of miracles.  The passage to which Rousseau referred comes from the Old 
Testament in Deuteronomy 13.1-3: “If a prophet arises among you, or a dreamer of dreams, and gives 
you a sign or a wonder, and the sign or wonder which he tells you comes to pass, and if he says, ‘Let 
us hp after other gods,’ which you have not known, ‘and let us serve them,’ you shall not listen to the 
words of that prophet or to that dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God is testing you, to know 
whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul.”  See: Letter to 
Beaumont.  CW IX.70; OC IV.990.
694 Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 43 [321], p. 403.
695 Ibid., Ch. 43 [322], p. 403.
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scripture—the basis of divine law—“belongs to individual churches.”696  As he 
explained, such a power falls beyond the jurisdiction of “civil authority” and must 
“depend either on the judgment of individual citizens or an outside authority.  But it 
cannot depend on the judgment of individual citizens: that can be seen from the 
inconveniences and absurdities it would give rise to.”697  In sum, “it is the task of a 
church to settle disputes; and therefore it is for a church, not for individuals, to 
interpret holy scripture.”698  As a Genevan Protestant with Pelagian sympathies, 
Rousseau must have abhorred both conclusions.699  He viewed the relationship 
between God and man as a strictly private matter.  Furthermore, as we have already 
seen, he championed mankind’s natural innocence and rejected the narrative of 
Original Sin.  Given these profound disagreements, Rousseau could hardly have 
considered Hobbes an ally in the politico-theological debates.
The Genevan was born into a heritage that shunned Roman Catholic directives 
as intrusions upon the individual liberty to worship, breaches of political jurisdiction, 
and offenses to the lessons of the Gospel.700  On a more intimate note, this inherited 
anticlericalism was reinforced by personal experience.701  No stranger to the 
ecclesiasts’ wrath, Jean-Jacques understood all-too-well the dangerous repercussions 
of openly defying orthodox precepts.702  For such a widely-read public figure as he—
696 Hobbes, De Cive, p. 230.
697 Ibid., p. 230.
698 Ibid., p. 231.  See also: p. 245.
699 As he wrote to Voltaire, “whatever the Sophist Hobbes might have been able to say on this, when a 
man serves the State well, he does not owe an account to anyone of the matter in which he serves 
God.”  Letter from Rousseau to Voltaire, August 18, 1756.  CW III.119; OC IV.1072.
700 See: Rosenblatt, pp. 259-260.
701 For a summary of Rousseau’s exile see Chapter Four above.
702 Rousseau’s lack of anonymity separated him from other authors who dared take controversial 
stances on religion such as, most notably, Voltaire.
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one who dared challenge the priest’s authority—the politico-theological question was 
hardly academic.
On both general and personal levels, Rousseau was firmly convinced that the 
Catholic Church had overstepped legitimate spiritual and secular bounds.  They 
abused their duties as a religious authority by dictating terms of material worship that 
both assumed humankind’s intrinsic guilt and required rote (and hence unfeeling) 
repetition of hollow catechisms.  And they exploited their political influence, 
purveying an agenda of particularist interests characterized by hegemonic intolerance 
and persecution.  Subjecting citizens to their narrow interpretations of religious duty, 
positive law, and spiritual salvation alike, they subverted the very foundation of a 
healthy polity: civic cohesion reflective of a general will and grounded in the 
Gospel’s benevolent, harmonious spirit.
In criticizing orthodox Catholicism, Rousseau had not merely entered a 
Scriptural debate.  His charge denied the Church’s authority as a legitimate mediator 
between man and God.  Interior faith was a matter of individual conscience and 
personal belief; any ruling body which intervened contradicted the very will of God.  
If true faith was nourished in the heart, particular rites fell under the realm of public 
jurisdiction; exterior worship was by contrast a matter (as he quipped in Emile) of 
public policy.703  Yet following the terms established in The Social Contract, 
religious congregations (like any civic association) were legitimate only if they 
reflected a truly general will.704  By contrast, the unilateral dictates of papists 
703 Rousseau here sides with the Vicar, who argued that “external worship, if it must be uniform for the 
sake of good order… is purely a question of public policy.”  Emile.  E 296.
704 Furthermore, because God imbued us with an inherent sense of pitié and universal brotherhood, this 
unifying aim is consistent with Rousseau’s understanding of adherence to the divine will.
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cultivated a singular dogmatism which disserved both God and man.  Correcting 
these abuses posed practical and political challenges: disavowing the Church of its 
sole authority in spiritual matters; and reforming public worship in accord with the 
democratic tenets of tolerance and civic unity.
As we have already seen, Rousseau insisted upon the necessity and utility of 
his thought.  The pragmatic emphasis evident in his introduction to Civil Religion was 
equally explicit in the Geneva Manuscript.705  Rousseau began this earlier draft by 
stating his objective: “to put the machine in running order.”706  By “machine” he 
meant the political institutions that necessarily order social life.  As in the Second 
Discourse, malfunction was a consequence of denaturization, a development that 
created new needs which “bring us together in proportion as our passions divide 
us.”707  Although human beings are naturally innocent, socialization gave rise to 
wickedness.  As our wants grew to surpass our needs, the “cupidity” exemplified by 
amour-propre weakened man’s sense of collective welfare and interdependence.708
The satiation of particularist desires undermined natural harmony, an intuitive 
sentiment which served as “the first bonds of general society” and “the foundations 
of… universal good will.”709  Still, “the more we become enemies of our fellow 
men”—the more we pursue personal gain at the expense of others—“the less we can 
705 Although the sections I address (I.1 and I.2) of the Geneva Manuscript were deleted from The 
Social Contract, certain passages from I.2 are appropriated in Rousseau’s final chapter On Civil 
Religion.
706 Geneva Manuscript.  CW IV.76; OC III.281.
707 Rousseau’s influence upon Hegel is evident in his dialectical analysis: “Thus the same causes that 
make us wicked also make us slaves and reduce us to servitude by depraving us.”  Geneva Manuscript.  
CW IV.76; OC III.282.
708 Geneva Manuscript.  CW IV.76; OC III.282.
709 Geneva Manuscript.  CW IV.76-77; OC III.282.
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do without them.”710  This was a dilemma whose redress required hard labor, yet 
“universal goodwill” remained a “fruit everyone would like to reap without being 
obliged to cultivate it.”711
If effort was wanting, the need was undeniable.  In society, a “new order of 
things gives rise to a multitude of relationships lacking order, regulation, and 
stability.”712  To further complicate matters, Rousseau admits that “nature’s gentle 
voice is no longer an infallible guide for us, nor is the independence we have received 
from her a desirable state.”713  Human beings are, for better or worse, social creatures.  
In this deracinated state, we no longer follow (let alone discern) the guidance of our 
God-given conscience.  Mankind is also painfully oblivious: “the sublime concepts of 
a God of the wise, the gentle laws of brotherhood He imposes upon us, the social 
virtues of pure souls—which are the true cult He desires of us—will always escape 
the multitude.”714  This is because people are easily swayed.  They are fed “senseless” 
Gods who, far from upholding morality and social cohesion, would lead them to 
“indulge in a thousand horrible, destructive passions… if Philosophy and laws did not 
hold back the furies of fanaticism.”715
710 Geneva Manuscript.  CW IV.76; OC III.282.
711 Geneva Manuscript.  CW IV.77; OC III.282.
712 Geneva Manuscript.  CW IV.77; OC III.282.
713 The remainder of this passage offered a sharp rejoinder to those (most famously Voltaire) who 
depicted Rousseau as overly-romanticizing nature.  Here, however, Jean-Jacques is a hard realist: “We 
lost peace and innocence forever before we had appreciated their delights.  Unfelt by the stupid men of 
earliest times, lost to the enlightened man of later times, the happy life of the golden age was always a 
state foreign to the human race, either because it went unrecognized when humans could have enjoyed 
it or because it had been lost when humans could have known it.”  His bluntly honest assessment 
underscores the pragmatism that I argue is central to Rousseau’s formulation of Civil Religion.  
Geneva Manuscript.  CW IV.77; OC III.283.
714 Geneva Manuscript.  CW IV.79; OC III.285.
715 Geneva Manuscript.  CW IV.79; OC III.285.
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The problem, however, lies with sectarianism rather than religion.716  “Ever 
since particular instructions became necessary, each People has its own ideas which it 
is taught are the only valid ones, and which lead to Carnage and murder more often 
than to harmony and peace.”717  Rousseau instead urged us to “set aside the sacred 
precepts of the various Religions, whose abuse causes as many crimes as their use can 
avoid, and give back to the Philosopher the examination of a question that the 
Theologian has never dealt with except to the detriment of the human race.”718
Although these lines were removed in The Social Contract, they strike an odd chord 
coming from one so mistrustful of the philosophes.  Rather than read this as a reversal 
of Rousseau’s well-documented suspicions, we should recognize in his plea an 
unflinching indictment of those charged with religion’s keeping.  Forced to choose 
(on society’s behalf) between priests and philosophers, he sides here with the latter.719
Although this admission occurs only in passing (in a draft, at that), it underscores an 
insistence consistent throughout Rousseau’s oeuvres: theologians have made a mess 
of religious institutions, a grievous gaffe for which humankind has paid a dear price.
Clearly, those charged with safeguarding and promoting that “greatest good of 
all” (positive religion) have failed men where they are most in need.  As Rousseau 
concludes, 
716 Given Rousseau’s historical analysis of religious associations, readers might wonder if sectarianism 
and religion are fundamentally inseparable.  Yet unless we allow him this crucial distinction, we 
cannot accept his “civil faith” as a practical alternative to despotic dogmatism. 
717 Geneva Manuscript.  CW IV.80; OC III.286. 
718 For additional examples of Rousseau’s anticlericalism in The Social Contract’s final version 
(beyond his chapter On Civil Religion), see Book II, Chapters 6-7 and Book IV, Chapter 7.  Geneva 
Manuscript.  CW IV.80; OC III.286.
719 Of course, Rousseau vacillates on this subject.  In Emile, for example, he writes that “fanaticism, 
although more deadly in its immediate effects than what is today called the philosophic spirit, is much 
less so in its consequences.”  Emile.  E 312.
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although there is no natural and general society among men, although 
men become unhappy and wicked in becoming sociable, although the 
laws of justice and equality mean nothing to those who live both in the 
freedom of the state of nature and subject to the needs of the social 
state, far from thinking that there is neither virtue nor happiness for us 
and that heaven has abandoned us without resources to the deprivation 
of the species, let us attempt to draw from the ill itself the remedy that 
should cure it.  Let us use new associations to correct, if possible, the 
defect of the general association.720
Seemingly awash in despair, Rousseau draws hope from his faith in natural human 
innocence and divine beneficence.  Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, 
God has not abandoned His worthy creations.721  Rather than meekly suffer an 
inalterable fate, we must summon courage and employ that most human of traits722—
perfectibility—to reform the “particular institutions” as necessary to human religion 
as governments are to socialized man.
Writing on politics, education and social relations, Rousseau used starkly 
honest critique—what I have previously referred to as pessimistic realism—as a 
catalyst for heuristic idealism.723  His approach to the politico-theological problem724
was no different.  As with inequalities, religious intolerance was a byproduct of 
socialization, a corruption of the natural harmony instilled in us as creatures of God.  
The dominance of papists perverted the spirit of the gospel by dictating terms of 
salvation inconsistent with divine mercy and natural goodness, just as the Catholic 
church infected society by dividing citizens and sovereignty.  As in the Second 
720 Geneva Manuscript.  CW IV.81-82; OC III.288.
721 Rousseau immediately notes that “the human race… alone ought to decide [in such matters of faith] 
because the greatest good of all is the only passion it has.”  In typically paradoxical fashion, 
Rousseau’s pessimistic realism and ontological optimism are in simultaneous evidence.  Geneva 
Manuscript.  CW IV.80; OC III.286.
722 In the Second Discourse, Rousseau argued that free will and perfectibility are uniquely human traits 
(unlike pitié and self-preservation, which animals possess).  See: CW III.26-27; OC III.141-143.
723 For a further discussion of these terms, see Chapter One above.
724 As defined earlier, I use this term to mean the consideration of religion as it relates to politics.
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Discourse, redressing these wrongs demanded drawing “from the ill itself the remedy 
that should cure it”: creating new associations to replace those that have failed us in 
politics, society, and religion alike.  If positive religion is particularly adrift, and its 
reform is essential to a polity’s well-being, the task of instituting a civil religion is 
nothing short of imperative.
*   *   *   *   *
We might here recall that Rousseau begins The Social Contract in search of 
“legitimate and reliable rule.”725  His vision takes shape as strong citizenship guided 
by the general will, a unified volition shared and exercised by all.  Reconceptualizing 
the relationship between religion and politics (a nexus of divided loyalties) is 
necessary to enact such valid political reform.  If citizens do not resolve this 
debilitating tension, they will be left dazed and confused, ruled by “two powers, two 
Sovereigns”726—that of Christ as defined by a hegemonic church, and that of the state 
as putatively defined by a monarch.
In the Second Discourse, speculative genealogy laid the foundation for a 
sociopolitical critique of inequality.  As in this earlier work, Rousseau’s introduction 
to Civil Religion served a similar purpose: identifying the source of a social problem 
in need of political redress.  In both cases, an examination of the past established the 
context to better assess and correct present failings.  We may here take a moment to 
725 The Social Contract.  CW IV.131; OC III.351.
726 The Social Contract.  CW IV.218; OC III.463.
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review Rousseau’s historical account of religion, as it defines the problems 
theoretically solved by Civil Religion.
Although the relationship between religion and politics took the initial form of 
a relatively benign polytheism (much like early societies were characterized as loose 
congregations of cooperative individuals), it became a source of despotism amongst 
human societies.  In the Second Discourse, the invention of private property marked a 
decisive turning point in the evolution of civil society.  In Civil Religion, Rousseau 
locates a similar world-changing moment in the history of spiritual worship: the 
advent of theological intolerance between nation-states, and the subsequent export of 
deities to vanquished territories.  Rome’s overexpansion subverted this practice, as 
fringe cults sprouted throughout the Empire’s territory.  Amongst these, Christianity 
proved most enduring, and divested spiritual faith of its need for political affirmation.  
More strongly, Christians opposed an Empire’s authority, drawing legitimacy from 
faith in a single omnipotent divinity, and creating an autonomous ruling body who 
answered to Christ above the Emperor.  What began as a movement opposed to 
earthly involvement eventually grew to dominate corporeal affairs.
In addition to providing a conceptual and historical foundation for his 
argument, Rousseau’s introduction establishes three main concerns.  First, theological 
and civil intolerance—prejudices he describes as synonymous727—are products of 
human history, unnatural to the extent that (like inequalities) they develop with 
socialization and are nonexistent in the natural state.  Second, politics and religion 
were intimately linked from the first seedlings of human society.  This relationship 
was initially mutually beneficial, as divine rule served a normative, legislative, 
727 The Social Contract.  CW IV.216; OC III.460.
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unifying political function.  Third, this balance was fundamentally (and permanently) 
altered by Christianity, a faith that supplanted nationally-sponsored deities with a 
universal God whose authority was autonomous from (and far more powerful than) 
the state.  This schism between religious and secular authority in turn created a 
political problem, the phenomenon of sovereignty divided amongst monarchs and 
priests.  As Rousseau observes, the “sacred cult has always remained, or again 
become independent of the Sovereign, and without a necessary bond with the body of 
the State.”728  It was this “necessary bond” that he sought to repair.
Before developing his solution, Rousseau quickly distances himself from the 
fray of contemporary theological debate.  Describing the two dominant poles of 
thought epitomized by “the opposing sentiments of Bayle and Warburton, one of 
whom claims that no Religion is useful to the body politic, the other of whom 
maintains, to the contrary, that Christianity is its firmest support,”729 he makes clear 
his distaste for such arguments.  Rousseau’s overriding aim is to re-forge religion’s 
civic ties and reunite civil and religious faith, thereby imbuing strong democratic self-
rule with religion’s unifying moral foundation.  He dismisses chic theological and 
728 Rousseau’s comments on Islam underscore the tolerance he grants non-Christian faiths: 
“Mohammed had very sound views; he tied his political system together well, and as long as the form 
of the Government subsisted under his successors the Caliphs, the Government was completely 
unified, and good for that reason.  But when the Arabs became prosperous, lettered, polished, soft, and 
weak, they were subjugated by barbarians.  Then the division between the two powers began again… 
[although] it is less apparent among the mohammedans than among the Christians.”  Under this 
assessment, corporeal prosperity—and not beliefs intrinsic to the Islamic faith—injured Arabic civil 
unity; if anything, Christianity is more prone to divided sovereignty.  This directly refutes 
Montesquieu’s conclusion that “moderate government is better suited to the Christian religion, and 
despotic government to Mohammedanism,” and offers a rejoinder to Locke’s proscription of the 
“Mahometan” as one who could not live in political harmony with Christians.  See: Montesquieu, The 
Spirit of the Laws, p. 461; Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, pp. 63-64; The Social Contract.  
CW IV.218; OC III.462-463.
729 The Social Contract.  CW IV.219; OC III.463-464.
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philosophical arguments as fundamentally irrelevant to his study, one guided by 
practical—not metaphysical—concerns.
Rousseau’s aversion to theological debates reflects an even deeper conviction.  
As we saw in Chapter 3, he believed divine mysteries were ultimately impenetrable.  
Humankind was capable of discerning only the most general characteristics of God 
(omnipotence and beneficence) and His will (exemplified in the order of the natural 
world).  Beyond these vague certainties, theological speculation was wholly 
indeterminate.  Efforts to apply particular characteristics to a Being beyond human 
comprehension were vain in both senses of the word: ineffectual and unduly proud.  
Rather than attempt to settle questions irresolvable to the human mind,730 Rousseau 
strove only to “give a little more precision to the overly vague ideas about Religion 
that are relevant to my subject.”731
Before developing his subject—a “purely civil profession of faith”—Rousseau 
begins with a typology, dividing religion “into two types, namely the Religion of man 
and that of the Citizen.”732  The first “is the pure and simple Religion of the Gospel… 
and what may be called natural divine right,” an internal worship “without Temples, 
altars, or rituals.”733  The second is practiced by and within specific countries, an 
external worship of “dogma, rites, and external cult… prescribed by law.”734
Rousseau adds a “third, more bizarre, type of Religion which, by giving men two 
730 Note that Rousseau here sides with the Stoic critique of rhetoric recounted in Plutarch’s Moralia, 
Volume XIII, Part II, and discussed in Chapter 2 above.
731 On the subject of clarity, although religion is (according to the Oxford English Dictionary) of 
“doubtful etymology” writers after Cicero frequently attributed its origins to the term religāre, “to 
bind.”  Rousseau draws upon this sense of legitimate constraint in claiming that a purely civil faith can 
be regulated by a corporeal sovereign.  The Social Contract.  CW IV.219; OC III.464.
732 The Social Contract.  CW IV.219; OC III.464.
733 The Social Contract.  CW IV.219; OC III.464.
734 The Social Contract.  CW IV.219; OC III.464.
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legislative systems, two leaders, and two fatherlands, subjects them to contradictory 
duties, and prevents them from being simultaneously devout men and Citizens.”735
He has in mind Roman Catholicism or “the religion of the Priest,” one that “leads to a 
type of mixed and unsocial right that has no name.”736
Rousseau immediately (and categorically) dismisses the “religion of the 
Priest” as being “so manifestly bad that it is a waste of time to amuse oneself by 
proving it.”737  Catholicism fails to uphold the most basic requisites of the social 
contract: it “destroys social unity” and “put[s] man in contradiction with himself,” 
rendering it “worthless” and—given Rousseau’s concept of divine order—
fundamentally irreligious.738  The remaining categories have more forgivable flaws.
External worship “combines the divine cult and love of the laws,” a union that 
renders “the fatherland the object of the Citizens’ adoration.”739  Such a formula 
transforms the state into a “tutelary God,” a “kind of Theocracy in which there ought 
to be no other pontiff than the Prince, nor other priests than the magistrates.”740  If 
Rousseau appreciated such patriotic eros, he remained mistrustful of unilateral 
hierarchical authority.  Like papists, theocrats conflated secular and spiritual 
jurisdiction.741  Furthermore, their muddled creed was “bad in that, being based on 
error and falsehood, it deceives men, makes them credulous, superstitious, and 
735 Readers should note Rousseau’s wholly dismissive numeration.  By initially claiming that religion 
can be “divided into two types,” he implies that Catholicism (a “third, more bizarre, type”) barely even 
qualifies as a religion.  The Social Contract.  CW IV.219; OC III.464.
736 The Social Contract.  CW IV.219; OC III.464.
737 The Social Contract.  CW IV.219; OC III.464.
738 The Social Contract.  CW IV.219; OC III.464.
739 The Social Contract.  CW IV.219; OC III.464-465.
740 The Social Contract.  CW IV.220; OC III.465.
741 Furthermore, both Roman Catholicism and theocracy failed to coherently define (and subsequently 
separate) these two distinct domains.  As a Genevan, Helena Rosenblatt argues, Rousseau was 
“particularly sensitive” to such matters.  The experience of his patrie had illustrated the more 
dangerous “political uses of religion and… political implications of certain beliefs.  He was well aware 
that some dogmas were being used by the authorities to depoliticize the people.”  Rosenblatt, p. 261.
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drowns the true cult of divinity in empty ceremonial.”742  Under this system, the 
gospel was supplanted by arbitrary ritual, cultivating a faith based upon credulity and 
intolerance rather than the truth and harmony characteristic of God’s will.
Having examined the problems of state- and priest-based worship, Rousseau 
returns to his first category: “the Religion of man, or Christianity,” which he 
immediately distinguishes from “that of today.”  The faith he envisions is a “saintly, 
sublime, genuine Religion, [which urges] men—all children of the same God—[to] 
acknowledge one another as brothers,” a bond which survives even death.743  From 
the perspective of civil society, the problem with Christianity is that it lacks any 
“particular relation to the body politic, [and] leaves laws with only their intrinsic 
force, without adding any other force to them.”744  Rousseau here resurrected a 
familiar critique of Christianity’s incompatibility with political action, describing 
earthly indifference as a symptom of solely focusing upon the afterlife.  As he 
lamented, “far from attaching the Citizens’ hearts to the State, it detaches them from 
it as from all worldly things,” a phenomenon completely “contrary to the social 
spirit.”745  Even more strongly, he argued that “a society of true christians would no 
longer be a society of men.”746  Such individuals would be wholly united with God 
and wholly detached from their fellows.
This is because “Christianity is a totally spiritual religion, uniquely concerned 
with Heavenly matters.”747  Although true Christians are dutiful, law-abiding, 
742 The Social Contract.  CW IV.220; OC III.465.
743 The Social Contract.  CW IV.220; OC III.465.
744 In so doing, Christian corporeal indifference weakens “one of [society’s] great bonds.”  The Social 
Contract.  CW IV.220; OC III.465.
745 The Social Contract.  CW IV.220; OC III.465.
746 The Social Contract.  CW IV.220; OC III.465.
747 The Social Contract.  CW IV.220; OC III.466.
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moderate, incorruptible, brave and temperate, “[t]he Christian’s fatherland is not of 
this world.”748  Civil duties would be performed “with profound indifference for the 
good or bad outcomes of his efforts.”749  Whatever his state’s fortunes may be, the 
Christian either ignores its felicity or “blesses the hand of God that weighs heavily on 
his people.”750  He allows himself neither pride in his patrie, nor the will needed to 
reform a polity in decline.  As we have already seen, this mirrors a fundamental 
division between Augustine and Pelagius.  Augustine saw little hope in meaningful 
human reform, save constant vigilance carried out with the realization that 
redemption might only follow the grace of God.  By contrast, Pelagius embraced 
corporeal improvement as a means of actively soliciting the divine Creator’s mercy.  
Arguing that salvation and earthly improvement were mutually constitutive aims, 
Rousseau seemed to side with Pelagius.
If the Christian state denuded citizens of their capacity for physical self-
betterment, it possessed another fatal weakness.  Such a polity could prosper only if 
“all Citizens without exception… [were] equally good Christians.”  This is because 
those truly devoted to Christ are not simply indifferent to their corporeal fates; they 
are also utterly naïve, awash in blind brotherly love that makes them easy victims for 
even “a single ambitious man, a single hypocrite.”751  Such ingenuousness combined 
with a passive attribution of fate to the will of God do not strong citizens make.  
748 The Social Contract.  CW IV.220; OC III.466.
749 The Social Contract.  CW IV.220; OC III.466. 
750 The Social Contract.  CW IV.221; OC III.466.
751 If Rousseau’s fear appears to be at odds with his belief in man’s natural goodness, we must recall 
that he hardly withheld from casting blame.  Although man might be innocent by nature, men had 
certainly made a mess of denatured society.  As with Pelagius, his faith in natural goodness never 
blinded him to the shortcomings of society.  In this he (as an individual) differs sharply from the 
Christian for whom “charity makes it hard to think ill of one’s neighbor.”  The Social Contract.  CW 
IV.221; OC III.466.
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Because the Christian’s “essential thing is to go to paradise,” they lack the worldly 
devotion needed to cultivate or defend their States.752  Christianity may nourish 
deeper existential truths and worship a just deity, but—like natural man—its “true” 
practitioners are ill-suited for society.  As Rousseau concludes, 
I am mistaken when I speak of a Christian Republic;753 these two 
words are mutually exclusive.  Christianity preaches nothing but 
servitude and dependence.  Its spirit is so favorable to tyranny that 
tyranny always profits from it.  True Christians are made to be slaves.  
They know it and are scarcely moved thereby; this brief life is of too 
little worth in their view.754
Passages such as these evoke thinkers from Machiavelli755 to Nietzsche756 who levied 
stark critiques against the slavish disposition of Christian faith.  As Machiavelli wrote 
in the Discourses on Livy, “while our religion has shown us truth and the true path, it 
also makes us place a lower value on worldly honor.”757  In addition, Christianity 
“has more often glorified humble and contemplative men rather than active ones,” 
and “defined the supreme good as humility, abjection, and contempt of worldly 
things.”758  Just as Rousseau asserted that Christians neglect corporeal concerns in an 
752 “Suppose that your christian republic is face to face with Sparta or Rome,” Rousseau wonders.  The 
results would not be pretty: “the pious christians will be beaten, crushed, destroyed before they have 
had time to look around, or they will owe their salvation only to the scorn their enemies will conceive 
for them.”  The Social Contract.  CW IV.221; OC III.466-467.
753 For a comparison with Locke’s similar assertion, see below.
754 The Social Contract.  CW IV.221; OC III.467.
755 The association is none too favorable.  In the 1539 Apologia Reginaldi Poli ad Carolum V, 
Reginald Pole described Machiavelli’s works as “written by the finger of Satan,” a not uncommon 
view amongst the more spirited detractors.  It is nonetheless worth noting that, as with Rousseau, not 
everyone saw the Devil as Machiavelli’s muse.  In his massive 1668 Apologie pour Machiavel
(commissioned by Cardinal Richelieu), Louis Machon defended the Discourses and The Prince as 
saintly efforts “drawn from the book of books” itself, the Holy Scripture.  Peter S. Donaldson, 
Machiavelli and the Mystery of State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. xi, 9 & 188.
756 In addition to Genealogy of Morals I.11, readers should also consult I.7, I.13, II.7, as well as the 
following: Beyond Good and Evil §62, 260; The Will to Power §8, 90; The Antichrist §571.
757 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, II.2 p. 158.
758 Ibid., II.2 p. 159.
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effort “to go to paradise,” so did Machiavelli argue that “in order to go to paradise, 
most men think more about enduring their pains than about avenging them.”759
If Rousseau’s indictment of Christian citizens followed Machiavelli (at times 
to the letter), it also resurrected Bayle’s depiction of Christian states as fundamentally 
apolitical entities.760  By reviving these controversial stances Rousseau seemed to 
enter the very theological debates he had dismissed mere pages earlier.  Such 
apparent reversals make Civil Religion a particularly frustrating text, even by 
Rousseau’s paradoxical standards.  Yet what appears blatantly contradictory more 
accurately alludes to a deep ambivalence.  Rousseau insisted upon the necessity of 
integrating religious practice within legitimate political associations.  At the same 
time, he recognized that organized religion historically opposed republican civic 
interests: theocratic states were built upon lies and cultivated credulous intolerance; 
and Catholic polities were dominated by dangerous dogmatists.  Even “true” 
Christians were ill-suited to the rigorous corporeal duties of strong citizenship.
Each form of religious practice categorically undermines the conditions 
requisite of a prosperous civic body.  None are capable of simultaneously preserving 
religion’s most beneficial elements (truth, harmony, connectedness, moral will) and 
the core values of legitimate polities (freedom, tolerance, unity).  In all three 
instances, spiritual associations seem fatally incompatible with political associations, 
doomed either to dominate corporeal governance, supplant true faith with narrow-
minded superstition, or create a citizenry fatally disinterested in worldly affairs.  
Before even sketching his alternative, Rousseau has planted a significant doubt: are 
759 Ibid., II.2 p. 159.
760 Readers should refer to Pierre Bayle’s 1697 Dictionnaire historique et critique.  For a refutation of 
Bayle see: Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws Part V, Book 23, Chapters 2 & 6.
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religion and politics fundamentally incompatible, or can Civil Religion succeed 
where all others have failed?  In provoking such uncertainty, he prods readers to 
question his very enterprise.
Because Rousseau seemed to portray religious associations as the proverbial 
oil to a healthy polity’s water, it should come as no surprise that commentators have 
read his chapter On Civil Religion as a wholly secular plea in spiritual clothing and 
(more broadly) labeled its author emphatically irreligious.  The evidence for such an 
interpretation lies in plain view.  Yet as I have argued throughout, such conclusions 
dismiss a crucial element of Rousseau’s thought: his sincere religiosity.  To ignore 
this is to place him in the company of atheist philosophes such as Helvétius, Holbach 
and d’Alembert whose views, he argued in Emile, were more dangerous than 
fanaticism itself.761  Religion fulfills a unique and fundamental role in the moral 
composition and civic harmony of communities.  That dogmatic creeds nullify this 
value should compel rather than deter us to reform spiritual associations.  An essential 
facet of human life, like social bonds they must be repaired.762
To justify this claim that Rousseau was a thinker equally committed to secular 
and spiritual well-being, we must nonetheless resolve the doubts his condemnation of 
Christianity rightfully raise.  Rousseau’s critique of the Christian citizen is 
problematic on at least three levels.  First, it seems to render his very enterprise 
(“considering [religion] in relation to society”) moot by placing religion in 
fundamental opposition to society.  Second, it seems self-subverting when considered 
761 See: Emile.  E 312.
762 Again, this position sharply separates Rousseau from his atheist philosophe peers.
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in relation to Rousseau’s descriptions of himself as a “true” Christian.763  Finally, 
unlike his anticlericalism which attacks overtly (and actively) self-serving papists, it 
targets a relatively benign group: the genuinely faithful.  What then are we to make of 
an argument to integrate religious practice into civil society that begins by dismissing 
even the most exemplary practitioners?
By way of explanation, Helena Rosenblatt argues that these “provocative 
statements… should not be taken at face value.”764  Placing Rousseau’s chapter on 
Civil Religion within the context of Genevan politics, she describes Rousseau’s 
“strategy” as a method of “adopt[ing] and amplify[ing] the Genevan patriciate’s 
version of Christianity, only to turn it against them.”765  To secure their own political 
power, the patriciate “claimed that Christianity preached only otherworldliness, 
submission, and resignation.”766  Rousseau simply took this conclusion to its logical 
extreme, describing a “Christian republic” as a contradiction in terms.767  According 
to Rosenblatt, his position was deliberate, a means of “provoking people to defend 
their religion and, in the process, to refute the patriciate’s ‘Christian submission’ 
763 For an assessment of Rousseau’s self-description as a “true Christian” see Chapter Six below, 
where I discuss his religiosity through the lens of his “conversions” to both Catholicism (as a youth 
under de Warens’ direction) and philosophy (on the road to Vincennes).
764 Rosenblatt, p. 263.
765 Rousseau himself substantiated this reading in a 1763 letter to Deluc: “The surest way to refute [the 
Genevan patriciate’s] maxims is to force them to deduce the consequences of them themselves and to 
take them as far as they will go.”  From CC XVII.279-280, as quoted in Ibid., p. 263.
766 Ibid., pp. 263-264.
767 Locke similarly claimed that “there is absolutely no such thing… as a Christian commonwealth.”  
His argument was rooted in a technical reading of the Gospel, in which he finds no evidence that a 
commonwealth was ever “constituted upon that foundation” of Christian faith, or “in which God 
himself was the legislator.”  Lest we overemphasize their affinities, readers might also consult 
Rousseau’s refutation of Lockean epistemology written in a 1755 letter to Voltaire: “The true 
principles of optimism can be drawn neither from the properties of matter, nor from the mechanics of 
the universe, but only by inference from the perfections of God who presides over everything.”  Locke, 
A Letter Concerning Toleration, pp. 52-53.  Letter to Voltaire (August 30, 1755).  CW III.115; OC 
IV.1068.
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argument.  Rousseau’s readers had to choose: either Christianity does not preach 
submission, or its political relevance must be rejected.”768
Because Civil Religion proceeds from the premise that religion is politically 
relevant, Rosenblatt argues that its exaggerated anti-Christian stance must be read as 
a negative lesson, a means of prodding readers to understand the dangers in 
categorically dismissing Christianity’s political value.  This was the very explanation 
Genevan minister Antoine-Jacques Roustan offered in an amicable retort to his 
friend’s hyperbolic position.  In Ofrande aux Autels et à la Patrie , Roustan wondered 
aloud if “M. Rousseau believe[s what he has written] himself.”769  After all, 
Christianity requires good acts; it encourages self-sacrifice in the face of tyranny; and 
it preaches submission only as a last resort.
Yet if these values were well-suited to republicanism, and “if Christianity is 
so favorable to liberty, [why are there] so few free states in Europe?”770  Roustan 
provided a decidedly Rousseauist answer to this Rousseauist question: “because there 
are so few Christians.”771  As he continued, “an ambitious person… would have to 
think twice before attacking the liberty of a really Christian people, whose citizens 
would scorn riches, would lead a simple, laborious, frugal life, would love each other 
like brothers and future fellow-citizens of heaven.”772  This analysis tacitly suggests 
that greed and covetousness (qualities Rousseau associated with the Genevan 
patriciate), not humility and brotherly love, threaten strong citizenship.  It also 
768 Rosenblatt, p. 264.
769 Roustan was also instrumental in getting Rousseau’s Social Contract approved (by the censors) and 
published.  Antoine-Jacques Roustan, Offrande aux Autels et à la Patrie (Amsterdam: Michel Rey, 
1764), as quoted in Ibid., p. 264.
770 Ibid., p. 265.
771 Readers should note that Diogenes the Cynic reached a similar conclusion when searching for a 
“real man” in broad daylight while holding a lantern.  See Chapter Four above.
772 Ibid., p. 265.
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reiterates an argument familiar to Rousseau’s readers: religion rightly understood 
bears little in common with most contemporary religious practice.
Just as Papal abuses should not obscure true religion’s value to humankind, 
Jean-Jacques’ anticlericalism should not be confused with irreligiosity.  Indeed, his 
vision of a legitimate society was grounded in a unified sense of duty or “moral will” 
which, in turn, “was dependent upon the existence of God.”773  Did these convictions 
redeem him from charges of impiety?  Rousseau certainly thought so.  Revisiting The 
Social Contract in the Third of his Letters Written from the Mountain, his writes:
One cannot say… that I attack morality in a Book in which I establish 
with all my power the preference for the general good over the private 
good and in which I relate our duties toward men to our duties toward 
God; the only principle upon which morality can be founded, in order 
to be real and go beyond appearance.774
An obligation to serve God, fellow man, and the general good: these are the moral 
precepts Rousseau draws from his belief in a divine universal order.  And as the 
“most reasonable and holy Religion on earth,” Christianity powerfully affirms these 
duties.775
Jean-Jacques was emphatic on this point.  Flatly denying “that Christianity is 
attacked in my [Social Contract],”776 he described it as “a book where the truth, 
utility, and necessity of Religion in general is established with the greatest force; 
where, without making any exception, the Author prefers the Christian Religion to 
773 Despite their shared skepticism, this position clearly distinguishes Rousseau from that of Bayle.  
Rosenblatt, p. 265.
774 Letters Written from the Mountain (Third Letter).  CW IX.191; OC III.758.
775 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.47; OC IV.960.
776 Again, what he did attack were “the distinctive dogmas of the Catholics” quick to condemn man in 
both this and the after-life.  As Rousseau protested, “to machinate… is to do what certain people”—
namely, Roman Catholics—“do against Christianity and against me.”  Letters Written From the 
Mountain (Third Letter).  CW IX.190; OC III.757.
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any other worship and the evangelical Reformation to any other sect.”777  Yet despite 
this praise, Rousseau never retracted his more disparaging sentiments about the 
“purely spiritual faith.”  Clarifying his critical position, he argued that Christianity—
although “making men just, moderate, and friends of peace” and being “very 
favorable to the general society”—“weakens the force of the political spring [and] 
complicates the movements of the machine.”778  Being “not sufficiently suited to 
[corporeal politics]… it must either degenerate or remain a foreign and cumbersome 
component.”779  Although Christianity served human life and livelihood, it was still a 
disembodied belief-system ill-equipped to impose the rigorous corporeal duties 
essential to a strong polity’s welfare.  Rousseau’s conclusion, borne of realistically 
appraising the practical values and limits of different forms of religion, carved a sharp 
distinction between interior and exterior worship.  In the process, it also forced 
readers to judge his project on its own explicitly social terms.
*   *   *   *   *
True religion neither divides nor oppresses humankind; it simply cultivates a 
healthy deference to divine order.  Yet as Rousseau illustrated, religious associations 
rarely reinforced God’s harmonious will.  In a 1755 letter to Voltaire, he blamed “the 
Priests and the Devout” for this failing.780  Rather than developing our moral sense by 
777 It is worth noting that as evidence, Rousseau entreats readers (in an author’s note) to consult his 
postscript to the Vicar’s Profession in Emile.  Letters Written From the Mountain (Second Letter).  
CW IX.159; OC III.718-719.
778 Letters Written From the Mountain (First Letter).  CW IX.148; OC III.705.
779 Letters Written From the Mountain (First Letter).  CW IX.148; OC III.705.
780 This was, of course, a typically Protestant stance that Rousseau here adopts.
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preaching compliance with “the established order,” they “have Divine justice 
intervene” only when it serves their dogmatic teachings.781  They supplant the 
fraternité and pitié natural to God’s creations with fear of papal authority and 
intolerance towards non-believers.  And finally, because “it matters greatly to the 
State that each Citizen have a Religion that causes him to love his [civic and moral] 
duties,” they undermined the very requisites of healthy, virtuous polities.782
Rousseau’s alternative to such a divisive dogmatism was Civil Religion, a 
purely civic faith fettered only by “the limits of public utility.”783  Beyond this 
guiding principle, his formulation was purposefully broad.784  So long as religious 
worship did not conflict with society’s general interests, the specific tenets of the faith 
were irrelevant:
the dogmas of that Religion are of no interest either to the State or to 
its members; except insofar as these dogmas relate to morality, and to 
the duties that anyone who professes it is obliged to fulfill toward 
others.  Everyone can have whatever opinions he pleases beyond that, 
without the Sovereign having to know what they are.  For since the 
sovereign has no competence in the other world, whatever the fate of 
subjects in the life hereafter, it is none of its business, as long as they 
are good citizens.785
A sharp line is carved in stone.  The State has no business intruding upon personal 
beliefs which do not compromise the general welfare of its citizens.  Although our 
relationship with God is a sacred and private source of individual moral strength, 
religious associations must serve public interests and be held accountable to the same 
civic standards applicable to any legitimate community.
781 Letter from Rousseau to Voltaire, August 30, 1755.  CW III.116; OC IV.1068-1069.
782 The Social Contract.  CW IV.222; OC III.468.
783 The Social Contract.  CW IV.222 OC III.467.
784 In this, Rousseau sides with the Vicar who argued that “particular dogmas” confuse and debase 
“notions of the great Being… instead of establishing peace on earth, they bring sword and fire to it,” 
making “man proud, intolerant, and cruel.” Emile.  E 295.
785 The Social Contract.  CW IV.222; OC IV.468.
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Because the articles of such a “purely civil profession of faith” are less 
“Religious dogmas” than “sentiments of sociability without which it is impossible to 
be a good Citizen or a faithful subject,” they must be established by the Sovereign.786
Precepts essential to a polity’s moral health, they reflect only the most general, 
universally accessible tenets of the Gospel.  In this, Rousseau sides with his Vicar: 
“The dogmas of the civil Religion ought to be simple, few in number, stated with 
precision, without explanation or commentaries.”787  Specifically, they require belief 
in “[t]he existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, foresighted, and providential 
Divinity; the afterlife; the happiness of the just; the punishment of the wicked.”788
Rousseau also adds a strict civil caveat to these core Christian assumptions: “the 
sanctity of the social Contract and the Laws” must always be observed.789
From the outset, Civil Religion shows simultaneous deference to both divine 
and human order, vesting its authority in spiritual truths and secular precepts.  Beliefs 
in an omnipotent God and the afterlife, and a righteous heavenly order which rewards 
justice and punishes wickedness are balanced by the inviolability of positive law 
defined by the general will.  To these “positive” stipulations, however, Rousseau adds 
one crucial “negative” dogma: intolerance is proscribed.790  A caveat essential to 
upholding individual liberty, this final term reflects Jean-Jacques’ insistence that 
intolerance fundamentally opposes spiritual and secular freedom.
786 Pierre Burgelin rightly notes the spiritual quality of this secular covenant, a pact between citizens 
and sovereign that “must be called sacred.”  This is because the social contract rests upon an act of 
will, what Rousseau described in the Second Discourse as a Cartesian ‘operation of the soul.’  As he 
made clear, “in the sentiment of this power [of willing] are found only purely spiritual acts about 
which the Laws of Mechanics explain nothing.”  (My emphasis.)  Second Discourse.  CW III.26-27; 
OC III.142-143.  Pierre Burgelin, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la religion de Genève, p. 32.
787 The Social Contract.  CW IV.223; OC III.468.
788 The Social Contract.  CW IV.223; OC III.468.
789 The Social Contract.  CW IV.223; OC III.468.
790 The Social Contract.  CW IV.223; OC III.468-469.
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His negative dogma also reveals a deep mistrust of a creed like Catholicism 
which “dares to say there is no Salvation outside of the Church.”791  Such 
presumptuous sects should, on no uncertain terms, “be chased out of the state.”792
Their expulsion is merited by crimes against both civil and theological order: 
claiming to monopolize the gift of salvation, ecclesiasts falsely usurp a power held 
solely by God; and they sharply divide polities by condemning those outside their 
flocks to Hell.  This is certainly no way to build a congregation, much less a society.  
As Rousseau notes, on a practical level “[i]t is impossible to live in peace with people 
whom one believes are damned.  To love them would be to hate God who punishes 
them.  They must absolutely be brought into the faith or tormented.”793  A theological 
stance with decidedly despotic corporeal consequences, the Catholic position on 
salvation forces the Church to either “torment” or convert nonbelievers.  Presenting 
itself as the sole executor of God’s will, this singular spiritual authority acts out of 
wrath and intolerance, rather than truly divine motives of forgiveness and love.  
Politically, the consequences of one creed claiming jurisdiction over an entire 
species’ eternal fate is devastating.  If humankind’s greatest prize is controlled by a 
single dogmatic authority, then no citizen is free; even “the Sovereign is no longer 
Sovereign… over temporal matters.”794
Although Rousseau’s exposé builds a strong case for religious tolerance, 
closer scrutiny reveals a serious discrepancy in his argument: Jean-Jacques is wholly 
791 The Social Contract.  CW IV.223; OC III.468.
792 The Social Contract.  CW IV.224; OC III.468.
793 The Social Contract.  CW IV.223; OC III.469.
794 As Rousseau had argued in the introduction to On Civil Religion, under these circumstances 
“Priests are the true masters; Kings are merely their officers.”  The Social Contract.  CW IV.223; OC 
III.469.
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intolerant towards the intolerant.  “Without being able to obligate anyone to believe 
[its dogmas],” he writes, “the sovereign can banish from the State anyone who does 
not believe them.”795  Expulsion is a legitimate punishment not for the “impious” but 
for the “unsociable; for [a citizen] incapable of sincerely loving the laws, justice, and 
of giving his life, if need be, for his duty.”796  Those who reject Civil Religion reject 
the very terms of sociability critical to society’s well-being.  Such dissenters cannot 
be trusted to uphold the rigorous demands of citizenship, or devote sacrificial love to 
a value (common welfare) or entity (the state) that transcends their own particular 
interests.  Failure to accept a civil faith therefore indicates a fundamentally antisocial 
pathology punishable by the revocation of citizenship.  Rousseau’s unbending tone is 
only reinforced by a sudden threat: “If someone who has publicly acknowledged 
these same dogmas behaves as though he does not believe them, he should be 
punished with death.  He has committed the greatest of crimes: he lied before the 
law.”797
These sentiments are discomforting for several reasons.  First, Rousseau 
advocates banishment without so much as suggesting the possibility of individual 
reform or allowing space for public dialogue.  Second, he is notably quick to 
violence, threatening the death penalty to those who lie “before the law.”  And third, 
he seems to foster a culture of persecution; Civil Religion’s positive dogmas 
presumably exclude atheists from a state in which all citizens must recognize the 
795 The Social Contract.  CW IV.222-223; OC III.468.
796 The Social Contract.  CW IV.223; OC III.468.
797 The Social Contract.  CW IV.223; OC III.468. 
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existence of a beneficent Divinity.798  Rosenblatt argues that “Rousseau’s chapter on 
civil religion should be seen as an attack on the political uses of religion by an 
absolutizing and oligarchical regime,” yet his Civil Religion seems unapologetically 
draconian when taken on its own “simple” terms.799  How does a model built around 
the sanctity of tolerance, fraternity, and individual liberty so swiftly descend into a 
platform of forced exile and corporal punishment?  Can a truly democratic society 
exclude any of its members, particularly atheists?  Are such proposals even in accord 
with Rousseau’s own Golden Rule, to do “what is good for you with the least possible 
harm to others”?800  Or was Lester Crocker correct in labeling this work a 
premonition of twentieth century totalitarianism?
Lest the more sensitive readers amongst us conclude that our mercurial author 
has finally gone mad, we might offer two explanations in Rousseau’s defense.  The 
first comes courtesy of Christopher Kelly and Roger Masters who locate within Civil 
Religion a “‘toughness’… that is often overlooked” in Rousseau’s thought.801
Certainly, beneath the surface of his gentle reveries on nature, God, and the 
possibility of human redemption lies an unyielding backbone aligned with Spartan 
severity.  Yet even Kelly and Masters soften this disposition, stressing “that for 
Rousseau, only behavior—and never an opinion or belief—can be punished by 
798 Locke claimed that “those are not at all to be trusted who deny the being of God.”  This was 
because contracts “[p]romises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have 
no hold upon an atheist.”  Although atheism qualifies as a “private belief” (and thus an individual 
liberty), On Civil Religion seemed to side with Locke.  Each citizen had to uphold its four positive 
dogmas, including the recognition of God’s existence.  However, as we shall see below, Rousseau’s 
position is more ambiguous; he also decried the persecution of atheism in an author’s note from Julie.  
See: Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, p. 64.
799 Rosenblatt, p. 267.
800 Second Discourse.  CW III.37-38; OC III.156.
801 CW IV.266, n. 140.
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society.”802  Their argument relies upon a generous assessment of Civil Religion’s 
jurisdictional limits.  Rousseau certainly protects individual faith from magisterial 
authority, but he qualifies this liberty by insisting upon compliance with the four 
positive dogmas, and buttressing this condition with the threat of physical force.  If, 
for example, denying the existence of the afterlife constitutes a rejection of the civil 
code (and, therefore, a crime against the social order), beliefs would appear to be 
punishable by law.803
No matter the degree, Civil Religion certainly exhibits “toughness.”  But this 
should hardly assuage our fears.  Instead, let us consider Rousseau’s controversial 
proposals within the context of his Social Contract’s broader aim: legitimizing the 
“chains” of denatured society by instituting associations under which equality, 
individual liberty and civil unity might flourish.  For Rousseau, ecclesiastical dogma 
was anathema804 to such legitimate political reform.  Because sectarian creeds posed 
ever-present threats to civil and spiritual harmony alike, their influence had to be 
contained at all costs.  Forced to make difficult choices between a world liberated 
from the papist’s grasp and a polity which excluded members destructive of its civic 
unity, On Civil Religion unequivocally advocates the latter.805  We might therefore 
consider the intolerant terms of Rousseau’s civil faith as a sort of heuristic threat: the 
802 CW IV.266, n. 140.
803 Rousseau does not satisfactorily clarify his position, leaving readers to wonder if rejecting the 
positive dogmas constitutes a crime against the state, of if citizens might publicly profess adherence 
despite private disbelief, the very schism between belief and practice that he attributes Catholic 
coercion.
804 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, anathema is “anything accursed, or consigned to 
damnation,” a sense derived from its Biblical usage as “a thing devoted to evil, an accursed thing” in 
Paul’s Romans ix.3.  I use it here purposefully to suggest the religious terms with which Rousseau’s 
phrased the problem of civic unity.
805 Again, we must also bear in mind Rousseau’s depiction of philosophic atheism as its own form of 
debilitating fanaticism in Emile.  See: E 312.
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lengths to which the author is willing to go in order to ensure that religious practice 
does not subvert the requisites of legitimate self-rule.806
Rousseau’s hard-line stance should come as no surprise.  After all, sometimes 
man must be forced into freedom.807  This was particularly true in politico-theological 
matters where only the combined forces of law, individual consent and group 
consensus could counteract sectarianism’s strongly antidemocratic impulses.  
Although Civil Religion made painfully clear the difficulty of this challenge, grim 
reality (as in the Second Discourse) did not deter Rousseau from envisioning its 
fruition.808  Quite the opposite.  Taking religion as it was and religious associations as 
they should be, dissatisfaction provided the impetus for radical reform.  Yet even if 
his ambitions were well-intentioned, the intolerant terms of his proposal are still 
unsettling.  In suggesting exile and the death penalty, was Rousseau subverting his 
own aims, substituting one form of intolerance (religious) for another (civic)?  Did 
the “end” of civil liberty necessarily beg such questionable means?
806 As Rousseau stipulates, “the fundamental problem which is solved by the social contract” is to 
“[f]ind a form of association that defends and protects the person and goods of each associate with all 
the common force, and by means of which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself 
and remains as free as before.”  Because this solution requires each citizen’s willful support, anyone 
who rejects the essential articles of a Civil Religion refuse the terms of legitimate association.  The 
Social Contract.  CW IV.138; OC III.360.
807 As Rousseau (in)famously argued, “in order for the social compact not to be an ineffectual formula, 
it tacitly includes the following engagement, which alone can give force to the others: that whoever 
refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body; which means only that 
he will be forced to be free.”  The Social Contract.  CW IV.141; OC III.364.
808 If Rousseau’s idealized visions presented a theodicy of sorts (the best possible world), they also 
reflected his acute critical awareness and ability to compromise.  Even his most seemingly 
impracticable proposals establish heights towards which humankind should strive, no matter if 
evidence suggests we will fall short; this is what I have termed Rousseau’s “heuristic idealism” 
throughout.  To my mind, the best illustration of this dynamic is revealed in a comparison between The 
Social Contract and On the Government of Poland.  In his Contract,  Rousseau lists apparently 
necessary qualities of people “suited for legislation” which, by the authors own admission, are “hard to 
find together.”  (In all of Europe only Corsica was “still… capable of legislation.”)  Poland—a large, 
diffuse, disunited nation threatened by foreign invaders on multiple fronts—was particularly ill-suited 
to the Contract’s terms.  Yet this did not prevent Rousseau from earnestly envisioning reforms which 
would allow the Poles rewrite their history and work towards a more legitimate political future. The 
Social Contract.  CW IV.162; OC III.390-391.
237
As an attempt to marry religious and political faiths under a liberal democratic 
framework, On Civil Religion marked an auspicious beginning.  Even Rousseau 
himself seemed unsatisfied with its outcome.  Subsequent correspondences to his 
friend Moultou and the pastor Usteri find him both clarifying and even modifying his 
position.809  He further refined his stance in the Letter to Beaumont, adhering to Civil 
Religion’s core assertions while abandoning its more reactionary threats.  Rousseau 
began by repeating a refrain consistent throughout his works: “if man is made for 
society, the truest Religion is also the most social and the most humane.”810  Still, he 
forthrightly admitted that “this sentiment is subject to great difficulties from the 
historical account and the facts that contradict it.”811  As he elaborated,
I neither say nor think there is no good Religion on earth.  But I do 
say, and it is only too true, that there is none among those that are or 
have been dominant that has not cruelly wounded humanity.  All 
parties have tormented their brothers, all have offered to God 
sacrifices of human blood.  Whatever the source of these 
contradictions, they exist.  Is it a crime to want to eliminate them?812
Here, in a nutshell, was Rousseau’s self-defense of Civil Religion.  His text did not 
categorically condemn “Religion on earth”; it merely recognized a problem in need of 
redress, the fact that “dominant” religions had scorched God’s earth, shed man’s 
blood, and wounded social unity.
As explanations go, Rousseau’s was conspicuously unrepentant.  He forced a 
dubious distinction between practical observation and profane censure, one further 
blurred by his subsequent critique of the meek masses.  If creeds had “cruelly 
809 See: CC XVI.2626, 2662, 2768; and XV.2825.
810 Rousseau completes this sentence with a refutation of ontological guilt: “For God wants us to be as 
he made us, and if it were true that he had made us wicked, it would be disobeying him to want to 
cease being so.”  Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.54; OC IV.969.  Readers should compare this with 
Emile.  E 212, 281.
811 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.54; OC IV.970.
812 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.55; OC IV.970-971.
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wounded humanity,” their followers voiced little objection.  As Rousseau lamented, 
“[p]eople submit in silence,” conforming without protest to the pernicious precepts of 
domineering papists.813  Despite appearances, Jean-Jacques was not simply decrying 
the subservience of a slavish flock.  He viewed such complicity as a natural reaction 
to clerical coercion.  Indeed, his point was even firmer: outer compliance did not 
reveal inward complicity because individual belief systems could not be bullied into 
submission.
He was hardly the first to air such opinions.  Luther had argued forcefully that 
outward obedience offered little proof of sincere conviction; unlike motives or faith, 
good works were easily contrived.814  And in his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke 
insisted that “no man can, [even] if he would, conform his faith to the dictates of 
another.”815  Because “the life and power of true religion consists in the inward and 
full persuasion of the true mind[,] faith is not faith without believing.”816
Furthermore, for Locke “the liberty of conscience is every man’s natural right.”817
Rousseau likewise championed the sanctity of individual conscience, and agreed that 
813 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.57; OC IV.973.
814 We must recall that Luther, unlike Rousseau, was (as Quentin Skinner perfectly puts it) “obsessed 
by the idea of man’s complete unworthiness.”  His argument that “[g]ood works do not make a good 
man, but a good man does good works” refuted the papal authority in granting “indulgences” 
(remissions of temporal sins through penance), but it also served to instill a self-deprecating fear of 
God in a species profoundly incapable of affecting its eternal fate.  Luther, The Freedom of a Christian 
in Selections From His Writings, p. 69.  Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political 
Thought: Volume Two: The Age of Reformation (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1978), p. 3.
815 Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, p. 19.
816 Ibid., p. 19.
817 Ibid., p. 65
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external force did not cultivate internal conviction.  Superficial compliance to 
orthodox precepts was just that: “only in appearance.”818
The “inconsistency… noted between [subjects’] morality and their actions” 
was therefore less the fault of individuals than institutions which demanded public 
affirmation of opinions private by nature.819  As Rousseau countered in Civil 
Religion, only the most general tenets shared by all could serve as a basis for civil 
communion; individual beliefs lay beyond the jurisdiction of Church and State alike.  
Reiterating this argument in his Letter to Beaumont, Rousseau wondered:
Why does one man have the right of inspection over another man’s 
belief, and why does the State have it over the belief of the Citizens?  
It is because it is assumed that what men believe determines their 
morality, and that their conduct in this life is dependent upon their 
ideas about the life to come.  If this is not true, what difference does it 
make what they believe or what they pretend to believe?820
The answer is none, so long as citizens uphold the common duties necessary to 
preserve their polity’s well-being.821  In society, “everyone has the right to find out 
whether another person believes himself obligated to be just, and the Sovereign has 
the right to examine the reasons on which each person bases this obligation.”822  This 
standard did not, however, apply to an individual’s faith.  As Rousseau emphasized, 
for “opinions that are not connected to morality, that do not influence actions in any 
818 For a discussion of the problem between appearance and reality used as a justification for 
Rousseau’s sense of individual innocence, see Chapter 3 above.  Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.57; OC 
IV.973.
819 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.57; OC IV.973.
820 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.57; OC IV.973.
821 Locke similarly argued that a heathen who rejected “both Testaments” should not be “punished as a 
pernicious citizen,” because such beliefs affect neither the security of magisterial power nor “the 
estates of the people.”  Even though he “readily grant[s] that these opinions are false and absurd,” 
Locke maintained that “the business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the 
safety and security of the commonwealth, and of every particular man’s goods and person.”  Locke, A 
Letter Concerning Toleration, pp. 55-56.
822 Letter to Beaumont.  Beaumont CW IX.57; OC IV.973.
240
way, and that do not transgress Laws, each person has only his own judgment as a 
master on these, and no one has either right or interest in prescribing his way of 
thinking for others.”823
Jean-Jacques further developed this distinction between public and private 
faith in his Letters Written from the Mountain.  Beginning with a tripartite division of 
religion into dogma, morality, and worship (“which is only ceremonial”), he split 
“dogma further into two parts, namely the one which in setting forth the principles of 
our duties serves as a foundation for morality, and the one which, purely of faith, 
contains only speculative dogmas.”824  Rousseau’s civil faith was concerned only 
with the former, foundational codes which define society’s moral will.
As for the part of Religion that deals with morality, that is to say 
justice, the public good, obedience to the natural and positive Laws, 
the social virtues and all the duties of man and Citizen, it is the 
business of government to take cognizance of them.  It is on this point 
alone that Religion falls directly under its jurisdiction, and that it must 
banish not error, of which it is not the judge, but every harmful 
sentiment that tends to cut the social knot.825
As his stance on Christianity made clear, religion takes different forms, each with its 
own unique function.  Those that serve morality, justice, the public good and civic 
duty define the terms of social relations, and therefore fall under the domain of 
sovereign jurisdiction.
Reiterating his claim that “it is important for the State not to be without 
Religion… for serious reasons, upon which I have strongly insisted throughout,” 
Rousseau nonetheless argued that it would be better to do without “than to have a 
barbarous and persecuting [creed] that, tyrannizing the Laws themselves, would 
823 Letter to Beaumont.  Beaumont CW IX.57; OC IV.973.
824 Letters Written From the Mountain (First Letter).  CW IX.139; OC III.694.
825 Letters Written From the Mountain (First Letter).  CW IX.140; OC III.694-695.
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thwart the duties of the Citizen.”826  In this worst of possible scenarios, a wise 
Legislator is left with only two options:
the first is to establish a purely civil Religion, which includes all 
fundamental dogmas of every good Religion, all dogmas truly useful 
to either a universal or a particular society…  The other expedient is to 
leave Christianity as it is in its genuine spirit: free, disengaged from all 
bonds of flesh, with no other obligation than that of conscience, no 
other constraint in its dogmas than morals and Laws.827
Because “the Gospel has only one aim… to call and save all men,” and because this 
lesson is fundamentally removed from worldly concerns (as Jesus himself said “a 
thousand times”), “Christianity as it is” could not combat the tyranny of a “barbarous 
and persecuting” creed.  Under such circumstances, Legislators had only one feasible 
strategy: “removing the Christian Religion from national Institutions” and instituting 
a Civil Religion.  In so urging Rousseau claimed to “establish what is best for the 
human race,” a religious association distinct from (and protective of) interior faith 
which actively fostered civic duty.
His solution to the politico-theological problem therefore demanded sharp 
jurisdictional boundaries, a clear understanding of the varieties of religious practice, 
and a sober assessment of religion’s strengths and weaknesses when “considered in 
relation to society.”  The only way to preserve Christianity was to keep it out of 
politics.  This argument was consistent with the lesson (as Rousseau understood it) of 
Jesus, the first to completely divest religion of corporeal concerns.  Furthermore, as 
we have also seen, Rousseau believed that “purely spiritual” faiths tended towards 
political apathy or (when appropriated by theocrats and papists) dogmatic intolerance, 
and were thus ill-suited to the specific demands of citizenship.  By contrast, the only 
826 Letters Written From the Mountain (First Letter).  CW IX.148; OC III.705.
827 Letters Written From the Mountain (First Letter).  CW IX.148; OC III.705-706.
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way to protect society and preserve true adherence to divine order was to implement a 
“purely civil” faith.  If Civil Religion discouraged dogmatism, cultivated civic unity, 
and conformed to the general will, it also upheld the sanctity of personal religious 
belief so necessary to keep man attuned to his divinely-scribed nature.
Rousseau’s dual commitment to religious piety and individual liberty are easy 
to overlook in a text which errs on the side of authoritarianism.  After all, he presents 
exile and corporal punishment as threats necessary to protect a greater good.  Yet for 
Rousseau, attacks upon individual faith had always aroused such unbending hostility.  
Consider these two examples of righteous indignation from earlier works, first in his 
August 30, 1756 Letter to Voltaire and then in Julie:
I am indignant that the faith of everyone is not in the most perfect 
liberty, and that man dares control the interior of consciences, where 
he is unable to penetrate, as if it depended on us to believe in matters 
where demonstration has no place.828
[N]o true believer can possibly practice intolerance or persecution.  If I 
were a judge, and the law prescribed the death penalty against atheists, 
I would begin by having burned for atheism anyone who came to turn 
in someone else.829
To Voltaire, Rousseau forthrightly denounced those who would dare “control the 
interior of consciences.”  And in Julie, he suggested that those who condemned non-
believers to death were themselves more deserved of execution.
828 Letter from Rousseau to Voltaire, August 18, 1756.  CW III.119; OC IV.1072.
829 The context of these lines is particularly revealing.  A letter detailing Wolmar’s atheism notes that 
“he had in his whole life found no more than three Priests who believed in God.”  In an author’s note, 
Rousseau qualifies this third-person statement: “God forbid I should approve these harsh and 
outrageous assertions; I merely affirm that there are people who make them and whose excess is only 
too often justified by the clergy of all countries and all sects.”  Although, as we have seen, Rousseau 
himself charged ecclesiasts with irreligiosity, here he claims to want only to provide “clarity [in] my 
sentiment on this point”: namely, that genuine religious belief and intolerance are mutually 
incompatible.  Julie.  CW VI.482n; OC II.589n.
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If Rousseau sustained these severe sentiments throughout his career, On Civil 
Religion nonetheless marked a turning point, a struggle to apply his convictions to 
practice.  It was the concrete culmination of a vague idea initially conceived in 1756 
as “a sort of profession of faith that the laws can impose.”830  Even at this nascent 
stage, however, Rousseau sounded obdurate.  He approached the task of religious 
reform as though it were war, warning that “there can exist Religions which attack the 
foundation of society, and… it is necessary to begin by exterminating these Religions 
in order to assure the peace of the State.”831  So were set the harsh tones of a battle he 
returned to wage in full more than six years later.
Why did Rousseau strike so violent a pose from beginning to end?  In a 1755 
letter to Voltaire, he made plain that sometimes “evil is such that the very causes that 
gave birth to it are necessary to prevent it from becoming larger.  It is the sword that 
must be left in the wound for fear that the wounded person will die when it is 
removed.”832  Sometimes, evil cannot be completely eradicated; and sometimes, as 
the Second Discourse and Social Contract argued, the very faculties which corrupt us 
can facilitate our salvation; sometimes, in these extreme instances, you have to fight 
fire with fire.
Desperate times may require desperate measures, but never apathy or 
resignation.  This was precisely the challenge posed in Civil Religion.  In claiming to 
solely represent God, clerics undermined His benevolence and misrepresented His 
830 Letter from Rousseau to Voltaire, August 18, 1756.  CW III.119; OC IV.1073.
831 As in Civil Religion, Rousseau claimed that “intolerance [was] easily the most odious” of dogmas 
meriting proscription.  This was because an intolerant person “imagines that one cannot be a good man 
without believing everything that he believes, and damns unmercifully all those who do not think like 
him.”  This was the very critique he presented in The Social Contract, and a crime attributed to papists 
throughout his writings (specifically when denouncing Original Sin).  Letter from Rousseau to 
Voltaire, August 18, 1756.  CW III.119; OC IV.1073.
832 Letter from Rousseau to Voltaire, September 10, 1755.  CW III.106; OC III.226-227.
244
very will.  Their coercive creeds crippled social unity, assailed individual liberty, and 
perverted His magnificent order.  Rather than remain complacent, Rousseau urged 
readers to fight back.  After all, the secular and spiritual damage wrought by papists 
could only be repaired through radical reform.  Only by instituting a faith which 
rejected despotic dogma and expunged religious intolerance could Jean-Jacques’ 
vision of secular and spiritual salvation achieve fruition.833
Towards this end, Rousseau made one essential demand.  He asked that we 
keep our relationship with God to ourselves, and allow others the same freedom.  
Consider as evidence his response to being pressed on a theological point of 
contention:
after telling [an interlocutor] I do not understand it and do not care 
about understanding it, I would ask him as decently as I could to mind 
his own business, and it he persisted, I would leave him there.
That is the only principle on which something stable and equitable can 
be established about disputes of Religion.  Lacking that, everyone 
establishes on his own part what is in question, there will never be 
agreement on anything, people will never in their lives understand one 
another, and Religion, which ought to make men happy, will always 
cause their greatest ills.834
In short, mind your own business.  This was less a suggestion than an imperative.  
Religion “ought to make men happy” because it affirmed our connection to God and 
His benevolent order.  Doctrinal differences subverted this relationship, serving only 
to enflame corporeal divisions.  Since men could never settle such “disputes,” they 
must agree to not agree.  This was wholly possible because, as Rousseau argued, 
833 If Civil Religion’s more reactionary proposals reflect this adamant condition, Rousseau’s model 
also drew upon the dictate of his Golden Rule, to do “what is good… with the least possible harm to 
others.”  Second Discourse.  CW III.37-38; OC III.156.
834 Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.57; OC IV.973.
245
every believer regardless of creed shared certain fundamental tenets.835  And only 
these most general of beliefs could foster an inclusive, unifying, truly civil morality 
grounded in religious piety.
Perhaps On Civil Religion failed to strike the right balance.  Perhaps it 
succumbed too heavily to its author’s fear of dogmatism and preoccupation with 
social order.  Or perhaps it was subverted by conflicting loyalties, by the “strange 
confusion of the profane and the sacred” Robert Derathé identified in its manifold 
claims.836  Rousseau accepted man’s needs as creations of God dependent upon 
divine guidance, and denatured creatures dependent upon legitimate institutions.  He 
examined religion as a source of moral virtue, and religious associations as a catalyst 
for human oppression.  He identified the necessity of social harmony and the threats 
to this order.  And he concluded that the only way to truly serve mankind—to satisfy 
our equally compelling spiritual and secular needs—was to draw from religion only 
those principles we knew were true (no matter our creed), while forging the 
legitimized chains necessary to preserve our freedom.  As with the treatise on Poland, 
Civil Religion sincerely struggled to implement a social contract under less-than-ideal 
circumstances. 
In the final analysis, Rousseau refused to abandon his commitment to either 
spiritual or corporeal improvement because he believed they were so deeply 
interrelated.  Society needed social order, just as individuals needed faith.  After all, 
835 In this, Rousseau’s stance mirrors the Vicar’s deistic anti-sectarianism.  This shared beliefs also 
serve as Civil Religion’s four “positive” dogmas.
836 Derathé interpreted this “confusion” as evidence of escapism, arguing that Rousseau had vainly 
attempted to tidy up the paradoxes and dualisms so characteristic of his works.  Judith Shklar had 
levied a similar charge against Rousseau in Men and Citizens.  OC III.1505.  For a rebuttal to Shklar’s 
argument, see Chapter Two above.
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human beings were both creations of God and denatured individuals.  We were 
blessed with conscience and free will, natural goodness and the ability to err.  God 
gave us perfectibility, the faculty that enabled our history of decline and allowed us 
the means of self-redemption.  Civil Religion reflects this tense dialectic: it is both 
pious and profane, pessimistic and idealistic, civil and intolerant, civic-minded and 
individualistic, reasoned and emotive, historically-grounded and forward-thinking.  In 
striking so many dissonant chords it grabs our attention, prodding us to accept 
religion and man as they are, and envision the relationship between religion and 
politics as it should be.
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Chapter 6: The Road to Vincennes
I do not mean… that one can be virtuous without Religion; I held this erroneous 
opinion for a long time, but now I am only too disabused.
—Rousseau, Letter to d’Alembert 837
I have suffered too much in this life not to expect another one.  All the subtleties of 
Metaphysics will not make me doubt for a moment the immortality of the soul, and a 
beneficent Providence.  I feel it, I believe it, I wish it, I hope it, I shall defend it until 
my last breath; and it will be, of all the controversies that I shall have sustained, the 
only one where my interest will not be forgotten.
—Rousseau, Letter to Voltaire838
Taking organized religion as it was, Rousseau imagined a civil faith as it 
should be: serving both God and man, facilitating moral virtue and political 
prosperity, and occluding the violent intolerance characteristic of dogmatic 
sectarianism.  His prescription was in part reactionary, a positive alternative to the 
divisive creed of Roman Catholicism.  Instilling fear of a rancorous God amongst 
subjects, the “religion of the priests” partitioned humankind into two mutually 
antagonistic camps: those who either conformed to or rejected Catholic tenets.  The 
837 Although Rousseau insists that one cannot “be virtuous without religion,” he adds a significant 
qualifier: “a Believer can sometimes, from motives of purely social virtue, abstain from certain actions, 
indifferent in themselves and which do not immediately involve the conscience, such as going to the 
theater in a place where it is not good to tolerate it.”  Notably, a secular sense of “social virtue” can 
serve a religious moral function.  Without debasing the moral necessity of religion, he defers to a 
pragmatic position: in his example, both the religious and socially virtuous individual would shun a 
Genevan theater.  The end result (abstinence) is more significant than the source of guidance.  This 
position is wholly consistent with Rousseau’s broader vision of political reform, one which employs 
social or artificial remedies to cultivate virtue in a denatured society.  In addition, this argument 
suggests a mutually beneficial relationship between spiritual and secular morality, one in which a 
social remedy mimics the benefits of religious piety.  Letter to d’Alembert.  CW X.322n; OC V.89n.  
Readers should also compare this to Rousseau’s claim, ten years later, that “[t]o root out all belief in 
God from the heart of man is to destroy all virtue there.”  Letter to Franquières.  CW VIII.266-167; 
OC IV.1142.
838 Letter to Voltaire, August 18, 1756.  CW III.121; OC IV.1075.
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former were deemed eligible for divine redemption, while the latter were condemned 
as heathens and sentenced to an eternity of damnation.839
As Rousseau noted, this brash verdict followed an equally egregious 
assumption.  Papal authorities believed themselves to be the sole mediators and 
arbiters of a divine will that was, in fact, ultimately incomprehensible to the human 
mind.  And in claiming to exclusively represent the Author of all things, clerics 
actually disserved their presumed Creator and His creations alike.  Perpetuating 
dogmatic myths of a sinful species and punitive deity, they cast a dark shadow over 
the true beauty, wisdom and order characteristic of our divinely-scribed world.  
Furthermore, in damning human ontology as fatally flawed, Roman Catholicism 
decreed that remission (and, hence, redemption) was possible only through strict 
adherence to its tenets.  Rousseau sharply disagreed, dismissing orthodox positions on 
Original Sin, miracles, and revelation, while soundly rejecting the Church’s assertion 
that it alone possessed the authority to mete out man’s salvation.
Virulent anti-clericalism notwithstanding, Jean-Jacques was hardly irreligious.  
Rather, he argued that religion and faith were keystones of a virtuous polity.  The 
problem was simply that Catholicism840 did not cultivate the values (tolerance, 
liberty, and equality under the law) essential to a vibrant democratic culture’s welfare.  
In remedy, Rousseau offered a bold alternative: a Civil Religion that both enriched 
corporeal life and upheld divine order.
839 Readers should also note the socially divisive consequences of this verdict.  As Maurice Cranston 
describes, Rousseau’s was “an age when nonconformity was everywhere severely penalized.”  This 
phenomenon was particularly acute in sectarian matters, as the infamous Calas affair and routine 
persecution of non-Catholics illustrates.  Cranston, The Noble Savage, p. 1.
840 As we saw in Chapter 5, Catholicism epitomized the social and political failings that (in On Civil 
Religion) he attributed to all dogmatic and theocratic creeds.
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The ambitiousness of his solution cannot be understated.  Rousseau did not 
merely dismiss the merits of papism; he attempted to found a new religion entirely, a 
“purely civil” faith that served God and man alike.  Civil Religion certainly adhered 
to foundational Christian beliefs (in an omnipotent Creator, the existence of an 
afterlife, and a divine moral code) and drew upon a Protestant model of individual 
worship.841  Yet it was also deeply secular, designed in conformity with the requisites 
of a legitimate polity established in The Social Contract.  Where Catholicism molded 
subjects who cowered before God and monarch alike, Rousseau claimed that his civic 
creed cultivated autonomous, pious citizens.  Where clerics damned mankind as 
Adam’s infected progeny, the Genevan dared to suggest that, as naturally innocent 
creations, salvation was possible in this world and the next.
From whence did he summon the nerve to voice such radical beliefs?  We 
might here recall that Rousseau once described Jesus and Socrates as his spiritual and 
moral forebears.842  Like these storied figures, he acted as a man possessed by a 
higher calling.  Jean-Jacques may have lacked the self-possession of Socrates and the 
sheer fearlessness of Jesus.  But, as his motto reminds us, he shared their commitment 
to reveal the truth no matter the cost.  Following divinely-instilled missions, Jesus and 
Socrates843 sacrificed individual welfare to point their slumbering peers towards 
841 According to Rousseau, “the two fundamental points of the Reform… [were] to acknowledge the 
Bible as rule of one’s belief, and not to admit any other interpreter of the meaning of the Bible than 
oneself.”  This was because Reformers had established “the individual mind… as the sole interpreter of 
Scripture” while rejecting “the authority of the Church.”  Letters Written From the Mountain: Second 
Letter.  CW IX.154; OC III.712-713.
842 See: Letter to Beaumont (Fragment 5).  CW IX.89; OC IV.1016.
843 As Socrates asserted, “I want you to think of my adventures as a sort of pilgrimage undertaken to 
establish the truth of the oracle.”  The reference is to the Delphic oracle, to whose divine injunction 
Socrates attributed his calling as a gadfly.  See: The Apology, 20D-22A in Plato, The Last Days of 
Socrates, pp. 49-51.  What Socrates considered divine inspiration (the priestess’ pronouncements), 
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redemption amidst a world beset by decay.  Rousseau was similarly consumed, 
drawing upon faith in divine beneficence and human potential to dream of—and 
struggle to realize—a better future for all.
The Genevan attributed his intense convictions to a life-changing event.  Like 
Paul on the road to Damascus, he was struck by a supernatural epiphany that occurred 
en route to Vincennes.844  Rousseau described his conversion as the epicenter of his 
career, the catalyst to his every oeuvre.  A moment of profound clarity and physical 
exhaustion, transcendent bliss and tearful collapse, Rousseau’s transformation was 
also, quite notably, Christian in form and Pagan in content.  Seemingly touched by 
the hand of God, he was reborn as a proselyte845 for human glory and corporeal 
redemption: his spiritual awakening crystallized as a mandate of secular reform.  A 
stunning amalgam of the themes with which we have grappled throughout, the road 
on which Jean-Jacques began life anew marks a particularly fitting point for our own 
study to conclude.
*   *   *   *   *
modern science suggests were in fact ethylene-induced hallucinations.  See: William J. Broad, “For 
Delphic Oracle, Fumes and Visions,” The New York Times, March 19, 2002.
844 Rousseau was visiting Diderot, who had been imprisoned in the dungeons of Vincennes on July 24, 
1749 for anti-Catholic writings, and had recently been moved to a château where he was permitted to 
receive visitors.  For a summary of the political climate that led to Diderot’s arrest—specifically, of the 
rise in censorship following the Austrian Succession—see: Cranston, Jean-Jacques: The Early Life 
and Work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1754. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 
pp. 226-227.
845 In The Confessions, Rousseau reveals that his uncle was a preacher, and that he had considered a 
career as a minister (which he forewent due to financial considerations): “I preferred to be a minister 
[to a watchmaker or a lawyer], for I found it very fine to preach.  But the small income from my 
mother’s property which was to be divided between my brother and myself was not enough for 
furthering my studies.”  CW V.21; OC I.25.
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Rousseau changed creeds twice in his life, from Protestantism to Catholicism 
and back to Protestantism.  If the first846 was juvenile, a trite decision he made as a 
teenage runaway charmed by a Savoyard priest over dinner and fine Frangi wine, the 
second847 was commonly viewed as a matter of expediency “to recover his rights and 
privileges as a citizen of Geneva.”848  No matter the circumstances, neither of these 
formal conversions suggest a calling in the Biblical sense of the term.849  Fittingly 
enough for our paradoxical author, Rousseau’s most Christian conversion—in form if 
not content—was to political philosophy.
Jean-Jacques’ first and most elaborate description of this life-changing event 
appeared in a series of 1762850 correspondences to the censor Malesherbes.851  He 
846 In his sixteenth year, Rousseau missed his city’s curfew, and found himself locked out of Geneva’s 
gates.  In reaction, he fled, making his way to Savoy.  He there met Benoit de Pontverre, the first of 
two figures he credits as inspiration for his fictional Savoyard Vicar.  Pontverre took the wayward lad 
into his home, and urged him to renounce his native Protestantism for Catholicism.  As Rousseau 
writes, “I did not dream of changing religion; and very far from growing accustomed so quickly to that 
idea, I envisaged it only with a horror that ought to have kept it away from me for a long time; I only 
wanted not to anger these people who were cajoling me with that intention; I wanted to cultivate their 
benevolence and to leave them the hope of success by appearing less well armed than I was in fact.”  
Passivity and purported politeness aside, he did in fact convert, and soon departed to Annency where 
he met the woman entrusted with his care—Louise Eleonor de Warens.  The Confessions.  CW V.39; 
OC I.46-47.
847 As Rousseau wrote after his Protestant conversion of 1754, “I am attached in good faith to that true 
and holy Religion, and I shall be until my last breath.  I wish always to be united to that church in 
public as I am in the depths of my heart, and however consoling it will be for me personally to 
participate in the communion of believers, I desire it, I assure you, more for the edification of those 
believers and for the honour of the Church than for my own advantage, for it would not be right for 
people to think that a man of good faith who reasons cannot be a member of Jesus Christ.”  From: CC 
XII.2108, as translated in Cranston, The Solitary Self, p. 32.  For the displeasure this declaration 
elicited amongst the Parisian philosophes (particularly d’Alembert), see p. 33.
848 Despite this cynical view held even amongst his friends, Rousseau insisted that his Protestant faith 
was sincere and passionate.  In support, Cranston argues that Jean-Jacques’ conversion back to 
Protestantism was not simply guided by practical or strategic concerns, and in fact was wholly 
consistent with Jean-Jacques’ increasing commitment to “lead a thoroughly virtuous life.”  As 
Cranston continues, “Rousseau saw himself as having become a true believer in the Reformed religion, 
at least as he understood it.”  Cranston, The Noble Savage, p. 1.
849  The Oxford English Dictionary defines a Biblical calling as either a “summons, invitation, or 
impulse of God to salvation or to his service,” or “the inward feeling or conviction of a divine call.”
850 Rousseau wrote four letters in this series to Malesherbes, dating from January 4 to January 28, 
1762.  See: CW V.572-583; OC I.1130-1147.
851 As John M. S. Allison describes, Malesherbe’s relationship to Rousseau was “friendly but always 
frank.”  Their interactions nonetheless were strained following the publication of Emile and The Social 
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began these Letters much as he would his later Confessions: with a bold claim that 
they contained “the true picture of my character and the true motives for all my 
behavior.”852  The “true picture” depicted Rousseau as a defeated, disillusioned 
wanderer who possessed a “natural love of solitude which has done nothing but 
increase in proportion as I have gotten to know men better.”853  He attributed this 
propensity to both temperament and circumstance: men had caused him to “take 
fright” and withdraw, while his nature predisposed him to passivity.  “The active life 
has nothing that tempts me,” he asserted.  “I would a hundred times rather consent to 
never doing anything than to doing something in spite of myself; and I have thought a 
hundred times that I would not have lived too unhappily at the Bastille, since I would 
not be restricted to anything at all except to staying there.”854
This manifesto of inactivity was nonetheless incomplete, for Rousseau also 
admitted to harboring ambition as a youth.855  He attributed his taste for achievement 
to the Pagan writings of Plutarch, heroic tales which he encountered at age six and 
memorized by age eight.856  These epic stories moved his heart and (much as the 
Contract.  In a letter to Rousseau dated November 13, 1762, Malesherbes praised “that spirit of truth 
so strong, courageous, and passionately virtuous which pervades all your writing,” but regretted that he 
“found myself at odds… in regard to the most important principles which you have discussed in your 
more recent works.”  See: Allison, Lamoignon de Malesherbes: Defender and Reformer of the French 
Monarchy, 1721-1794, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), p. 32.
852 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.572; OC I.1130.
853 According to Rousseau, the cause of his reclusiveness “is nothing other than that indomitable spirit 
of freedom which… comes to me less from pride than from laziness; but this laziness is unbelievable; 
everything makes it take fright; the slightest duties of civil life are unbearable to it.”  Letters to 
Malesherbes.  CW V.572-573; OC I.1131-1132.
854 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.573; OC I.1132.
855 “Nevertheless,” Rousseau confides, “in my youth I made several efforts to succeed.”  Letters to 
Malesherbes.  CW V.573; OC I.1132-1133.
856 From these readings, Rousseau writes, “was formed in my heart that heroic and romantic taste 
which has done nothing but increase up to the present, and which ended by disgusting me with 
everything.”  Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.574; OC I.1134.
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Bible had affected Augustine)857 caused him to “shed buckets of tears.”858  They also 
caused him significant grief, planting dreams of glory that were soon “soured by the 
injustices I had suffered, and by those I had been the witness of.”859
At the time of his writing, only two things assuaged Rousseau’s regret: 
daydreams and faith.  Dismayed with the “society of men,” he retreated (as in the 
Reveries) into his “imagination which charmed me all the more since I could cultivate 
it without effort, without risk, and always find it reliable and as I needed it to be.”860
And (as in The Confessions) he insisted that the Lord would ultimately affirm his 
goodness: “I do not fear at all being seen as I am.  I know my great flaws, and I feel 
all my vices keenly.  With all that I will die full of hope in the Supreme God, and 
very persuaded that of all the men I have known in my life, none was better than I.”861
These therapeutic asides notwithstanding, Rousseau struggled mightily.  
“Forty years of my life [passed] this way,” he bemoaned. 862  “[D]issatisfied with 
myself and with others, I fruitlessly sought to break the bonds that were keeping me 
attached to that society which I esteemed so little, and which chained me to 
occupations that were least to my taste through needs that I considered to be those of 
nature and which were only those of opinion.”863  In short, he would have been far 
happier left to his own devices and free to pursue an unfettered existence.  The bonds 
that “attached” him to society—social relations generally, and employment 
857 See: Augustine, Confessions, VIII.xii.29, pp. 152-153.
858 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.574; OC I.1134.
859 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.575; OC I.1134.
860 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.575; OC I.1135.
861 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.574; OC I.1133.  Readers should compare this passage with: The 
Confessions.  CW V.5; OC I.5.
862 In fact, only thirty-seven years of Rousseau’s life had passed.  His epiphany on the road to 
Vincennes occurred in October of 1749.  His first visit to Diderot was in August of the same year.  
Trousson and Eigeldinger, Rousseau au jour le jour, p. 53.
863 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.575; OC I.1135.
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specifically—nonetheless proved difficult to break.  Rousseau was lost in the world, 
disgusted with denatured society yet unsure of how to liberate himself, when a stroke 
of fate delivered him from his monotonous stalemate: “Suddenly a fortunate chance 
happened to enlighten me about what I had to do for myself, and to think about my 
fellows about whom my heart was ceaselessly in contradiction with my mind, and 
whom I still felt myself brought to love along with so many reasons to hate them.”864
This “singularly epoch-making moment in my life” occurred on the road to 
Vincennes.865  The catalyst to his revelation was a small advertisement in le Mercure
de France for the Dijon Academy’s essay contest.  Although Rousseau later 
responded to the question posed (has the restoration of the sciences and arts tended 
to purify morals?)866 with his prize-winning First Discourse, it’s reading produced a 
far more immediate effect.
If anything has ever resembled a sudden inspiration, it is the motion 
that was caused in me by that reading; suddenly I felt my mind dazzled 
by a thousand lights; crowds of lively ideas presented themselves at 
the same time with a strength and a confusion that threw me into an 
inexpressible perturbation; I feel my head seized by a dizziness similar 
to drunkenness.  A violent palpitation oppresses me, makes me sick to 
my stomach; not being able to breath any more while walking, I let
myself fall under one of the trees of the avenue, and I pass a half-hour 
there in such an agitation that when I got up again I noticed the whole 
front of my coat soaked with my tears without having felt that I shed 
them.867
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “inspiration” as the “special immediate action 
or influence of the Spirit of God (or of some divinity or supernatural being) upon the 
864 The passivity of Rousseau’s language is noteworthy.  While he was paralyzed (by a strong 
ambivalence towards his “fellows”), chance intruded “to enlighten me about what I had to do for 
myself.”  Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.575; OC I.1135.
865 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.575; OC I.1135.
866 First Discourse.  CW II.1; OC III.1.  The announcement appeared in the October, 1749 edition of le
Mercure de France.  OC III.1237.
867 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.575; OC I.1134.
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human mind or soul.”868  Rousseau’s “sudden inspiration” bore precisely these marks 
of divine intervention.  His eyes “dazzled by a thousand lights,” his mind crowded by 
a host of “lively ideas,” his head “seized” in a dizzying state, a “violent” force 
overwhelmed him.  Nauseous, overcome, and robbed of breath, he collapsed in a 
puddle of his own tears.
Rousseau was certainly not the first to be floored by a supernatural revelation.  
As Augustine’s Confessions detail, a similarly agonizing state of conflict preceded the 
Saint’s conversion to Christianity.  His soul became a battlefield “between different 
wills” characterized by their “mutual incompatibility.”869  He was “torn apart in a 
painful condition,” bound by the chains of earthly desires and initially unable to make 
a whole-hearted leap of faith to Christ.870  “Twisting and turning in my chain”—
namely, attachment to physical desire—“until it would break completely,” Augustine 
confided that “the nearer approached the moment of time when I would become 
different [converted] the greater the horror of it struck me.”871  Paralyzed in a “state 
of suspense,” caught between deeply conflicting urges (earthly habit and divine 
inspiration), his “painful” transformation finally coalesced in a moment of clarity: 
wholly dedicating himself to God, he concluded that life was a trial “to be endured, 
not loved.”872
868 More specifically, the term “inspiration” is used to describe “that divine influence under which the 
books of Scripture are held to have been written.”
869 Augustine, Confessions, pp. 146 & 150.
870 Ibid., p. 150.
871 Ibid., pp. 150-151.
872 Ibid., p. 202.
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Likewise, Rousseau’s illumination physically overpowered him, imbued him 
with faith, and culminated in revelation.873  However, these similarities 
notwithstanding, one significant distinction separates the two conversions: 
Augustine’s followed a protracted, self-conscious struggle to convert874 whereas 
Rousseau was quite literally struck out of the blue.  As the Letters to Malesherbes 
make clear, he had dreamt far more of retreat (from society) than (individual) reform.  
Only a series of fortuitous coincidences led him to Vincennes with le Mercure in 
hand, where he read a brief question from Dijon that abruptly, intensely, and without 
rational explanation,875 coalesced all the contradictory thoughts in his brain and sent 
him reeling to the ground.
Rousseau provides little evidence that he had sought, much less anticipated, 
such a dramatic transformation.  Yet unlike his formal conversions to Catholicism 
and Protestantism, this moment marked a deep and permanent change.  The sense of 
duty that he actively eschewed for so long had suddenly become manifest.  Touched 
by otherworldly inspiration, Rousseau was reborn as a proselyte compelled to convey 
that single brief illumination.  He had finally found his calling or, more precisely, his 
calling had finally found him.
873 In addition, the fortuitous appearance of a text (Athanasius’ The Life of Antony and le Mercure de 
France) provided the catalyst for the conversions of both Augustine and Rousseau.
874 As Augustine writes, “I supposed that the reason for my postponing ‘from day to day’ the moment 
when I would despise worldly ambition and follow you was that I had not seen any certainty by which 
to direct my course.”  It was only after encountering the story of Saint Antony’s life that Augustine 
recognized “the day had now come when I stood naked to myself, and my conscience complained 
against me,” pushing him to wholly embrace God.  Ibid., p. 145.
875 This absence of reasoning further distinguishes the conversions of Rousseau and Augustine.  The 
Saint’s leap of faith to God was predicated upon a sophisticated metaphysical analysis of the dangers 
of a divided soul, an affliction whose only possible, rational cure was the whole-hearted embrace of 
God.  See: Augustine, Confessions, pp. 137-141.  For Augustine’s comparably reasoned argument on 
time, see: 221-245.
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In this regard, Rousseau’s epiphany more closely resembles Saint Paul’s 
storied conversion on the road to Damascus.  Paul was a Roman citizen and 
Hellenized Jew, “a Hebrew born of Hebrews” in approximately 10 AD.876  In 36 AD 
he was sent north by the high priest of Jerusalem to arrest the followers of Jesus and 
destroy their burgeoning heresy.  As Acts 9 describes, Paul was initially no Saint: 
“breathing threats and murder against the disciples of the Lord,” he left in active 
pursuit of “any belonging to the Way, men or women, [so] he might bring them 
bound to Jerusalem.”877  While crossing the Jordan Valley en route to Damascus, he 
was struck by a vision that forever transformed him.  Outside the city’s borders, 
“suddenly a light from heaven flashed about him.  And he fell to the ground and
heard a voice saying to him, ‘Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?’”878
Overwhelmed by the voice of God, Paul collapsed.  When he arose “and when his 
eyes were opened, he could see nothing.”879  The would-be scourge of Christianity 
was rendered helpless, led to Damascus by his company.
As the Bible tells, “for three days he was without sight, and neither ate nor 
drank.”880  On the final day Paul exhibited the first sign of faith (prayer) and was 
subsequently healed by the Christian disciple Ananias.  Ananias had already “heard 
from many about this man [Paul], how much evil he has done to thy saints at 
Jerusalem” acting under the “authority from the chief priests to bind all who call upon 
thy name.”881  He relayed this to God in a vision, yet the Lord was undeterred: “Go 







[to cure him], for he is a chosen instrument of mine to carry my name before the 
Gentiles and kings and the sons of Israel; for I will show him how much he must 
suffer for the sake of my name.”882
It was under these conditions—a solemn mixture of divine mercy and 
imposed suffering—that Ananias visited Paul with the gift of redemption.  After 
receiving the disciple’s touch, scales fell from Paul’s eyes, his blindness was cured, 
and he rose to be baptized, dedicating his life to spreading the gospel that Jesus was 
the son of God.  As Ronald Brownrigg observes, “Paul’s conversion was remarkable 
for the total reversal that it involved in his thinking, and the complete redirection of 
his whole life.”883  He was reborn as an Apostle in the very act of persecuting those to 
whom he was now entrusted to serve.
Parallels between the conversions of Paul and Rousseau range from the 
superficial (both were on a road) to the substantive.  In each, supernatural epiphany 
inspired radical redirection in the form of an individual calling.  For both men, faith 
was the gift bestowed upon them after physical trials, and the catalyst to their 
redemption.  Furthermore, neither appeared to have much choice in the matter; 
illumination was the result of divine intervention rather than an autonomous act of 
will.884  And finally, both felt compelled to spread their newfound truths no matter the 
consequences.885
882 Acts 9:15-16.
-883 Ronald Brownrigg, Who’s Who in the New Testament.  (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 193.
884 Readers should recall that passivity—specifically, abandoning oneself to God—is a definitive 
element of Christian conversion.  For the prominence of passivity within Rousseau’s life and works, 
readers should consult Starobinski’s  Transparency and Obstruction.
885 Paul enraged his former allies in preaching Christianity, just as Rousseau alienated the philosophes 
in praising religiosity.  See, for example, Voltaire’s quip (following the Letter to d’Alembert) that 
Rousseau had perhaps “become a priest of the Church” in Besterman, Voltaire's Correspondence. 
XIX.D7864.
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This latter point proved particularly significant to Rousseau’s life.  As with 
Paul on the road to Damascus, he emerged from the road to Vincennes determined to 
share his revelation.  As he confides, 
if I had ever been able to write a quarter of what I saw and felt under 
that tree, how clearly I would have made all the contradictions of the 
social system seem, with what simplicity I would have demonstrated 
that man is naturally good and that it is from these institutions alone 
that men become wicked.  Everything that I was able to retain of these 
crowds of great truths which illuminated me under that tree in a 
quarter of an hour has been weakly scattered about in my three 
principal writings.886
Here, finally, is the source of Rousseau’s manifold claims of consistency and 
coherence.  Every discourse, treatise, novel and letter to escape his pen was an 
attempt to articulate these compelling “truths.”  More specifically, the most powerful 
truth of all—the source of human suffering—had suddenly become clear: man was 
“naturally good,” a victim of society’s perverting influence.  Buoyed by its simplicity, 
Jean-Jacques dedicated his remaining years to articulating this illumination, 
struggling to convince his peers that they should heed his insights and reform their 
religious, social and political institutions accordingly.
“That is how when I was thinking about it least,” Rousseau confides, “I 
became an author almost in spite of myself.”887  After all, his epiphany offered 
rapturous clarity, but it also pressed him to pursue a life not of his making.  From that 
point forward Jean-Jacques “wanted to be consistent and shake the heavy yoke of 
opinion from my shoulders once and for all” by relating his message of natural 
886 Rousseau is here referring to the two Discourses and Emile, works which “are inseparable and 
together form the same whole.”  Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.575; OC I.1135-1136.  (My emphasis, 
to again underscore the distinction between man and men central to Rousseau’s concept of innocence.)
887 Although Rousseau cherishes freedom and liberty, he implies that he is prone to inactivity in the 
absence of exogenous pressure.  In addition, he confides that “I have always written in a cowardly 
manner and badly when I was not strongly persuaded.”  Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.575-576; OC 
I.1136.
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innocence and artificial corruption.888  Yet this duty was, at best, a mixed blessing.889
The individual sacrifice required to spread these contentious truths caused him 
significant regret, and left him once again longing for solitude.  Convinced that “great 
tests” and “experience” demonstrated “the state in which I have put myself890 is the 
only one in which man can live as good and happy, since it is the most independent of 
all, and the only one in which one never finds oneself in the necessity of harming 
someone else for one’s own advantage,” he still dreamt of an “isolated and 
independent” life free of social constraints.891
When the real world failed him, Rousseau did what devout Christians often 
do: he looked beyond the material world.  He stole moments of ecstasy in fits of 
reverie.  Only then could he enjoy “the whole universe, everything that is, everything 
that can be, everything that is beautiful in the perceptible world, and that is 
imaginable in the intellectual world.”892  Retreating within his imagination, Rousseau 
took delight in a rapturous embrace of everything, in communion with a magnificent 
divine order free of society’s flaws.  Although this “golden age” crafted in his mind 
left him “tender to the point of tears,” he was still saddened by “the nothingness of 
my chimeras” and, more deeply, the “inexplicable void in myself that nothing could 
888 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.576; OC I.1136.
889 As Rousseau laments, soon after his revelation Diderot “exhorted me to give vent to my ideas and 
to compete for the prize.  I did so, and from that instant I was lost.  All the rest of my life and 
misfortunes was the inevitable effect of that instant aberration.”  Jean-Jacques’ complaint (and 
deflection of accountability) is, however, somewhat misleading.  It was the force and clarity of his 
illumination—not the cajoling of his friend—that, by his own description, compelled him to embark on 
his career as an author and public intellectual.  The Confessions.  CW V.294-295; OC I.351.
890 Readers should note that Rousseau’s language here takes the possessive form (“the state in which I 
have put myself”), implying an autonomy at odds with his more frequent descriptions of duty as an 
exogenously-imposed burden.
891 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.576; OC I.1137.
892 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.577; OC I.1138-1139.
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fill; a certain yearning of the heart toward another sort of enjoyment the idea of which 
I did not have and the need for which I felt nonetheless.”893
In seeking to fill this void Rousseau moved closer to God.
Soon I raised my ideas from the surface of the earth to all the beings of 
nature, to the universal system of things, to the incomprehensible 
being who embraces everything.  Then with my mind lost in that 
immensity, I did not think, I did not reason, I did not philosophize; 
with a sort of sensual pleasure I felt myself weighed down with the 
weight of that universe, with rapture I abandoned myself to the 
confusion of these great ideas, I loved to lose myself in imagination in 
space; confined within the limits of beings my heart found itself too 
constrained, I was smothered in the universe, I would have wanted to 
throw myself into the infinite.  I believe that if I had unveiled all the 
mysteries of nature, I would have felt myself to be in a less delightful 
situation than that stupefying ecstasy to which my mind abandoned 
itself without reserve, and which sometimes made me cry out in the 
agitation of my raptures, “Oh great being!  Oh great being,” without 
being able to say or think anything more.894
As in the later Reveries, Rousseau discovered “continuous delirium” in total and utter 
abandonment: “abandoning myself to the impression of the objects but without 
thinking, without imagining, without doing anything else but feeling the calm and the 
happiness of my situation.”895  Raising himself to “the incomprehensible being who 
embraces everything,” he savored the experience of floating amidst an unfathomable 
divine order while losing his faculties of speech and reasoning.  As he admits, the all-
too-human limitations of his mind only enhanced his sense of thrill: had he “unveiled 
all the mysteries of nature,” he would not have achieved the “stupefying ecstasy” 
borne of abandonment “without reserve.”
These moments of spiritual bliss were nonetheless fleeting.  Rousseau’s 
rapture could not quell his real-world misgivings; they rather made him long for a 
893 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V.578-579; OC I.1140.
894 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V. 579; OC I.1141.
895 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V. 579; OC I.1141.
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more immediate salvation.  “[T]he trial I have made of these sweet enjoyments no 
longer serves for anything but making me wait with less fright for the moment of 
tasting them without distraction,” he lamented.896  Compelled to serve the society of 
men, Rousseau increasingly dreamt of an afterlife when, freed from the chains of 
society, he might finally delight in the heavens.
Still, if Jean-Jacques’ faith in a beneficent Creator drew him closer to God it 
also ushered his involvement in the world of men.  After all, the means (and 
correlative obligation) to enact corporeal salvation suddenly became clear on the road 
to Vincennes.  This combination of insight and prerogative reunited our self-
described misanthrope with a world he was now determined to change.  Indeed, 
Rousseau confides, on that day “I saw another universe and I became another man.”  
More than simply affirm the existence of a divine order, his illumination gave him 
new life, one defined by faith in humankind’s potential for virtuous redemption, and 
the duty to encourage this promise in practice.  The society of men might never exude 
divine calm, but man could struggle to legitimize our interdependent chains, to 
reawaken our conscience, hone our judgment, shun divisive, oppressive opinion and 
align (as closely as possible) our associations with God’s harmonious order.897
To save ourselves we might—indeed must—follow our Creator’s lead.  After 
Vincennes, Rousseau felt compelled to teach this lesson by example, to present 
himself as a natural, uncorrupted man, a beacon of hope in a denatured world.898  His 
896 Letters to Malesherbes.  CW V. 580; OC I.1142. 
897 Rousseau’s argument that man should embrace divine order (even though we can never replicate it 
in society) parallels his claim that we should evoke natural goodness as a basis for reform (even though 
we cannot return to our natural state).  See: Letter from Rousseau to Voltaire, September 10, 1755.  
CW III.105; OC III.226.
898 Although Rousseau was deeply discomforted by his newfound role, he struggled onwards.  He 
attributed his sense of duty to his secular attachments.  “I have a very loving heart,” he confided.  “I 
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illumination lighted the path to future redemption, one guided by a clear conviction 
that humankind had disserved its God-given potential.  But divine inspiration also 
instilled within him a broad sense of civic duty, a desire to correct society’s failings 
for the good of his species.  It was thus on the road to Vincennes that Rousseau the 
pious (felled by a revelation) and Rousseau the profane (champion of secular welfare) 
became one.  The dialectic between secular and spiritual themes that mingles so 
awkwardly throughout his works was, during his shining epiphany, made painfully, 
blissfully, harmoniously clear to him.  It was that unprecedented moment of 
coherence that Rousseau spent his remaining years struggling to relate, a flash of 
divine inspiration that pressed him into corporeal service.
*   *   *   *   *
Following Vincennes, religious conviction imbued Rousseau with hope for his 
species and a passion to better his world.  Still, in others the very same sentiment 
gave him serious pause.  Religion may have been necessary, both to his own work 
and the prosperity of his species, but religious practice often undermined the 
requisites of civic virtue.  Rather than encourage civil harmony, fanatical creeds bred 
divisiveness and intolerance.  Men were beholden to a single deity and shared a 
common welfare, yet dogmatists obscured this truth by imposing artificial sectarian 
differences.  Far from justifying the need to reconcile religious and political 
love men too much… I love them all, and it is because I love them that I hate injustice; it is because I 
love them that I flee them, I suffer less from their evils when I do not see them.”  Letters to 
Malesherbes.  CW V. 581; OC I.1144.
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institutions, Rousseau’s assessment implied that such a relationship was nothing short 
of fatal.
Machiavelli expressed a similar ambivalence in his Discourses on Livy.  In an 
aptly-named chapter, How Important It Is to Take Account of Religion, and How 
Italy, Lacking in Religion Thanks to the Roman Church, Has Been Ruined, he 
described Catholicism as a threat to civic republicanism: “the church has kept and 
still keeps this land divided.”899  Yet moments prior he argued that “there can be no 
greater indication of the ruin of a state than to see a disregard for its divine 
worship.”900  And in the preceding section, On the Religion of the Romans, he insisted 
that “[j]ust as the observance of divine worship is the cause of the greatness of 
republics, so the disregard of divine worship is the cause of their ruin.”  Although 
“divine worship” was crucial to a polity’s prosperity, the most powerful house of 
worship—the Catholic church—had “divided” Italy.
Like Rousseau in On Civil Religion, Machiavelli here seemed to lead readers 
towards conflicting conclusions.  Yet if both thinkers agreed upon the virtues of 
religious piety and maintained the dangers of religious practice (in both cases, Roman 
Catholicism), what are we to make of religion’s practical value?  Does religiosity 
threaten—rather than cultivate—political virtue and civic republicanism?  Is it more 
divisive than unifying?   Given such compelling evidence to the contrary, do religious 
associations serve any positive function in the composition and preservation of a 
prosperous civil society?
899 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, I.12, p. 55.
900 Ibid., I.12, p. 53.
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Perhaps more emphatically than Machiavelli,901 Rousseau insisted that despite 
the crimes of clerics, religion was necessary to strong democratic reform.  
Furthermore, he claimed that his religious model was different from the dogmatic 
creeds he so loathed, because it both facilitated civic virtue and safeguarded citizens 
against sectarianism’s dangers.  Simply put, where Catholicism failed so miserably—
where it divided and conquered rather than united and supported—his Civil Religion 
would prosper.  Yet what made Rousseau’s creed any different?  Given the historical 
failings of formal religions, why was his compatible with civic republicanism?  
Conversely, if Rousseau was truly reborn following his conversion on the road to 
Vincennes, why was he concerned at all?  Why did he not simply abandon himself to 
the overwhelming pleasure of reverie?  Why not take solace in a dream of divine 
redemption, while letting the world stay its own self- destructive course?
In the end, Rousseau was unable to abandon his faith in either man or God; 
the failings of dogmatic associations only pressed him to present an alternative, an 
inclusive model of religious practice that adhered to both core Christian beliefs and 
civic standards of tolerance and equality under law.  In so doing, Civil Religion 
affirmed what Rousseau had argued elsewhere, both before and after The Social 
Contract: namely, that a truly civic religion engendered democratic virtue.  As he 
eulogized in To the Republic of Geneva, the prefatory dedication to the Second 
Discourse, his birthplace was such an “edifying example of… a perfect union 
between a Society of Theologians and of Men of Letters.”902  He attributed the city’s 
901 Although Machiavelli’s Discourses lauded religion’s role in facilitating civic republican virtue, 
many read his Prince quite differently: as a cynical realpolitik manifesto in which successful 
leadership requires machination, self-interest and savvy, rather than humbling, unifying faith.
902 Second Discourse.  CW III.9-10; OC III.119.
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“saintliness of morals, severity of oneself and gentleness to others” to “the spirit of 
Christianity” embodied by its pastors.  In the Letter to d’Alembert, Genevan virtue 
was credited to a mélange of religious piety, patriotic love, and culturally reified 
morals.903  In Emile, Christianity quelled revolutions and solidified the authority of 
“modern governments,” while the Islamic “Turks, who have innumerable pious 
institutions” were deemed “hospitable from religious principle.”904  And in Letters 
Written From the Mountain, idyllic Swiss communities were characterized not only 
by striking landscapes, common heritage and familial arrangements, but also the 
fortitude born of religious practice.905  Religion offered a crucial foundation for civic 
prosperity because it bound us to our fellow citizens, and urged us to work together 
(no matter our particular differences) for the general welfare of all.
Still, Rousseau’s recourse to divine redemption—particularly in his later 
works—smacked of personal neediness.  His religiosity increasingly bore the marks 
of a man obsessed with his own, rather than society’s, redemption.  As the Reveries 
made plain, his time on earth was beset by turmoil and misunderstanding.  When men 
had failed to appreciate (or even accurately grasp) his position, he found himself 
looking towards the heavens, insisting that God saw what his peers did not: the utility 
of his thought, his innocence as an author and individual, and the pious lessons he 
presented to a world increasingly ruled by amour-propre and perverse opinion.  Yet 
ultimately, religiosity united Rousseau with his fellows as much as with God.  As he 
admitted in a 1762 letter to the minister Frédéric-Guillaume de Montmollin, 
903 Letter to d’Alembert.  CW X.322; OC V.88-89.
904 Emile.  E 313n.
905 Letters Written From the Mountain (Second Letter).  CW IX.154-155; OC III.712.  See also: The 
Social Contract.  CW IV.222; OC III.468.
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membership in the Christian906 community gave him unabashed joy: “It is consoling 
and sweet for me to be counted among its members, to participate in the public 
worship they offer to the divinity, and to say to myself in their midst: I am with my 
brothers.”907
Fellowship, communion, harmony, connectedness in this world: as much as 
anything, this was the indisputable promise of religion, to unite denatured creatures, 
not in some distant postmortem realm, but during this lifetime and on this earth.  That 
is why, on no uncertain terms, religiosity was necessary to Rousseau’s thought.  Only 
religion could serve the greatest of all political needs—cultivating civic virtue—
because only religion reminded us that we were all creatures beholden to the same 
Creator and the same divine order, no matter our denominational, national, ethnic, 
and philosophical differences.
Writing about a “universal and all-pervading [divine] Spirit of Truth” in his 
autobiography, Gandhi argued that “a man who aspires after that cannot afford to 
keep out of any field of life.  That is why my devotion to Truth has drawn me into the 
field of politics; and I can say without the slightest hesitation, and yet in all humility, 
that those who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do not know what 
religion means.”908  Rousseau could not have agreed more.  In the final analysis, his 
peculiar faith in man and God alike imbued with him the same stubborn conviction.  
906 Again, we must emphasize the fact that by “Christian” Rousseau clearly means “Protestant,” and 
not “Catholic.”  He was, he explained to Beaumont, “fortunate to be born into the most reasonable and 
holy Religion on earth, I remain inviolably attached to the worship of my Fathers.  Like them, I take 
Scripture and reason for the unique rules of my belief.  Like them, I challenge the authority of men and 
agree to submit to their formulas only to the extent I perceive their truth.  Like them, I join in my heart 
with the true servants of Jesus Christ and the true adorers of God, to offer him the homages of his 
Church in the communion of the faithful.”  Letter to Beaumont.  CW IX.47; OC IV.960.
907 CC XII.2108.
908 Mohandas K. Gandhi, An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments With Truth, Mahadev 
Desai, tr. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957 & 1993), p. 504.
268
The relationship between spirituality and secularism that others dismissed as 
paradoxical, inconsistent, heretical, or even incoherent, Rousseau believed was true 
and necessary to send us down a more virtuous path.  The urgent necessity with 
which he wrote, with which he engaged a world that so discomforted him, with which 
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